G. Dunbar v. J.E. Wetzel, Secretary for Pa. DOC

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Gregory Dunbar, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

John E. Wetzel, Secretary for :

Pa. Dept. of Corrections, : No. 75 M.D. 2019

Respondent : Submitted: July 5, 2019

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM FILED: January 21, 2020

Gregory Dunbar (Dunbar) petitions this Court, pro se, seeking review

in our original jurisdiction of his inmate misconduct finding and an order to void and

correct certain provisions of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of

Corrections’ – Administrative Directive 801 (“DC-ADM 801”), effective July 2,

2015, relating to inmate discipline implemented by the Secretary of Corrections, of

the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (Department), John E. Wetzel, acting

in his official capacity (Secretary).1 Before us are the preliminary objections filed

by the Secretary in the nature of a demurrer2 and the preliminary objections filed by

1

DC-ADM 801 is a policy established by the Secretary of the Department to provide notice

to inmates of “prohibited behavior,” to provide a “fundamentally fair hearing process” and to

establish “consistent sanctions” for failure to abide by Department rules and regulations. See DC-

ADM 801 (III). We take judicial notice of DC-ADM 801, which appears on the Department’s

official website at:

https://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Documents/DOC%20Policies/801%20Inmate%20Discipli

ne.pdf. (last visited Jan. 16, 2020). See Figueroa v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 900 A.2d 949,

950 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (taking judicial notice of information found on Department website).

2

A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer admits every well-pleaded fact in the

petition for review and all reasonable inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. Clark v. Beard,

Dunbar to the Secretary’s preliminary objections alleging that the Secretary failed to

comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Upon review, we

overrule Dunbar’s preliminary objections, we sustain the Secretary’s preliminary

objections to Dunbar’s claims relating to the misconduct procedures and we allow

Dunbar’s Petition for Review for Declaratory/Injunctive Relief to proceed on a

remaining constitutional claim.

Dunbar is an individual incarcerated at the State Correctional

Institution at Greene (SCI-Greene). See Petition for Review for

Declaratory/Injunctive Relief (Petition) ¶ 1; Secretary’s Preliminary Objections ¶ 1.

A hearing officer found that Dunbar engaged in inmate misconduct when he

possessed another inmate’s property (legal work) and imposed, as discipline, 30-

days’ cell restriction. Petition ¶ 17. In his Petition, Dunbar brings three complaints

against the Secretary: one complaint relating to the misconduct finding and two

complaints regarding the process established in DC-ADM 801.

First, Dunbar complains that the misconduct finding was improper

because the hearing officer relied on the misconduct report, an unsworn report, rather

than an affidavit or sworn testimony to support the finding. Petition ¶¶ 9 & 15.

Dunbar argues that to the extent DC-ADM 801 allows the hearing officer to rely on

the misconduct report, the policy violates his federal due process rights “as well as

every inmate in the state system, who has been found guilty solely with [sic] unsworn

misconduct report.” Id. ¶ 16. Second, Dunbar complains that DC-ADM 801 is

918 A.2d 155, 158, n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). The objection tests “the legal sufficiency of the

challenged pleadings and will be sustained only in cases where the pleader has clearly failed to

state a claim for which relief can be granted.” Id. We must confine our analysis to Dunbar’s

Petition for Review for Declaratory/Injunctive Relief and decide whether sufficient facts have been

pleaded to permit recovery if the facts are ultimately proven. Id. “The demurrer may be granted

only in cases which are so free from doubt that a trial would certainly be a fruitless exercise.” Id.

2

inconsistent with 37 Pa. Code § 93.10(b), because the policy does not allow inmates

to have assistance or witnesses at an informal resolution meeting, but 37 Pa. Code §

93.10(b)(4) requires inmates to have assistance at “both informal and formal

hearings.” Id. ¶¶ 6-7. Third, Dunbar alleges that there is common law right and

First Amendment right, U.S. Const. amend. I & Pa. Const. art. I, §§ 9 & 11, to access

another prisoner’s “judicial record” and DC-ADM 801’s rule prohibiting an inmate

from possessing “another inmate’s legal work” and obtaining “[p]aralegal assistance

on the unit (house) and in the library” is inconsistent with established case law. Id.

