Jeffrey T. Siler, Jr. v. State of Tennessee

03/24/2020

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

January 28, 2020 Session

JEFFREY T. SILER, JR. v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County

No. 90960 G. Scott Green, Judge

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No. E2019-00018-CCA-R3-PC

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Over twenty years ago, a Knox County jury found Petitioner, Jeffrey T. Siler, Jr.,

guilty of first degree felony murder. At the advice of his trial counsel and prior to the

jury trial, the then seventeen year old Petitioner pled guilty to attempted especially

aggravated robbery which formed the basis for the felony murder charge. Petitioner

received an eight-year sentence for the attempted especially aggravated robbery charge to

be served concurrently with the life sentence for the felony murder charge. Petitioner’s

convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Jeffrey T. Siler, No. E2000-

01570-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 387088 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2001) perm. app.

denied (Tenn. June 20, 2014) (“Siler I”). On February 13, 2009, Petitioner filed a

petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the

petition as untimely. This Court reversed the post-conviction court and remanded for an

evidentiary hearing to determine whether due process tolled the statute of limitations and

to consider Petitioner’s claims regarding his mental condition. See State v. Jeffrey T.

Siler, No. E2009-00436-CCA-R3-PC, 2010 WL 1444511 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 12,

2010), no perm. app. filed (“Siler II”). After conducting a hearing, the post-conviction

court determined that the statute of limitations should have been tolled and that Petitioner

was entitled to a full hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief. After conducting a

full evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief and dismissed the

petition. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

TIMOTHY L. EASTER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W.

WEDEMEYER and ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JJ., joined.

John M. Boucher, Jr., Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jeffery T. Siler, Jr.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Garrett D. Ward, Assistant

Attorney General; Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General; and Kevin Allen,

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Facts and Procedural Background

This matter began in the juvenile court of Knox County. The State filed a petition

to transfer Petitioner to criminal court to be tried as an adult. As part of the petition to

transfer, Dr. Leonard Miller performed a psychological exam on Petitioner. Dr. Miller

acknowledged that Petitioner had some mental health issues, but ultimately concluded

that “[t]he test data [did] not indicate a need for placement in a psychiatric facility.” Dr.

Miller reported to the juvenile court that Petitioner could be transferred to “adult court.”

In exchange for “open file discovery,” which included a review of Petitioner’s juvenile

record, trial counsel waived the hearing on the State’s petition to transfer.

In the opinion on direct appeal, this Court provided a summary of the underlying

facts in this case:

On February 19, 1998, the fifteen-year-old [Petitioner] and fifteen-

year-old Lavon Davis were riding with Jason Copley. Davis stated that he

was “looking for a lick,” meaning someone to rob. Upon seeing fifty-six-

year-old Tommy Haworth, the victim, walking down the street, they

decided to rob him. [Petitioner] agreed to take Davis’[s] pistol, and Davis

and [Petitioner] exited the vehicle and followed the victim to his residence.

There, [Petitioner] confronted the victim and asked him for money. The

victim replied that he had none. [Petitioner] then cocked the pistol, and it

fired. The victim was hit in the face with the bullet and died as a result of

this gunshot wound.

[Petitioner] and Davis fled the scene, and [Petitioner] threw the

empty shell casing into a storm drain. Copley, who had remained in the

vehicle, stayed at the scene and told someone to call 911.

[Petitioner] and Davis were subsequently arrested, and [Petitioner]

confessed his involvement in the offense. In his statement [Petitioner]

contended the gun went off accidentally during the attempted robbery, and

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he did not intend to shoot the victim. An analysis of the shell casing found

in the storm drain and the projectile recovered in the victim’s toboggan

revealed they were fired from the pistol recovered from Davis’[s] coat

pocket. [Petitioner’s] fingerprints were also found on the door of the

victim’s residence.

[Petitioner] was transferred from juvenile court to the Criminal

Court for Knox County and indicted in Count 1 for first degree murder

during the perpetration of an attempted especially aggravated robbery and

in Count 2 for attempted especially aggravated robbery. On the morning of

trial [Petitioner] entered a guilty plea to attempted especially aggravated

robbery, and the case was tried before a jury on the felony murder charge.

The jury found [Petitioner] guilty of felony murder. [Petitioner] was

sentenced to concurrent sentences of life for felony murder and eight years

for attempted especially aggravated robbery.

Siler I, WL 387088, at *1. This Court affirmed the convictions on direct appeal. Id.

On February 13, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The

post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as untimely. This Court found

that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition without conducting a

hearing. Siler II, WL 1444511, at *7. We remanded to the post-conviction court to hold

a hearing on whether due process required tolling of the statute of limitations and to

consider Petitioner’s claims regarding his mental health. Id.

