State of Tennessee v. Reuben Eugene Mitchell

12/20/2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

September 5, 2019 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE V. REUBEN EUGENE MITCHELL

Appeal by Permission from the Court of Criminal Appeals

Criminal Court for Knox County

No. 102034 Steven W. Sword, Judge

No. E2017-01739-SC-R11-CD

The defendant, Reuben Eugene Mitchell, was convicted of one count of arson and one

count of presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim. The Court of Criminal Appeals

affirmed the defendant’s arson conviction but reversed his conviction for presenting a

false or fraudulent insurance claim. We granted the State’s application to appeal to

address whether the proof at trial was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for

presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim. Our review leads us to conclude that the

evidence was sufficient. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the Court of

Criminal Appeals and reinstate the defendant’s conviction for presenting a false or

fraudulent insurance claim.

Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission;

Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals Affirmed in Part,

Reversed in Part; Judgments of the Trial Court Affirmed

ROGER A. PAGE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JEFFREY S. BIVINS, C.J.,

and CORNELIA A. CLARK, SHARON G. LEE, and HOLLY KIRBY, JJ., joined.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée S. Blumstein, Solicitor

General; Katherine C. Redding, Assistant Attorney General; Randall E. Nichols, District

Attorney General; and William C. Bright and Andrea Kline, Assistant District Attorneys

General, for the appellant, the State of Tennessee.

Joshua D. Hedrick, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Reuben Eugene Mitchell.

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OPINION

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

After a fire caused extensive damage to his house, the defendant was charged with

one count of arson1 and one count of presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim.2

At the ensuing jury trial, the following evidence was adduced.

On November 30, 2011, the defendant applied to Allstate Property and Casualty

Insurance Company (“Allstate”) for a homeowner’s insurance policy. On December 1,

2011, Allstate issued the homeowner’s policy, number 9 63 861797, naming the

defendant as the insured and the defendant’s residence as the insured dwelling (“the

Policy”). A copy of the Policy, which covered the house, “other structures,” personal

property, and “additional living expense,” was admitted into evidence. As to the

dwelling, the Policy covered “sudden and accidental direct physical loss.” It also

provided liability protection.

In the portion titled “Section I Conditions,” beginning on page 16, the Policy

contains multiple provisions directing what the insured “Must Do After A Loss.” One of

the requirements is to “immediately give” Allstate or its agent “notice.” Also required,

“within 60 days after the loss,” is a “signed, sworn proof of the loss” including “the

actual cash value and amount of loss for each item damaged, destroyed or stolen.”

Nowhere in the criteria for “What You Must Do After A Loss” is the insured required to

“file” a “claim” for a loss resulting from fire damage.

On the evening of December 5, 2011, just a few days after the Policy was issued, a

fire caused extensive damage to the living room area of the defendant’s residence. The

defendant was not at home, and neighbors called the fire department. Although the fire

had been extinguished, the defendant called the fire department after he arrived home the

morning after the fire. The defendant, who testified at trial, also called Allstate and told

Allstate that there had been a house fire. He acknowledged that he called Allstate “to

report the loss” and that his call was to “start the process to file a claim.” However, the

defendant also testified that he did not fill out any claim forms for Allstate, and he denied

telling anyone at Allstate that he wanted to be paid for a property loss or that he wanted

1

The indictment charged that the defendant “did knowingly damage, by fire a structure . . .

without the consent of all persons having a possessory and proprietary interest in said structure[.]” See

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-301(a)(1) (2010) (defining arson as “knowingly damag[ing] any structure by

means of a fire or explosion . . . [w]ithout the consent of all persons who have a possessory, proprietary or

security interest therein”).

2

The indictment charged that the defendant “did unlawfully and intentionally present and cause

to be presented to Allstate Insurance Company, a false and fraudulent claim for the payment of a loss

upon a contract of insurance coverage for property located at” the address of his residence. See Tenn.

Code Ann. § 39-14-133 (2010).

2

Allstate to make repairs. He stated that he did not fill out a list of property that he lost

and wanted replaced but added that an Allstate representative did so.

After reporting the fire, the defendant met with two Allstate representatives, Mr.

