The opinion
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 18-186C
(Filed: March 11, 2020)
FOR PUBLICATION
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PATRICIA FIELDS, *
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Plaintiff, *
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v. *
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THE UNITED STATES, *
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Defendant. *
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Jack Bradley Jarrett, III, Alan Lescht & Associates, PC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff
Ashley Akers, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, Joseph H. Hunt,
Assistant Attorney General, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Director, and Deborah A. Bynum,
Assistant Director, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington DC, for Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
DAMICH, Senior Judge.
On February 6, 2018, Patricia Fields (“Plaintiff”), filed a Complaint in this Court seeking
damages for the alleged breach of a settlement agreement between Plaintiff and the United States
(“Defendant”), through its agency, Naval Hospital Camp Lejeune, Marine Corps Base Camp
Lejeune, North Carolina (“Agency”) (Defendant and Agency, collectively, “the Government”).
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the Government’s breach caused her to incur “at least
$102,000.00” in lost wages and consequential damages. Compl. at 5.
On May 9, 2018, the Government filed an Answer. Thereafter, on September 7, 2018, the
Government filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. On December 12,
2018, the Court issued an Order and Opinion denying the Government’s motion to dismiss. ECF
No. 17. In particular, the Court held that Plaintiff met her limited burden of establishing that the
settlement agreement can be fairly interpreted as mandating money damages in the event of
breach. Thereafter, discovery ensued. After several motions for extension of time, discovery
closed on November 15, 2019.
Pursuant to the briefing schedule provided by the parties, on November 22, 2019, the
Government filed a motion for summary judgment (“Def.’s Mot.”). 1 In its motion, the
Government agreed that the settlement agreement constituted a valid contract. It further agreed
that in light of that, an obligation or duty arose out of the contract, and that the Government
breached the contract. Def.’s Mot.at 6. In admitting liability, the Court need only address the
question of damages. In particular, the Court must determine whether the Plaintiff is able to
establish that the breach caused any damages. For the reasons set forth below, the Court holds
that Plaintiff has not done so. The Court, therefore, GRANTS the Government’s motion for
summary judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was employed as an athletic trainer from June 7, 2010 until her termination on
February 4, 2011. Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 37, at 2. Plaintiff claims that she struggled with PTSD
during her employment with the Agency and had requested accommodations for her PTSD and
mental health conditions prior to her removal. Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 38, at Appx7.
Following her departure from the Agency in 2011, Plaintiff applied to several athletic
trainer positions with the Federal government, including positions with the Agency and the
Department of the Army, and with private employers, but did not receive any job offers. Def.’s
Mot., Ex. 1, at Appx 0001-0324; Appx 0125; Pl.’s Resp. at Appx17, 20. Sometime in 2012,
Plaintiff filed an informal charge of discrimination against the Agency, alleging discrimination
based on physical and mental disabilities. Def.’s Mot. at Appx 0125; Pl.’s Resp. at Appx17.
On February 26, 2013, Plaintiff and the Agency, through the assistance of an EEO
mediator, negotiated a settlement agreement to resolve Plaintiff’s pending EEO claim. Pl.’s
Resp. at Appx7. Under the terms of the negotiated settlement agreement, Plaintiff agreed to
withdraw her complaint, and in exchange, the Agency agreed to: “remove the document that
indicated [Plaintiff] was terminated for lack of performance and instead provide documentation
that she resigned her position for personal and family medical reasons,” seal the record of the
Plaintiff, and appoint investigations into allegations of false information on Plaintiff’s time cards
and the release of Plaintiff’s private and personal information to prospective employers and to
inform Plaintiff of the results. Pl.’s Resp. at Appx2. The Agency also promised to “provide a
neutral reference to prospective employers of [the Plaintiff] with dates of employment and a
general description of her duties.” Id. Again, the Government agrees it breached this settlement
agreement. Def. Mot. 6.
II. DISCOVERY
While in discovery, and in responding to the Government’s interrogatories, Plaintiff
explains that she spoke to employees in the human resources office at the Minneapolis VA in
2014 or 2015 and approached hiring managers and program directors at conferences she
1
Rather than filing a cross-motion for summary judgment as provided for in the parties
agreed upon scheduling order Plaintiff chose to only file a response. (“Pl.’s Resp.”). The
Government timely replied to such.