¶¶ 19 & 23.

For relief, Dunbar asks this Court to issue an order to declare “void

misconduct reports” and DC-ADM 801 to the extent it allows the hearing officer to

rely on the misconduct reports to support findings of guilt in violation of his federal

due process rights and the rights of other inmates similarly convicted of misconduct.

Petition, Relief Requested ¶¶ B & D. Dunbar seeks an order to declare void

provisions of DC-ADM 801 relating to inmate assistance because he maintains it is

inconsistent with 37 Pa. Code § 93.10(b). Id. ¶ A. Dunbar also seeks to declare

void, as unconstitutional and inconsistent with established case law, DC-ADM 801

prohibiting an inmate from possessing another inmate’s legal work and thereby

prohibiting an inmate from using “paralegals/and jailhouse lawyers[.]” Id. ¶ C.

Finally, Dunbar seeks a “permanent injunction” to require the Secretary to “correct”

DC-ADM 801 to “conform” to existing law. Id. ¶ E.

The Secretary responded by filing preliminary objections in the nature

of a demurrer to Dunbar’s Petition. The Secretary asserts that the Petition should be

dismissed because this Court lacks jurisdiction over rulings on inmate misconduct

decisions. Secretary’s Preliminary Objections ¶ 6(f)-(i). The Secretary further

3

contends that Dunbar received adequate due process in connection with his

misconduct charges; sufficient evidence supported the hearing officer’s finding; and

Dunbar’s discipline “does not amount to an atypical and significant hardship in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” and does not implicate a liberty

interest. Id. ¶ 6(b), (c) & (d). The Secretary argues that DC-ADM 801 is consistent

with 37 Pa. Code § 93.10(b). Id. ¶ 6(j). The Secretary asserts that with respect to

Dunbar’s request for a “permanent injunction,” he fails to state a claim for

“mandamus relief” because Dunbar does not “have a clear legal right not to be issued

a misconduct and found guilty after a hearing” and the Secretary has “no

corresponding duty.” Id. ¶ 6(a) & (e). Finally, the Secretary generally objected that

Dunbar “failed to allege a violation of the U.S. and State Constitutions by the

[Secretary].” Id. ¶ 6(k).3

Dunbar responded to the Secretary’s preliminary objections by filing

preliminary objections and asking this Court to strike the Secretary’s preliminary

objections. See Dunbar’s Preliminary Objections ¶¶ 1-3, 8-9 & 13. Although the

majority of Dunbar’s preliminary objections are responses to the Secretary’s

preliminary objections, Dunbar raises procedural objections that we summarize into

two objections. First, Dunbar asserts that the Secretary failed to attach a notice to

plead and a verification to his preliminary objections. Id. ¶ 3. However, a notice to

plead is only required for preliminary objections that cannot be determined from the

facts of record as provided in Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 1028(a)(1),

(5), (6), (7), or (8). See Pa.R.C.P. No. 1028(c)(2), note; Cooper v. Church of St.

Benedict, 954 A.2d 1216, 1221 (Pa. Super. 2008) (explaining that “[w]hen an issue

3

Upon review of the preliminary objections, it is unclear as to whether the Secretary

overlooked the claim raised by Dunbar alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights or if the

Secretary is saying that Dunbar’s claim, as alleged, is legally insufficient.

4

raised cannot be decided based on facts of record (i.e., the complaint), the

preliminary objections must be endorsed with a notice to plead, which requires the

plaintiff to admit or deny each allegation of fact supporting the preliminary

objections”). Here, the Secretary objected to Dunbar’s claims based on legal

insufficiency as provided in Rule No. 1028(a)(4), and therefore, no notice to plead

was required. With respect to the verification, a verification is required when the

pleading contains an “averment of fact not appearing of record in the action or

containing a denial of fact.” Pa.R.C.P. No. 1024(a). The Secretary did not add facts

or deny facts raised by Dunbar in his Petition, as the Secretary relied on law to

support his objections. Therefore, we overrule Dunbar’s first preliminary objection.

