Sharon v. Commissioner

Scott, J., dissenting: I respectfully disagree with the conclusion of the majority that the $25 license fee paid by petitioner to New York, the $571 paid to take the California bar examination, the $11 for admission to practice before two Federal courts in California, and the $313.35 paid for travel to Washington, via New York, to practice before the United States Supreme Court are properly amortizable over petitioner’s life expectancy. I agree that these expenditures, except for transportation to Washington, via New York, the place of the home of petitioner’s family, are capital expenditures. However there is nothing in this record to show the reasonable useful life of these expenditures. How long petitioner will practice law and where are so conjectural as to cause there to be no way to ascertain the reasonable useful life of the asset petitioner acquired through his capital expenditures. Although respondent apparently makes no contention that the trip to Washington, via New York, when petitioner was admitted to practice before the Supreme Court was personal, the clear inference from the fact that he did go to New York where his family lived before coming to Washington and returned there after he came to Washington is that petitioner went to New York to visit his family and incidentally came to Washington to be admitted to practice before the Supreme Court. However, if the view of the majority, that the cost of travel to Washington, via New York, was properly part of the cost of petitioner’s admission to practice before the Supreme Court, were proper, then this, as the other capital expenditures, should not be amortizable since the useful life of the asset acquired is not reasonably ascertainable.

Sterrett, J., agrees with this dissent.