2
attended, but did not receive any job offers. Pl.’s Resp. at Appx19. Plaintiff also indicates that
she reviewed job boards for positions with the Federal government but did not apply to openings
for which she was qualified because she knew or had reason to know that the Agency would not
make good on its promises. Pl.’s Resp. at Appx8-9, 19-20. Similarly, Plaintiff indicates that
from 2013 to 2018, she searched for positions with private employers, but did not apply to any
openings due to her concern that the Agency would or had in fact breached the settlement
agreement. Pl.’s Resp. at Appx9.
Plaintiff further provided a damages calculation to the Government that approximated
Plaintiff’s damages in the amount of $274,142.92 for lost wages and benefits and in excess of
$500,000 for emotional distress; and pre- and post-judgment interest and attorney’s fees. See
Def.’s Mot. at 4.
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Pursuant to Rule 56(a) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC),
the Court shall grant summary judgment if the moving party shows that “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and [it] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The moving
party may satisfy this burden by “showing – that is ‘pointing out to the out to the [trial court] –
that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case,’” in which case
“there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts
immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325-327 (1986).
“[A] party who moves for summary judgment on the ground that the nonmoving party
has no evidence must affirmatively show the absence of evidence in the record,” which “may
require the moving party to depose the nonmoving party’s witnesses or to establish the
inadequacy of documentary evidence.” Id. “[T]he nonmoving party may defeat a motion for
summary judgment that asserts that the nonmoving party has no evidence by calling the court’s
attention to supporting evidence already in the record that was overlooked or ignored by the
moving party,” but cannot rely on the “mere pleadings themselves.” Id. In ruling on a motion for
summary judgment, the [trial court] is not confined to the materials cited, but it “may consider
other materials in the record.” RCFC 56(c)(3).
IV. DISCUSSION
To recover damages for breach of contract, “a party must allege and establish: (1) a valid
contract between the parties, (2) an obligation or duty arising out of the contract, (3) a breach of
that duty, and (4) damages caused by the breach.” San Carlos Irrigation & Drainage Dist. v.
United States, 877 F.2d 957, 959 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The Government has conceded that there is
(1) a valid contract between the parties, (2) that an obligation or duty arose out of the contract,
and (3) that it breached the agreement. The Court, therefore, turns its attention to (4) damages
caused by the breach.
Damages for breach of contract are recoverable provided they are: (i) reasonably
foreseeable at the time of contracting, (ii) caused by the breach of the promisor, and (iii) proved
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with reasonable certainty. Bluebonnet Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. United States, 266 F.3d 1348, 1355
(Fed. Cir. 2001). A plaintiff bears the burden to establish each element by a preponderance of
the evidence. Accordingly, if one element is not satisfied, the claim must fail.
The Government argues that Plaintiff is unable to establish causation or damages with
reasonable certainty. The Government’s arguments are based on Plaintiff’s failure to produce
any evidence showing that Plaintiff lost employment as a result of the Agency’s breach of the
settlement agreement. Plaintiff disagrees. Plaintiff maintains that she lost employment
opportunities and experienced a worsening of her psychiatric disorders as a result of the
Agency’s breach of the settlement agreement. It is Plaintiff’s position that these injuries are
sufficient to support the Court’s award of consequential damages and damages for emotional
distress. The Court disagrees.
Plaintiff also argues that there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to damages
that prevent the Court from granting the Government’s motion. The genuine issues of material
fact are relevant to Plaintiff’s damages for emotional distress. Because, as discussed herein,
Plaintiff is unable to recover emotional distress damages as a matter of law, the issues of fact
Plaintiff identifies in her response are immaterial.
The Court addresses the parties’ arguments below.
