Kira Mendiola Leonard v. Craig Michael Leonard

03/30/2020

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

January 15, 2020 Session

KIRA MENDIOLA LEONARD v. CRAIG MICHAEL LEONARD

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Shelby County

No. CH-16-0321 Jim Kyle, Chancellor

No. W2018-02235-COA-R3-CV

This case involves the classification and division of marital property between ex-military

spouses. In dividing the marital property, the trial court failed to address the factors

listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121 or make necessary findings of fact

and conclusions of law as is required under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01.

For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the trial court’s decision and remand with

instructions to properly address the required statutory factors.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of Chancery Court Vacated and

Remanded.

CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. STEVEN

STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., and ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, J., joined.

Brice Moffatt Timmons, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Craig Michael Leonard.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1

Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals provides as follows:

This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may

affirm, reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion

when a formal opinion would have no precedential value. When a case is

decided by memorandum opinion it shall be designated “MEMORANDUM

OPINION,” shall not be published, and shall not be cited or relied on for any

reason in any unrelated case.

Kira Mendiola Leonard (“Wife”) and Craig Michael Leonard (“Husband”)

married in Louisiana in August 2010. The parties have two minor children, ages seven

and five at the divorce filing. Both parties previously served in the United States Navy,

with Husband reaching the rank of Lieutenant after joining in 1994 and retiring in 2010.

The dates of Wife’s service are unclear. Since retiring from the military, Husband has

worked as a federal contractor, with gross earnings in 2017 of $84,312, and Wife has

worked as a fitness instructor, earning $22,872 per year. In addition to their stated

incomes, Husband also receives payments as part of his Navy retirement pension and

holds a retirement savings account through the Navy (“Husband’s Thrift Savings Plan”).

Wife receives disability payments of $731.36 per month from the Navy and also holds a

retirement savings account through the Navy (“Wife’s Thrift Savings Plan”).

Wife filed her complaint for divorce in the Chancery Court of Shelby County,

Tennessee on February 25, 2016, seeking a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable

differences and inappropriate marital conduct. Husband filed an answer and counter-

complaint for divorce on March 31, 2016, admitting to irreconcilable differences but

denying having committed inappropriate marital conduct. On August 10, 2016, the trial

court entered a permanent parenting plan order, and the parties have neither contested nor

sought modification of the custody arrangement.

While the divorce action in Shelby County was pending, Husband obtained an ex

parte divorce in Louisiana on May 8, 2017.2 The trial court heard the case on November

5, 2018, to determine the distribution of the marital estate. The record on appeal contains

no statement of evidence or trial transcript, and this Court is left with only the trial

court’s order on the matter (entered December 5, 2018) and copies of the ten trial

exhibits. While the record on appeal is limited, it is evident that the highly-contested

assets were Husband’s Navy pension and his Thrift Savings Plan. In its order dividing

marital property, the trial court found, among other things, the parties were married for

six years and nine months; the parties were divorced on May 8, 2017; Husband retired

from the Navy in 2010 after accruing 23 years of creditable military service; Husband

draws a retirement pension of $4,044 per month; Wife receives monthly disability

compensation (amount unspecified in the order); each party held a separate retirement

savings account through the Navy; and there was an outstanding debt on the two-year

lease from the parties’ marital home that was vacated prior to its expiration.

In making its conclusions of law, the trial court found that the Louisiana divorce

2

Prior to the divorce decree in May of 2017, the parties had entered into a Marital Dissolution

Agreement (“MDA”) on November 11, 2016, which is no longer in effect. Under the MDA, the parties

had agreed to an “equitable division” of personal property and the division of the parties’ military

retirement pensions. After Husband contested the validity of the MDA, the trial court set aside the

agreement in April 2018, finding that new facts had developed since it was entered into by the parties

(such as Husband obtaining a divorce decree in Louisiana); that Husband had repudiated the terms of the

MDA; and that the court had never approved the terms of the MDA.

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from May 2017 was valid and gave it full faith and credit, but stated that it did not affect

property rights of the parties. It also awarded Wife 25% of Husband’s military retirement

payments (as an element of property division), but denied Wife’s request for alimony.

