The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 13 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LANEY SWEET, an individual, on behalf of No. 18-16118
E.S., N.S., and the estate of Daniel Shaver;
et al., D.C. Nos. 2:17-cv-00152-GMS
2:17-cv-00715-GMS
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v. MEMORANDUM*
CHARLES J. LANGLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
G. Murray Snow, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 2, 2020
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: CLIFTON, OWENS, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Charles Langley appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to
dismiss on qualified immunity grounds two 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions based on
Langley’s involvement in the fatal shooting of Daniel Shaver. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009).
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
We review de novo a district court’s decision denying a motion to dismiss,
accepting as true all well-pleaded allegations of material fact and construing them
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748,
757 (9th Cir. 2012). As the parties are familiar with the allegations, we do not
recount them here. We affirm.
“Qualified immunity attaches when an official’s conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The clearly established right
“must be defined with specificity” so that officials can be said to have reasonable
notice of the violation. Id. When determining whether a defendant’s actions
violate clearly established law, courts may look not only to Supreme Court
precedent, but also to Ninth Circuit precedent, unpublished decisions, and the law
of other circuits. Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692, 701–02 (9th Cir.
2005).
1. Philip Brailsford violated clearly established law when he shot
Shaver. “A police officer may not seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by
shooting him dead.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). Under the
integral participant rule, the plaintiffs need not demonstrate “that each officer’s
actions themselves rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Boyd v. Benton
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Cty., 374 F.3d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 2004). Any “fundamental involvement in the
conduct that allegedly caused the violation” is sufficient to make an officer an
integral participant under clearly established law. Blankenhorn v. City of Orange,
485 F.3d 463, 481 n.12 (9th Cir. 2007). Ninth Circuit precedent in effect at the
time of Shaver’s death clearly establishes that Langley was an integral participant
in the shooting.
In Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 1997), this court denied a
motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity by federal officials who “developed
the plan that resulted in [plaintiff’s] shooting and encouraged [the shooter] to fire
at him.” Id. at 1204. The defendants could be held liable for setting “special rules
of engagement” that “directly impinged on the clearly established constitutional
rights of those against whom they were aimed . . . .” Id. at 1205. Here, the
plaintiffs allege that Langley developed the plan that led to three police officers
pointing rifles at the unarmed Shaver. Langley also told Shaver that there was a
“very severe possibility” that he would be shot and killed if he made a mistake or if
he moved. Because it is alleged that Langley effectively authorized his
subordinates to use excessive force against Shaver, he was an integral participant
in Brailsford’s ultimate decision to shoot Shaver. Id.
2. Langley also argues that Shaver’s parents, Grady and Norma Shaver,
failed to allege that Langley’s conduct “shocks the conscience.” Wilkinson v.
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Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010). He claims that, because he and his
fellow officers made a “snap judgment” when shooting Shaver, “his conduct may
be found to shock the conscience only if he act[ed] with a purpose to harm
unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives.” Hayes v. Cty. of San Diego,
736 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2013). The Shavers argue that the standard for
reviewing whether Langley’s conduct shocks the conscience is “deliberate
indifference,” because “actual deliberation [was] practical.” Id. The Shavers’
complaint plausibly alleges that Langley acted with either the purpose to harm or
deliberate indifference when he threatened to shoot Shaver for “mak[ing] a
mistake” and ordered his subordinates to point guns at an obviously unarmed and
compliant person. The district court properly denied qualified immunity in light of
these allegations.
AFFIRMED.
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