Petitioner was appointed counsel who filed a Supplemental/Amended Petition for

Post-Conviction Relief. After holding a hearing, the post-conviction court determined

that the statute of limitations should be tolled. 1

Post-Conviction Evidentiary Hearing

On October 10, 2018, the post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing on the

merits of Petitioner’s claims.2 Petitioner’s trial counsel was the only witness at the

1

By order enter on December 18, 2013, after the filing of the post-conviction pleadings,

the post-conviction court first determined that Petitioner had been “denied his second tier

appeal” of his direct appeal. The post-conviction court granted Petitioner a stay on his post-

conviction petition while the Tennessee Supreme Court considered a TRAP 11 application for

his 2000 direct appeal. The application was denied on June 20, 2014. State v. Jeffrey T. Siler,

No. E2000-01570-SC-R11-CD.

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hearing. Trial counsel identified a memorandum that he wrote and placed in Petitioner’s

file. The memorandum indicated that trial counsel was aware of Petitioner’s mental

health history, the history of Petitioner’s placement with various institutions and foster

care families, and the numerous medications that Petitioner took. Trial counsel stated

that the juvenile court judge would not deny any motion to transfer to “adult court.” He

testified that “the tradeoff for the transfer as an adult was that you got access not only to

the State’s file, but you got the - - if he did have juvenile history, and believe me,

[Petitioner] did. [Petitioner] had volumes of it. But those were made available to me.”

Trial counsel stated that Petitioner had no juvenile criminal history, only mental health

history. Trial counsel stated that he did not get any consent to waive the transfer hearing

in writing. He believed that Petitioner’s guardian was present in court that day. He

stated that Petitioner was facing life in prison whether the hearing was held or not. Trial

counsel did not bring Petitioner’s mental health issues before the juvenile court because

the juvenile court would have approved the transfer to criminal court anyway. Trial

counsel recalled another file memorandum that described Petitioner as “illiterate and

[having] the mind of a seven or eight year old child.”

Trial counsel recalled advising Petitioner to plead guilty to the underlying felony

of attempted especially aggravated robbery. Trial counsel testified that he hired Dr.

Michael Buckner to help establish that Petitioner was unable to form the intent required

for the underlying felony. Trial counsel could not remember if an insanity defense was

litigated, although there was discussion about it with Dr. Buckner. Trial counsel believed

that after Petitioner pled guilty to the underlying felony, Rr. Buckner’s testimony became

irrelevant. Trial counsel agreed that Petitioner had severe mental health issues. Trial

counsel stated that he litigated a motion to suppress Petitioner’s statement, but was

unsuccessful.

Trial counsel was also appellate counsel. Trial counsel agreed that it was his

responsibility to prepare the record for Petitioner’s appeal. He admitted that the

suppression hearing transcript was missing and that he did not draft any statement to

supplement the record. Trial counsel testified that it was his belief that Petitioner

understood the reasoning and consequences for pleading guilty to the underlying felony.

On cross-examination, trial counsel recalled Petitioner’s fingerprint was found at

the scene and that the shell casing from the bullet was recovered. He recalled that the

bullet matched the gun that was found. Trial counsel stated that he received all

discovery, including Petitioner’s confession to the shooting. He recalled that the motion

to suppress Petitioner’s confession hearing was held and subsequently denied. Trial

2

By this point, the original trial judge, the Honorable Mary Beth Leibowitz, had retired

and the current post-conviction judge, the Honorable G. Scott Green, presided.

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counsel stated that he was uncomfortable with Dr. Buckner and was not confident that

Dr. Buckner could present something intelligible to the jury in terms of Petitioner’s

mental health. Dr. Buckner wrote a report on Petitioner’s mental health at the time of

trial, and it was entered in to evidence at the post-conviction hearing.

Trial counsel testified that because Petitioner’s statement was entered into

evidence at trial, he had two reasons for Petitioner pleading guilty to the underlying

felony − credibility with the jury and consistency with Petitioner’s statement. Trial

counsel again stated that he believed that Petitioner understood why he was pleading

guilty to the underlying felony. Trial counsel stated that he was trying to get the jury to

recognize the discharge from the weapon was accidental, thereby absolving Petitioner.

Trial counsel reiterated that the juvenile court, without question, would transfer

the case to criminal court, with or without a hearing. It was his belief that his best course

was to waive the transfer hearing to get the discovery. The transcript from the trial and a

transcript of Petitioner’s statement were entered into evidence at the post-conviction

hearing.

The post-conviction court found that trial counsel’s strategy of advising Petitioner

to plead guilty to the underlying felony was “seriously flawed.” There was no intent

involved with felony murder, the “causal connection to the [especially aggravated

robbery]” exposed Petitioner to criminal liability for felony murder. The fact that

Petitioner admitted to the gun discharge and pled guilty to the underlying felony allowed

the post-conviction court to find that “conviction for felony murder was a foregone

conclusion.” The post-conviction court found that once the “[Petitioner’s] statement was

admitted in evidence in conjunction with the other evidence in this case, he had no viable

defense to the felony murder count.” The post-conviction court found that the “strategy

was not sound and is not entitled to deference, but this [c]ourt holds that Petitioner

suffered no prejudice.” The post-conviction court denied Petitioner relief and dismissed

the petition. It is from that dismissal that Petitioner now appeals.