The court summarily awarded each party “his/her personal property, vehicles, and bank

accounts” and made each “responsible for the debts in his/her own name” while ordering

that they share the liability associated with the marital residence. Additionally, the court

concluded that Wife’s Thrift Savings Plan was separate property and found the current

balance of Husband’s Thrift Savings Plan was “about same or slightly less as it was prior

to the marriage,” with withdrawals being made for marital purposes, leaving the

remaining balance of the account classified as the separate property of Husband.

Husband timely appealed the court’s division of the marital estate. Wife, now acting pro

se, declined to file an appellate brief.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Husband presents two issues on appeal, which we have slightly reworded.

1. Whether the division of Husband’s military pension violates the National

Defense Authorization Act of 2017 (“NDAA17”) by failing to properly

formulate the award to Wife; and

2. Assuming the trial court did have jurisdiction to divide Husband’s military

pension, whether the division of marital property was inequitable given the

short duration of the parties’ marriage.

For the following reasons, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further

proceedings.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In cases involving the division of marital property, the Tennessee Supreme Court

has stated the standard of review is as follows:

The classification of particular property as either separate or marital

is a question of fact to be determined in light of all relevant circumstances.

See Langford v. Langford, 220 Tenn. 600, 421 S.W.2d 632, 634 (1967);

Cutsinger v. Cutsinger, 917 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

[Appellate courts give] great weight to a trial court’s decisions regarding

the division of marital assets, and we will not disturb the trial court’s ruling

unless the distribution lacks proper evidentiary support, misapplies

statutory requirements or procedures, or results in some error of law. Keyt

v. Keyt, 244 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tenn. 2007). As to the trial court’s findings

of fact, “[appellate courts] review the record de novo with a presumption of

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correctness, and we must honor those findings unless there is evidence

which preponderates to the contrary.” Id. However, [there is] no

presumption of correctness [accorded] to the trial court’s conclusions of

law. Id.

Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 295 S.W.3d 240, 245–46 (Tenn. 2009).

IV. DISCUSSION

When dividing a marital estate, trial courts must first identify the property interests

in the estate that are marital, rather than separate. Tenn. Code Ann § 36-4-121(b);

Snodgrass, 295 S.W.3d at 246; Keyt, 244 S.W.3d at 328 (citing Flannary v. Flannary,

121 S.W.3d 647, 650 (Tenn. 2003); Brown v. Brown, 913 S.W.2d 163, 166 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 1994)). After listing property as either marital or separate, trial courts must then

equitably divide the marital property by applying the factors listed in Tennessee Code

Annotated section 36-4-121(c).3

In bench trials where facts are determined solely by the judge, Tennessee Rule of

Civil Procedure 52.01 states, “the court shall find the facts specially and shall state

3

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c) states:

(c) In making equitable division of marital property, the court shall consider all relevant

factors including:

(1) The duration of the marriage;

(2) The age, physical and mental health, vocational skills, employability, earning

capacity, estate, financial liabilities and financial needs of each of the parties;

(3) The tangible or intangible contribution by one (1) party to the education, training or

increased earning power of the other party;

(4) The relative ability of each party for future acquisitions of capital assets and income;

(5)(A) The contribution of each party to the acquisition, preservation, appreciation,

depreciation or dissipation of the marital or separate property, including the contribution

of a party to the marriage as homemaker, wage earner or parent, with the contribution of

a party as homemaker or wage earner to be given the same weight if each party has

fulfilled its role;

....

(6) The value of the separate property of each party;

(7) The estate of each party at the time of the marriage;

(8) The economic circumstances of each party at the time the division of property is to

become effective;

(9) The tax consequences to each party, costs associated with the reasonably foreseeable

sale of the asset, and other reasonably foreseeable expenses associated with the asset;

(10) In determining the value of an interest in a closely held business or similar asset, all

relevant evidence, including valuation methods typically used with regard to such

assets without regard to whether the sale of the asset is reasonably foreseeable. . . . . ;

(11) The amount of social security benefits available to each spouse; and

(12) Such other factors as are necessary to consider the equities between the parties.