A. Damages based on Lost Employment Opportunities
“As a general rule, ‘[a] non-breaching party is not entitled, through the award of
damages, to achieve a position superior to the one it would reasonably have occupied had the
breach not occurred.’” Kansas Gas and Electric Co. v. United States, 685 F.3d 1361. 1366 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (citing LaSalle Talman Bank, F.S.B. v. United States, 317 F.3d 1363, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2003)). Accordingly, a plaintiff is entitled to recover only such damages that are caused by the
breach of the promisor. To meet this requirement, the Federal Circuit has held that a plaintiff
must show that the damages would not have occurred “but for” the breach. See, e.g., Vt. Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC, 683 F.3d 1330, 1350 (2012)
(“‘damages for breach of contract require a showing of causation,’ which in turn necessitates a
‘comparison between the breach and non-breach worlds’”) (citing Yankee Atomic Electric Co. v.
United States, 536 F.3d 1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ). Stated differently, to recover damages for
breach of contract, a plaintiff must “allege and prove a plausible but for world.” Bluebonnet
Savings FSB v. United Sates, 67 Fed. Cl. 231 (2005). Alternatively, depending on the facts of a
particular case, the Federal Circuit has stated that the trial court has discretion to use the less
stringent “substantial factor” test. See American Savings Bank, F.A. v. United Sates, 98 Fed. Cl.
291 (2011); see also Citizens Fin. Servs. v. United States, 64 Fed.Cl. 498, 504 (2005); California
Federal Bank v. U.S., 395 F.3d 1263 (2005). Additionally, “[d]amages do not extend to remote
consequences of the breach. Similarly, mitigation efforts may result in direct savings that reduce
the damages claim.” Kansas Gas and Electric Co., 685 F.3d at 1367.
The Government argues that Plaintiff is unable to establish causation or damages with
reasonable certainty. In support, the Government cites Plaintiff’s failure to produce any
evidence showing: that Plaintiff applied to any open positions for which Plaintiff met the
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minimum qualifications, that any prospective employer denied Plaintiff employment based on
the information contained in Plaintiff’s personnel file or any other records that the Agency
maintains with respect to the Plaintiff, or that any prospective employer had knowledge of or was
at all influenced by the Agency’s failure to inform Plaintiff of the results of the investigations.
In response, Plaintiff does not dispute that Plaintiff’s responses to the Government’s
discovery requests and initial disclosures do not show that a prospective employer denied
Plaintiff employment as a result of the Agency’s breach of the settlement agreement. Rather,
Plaintiff claims that because of the Agency’s failure to inform her of the results of the
investigations and the fact that the personnel file she received on April 26, 2016 contained
multiple references to her termination and no indication that she had resigned for personal and
family medical reasons, Plaintiff was “unable to apply to jobs with the federal government or
with private companies because she knew that the [Agency] would inform those employers that
she had been terminated for cause.” Pl.’s Resp. at Appx19-20. Specifically, Plaintiff maintains
that the Agency’s breach cost her the opportunity to apply to positions with the Minneapolis VA,
with the Federal government, and with employers she approached at certain conferences she
attended. Relying on Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, 855 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1988),
Plaintiff argues that the fact that she has identified specific opportunities that she would have
applied to in the absence of the Agency’s breach is sufficient to support her claim for damages.
The Court agrees with the Government. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she
would have been selected for one of the positions that she claims she would have applied to had
the personnel file she received in April 2016 contained no references to her termination and
included documentation that she resigned due to personal and family medical reasons and had
she been informed of the results of the investigations. Accordingly, the Court is unable to
conclude that the Agency’s breach is either the “but for” cause or a substantial casual factor with
respect to Plaintiff’s failure to secure any of these positions and the associated pay. This is
necessarily so, for example, because: in the absence of the Agency’s breach, it is not evident that
Plaintiff would have applied to the open positions, and even assuming that she would have
applied, it is not evident that she would have been selected among the many well-qualified
candidates. Even assuming that Plaintiff would have been selected, it is not evident that
Plaintiff’s new employer would not have learned about the Plaintiff’s medical condition or the
fact of her termination from speaking to one of the Plaintiff’s former co-workers. Conversely,
had Plaintiff applied to any of the positions that she says were available, notwithstanding the
Agency’s alleged breaches, it is not evident that the Agency would have provided an uncorrected
version of Plaintiff’s personnel file to a prospective employer, nor is it evident that a prospective
employer would not have drawn negative inferences from the Agency’s provision of a “neutral
reference.” Nor is it evident that Plaintiff would not have secured employment notwithstanding
the Agency’s breach.