Second, Dunbar objects to the Secretary’s preliminary objections

arguing that the Secretary failed to comply with Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate

Procedure 121(b) and 122(a). See Dunbar’s Preliminary Objections ¶¶ 8-9.

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 121(b) provides, in relevant part, that

“[c]opies of all papers filed by any party and not required by these rules to be served

by the prothonotary shall, concurrently with their filing, be served by a party or

person acting on behalf of that party or person on all other parties to the matter.”

Pa.R.A.P. 121(b). Rule 122(a) provides for a proof of service and requires it to

contain a statement of the date and manner of service and the names of the persons

served. Pa.R.A.P. 122(a). Here, the Secretary’s preliminary objections were filed

with this Court on February 28, 2019, and the certificate of service attached to the

filing indicates that counsel made service on Dunbar by first-class mail on the same

date. Because the Secretary, in his certificate of service, provided the information

required by Rule 122(a) and served his preliminary objections concurrently, we

overrule Dunbar’s second preliminary objection.

5

We now address the Secretary’s preliminary objection in the nature of

a demurrer. We agree with the Secretary that we do not have jurisdiction to consider

Dunbar’s Petition to the extent he is asking this Court to review his misconduct

finding. Moreover, we agree with the Secretary that Dunbar fails to identify a

personal or property interest to support his due process challenge to DC-ADM 801

and that the policy is consistent with 37 Pa. Code § 93.10(b). Though we sustain the

Secretary’s preliminary objection relating to the misconduct finding and related

process, we cannot dismiss the Petition in its entirety because the Secretary failed to

provide this Court with an analysis or explanation as to why Dunbar’s constitutional

challenge to the provisions of DC-ADM 801 prohibiting Dunbar’s access to and

possession of another’s legal documents are legally insufficient as a matter of law.

We begin our analysis with an overview of our jurisdiction. In Bronson

v. Central Office Review Committee, 721 A.2d 357 (Pa. 1998), our Supreme Court

held that this Court does not have jurisdiction over inmate appeals of decisions by

intra-prison disciplinary tribunals because

[u]nlike the criminal trial and appeals process where a

defendant is afforded the full spectrum of rights and

protections guaranteed by the state and federal

constitutions, and which is necessarily within the ambit of

the judiciary, the procedures for pursuing inmate

grievances and misconduct appeals are a matter of

internal prison administration and the full panoply of

rights due a defendant in a criminal prosecution is not

necessary in a prison disciplinary proceeding. . . .

Therefore, the [C]ommonwealth [C]ourt does not have

appellate jurisdiction . . . over inmate appeals of decisions

by intra-person disciplinary tribunals.

6

Id. at 358-59 (citations and quotations omitted and emphasis added). Though

Dunbar brings his Petition before this Court in our original jurisdiction, our Supreme

Court further held in Bronson that this Court cannot entertain such matters in our

original jurisdiction, except in very limited circumstances. Our Supreme Court

explained that

[p]rison inmates do not enjoy the same level of

constitutional protections afforded to non-incarcerated

citizens . . . [I]ncarceration brings about the necessary

withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a

retraction justified by the considerations underlying our

penal system. Unless an inmate can identify a personal or

property interest . . . not limited by Department of

Corrections regulations and which has been affected by a

final decision of the [D]epartment the decision is not an

adjudication subject to the court’s review.

Bronson, 721 A.2d at 359 (citations and quotations omitted). Thus, to the extent

Dunbar challenges the hearing officer’s finding of misconduct, we do not have

jurisdiction to consider that finding because misconduct appeals are a matter of

internal prison administration. Id. at 358-59.