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separately its conclusions of law and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment.” This

requirement is critical to “facilitat[ing] appellate review and promot[ing] the just and

speedy resolution of appeals.” In re K.H., No. W2008-01144-COA-R3-PT, 2009 WL

1362314, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 15, 2009). “Simply stating the trial court’s decision,

without more, does not fulfill” the requirements of Rule 52.01. Barnes v. Barnes, No.

M2011-01824-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 5266382, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2012).

See also Long v. Long, No. E2018-01868-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 3986281, at *8 (Tenn.

Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2019); Trezevant v. Trezevant, 568 S.W.3d 595, 622 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2018). Despite the absence of a “bright-line test by which to assess the sufficiency of

factual findings, . . . ‘the findings of fact must include as much of the subsidiary facts as

is necessary to disclose to the reviewing court the steps by which the trial court reached

its ultimate conclusion on each factual issue.’” Lovlace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 35

(Tenn. 2013) (quoting 9C Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure §

2579, at 328 (3d ed. 2005)). “The equitable division of marital property is a fact-

intensive inquiry, and in the absence of sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law

regarding the classification of all property at issue, we cannot determine whether the

overall distribution of marital property . . . is equitable.” Swafford v. Swafford, No.

E2017-00095-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 1410900, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2018).

See also Smith v. Smith, No. E2017-00515-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 6467153, at *5

(Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2017); Halliday v. Halliday, No. M2011-01892-COA-R3-CV,

2012 WL 7170479, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2012). Rule 52.01 must be followed

to ensure “the [trial court’s] decision [is] guided by a careful consideration of the relevant

statutory factors” listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c). Cox v. Cox,

No. E2016-01097-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 6517596, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20,

2017) (citing Larsen-Ball v. Ball, 301 S.W.3d 228, 234–35 (Tenn. 2010)).

If the trial court properly expresses “the reasons for its decisions, [it] may well

decrease the likelihood of an appeal.” Lovlace, 418 S.W.3d at 35 (citing Hardin v.

Hardin, No. W2012-00273-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 6727533, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec.

27, 2012)). Without the necessary findings being made, the appropriate remedy at the

appellate level is, generally, to vacate the judgment and remand to the trial court. See,

e.g., Swafford, 2018 WL 1410900, at *6 (quoting Babcock v. Babcock, No. E2014-

01670-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 1059003, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2015)).

In the case at bar, the trial court did not properly follow Rule 52.01. While the

court’s Order Dividing Marital Property listed both factual findings and conclusions of

law, the court neglected to mention any of the factors listed in Tennessee Code Annotated

section 36-4-121(c) and failed to offer any substantive explanation for its decisions that

align with those factors. The court alluded to a few facts that may align with certain

factors, such as the length of the marriage; Husband’s monthly income; and Husband’s

use of his Thrift Savings Plan to pay for marital expenses rather than to dissipate the

asset, but it omitted or failed to consider many others. The court made conclusory

findings and rulings to divide the marital estate, such as awarding each party “his/her

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personal property, vehicles, and bank accounts” and holding each “responsible for the

debts in his/her own name” without listing specific values. Husband’s military pension

was hotly contested; yet, the court failed to detail its reasoning in awarding Wife

“twenty-five percent (25%) of Husband’s disposable military retired pay.”4

The trial court’s course of action does not afford us the ability to adequately assess

the division of the marital estate on appeal. Without a properly detailed order in

compliance with Rule 52.01, we are unable to determine how the court reached its

conclusions or whether its decision was equitable. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s

order pertaining to the division of marital property and remand for the court to properly

state its findings of fact and conclusions of law in compliance with Tennessee Code

Annotated section 36-4-121(c) and Rule 52.01.

As a result of our holding, we do not reach Husband’s issue regarding the

application of NDAA17 in the case at bar, and it is, therefore, pretermitted.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the trial court’s order dividing the marital

estate and remand with instructions for the trial court to make specific findings of fact

and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-

121(c) and Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01. Costs of this appeal are taxed

equally to appellant, Craig Michael Leonard, and appellee, Kira Mendiola Leonard, for

which execution may issue if necessary.

_________________________________

CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, JUDGE

4

Although vested and non-vested military pensions may be considered marital property in

Tennessee, see Kendrick v. Kendrick, 902 S.W.2d 918, 926 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994), it is not exempt from

the requirements of Rule 52.01.

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