Additionally, Plaintiff’s assertions are insufficient to show damages, caused by the
Agency’s breach, with reasonable certainty. The Court’s award of any amount of damages based
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on Plaintiff’s lost opportunity theory is speculative and would place Plaintiff in a position
superior to the one it would reasonably have occupied had the breach not occurred. 2
Plaintiff’s reliance on Redgrave case is misplaced. To begin, since it is a First Circuit
decision applying Massachusetts contract law, it is not binding precedent on this Court. Even so,
the First Circuit’s ruling only lends support to this Court’s conclusion that something more than
Plaintiff’s vague statements that she would have applied to certain opportunities in the absence
of the Agency’s breach is required. 3
B. Damages for Emotional Distress
As discussed above, as a result of the Agency’s breach of the settlement agreement,
Plaintiff also seeks damages for emotional distress. In her response, Plaintiff claims that the
2
Additionally, although not addressed by the parties’ briefs, Plaintiff is precluded from
seeking damages in this instance. When Plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the Agency’s
breach, Plaintiff was required to notify the EEO director within thirty days. See 29 C.F.R. §
1614.504; see also Section IV.H. of the parties’ settlement agreement.
3
In particular, in Redgrave, the First Circuit found that Redgrave’s testimony regarding
certain professional opportunities that she expected to materialize in the absence of the
defendant’s cancellation of Redgrave’s performance contract was insufficient to support an
award of consequential damages. Redgrave, 855 F.2d 888, 900. However, for one of the
identified professional opportunities, Redgrave also offered the producer’s testimony explaining
that he decided not to employ Redgrave because of the defendant’s cancellation of Redgrave’s
performance contract. Id. The First Circuit found that Redgrave could recover the amount of
damages supported by the producer’s testimony. Id.
Plaintiff also relies on a Fourth Circuit case, Rice v. Community Health Ass’n, 203 F.3d
283 (Fourth Cir. 2000). In this case, a physician sought damages for lost professional
opportunities resulting from the hospital’s breach of the physician’s employment contract. In
support of his claim, the physician relied on Redgrave, 855 F.2d 888. Id. at 288. The Fourth
Circuit, applying West Virginia contract law, determined that although West Virginia would
recognize a claim like Redgrave’s, the physician neither alleged nor proved that the hospital’s
breach resulted in the loss of future “identifiable professional opportunities” that would have
been available to the physician absent the hospital’s breach. Id. at 289. In particular, the Fourth
Circuit found that the physician: “failed to present evidence that the hospital’s breach actually
influenced any identifiable potential job offers. Instead, he offered expert testimony of two
doctors who opined generally that an emergency room physician who was fired for sexual
harassment or whose previously employer refused to comment on his qualifications would
experience substantial difficult in obtaining a full-time position. These experts did not testify that
the physician had applied for employment with them or that they had reviewed applications that
the physician had submitted to other hospitals. Thus, their testimony, unlike that of the producer
in Redgrave, “did [nothing] more than … highlight the potential problems” the physician might
experience in obtaining comparable employment.” Id.
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Agency’s failure to inform her of the results of the investigations into allegations of false
information on her time cards and the release of Plaintiff’s private and personal information to
prospective employers was “a major external stressor,” which caused Plaintiff to experience a
worsening of her pre-existing mental health conditions, which in turn caused Plaintiff to
experience cognitive difficulties, including short-term memory loss. 4 Pl.’s Resp. at Appx21.
The Federal Circuit has not directly addressed the circumstances under which this Court
may award damages for emotional distress. However, in discussing the concept of
“consequential damages” at common law, the Federal Circuit recited that:
Under the traditional contract law approach, “[i]t is well established that, as a
general rule, no damages will be awarded for the mental distress or emotional
trauma that may be caused by a breach of contract.” John D. Calamari & Joseph M.
Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 14.5(b), at 549 (4th ed.1998); see also Williston,
Williston on Contracts §§ 1338, 1341, at 200, 214; Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 353. To be sure there are exceptions, such as contracts of carriers and
innkeepers with passengers and guests, contracts for the carriage or proper
disposition of dead bodies, and contracts for the delivery of messages concerning
death. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 353 cmt. a; 5 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin
on Contracts § 1076, at 434 (1964). In these cases, however, breach of the contract
is particularly likely to cause serious emotional disturbance. Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 353, cmt. a. Moreover, with the limited exception of contracts for
the delivery of messages concerning death, damages for mental suffering are
usually refused absent wanton and willful misconduct. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts
§ 1076, at 434. Ordinary negligence does not suffice. Id. at 434–35, 254 S.E.2d
611.
Bohac v. Dep’t of Agriculture, 239 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Similarly, under the
Restatement approach: “[r]ecovery for emotional disturbance will be excluded unless the breach
also caused bodily harm or the contract or the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional
disturbance was a particularly likely result.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 353 (1981).
Plaintiff argues that this case fits within the second exception provided by the
Restatement—that is, “the contract or the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional
disturbance was a particularly likely result.” First, citing this court’s decision in Dobyns v.
United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 289 (2014), Plaintiff argues that because the parties entered into the
settlement agreement to resolve Plaintiff’s pending claim based on emotional distress, serious
4
Attached to Plaintiff’s response is a “Declaration of Patricia Fields.” Among other
things, the declaration is not in proper form. The Government indicated in its reply that it does
not dispute the factual statements contained therein. The Government also argues that Plaintiff’s
claim for emotional distress damages is not part of the complaint and is therefore not properly
before the Court. Notwithstanding, the Court’s opinion addresses whether emotional distress
damages are recoverable for breach of contract based on the facts and circumstances alleged in
the complaint.
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emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result of the Agency’s breach. Second, Plaintiff
argues that the Agency’s conduct with respect to the breach was particularly egregious since the
Agency “[was] aware that Plaintiff suffered from PTSD and was particularly fragile at the time
the parties reached the agreement,” but yet “refused to perform minor tasks it promised to
perform in the agreement.” Pl.’s Resp. at 10. In support, Plaintiff cites a Maryland district court
case, Munday v. Waste Management of North American, Inc., 997 F.Supp. 681 (D. Md. 1998), in
which the court awarded emotional distress damages for breach of a settlement agreement where
defendant’s employees “were aware of [the plaintiff’s] emotional problems and acted with actual
malice.”
First, the mere fact that the parties entered into the settlement agreement to resolve
Plaintiff’s pending discrimination claim, which if fully adjudicated, may have entitled Plaintiff to
recover damages for emotional distress or may have been based on facts and circumstances
giving rise to a separate claim against the Agency for emotional distress, is immaterial if the
Agency’s future commitments are not intended to remediate the facts and circumstances giving
rise to Plaintiff’s underlying discrimination claim. In other words, Plaintiff’s serious emotional
disturbance must be a particularly likely result of the Agency’s failure to fulfill its commitments
pursuant to the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement.
In responding to the Government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, Plaintiff
argued that the Agency’s commitments relate to Plaintiff’s ability to secure employment,
including its commitments to inform Plaintiff of the results of the investigations into allegations
of false information on Plaintiff’s time cards and the release of Plaintiff’s personal information.
Plaintiff now argues that: “Plaintiff bargained for assurances that her record was clear and that
her private medical information would not be released to prospective employers so Plaintiff
could move on and find a new job” and that the “[Agency’s] breach of these non-monetary
assurances was a breach of a personal, noncommercial obligation that was likely to cause mental
pain and anguish.” Pl.’s Resp. at 9-10.
Consistent with its prior decision in this case, the Court finds that the Agency’s
commitments were intended to prevent Plaintiff from being denied future employment based on
Plaintiff’s record as the Agency maintained it prior to the agreement and that “[b]y its terms, the
Government was required to take certain actions that would affect Plaintiff’s prospects of future
employment, which ‘inherently relate[s] to monetary compensation.’” ECF No. 17.