David Gray and Ms. Heather Stover. According to Mr. Gray, a “large loss adjuster,” the

defendant told Mr. Gray that “he had been home, and he had had a fire going in the

fireplace and had to leave the home and shortly after he left, the fire took place in the

home.”

On December 9, 2011, Ms. Stover, a “large loss contents adjuster,” presented the

defendant with a document titled “Advance Payment Agreement” and a check for $1,000.

The Advance Payment Agreement, signed by the defendant on December 9, 2011, was

admitted into evidence. This document references “Claim No.: 0228336426” and “Policy

No.: 000963861797.” It also lists the defendant as the “Policyholder(s),” the defendant’s

residence as the “Address of Insured Property,” and “[f]ire” as the “Type of Damage.”

The Advance Payment Agreement further provides as follows:

In consideration of the advance payment described below, the

policyholder(s) (“you”) and Allstate (“we”) agree as follows:

Before any benefit can be paid under this policy, you have an

obligation to fully comply with all policy requirements in submitting the

claim. We have an obligation to investigate and determine if the policy is

valid, if the claim is valid and the extent of coverage that may be applicable

to the loss, if any. We will continue to investigate the claim. If there are

requirements in the policy which you have not yet completed, you need to

comply with those requirements.

In the meantime, in good faith and to prevent any undue hardship

which this loss may cause you, we advance $1,000.00 on the loss under the

following terms and conditions:

1) that this advance shall not be considered payment under any

portion of the policy;

2) that if either the policy or the claim is not valid and payment is

not required by us, you will repay the advance; and

3) we, in making this advance, reserve and do not waive any right or

requirement under the policy described above, whether procedural or

substantive.

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By signing this agreement, you accept the advance payment fully

understanding that we reserve all rights and requirements under the policy

described above, including the right to receive from you proper notice and

proof of loss, and the right to ask you to take an examination under oath. If

the claim is honored, we may apply the advance against any benefit due

under the policy, and if it is determined that any part of the policy or the

claim is not valid, and no payment is due, you will repay the advance to us

in full.

The parties hereby acknowledge and agree to the terms set forth

above.

(Emphases added). The defendant acknowledged taking the $1,000 payment and signing

the Advance Payment Agreement.

When questioned about the Advance Payment Agreement, Ms. Stover explained:

“When we have a customer who has had a fire claim with extensive damage, we offer an

advance payment just for them to start getting some of the things they need right away,

and it’s taken off of their total settlement if and when we pay the claim.” She added that

“any time we do have a fire claim that’s extensive damage such as this one, we do offer

an advance payment just for people to get started replacing some of their personal

property.” Asked about the process following an advance payment, Ms. Stover further

explained:

Well, normally, we . . . prepare estimates. We have to do an investigation;

our cause and origin begins the investigation. And if everything comes

back okay with the investigation, then we proceed with paying the claim,

but in this situation, it went to our special investigations unit and when it

does that, . . . it’s removed from the adjuster’s handling and into the special

investigations unit where they do a more extensive investigation.

According to Ms. Stover, at the time she delivered the check to the defendant,

“everything had been done to start the processing of the claim.” She reiterated that any

advance payment would be deducted from the total proceeds payable on a valid claim. If

no valid claim were eventually processed, the advance payment would have to be repaid

by the recipient. On cross-examination, Ms. Stover asserted that the advance payment

was “issued in good faith that we will pay the claim.” She also acknowledged that she

did not receive a claim form or a signed, sworn proof of loss document from the

defendant.

Allstate hired EFI Global, a nationwide company that conducted investigations

into the causes and origins of fires, to investigate the cause and origin of the fire. Gary

M. Young, an investigator with EFI Global, reported to the scene and spoke with the

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defendant. The defendant acknowledged speaking with Mr. Young over the phone and

stated that Mr. Young told him that Allstate “wanted to investigate [the fire] first before

they file a claim.”

Mr. Young subsequently prepared a written report about the cause of the fire,

dated December 30, 2011 (“the Report”). A copy of the Report was admitted into

evidence, and in it, Mr. Young opined that “this fire was intentionally precipitated, by

introducing accelerant underneath and behind the loveseat in the living room, and then

igniting the accelerant with a manually and intentionally introduced ignition source.”

