Laferney v. United States

In the Gited States Court of Federal Claims

No. 19-1836C

(Filed: January 14, 2020)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

)

KEVIN OTHELL LAFERNEY, }

)

Plaintiff, Pro Se Complaint; Sua Sponte Dismissal

y ) for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction;

, ) RCFC 12(h)(3).

THE UNITED STATES, )

)

Defendant. )

)

OPINION

CAMPBELL-SMITH, Judge.

On December 2, 2019, plaintiff filed a complaint with this court without payment

of the court’s filing fee. See ECF No. 1. On December 5, 2019, the court issued an order

directing plaintiff to either pay the court’s $400.00 filing fee or submit an application to

proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), along with a trust fund account statement, and Prisoner

Authorization Form. See ECF No. 5. On December 23, 2019, plaintiff filed a motion to

proceed IFP, attaching his trust fund account statement. See ECF No. 8. On this same

day, plaintiff filed a status report in which he states that he was unable to produce the

Prisoner Authorization Form. See ECF No. 7. Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma

pauperis is DENIED and because the court lacks jurisdiction to hear this case, the court

must DISMISS plaintiff's complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(h)@G) of the Rules of the

United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC), See RCFC 12(h)(3) (“If the court

determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the

action.”’).

I. Background

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that he is “incarcerated and illegally detained in

the Texas Department of Criminally Justice.” Id. at 1.1 After explaining his lack of

I Plaintiff's complaint is made against “Steve Mnuchin, Secretary of Treasury and Dean

Fowler, Judge, Upshur County 115th District Court, Texas.”

access to legal research, plaintiff states as follows:

To ensure that I, the Surety, now Subrogee, am not longer considered an

enemy under Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA), and to honor the pledge

of KEVIN OTHELL LAFERNEY to the public trust, I did grant, convey,

and release the reversionary in the bonded birth certificate of the plaintiff to

or for the account of the United States as a pledge to the Social Security

account created for KEVIN OTHELL LAFERNEY Pursuant to subdivision

of TITLE 50 APPENDIX 5b 12 USC 95a(2) with intent and purpose for a

fullacquittance and discharge for all purposes of the grantor/surety/subrogee;

and that said conveyance was done in good faith without recourse to the

grantor relying on said subdivision during the administration of the

conveyance, SEE EXHIBIT A.

Id, at 2.2 Exhibit A to plaintiff’s complaint is a document titled “Bill of Lading,” which

includes a list of documents demanded by plaintiff from “Steve Mnuchin, Secretary of

Treasury.” ECF No. 1-1 at 1. Plaintiff goes on to reference one constitutional provision

and a number of other statutes, including: (1) the “Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution;” (2) 38 Stat. 265 (possibly a reference to 12 U.S.C. § 392, titled

“Depositaries of Government funds as confined to banks in Federal reserve system;

member banks as depositaries”); (3) the Social Security Act; (4) “Art. 1 sec B, clause

10” (uncertain reference); (5) the “Lieber code” (possibly a reference to a document

“adopted by President Lincoln after the Civil War,” to “provide guidance to the Union

army in distinguishing state-sanctioned militia from private armies,” see United States v.

Hamidullin, 114 F. Supp. 3d 365, 374 (E.D. Va. 2015)); (6) 31 U.S.C. § 3173 (uncertain

reference); 40 Stat. 415 (possibly a reference to the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917,

see 2006 WL 3843101); and 15 U.S.C. § 1 (titled “Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal;

penalty”). See id, at 3-4.

Plaintiff also alleges that he is party to a contract with the “115th District Court,

Upshur County, Texas” that— he claims---“the 115th District Court is prevented from

impairing.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff then seems to allege that he has transferred responsibility

for the obligations of that contract to the United States:

Having assigned reversionary interest to the United States Treasury pursuant

to 12 USC 95a(2) the beneficiary in this instant action is now the United

States, and all debts, specifically the debt represented by the above Court

case (14309) is now an obligation of the United States pursuant to 18 USC

8.

2 The court notes that two of the statutes to which plaintiff cites do not exist. Title 50,

“War and National Defense,” has no section titled “Appendix 5b.” Also, 12 U.S.C, § 95a is

titled “Omitted,” and has no content.

Id? The relief sought by plaintiff appears to be related to this alleged contract. The

section titled “Remedy Requested” states, in its entirety:

1) Pursuant to the above mentioned United States Law and the Contract

I have with the United States Treasury, I request a court order sent to

Secretary of Treasury, Steve Mnuchin, to enforce the discharge of the debt

on Cause No. 14309 IN The 115th District Court of Upshur County, Texas

and order the Judge of said court to deliver my property, the defendant, for

release immediately as applicable, as | am holder in due course of the

certificate of title to said goods. Or,

2) Appoint an Attorney on the grounds the Surety has no way to properly

represent himself as ong as he is denied access to court by the State of Texas.

Id. at 4-5.

I. Legal Standards

The court acknowledges that plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and is “not expected to

frame issues with the precision of a common law pleading.” Roche v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

828 F.2d 1555, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Pro se plaintiffs are entitled to a liberal

construction of their pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)

(requiring that allegations contained in a pro se complaint be held to “less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”). Accordingly, the court has

thoroughly examined the complaint to discern all of plaintiffs’ claims and legal

arguments.