But Dunbar also objects to DC-ADM 801, itself, as opposed to his

misconduct finding, and alleges that the policy violates his federal due process

rights. Dunbar argues that DC-ADM 801 allows the hearing officer to rely on the

misconduct report to support its findings, which resulted in the discipline of 30 days’

cell restriction. Petition ¶¶ 16-17. To address Dunbar’s constitutional challenge to

DC-ADM 801, we must apply a two-step approach. Bussinger v. Dep’t of Corr., 29

A.3d 79, 83 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). First, we must determine whether the challenged

policy infringes upon any of Dunbar’s constitutional rights. Id. If the answer to that

question is in the affirmative, then the second step is to determine whether the policy

7

is nonetheless reasonable, that is, whether it is “reasonably related to legitimate

penological interests.” Id.

Here, Dunbar does not explain how DC-ADM 801 violates his personal

or property rights to support his due process claim. See Shore v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr.,

168 A.3d 374, 383 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (explaining that to maintain a due process

challenge, a party must initially establish a deprivation of a protected liberty or

property interest). Dunbar alleges that he received discipline of 30 days’ cell

restriction. Petition ¶ 17. To the extent Dunbar is challenging DC-ADM 801

because of the discipline imposed by the Department, this discipline did not

implicate his liberty interest to require due process.

In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995), our United States

Supreme Court explained that the punishment of incarcerated prisoners effectuates

prison management and prisoner rehabilitative goals and that

[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary

withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a

retraction justified by the considerations underlying our

penal system. Discipline by prison officials in response to

a wide range of misconduct falls within the expected

perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of law.

Id. (brackets in original and quotations and citations omitted and emphasis added).

Though the discipline imposed on the inmate in Sandin was “concededly punitive,”

the United States Supreme Court held that 30 days in segregated confinement based

on a misconduct finding did not implicate the inmate’s liberty interest to require 14th

Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1, due process protections. Id. at 486. The

United States Supreme Court explained that the confinement “did not present the

8

type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a

liberty interest.” Id.

Likewise, here, the discipline imposed on Dunbar was 30 days’ cell

restriction resulting from the misconduct finding, which is not an atypical

deprivation to create a liberty interest per Sandin. Dunbar fails to identify any other

personal or property interest of which the Department, through the Secretary, has

deprived him.4 See Shore, 168 A.3d at 383; Bussinger, 29 A.3d at 83.

Additionally, Dunbar complains that DC-ADM 801 is “unlawful”

because it is inconsistent with the regulation at 37 Pa. Code § 93.10(b). Petition ¶

6. Dunbar asserts that the policy does not allow inmates to have assistance or

witnesses at an informal resolution meeting, but the regulation at 37 Pa. Code §

93.10(b)(4) requires inmates to have assistance at both “informal and formal

hearings.” Id. ¶ 7. But Dunbar’s argument is incorrect, as he confuses the formal

hearing process with the informal resolution process provided by 37 Pa. Code §

93.10(b).5

4

Dunbar asserts in his Petition that certain procedures create a “protected liberty interest

in the prison context.” Petition ¶ 5. To the extent that Dunbar argues that DC-ADM 801 creates

a liberty interest, this is not correct. Recently, this Court has explained that DC-ADM 801 contains

disclaimer language to “dispel any reasonable expectation that an enforceable right [was] created

by the DOC policy.” Dantzler v. Wetzel, 218 A.3d 519, 523 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (citing Weaver

v. Dep’t of Corr., 829 A.2d 750, 753 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003)). DC-ADM 801,VI explicitly provides

that it does not create rights in any person.

5

37 Pa. Code § 93.10(b) provides:

(b) Written procedures which conform to established

principles of law for inmate discipline including the

following will be maintained by the Department and

disseminated to the inmate population:

(1) Written notice of charges.

(2) Hearing before an impartial hearing examiner or an

informal resolution process for charges specified by the

Department in the Department of Corrections Inmate

9

The regulation at 37 Pa. Code § 93.10(b)(2) provides that inmates have

the option of a “[h]earing before an impartial hearing examiner or an informal

resolution process for [misconduct] charges specified by the Department in the

Department of Corrections[’] Inmate Handbook, or any Department document that

is disseminated to the inmates.” See 37 Pa. Code § 93.10(b)(2). The informal

resolution process is described in DC-ADM 801 and provides that when an inmate

elects to follow the informal resolution process, “[n]o assistance or witnesses are

permitted” at the meeting for disposition of the charges. See DC-ADM 801 § 2A(4).6

If an inmate elects the formal hearing process, then he may have assistance from an

Handbook, or any Department document that is

disseminated to inmates. The informal resolution

process is described in DC-ADM 801--Inmate

Discipline. The process gives inmates the option to meet

with staff to resolve a misconduct rather than proceed

with a hearing.

