stating: When the regulation interpreting a statute is written by the very agency whose "abusive actions or overreaching" were intended to be deterred by that statute, we must be especially vigilant to insure that the regulation "harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origins, and its purpose." Durbin Paper Stock Co. v. Comm'r, 80 T.C. [252,] at 257 [(1983)
How later courts described this case
- stating: When the regulation interpreting a statute is written by the very agency whose "abusive actions or overreaching" were intended to be deterred by that statute, we must be especially vigilant to insure that the regulation "harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origins, and its purpose." Durbin Paper Stock Co. v. Comm'r, 80 T.C. [252,] at 257 [(1983)
- stating that failure to meet any of the requirements of section 7430 precludes an award of costs
- "It has been noted that the Congress has explicitly directed that family attribution or unity of ownership principles be applied in certain aspects of Federal taxation, and in the absence of legislative directives, judicial forums should not extend such principles beyond those areas specifically designated by Congress."
- IRS’s “assertion that the litigation position was reasonable solely because valuation is a factual inquiry and that the valuation herein was based on an expert appraisal is woefully inadequate to establish that his position is reasonable”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Truck & Equipment Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 141 (1992)
We also reject petitioner's contention that the case at hand is similar to that in Minahan v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 492 (1987).
The opinion
SIMPSON, J., concurring: I accept the conclusions of the majority that the petitioners have exhausted their administrative remedies in this case and that the regulations are invalid insofar as they appear to require a taxpayer to consent to an extension of the statute of limitations in all cases in order to be entitled to recover litigation costs. However, I respectfully suggest that the majority goes too far. Suppose that the Commissioner’s agents commence a timely examination of a taxpayer’s return, but the complexity or the multitude of legal or factual issues make it impossible to complete the examination within the 3-year period. In such circumstances, there is insufficient time to issue a 30-day letter and to provide the taxpayer with an opportunity for an appeals hearing before the running of the statute. In such circumstances, I believe that it would be reasonable for the Commissioner,, to request the taxpayer to consent to an extension and that if the taxpayer refuses, we should hold that he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. In my opinion, the statute should be construed to include a test of reasonableness; that is, when the circumstances reveal that there was a reasonable need for the Commissioner to request an extension, the failure to grant one will constitute a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Sterrett, Cohen, and Swift, JJ., agree with this concurring opinion.