This court is one of limited jurisdiction. Specifically, the Tucker Act grants the

court the authority to consider, “any claim against the United States founded either upon

the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or

upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or

unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a)(1) (2012).

“A court may and should raise the question of its jurisdiction sua sponte at any time it

appears in doubt.” Arctic Comer, Inc. v. United States, 845 F.2d 999, 1000 (Fed. Cir.

1988) (citation omitted). If, at any point, the court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over a

particular case, that case must be dismissed. See RCFC 12(h)(3).

3 In referring to 18 U.S.C. § 8, titled “Obligation or other security of the United States

defined,” plaintiff cites a definitional section rather than a substantive one.

IH. Analysis

A. Jurisdiction

As noted above, plaintiffs complaint references a number of statutes and at least

one part of the United States Constitution. See generally ECF No. 1. Because He makes

no substantive argument or coherent allegations with regard to most of them, the court

does not address each one here. Instead, the court has endeavored to identify the

gravamen of plaintiff's complaint, and evaluate the same in light of the court’s grant of

subject matter jurisdiction.

The narrative of the complaint is somewhat difficult to follow, but the central

claims appear to be based on a disagreement related to a contract or agreement with a

state court in Upshur County, Texas, or an official thereof. See id. at 3, 4-5. The

complaint, in fact, is made against “Steve Mnuchin, Secretary of Treasury and Dean

Fowler, Judge, Upshur County 115th District Court, Texas.” See ECF No, 1 at 1, This

court is only empowered to consider contract claims involving contracts “with the United

States” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), and therefore, cannot rule on a contract dispute involving

an agreement with a state entity or an individual. See also United States v. Sherwood,

312 U.S. 584, 588 (1941) (noting that the only proper defendant in this court is the

United States) (citations omitted). Plaintiff states that he has “assigned reversionary

interest to the United States Treasury pursuant to 12 USC 95a(2),” which may indicate he

is under the impression that he can direct his state court claims to the United States in this

way. The court, however, is unaware of the procedure to which he refers, and notes that

12 U.S.C. § 95a has no content and is titled “Omitted.”

In addition, to the extent that plaintiff means to argue that this court should review

an action taken in connection with a state court proceeding, this court is likewise without

the authority to do so. See, e.g., Potter v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 544, 548 (2013)

(“This Court, like all lower federal courts, lacks authority to review a state court’s

judgments, nor does it have the authority to remedy injuries that are caused by a state

court’s order.”). For these reasons, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider

the merits of plaintiff’s complaint, and must dismiss the same pursuant to RCFC

12(h)(3).

B. Motion to Proceed IFP

When plaintiff filed his complaint, he failed to pay the filing fee. As a result, the

court directed him to either pay the fee or file a motion for leave to proceed IFP. See

ECF No. 5. Specifically, the court stated:

Plaintiff submitted the instant complaint without either the required fees or a

complete IFP application and Prisoner Authorization Form. Within thirty

(30) days of the date of this order, Plaintiff is ordered to either PAY the

$400.00 in required fees or SUBMIT the enclosed IFP application, trust

fund account statement, and Prisoner Authorization Form.

If plaintiff fails to comply with this order within thirty (30) days, this action

Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims.

Id. at 2 (footnote omitted).

Plaintiff responded by filing a motion for leave to proceed IFP, but his application

to do so was incomplete because it did not include a prisoner authorization form giving

the court permission to deduct the filing fee from his prisoner trust account. See ECF No.

8. Plaintiff was cognizant of this deficiency, and filed a status report explaining that the

law librarian at the prison refused to include the form when mailing the other IFP

application materials. See ECF No. 7. The court cannot judge the veracity of this

statement, but in any case will not grant the motion for leave to proceed IFP without a

prisoner authorization form. For this reason, plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed IFP,

ECF No. 8, is denied.

Cc, Transfer

Because the court has concluded that it lacks jurisdiction in this case, it must

consider whether transfer to a court with jurisdiction is in the interests of justice:

[w]henever a civil action is filed in [this] court .. . and [this] court finds that

there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice,

transfer such action or appeal to any other such court... in which the action

or appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed...

28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2012). “Transfer is appropriate when three elements are met: (1) the

transferring court lacks subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the case could have been filed in

the court receiving the transfer; and (3) the transfer is in the interests of justice.” Brown

v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 546, 550 (2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1631).”

The court has already determined that it lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims.

The court, however, does not have enough information to determine that another court

would have jurisdiction as the complaint is simply too incoherent and seemingly

frivolous, to allow for such an analysis.

For these reasons, transfer is not in the interest of justice. If plaintiff believes he

has a viable claim that can be heard in another forum, he may pursue such a case

independently.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court does not have the authority to exercise subject

matter jurisdiction over the claims in plaintiff's complaint. Accordingly,

(1) Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 8, is DENTED;

(2) The clerk’s office is directed to ENTER final judgment DISMISSING

plaintiff's complaint, pursuant to RCFC 12(h)(3) without prejudice; and

(3) The clerk’s office is directed to REJECT any future filings received from

plaintiff not in accordance with this court’s rules.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Runcia D uplen Suote

PATRICIA E. CAMPBELL-SMITH?

Judge