The Report also noted: “I questioned [the defendant] as to whether or not he has any

opinion as to the cause for this fire loss. He revealed that it is his opinion that this fire

was apparently caused by some problem with the wood burning fireplace.”

E. Metts Hardy of EFI Global, the Vice President of fire investigations for EFI

Global, reviewed and signed the Report. Because Mr. Young was deceased by the time

of trial, Mr. Hardy testified about EFI’s investigation. The trial court recognized Mr.

Hardy as “an expert in the area of origin and cause relating to fires.” Mr. Hardy opined at

trial that the fire had been intentionally set and had not originated in the fireplace. Based

on this information, Allstate did not pay the defendant any further money under the

Policy. Rather, this prosecution commenced on December 28, 2011, less than a month

after the fire. Allstate cancelled the Policy on February 14, 2012.

The defendant offered a different explanation of the fire. He explained that, due to

his failure to pay his bills, both water and electricity to the house had been cut off weeks

before the fire. On the evening of December 5, he arrived home during the early evening

and began a fire in the fireplace. He started the fire with a small starter log, some

kindling wood, and starter gel. He stated that there were no large pieces of wood in the

fireplace when he began the fire.

After starting the fire, the defendant claimed that he received a phone call

informing him that his sister was critically ill. He “went into panic mode” and, to

extinguish the fire, he “grabbed some wet logs” and threw the wet logs into the fireplace.

He explained that the logs had been out in the rain all week and he thought that they

would put out the fire he started. He stated that, after he threw the wet logs into the

fireplace, it “looked like” the fire was extinguished. He then left the house.

The defendant claimed that he drove to his sister’s house, where she was being

prepared for transport in an ambulance. He followed the ambulance to the hospital and

did not leave until the next morning. He did not realize that his house had caught fire

until his return home on December 6, 2011. As to the presence of an accelerant, the

defendant explained that he had recently refinished the living room floor and used

polyurethane, a flammable substance.

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After considering the evidence, the jury rejected the defendant’s explanation of the

fire and convicted him of arson. The jury also convicted the defendant of presenting a

false or fraudulent insurance claim in the amount of $10,000 or more but less than

$60,000. After a subsequent hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I,

standard offender to four years of incarceration on each conviction, to be served

concurrently and suspended to supervised probation.

The defendant appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the

defendant’s conviction of arson. State v. Mitchell, No. E2017-01739-CCA-R3-CD, 2018

WL 6439502, at *13 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2018). However, a majority of the Court

of Criminal Appeals panel concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support the

false or fraudulent insurance claim conviction and, therefore, reversed that conviction and

dismissed the charge. Id. We granted the State’s ensuing application for permission to

appeal to address whether the proof at trial was sufficient to support the defendant’s

conviction for presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard for appellate review of a claim challenging the sufficiency of the

State’s evidence is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (citing

Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972)); see Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); State v.

Davis, 354 S.W.3d 718, 729 (Tenn. 2011). To obtain relief on a claim of insufficient

evidence, the defendant must demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443

U.S. at 319. This standard of review is identical whether the conviction is predicated on

direct or circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both. State v. Dorantes, 331

S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (citing State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn.

2009)); State v. Brown, 551 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tenn. 1977) (quoting Farmer v. State, 343

S.W.2d 895, 896 (Tenn. 1961)).

On appellate review, “‘we afford the prosecution the strongest legitimate view of

the evidence as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn

therefrom.’” Davis, 354 S.W.3d at 729 (quoting State v. Majors, 318 S.W.3d 850, 857

(Tenn. 2010)); see also State v. Williams, 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983). In a jury

trial, questions involving the credibility of witnesses and the weight and value to be given

the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence, are resolved by the jury

as trier of fact. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Pruett, 788

S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990) (citations omitted). This Court presumes that the jury has

afforded the State all reasonable inferences from the evidence and resolved all conflicts

in the testimony in favor of the State; as such, we will not substitute our own inferences

drawn from the evidence for those drawn by the jury, nor will we re-weigh or re-evaluate

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the evidence. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379; State v. Lewter, 313 S.W.3d 745, 748 (Tenn.