(3) Opportunity for the inmate to tell his story and to

present relevant evidence.

(4) Assistance from an inmate or staff member at the

hearing if the inmate is unable to collect and present

evidence effectively.

(5) Written statement of the decision and reasoning of

the hearing body, based upon the preponderance of the

evidence.

(6) Opportunities to appeal the misconduct decision in

accordance with procedures in the Department of

Corrections Inmate Handbook.

(Emphasis in original and added.)

6

Section 2A(4) of DC-ADM 801 provides:

The Unit Manager/designee, and at least one other member of the

Unit Management Team shall meet with the inmate for disposition

of the charges within seven working days. The reporting staff

member is encouraged, but not required, to attend the meeting. No

assistance or witnesses are permitted at these meetings. . . .

DC-ADM 801 § 2A(4) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

10

inmate or staff member at the hearing “if the inmate is unable to collect and present

evidence effectively.” 37 Pa. Code § 93.10(b)(4). DC-ADM 801 and 37 Pa. Code

§ 93.10(b) plainly provide different processes, i.e., a formal or informal resolution

process, and the process elected by the inmate governs his or her options pertaining

to witnesses and assistance to resolve the misconduct charge(s). For this reason, the

provisions are not inconsistent, and Dunbar cannot state a claim on this basis.

Finally, Dunbar alleges that there is a common law right and First

Amendment right to access another prisoner’s “judicial record” and that DC-ADM

801’s rule prohibiting paralegal assistance is inconsistent with established case law.

Petition ¶¶ 19 & 23. Dunbar alleges that he was “sanctioned with 30 days [sic] cell

restriction” because he possessed another inmate’s legal work but the “United States

Supreme Court ruled that a jailhouse lawyer could compose in his cell another

inmate[’s] (client)[’s] [sic] legal work” and once finished the jailhouse lawyer could

return the documents to his client. Id. ¶ 17. In support, Dunbar relies on Gilmore v.

Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff’d, Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15

(1971).

In Gilmore, state inmates challenged the California Department of

Corrections[’] policy concerning “inmate access to law books, legal material and lay

assistance in preparing prisoner writs and complaints” and the procedures of the

California state law library regarding circulation of legal materials to inmates.

Gilmore, 319 F. Supp. at 107. The Gilmore Court explained that there were two

constitutional provisions invoked by the inmates’ challenge, that is, the right to

reasonable access to the courts and the Equal Protection Clause, U.S. Const. amend.

XIV, §1, as it pertains to indigent and uneducated prisoners. Id. at 109. Based on

his reliance on Gilmore and the facts alleged in his Petition, Dunbar claims that DC-

11

ADM 801 infringes on his constitutional rights because he was punished for acting

as a jailhouse lawyer when he was cited for possessing another inmate’s property in

his cell. Petition ¶¶ 17 & 23.

Additionally, and in further support of his claim, Dunbar asserts that

“public judicial records are accessible, and there exists a common law right to copy

and [sic] [First] [A]mendment right to access to any other prisoner’s judicial record

if you pay for them [sic]” and cites Commonwealth v. Fenstermaker, 530 A.2d 414

(Pa. 1987), and Commonwealth v. Martinez, 917 A.2d 856 (Pa. Super. 2007).