Because the Agency’s commitments relate to Plaintiff’s ability to secure future
employment, the Court concludes that the settlement agreement is plainly distinguishable from
the categories of contracts cited by the Restatement. Accordingly, contrary to what Plaintiff
asserts, the nature of the contract in this case does not provide an exception to the general rule
prohibiting recovery of emotional distress damages for breach of contract.
With respect to Plaintiff’s reliance on Dobyns, in that case, the court’s award of
emotional distress damages was based on the agency’s breach of an implied obligation to ensure
the safety of plaintiff and plaintiff’s family and that agency employees would not discriminate
against the plaintiff. 118 Fed. Cl.at 319. In finding that emotional distress damages were
recoverable, the court emphasized that agency’s breach placed plaintiff and plaintiff’s family at
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risk of physical injury. Id. Thus, even if the Court were to consider it as persuasive authority,
the nature of the breached obligations in Dobyns differ from those alleged here.
Moreover, as discussed above, the Federal Circuit has stated that, with the “limited
exception of contracts for the delivery of messages concerning death, damages for mental
suffering are usually refused wanton and willful misconduct …[o]rdinary negligence does not
suffice.” Bohac, 239 F.3d at 1340. Both cases cited by the Plaintiff are consistent with this
observation. Essential to the court’s award of emotional distress damages in Dobyns was its
determination that agency officials breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by acting
with a complete lack of diligence and cooperation with respect to its obligations under the
settlement agreement at issue, placing plaintiff and plaintiff’s family at risk of physical injury.
118 Fed. Cl.at 319. Likewise, in Munday, the Maryland district court found that the defendant
and its employees acted with “actual malice” by making plaintiff’s workplace as unpleasant as
possible, despite defendant’s contractual obligation to “not retaliate” against the Plaintiff for
filing a workplace discrimination complaint against the defendant. 997 F.Supp. at 687. With
respect to the severity of the defendant’s retaliatory conduct in this case, the Maryland district
court noted that it was of a nature “that no reasonable employee should be expected to endure.”
Id.
Plaintiff argues that the facts of this case are identical to those in Munday. In particular,
Plaintiff claims that during the negotiation of the settlement agreement she had an emotional and
psychological breakdown and that her supervisor, Commander Earl Frantz, was present at the
mediation and was aware that Plaintiff suffered from PTSD and had suffered a breakdown when
he terminated Plaintiff’s employment with the Agency. Pl.’s Resp. at Appx17. She also asserts
that Commander Frantz was aware of her struggles with PTSD through the issues that she had
during her employment with the Agency. Id. In Munday, the defendant exploited its knowledge
of the Plaintiff’s emotional problems to make Plaintiff’s workplace as uncomfortable as possible
in breach of its promise not to retaliate against the Plaintiff. 997 F.Supp. at 686-688. Based on
the terms of the parties’ written agreement, Plaintiff’s struggles with PTSD and fragile emotional
state during the negotiation of the settlement agreement are not related to the Agency’s
contractual obligations and are therefore irrelevant. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
353, cmt. a, Illustration 1.
Additionally, Government officials are presumed to act in good faith. See, e.g., Am–Pro
Protective Agency, Inc. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1234, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2002). To rebut this
presumption, there must be some evidence suggesting a specific intent to injure the plaintiff on
the part of the government. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the Agency failed to provide
Plaintiff the results of the investigation despite Plaintiff’s request for them. It also alleges that
Plaintiff requested the Agency EEO Director correct the Agency’s noncompliance with the
settlement agreement on October 6, 2017, but the Agency refused to correct its breach. Compl. at
3. In its response, Plaintiff asserts that Agency officials were aware that Plaintiff suffered from
PTSD and suffered an emotional breakdown during the parties’ negotiation of the settlement
agreement. The remaining materials in the record fail to provide the Court with any additional
information regarding Plaintiff’s attempts to enforce the agreement or the Agency’s conduct with
respect to the alleged breaches. Accordingly, the Court has no factual basis from which it can
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infer that Agency officials acted with “actual malice” towards the Plaintiff or a complete lack of
disregard and cooperation with respect to its obligations under the settlement agreement.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Government’s motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Edward J. Damich
EDWARD J. DAMICH
Senior Judge
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