Analysis

On appeal, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for waiving

the juvenile transfer hearing and that the post-conviction court erred by ruling that his

sentence was not in violation of the prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment.3

See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).

3

Petitioner lists the following issues in his brief: (1) illegal transfer from juvenile court; (2)

ineffective assistance of counsel for advising Petitioner to plead guilty to the underlying felony; and (3)

ineffective assistance of counsel for inadequate appellate preparation in his brief. However, Petitioner

appears to have abandoned these arguments on appeal because he does not provide argument or citation to

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Post-conviction relief is available for any conviction or sentence that is “void or

voidable because of the abridgment of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of

Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.” T.C.A. § 40-30-103. In order to

prevail in a claim for post-conviction relief, a petitioner must prove his factual allegations

by clear and convincing evidence. T.C.A. § 40-30-110(f); Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d

152, 156 (Tenn. 1999). “Evidence is clear and convincing when there is no serious or

substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence.”

Hicks v. State, 983 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). On appeal, a post-

conviction court’s findings of fact are conclusive unless the evidence preponderates

otherwise. Vaughn v. State, 202 S.W.3d 106, 115 (Tenn. 2006). Accordingly, questions

concerning witness credibility, the weight and value to be given to testimony, and the

factual issues raised by the evidence are to be resolved by the post-conviction court, and

an appellate court may not substitute its own inferences for those drawn by the post-

conviction court. State v. Honeycutt, 54 S.W.3d 762, 766-67 (Tenn. 2001). However,

the post-conviction court’s conclusions of law and application of the law to the facts are

reviewed under a purely de novo standard, with no presumption of correctness. Fields v.

State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001).

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by ruling that Petitioner was not

prejudiced by trial counsel’s ineffective assistance. The State argues that trial counsel

made an appropriate strategic decision to waive the juvenile transfer hearing.

Both the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and article I,

section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution guarantee the right of an accused to the effective

assistance of counsel. See Davidson v. State, 453 S.W.3d 386, 392-93 (Tenn. 2014). In

order to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate

that counsel’s representation fell below the range of competence demanded of attorneys

in criminal cases. Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). Under the two

prong test established by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), a petitioner

must prove that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced

the defense. See State v. Taylor, 968 S.W.2d 900, 905 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (noting

that the same standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel applied in federal

cases also applies in Tennessee). Because a petitioner must establish both elements in

order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “failure to prove either

authority to support them. “It is not the role of the courts, trial or appellate, to research or construct a

litigant’s case or arguments for him or her, and where a party fails to develop an argument in support of

his or her contention or merely constructs a skeletal argument, the issue is waived.” Sneed v. Bd. of Prof’l

Responsibility of Sup. Ct., 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2016).

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deficient performance or resulting prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on

the claim.” Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 580 (Tenn. 1997). “Indeed, a court need

not address the components in any particular order or even address both if the [petitioner]

makes an insufficient showing of one component.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 370

(Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

The test for deficient performance is whether counsel’s acts or omissions fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Henley, 960 S.W.2d at 579. This Court must evaluate the

questionable conduct from the attorney’s perspective at the time, Hellard v. State, 629

S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982), and “should indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” State v. Burns,

6 S.W.3d 453, 462 (Tenn. 1999). This Court will not use hindsight to second-guess a

reasonable trial strategy, even if a different procedure or strategy might have produced a

different result. See Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334, 347 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994);

Williams v. State, 599 S.W.2d 276, 279-80 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). However, this

deference to the tactical decisions of trial counsel is dependent upon a showing that the

decisions were made after adequate preparation. Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 528

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

Even if a petitioner shows that counsel’s representation was deficient, the

petitioner must also satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test in order to obtain

relief. The question is “whether counsel’s deficient performance renders the result of the

trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S.

364, 372 (1993). A petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability “sufficient

to undermine confidence in the outcome” that, “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,

the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 463 (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). A juvenile has a constitutional right to the effective

assistance of counsel during a transfer hearing. Kent v.United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554

(1966); see Howell v.State, 185 S.W.3d 319, 326 (Tenn. 2006).

Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-134 articulates the circumstances in

which a juvenile court “shall” transfer a juvenile accused of criminal offenses to criminal

court to be tried as an adult. Howell, 185 S.W.3d at 329. A juvenile who is more than

fourteen years of age at the time that the offense is committed shall be tried as an adult if

charged with certain enumerated offenses, including first-degree murder and especially

aggravated robbery. T.C.A. § 37-1-134(a)(1) (1998). The juvenile is entitled to a hearing

to determine whether transfer is appropriate, and the juvenile must have sufficient written

notice of the hearing. T.C.A. § 37-1-134(a)(2)-(3) (1998). At the hearing, the juvenile

court is required to find that there are reasonable grounds to believe that: “(A) The child

committed the delinquent act as alleged; (B) The child is not committable to an institution

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for the developmentally disabled or mentally ill; and (C) The interests of the community

require that the child be put under legal restraint or discipline.” T.C.A. § 37-1-

134(a)(4)(A)-(C) (1998).

Petitioner’s argument is that trial counsel should have shown Petitioner to be

committable at the time of the transfer hearing. Trial counsel testified that he waived the

hearing to obtain open discovery and other advantages. Trial counsel testified that this

juvenile judge always approved motions to transfer, and it would have been fruitless to

hold the hearing. This Court will not “second-guess [juvenile] counsel’s informed

tactical and strategic decisions.” Pylant v.State, 263 S.W.3d 854, 874 (Tenn. 2008).

Strategic decisions of counsel are given deference when based upon adequate

preparation. Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 369. Further, a psychological exam performed by Dr.

Miller, indicates that Petitioner was not committable to a psychiatric facility and that he

could be transferred to “adult court.” Petitioner, despite entering the written report by Dr.

Buckner into evidence at the evidentiary hearing, fails to show clear and convincing

evidence that Petitioner was committable. The record does not contain evidence that

Petitioner would have been successful in preventing his case from being transferred if a

transfer hearing had been conducted. Javonta Marquis Perkins v. State, No.

M201802223-CCA-R3-PC, 2020 WL 822089, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 19, 2020).

The Petitioner fails to demonstrate that trial counsel was deficient in waiving the

transfer hearing by clear and convincing. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

II. Sentence/Miller

Defendant argues that his sentence of life imprisonment violates the prohibition

against cruel and unusual punishment in the United States and Tennessee Constitutions

because he was a juvenile at the time of the offense. See U.S. Const. amend VIII; Tenn.

Const. art. I, § 16. Defendant asserts that his sentence is in “strict violation of [Miller v.

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)], [because] it specifically states that a mandatory

[sentence of] life imprisonment without parole for those under the age of [eighteen] at the

time of their crimes violates the 8th Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual

punishment.” The State argues that his sentence is not illegal.

In Tennessee, a defendant convicted of first degree murder is subject to three

potential sentences: (1) death; (2) life without the possibility of parole; or (3) life. T.C.A.

§ 39-13-202(c). “A defendant sentenced to life imprisonment in Tennessee may be

released after service of at least fifty-one years if the defendant earns the maximum

allowable sentence reduction credits.” Brown v. Jordan, 563 S.W.3d 196, 202 (Tenn.

2018). “When a defendant currently receives a life sentence in Tennessee, no parole is

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involved. He serves a specific number of years, and then he is released with no parole

supervision. His sentence is done.” Charles Everett Lowe-Kelley v. State, No. M2015-

00138-CCA-R3-PC, 2016 WL 742180, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 24, 2016), perm.

app. denied (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that a mandatory sentence of life

imprisonment without parole for juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 567 U.S. at 479. This Court has

consistently rejected the claim that a juvenile’s mandatory life sentence, which requires

service of at least fifty-one years before release, constitutes an effective sentence of life

without parole in violation of Miller. See State v. Antonious Johnson and Rodney

Williams, No. W2018-01125-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 4008113, at *15 (Tenn. Crim. App.

Aug. 23, 2019), no perm. app. filed; State v. Walter Collins, No. W2016-01819-CCA-R3-

CD, 2018 WL 1876333, at *19-21 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 18, 2018), perm. app. denied

(Tenn. Aug. 8, 2018); Martez D. Matthews v. State, No. M2015-02422-CCA-R3-PC,

2016 WL 7395674, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 21, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn.

Apr. 13, 2017); Charles Everett Lowe-Kelley, 2016 WL 742180, at *8; Billy L. Grooms v.

State, No. E2014-01228-CCA-R3-HC, 2015 WL 1396474, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar.

25, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 21, 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1216 (Feb.

29, 2016); State v. Kayln Marie Polochak, No. M2013-02712-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL

226566, at *34 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 14,

2015); Cyntoia Denise Brown v. State, No. M2013-00825-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL

5780718, at *21 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 6, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 15,

2015); Floyd Lee Perry, Jr. v. State, No. W2013-00901-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 1377579,

at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2014).

Because Petitioner received a life sentence that has early release eligibility, his sentence

is not unconstitutional. Petitioner has not stated a colorable claim upon which relief can

be granted. Consequently, the post-conviction court did not err in dismissing the petition.

The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

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TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JUDGE

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