Petition ¶ 19. In these cases, the courts addressed the common law right of media to

access documents in criminal proceedings. See Fenstermaker, 530 A.2d at 421

(holding that newspaper had common law right of access to arrest warrant affidavits

that have already been executed); see also Martinez, 917 A.2d at 863 (holding that

newspaper had common law right of access to letters presented to sentencing court

by defense counsel because the court relied upon the letters to impose sentence). As

provided in Fenstermaker and Martinez, there is a common law right to examine

public judicial documents and to inspect and copy public records and documents and

there is a “qualified First Amendment right to access to certain judicial proceedings

and documents.” Martinez, 917 A.2d at 860 (citing Fenstermaker, 530 A.2d at 418).

Therefore, Dunbar asserts that he had a constitutional right to possess the other

inmate’s legal work. Petition ¶¶ 17 & 19.

Though the Secretary asserts in his preliminary objections that Dunbar

“has failed to state a claim for mandamus relief” and “has failed to allege a violation

of the U.S. and State Constitutions,” Preliminary Objections ¶ 6(a) & (k), the

Secretary does not explicitly provide any argument or analysis as to why Dunbar’s

claim regarding paralegal assistance and the right to access records provided in

12

Paragraphs 17 through 23 of his Petition is insufficient as a matter of law or why this

Court cannot provide Dunbar with the requested relief. See Clark v. Beard, 918

A.2d 155, 158 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (explaining that the “demurrer may be granted

only in cases which are so free from doubt that a trial would certainly be a fruitless

exercise”); see also McClellan v. Health Maint. Org. of Pa., 604 A.2d 1053, 1055

(Pa. Super. 1992) (providing that a complaint cannot be dismissed unless the court

is convinced that, as a matter of law, no recovery is possible under the facts pleaded).

This Court is required to accept as true “all well-pleaded allegations of

material facts as well as all of the inferences reasonably deducible from the facts.”

See Gregory v. Pa. State Police, 160 A.3d 274, 276 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017); Smith v.

Pa. Emps. Benefit Tr. Fund, 894 A.2d 874, 879 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (stating that it

is well established law in Pennsylvania that “preliminary objections in the nature of

a demurrer require the court to resolve the issues solely on the basis of the pleadings.

. . .”). Accepting Dunbar’s factual allegations as true (and the reasonable inferences

from his allegations), Dunbar had judicial materials belonging to another inmate, his

client, in his cell while he was acting as a jailhouse lawyer. Petition ¶¶ 17 & 19. As

a result of Dunbar aiding his client, he received a misconduct citation, which resulted

in a finding of misconduct and 30 days’ cell restriction. Id. ¶ 17. Dunbar pleaded

that by punishing him for this activity pursuant to DC-ADM 801, the Secretary

infringed upon his First Amendment rights, id. ¶¶ 17 & 19, which if proven would

enable this Court to issue an order to compel the Secretary to stop enforcing DC-

ADM 801 in this manner and to void the provisions of DC-ADM 801 that resulted

in his discipline. Because the Secretary only claims that Dunbar “failed to allege” a

constitutional claim, and we find that he did, this Court will allow that claim to

proceed.

13

For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the preliminary objections raised

by the Secretary as to the claims brought in Dunbar’s Petition relating to the inmate

misconduct process, and we allow Dunbar’s Petition to proceed on the claims raised

by Dunbar involving the “Prohibition of Paralegal Assistance” enumerated in

Paragraphs 17 through 23 of the Petition. The Secretary is ordered to file an answer

to these allegations within 30 days of the date of our Order.

14

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Gregory Dunbar, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

John E. Wetzel, Secretary for :

Pa. Dept. of Corrections, : No. 75 M.D. 2019

Respondent :

PER CURIAM

ORDER

AND NOW, this 21st day of January, 2020, the preliminary objections

filed by Respondent John E. Wetzel, Secretary of Corrections, of the Department of

Corrections (Secretary), are SUSTAINED as to the claim raised by Gregory Dunbar

(Dunbar) relating to the inmate misconduct process. The preliminary objections

filed by Dunbar to the Secretary’s preliminary objections are OVERRULED. The

Secretary is ordered to file an answer to the remaining claim raised by Dunbar

relating to “Prohibition of Paralegal Assistance” as provided in Paragraphs 17

through 23 of the Petition for Review for Declaratory/Injunctive Relief within 30

days of the date of this Order.