2010); Liakas v. State, 286 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tenn. 1956). Because a jury conviction

removes the presumption of innocence that the defendant enjoyed at trial and replaces it

with one of guilt at the appellate level, the burden of proof shifts from the State to the

convicted defendant, who must demonstrate to this Court that the evidence is insufficient

to support the jury’s findings. Davis, 354 S.W.3d at 729 (quoting State v. Sisk, 343

S.W.3d 60, 65 (Tenn. 2011)).

III. ANALYSIS

In conducting our sufficiency review, we must evaluate the proof in light of the

elements of the crime. See State v. Gentry, 538 S.W.3d 413, 420 (Tenn. 2017)

(recognizing that the first step of a sufficiency review is to “‘examine the relevant

statute(s) in order to determine the elements’ of the offense that must be proven by the

prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt” (quoting State v. Stephens, 521 S.W.3d 718,

723-24 (Tenn. 2017)). Accordingly, our review of the evidence in this case depends

upon our construction of the false or fraudulent insurance claims statute, Tennessee Code

Annotated section 39-14-133, which provides:

Any person who intentionally presents or causes to be presented a

false or fraudulent claim, or any proof in support of such claim, for the

payment of a loss, or other benefits, upon any contract of insurance

coverage, or automobile comprehensive or collision insurance, or certificate

of such insurance or prepares, makes or subscribes to a false or fraudulent

account, certificate, affidavit or proof of loss, or other documents or

writing, with intent that the same may be presented or used in support of

such claim, is punished as in the case of theft.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-133 (2010).

When engaging in statutory interpretation, “well-defined precepts apply.” State v.

McNack, 356 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Tenn. 2011). “The most basic principle of statutory

construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent without unduly

restricting or expanding a statute’s coverage beyond its intended scope.” Owens v. State,

908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995) (citing State v. Sliger, 846 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tenn.

1993)); see also Carter v. Bell, 279 S.W.3d 560, 564 (Tenn. 2009) (citing State v.

Sherman, 266 S.W.3d 395, 401 (Tenn. 2008)). In construing statutes, Tennessee law

provides that courts are to avoid a construction that leads to absurd results. Tennessean v.

Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 485 S.W.3d 857, 872 (Tenn. 2016). “Furthermore, the

‘common law is not displaced by a legislative enactment, except to the extent required by

the statute itself.’” Wlodarz v. State, 361 S.W.3d 490, 496 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting

Houghton v. Aramark Educ. Res., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 679 (Tenn. 2002)), abrogated on

other grounds by Frazier v. State, 495 S.W.3d 246 (Tenn. 2016). “When statutory

7

language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply its plain meaning in its normal and

accepted use, without a forced interpretation that would extend the meaning of the

language . . . .” Carter, 279 S.W.3d at 564 (citations omitted).

The false insurance claim statute criminalizes two courses of conduct. The

elements of the first prohibited course of conduct are as follows: (1) intentionally; (2)

presenting or causing to be presented; (3) a false or fraudulent; (4) claim or any proof in

support of such claim; (5) for the payment of a loss or other benefit; (6) upon any

contract of insurance coverage. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-133. The elements of the

second prohibited course of conduct are as follows: (1) preparing, making, or

subscribing to; (2) a false or fraudulent; (3) account, certificate, affidavit or proof of loss,

or other documents or writing; (4) with intent; (5) that the same may be presented or used

in support of; (6) a claim for the payment of a loss or other benefit; (7) upon any contract

of insurance coverage. See id. The defendant was charged with engaging in the first

prohibited course of conduct.

The majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals panel held that the proof was

insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of this offense because “[t]he defendant

legally, and under the policy, did not initiate a claim because he did not file the necessary

and required documentation pursuant to the policy, including a proof of loss, in the

requisite time period.” Mitchell, 2018 WL 6439502, at *12. The intermediate appellate

court relied on the Policy’s technical requirements attendant upon filing a claim and

concluded that “the defendant in this case did not meet the conditions precedent to filing

a claim.” Id. The majority reasoned,

While the defendant made Allstate aware that there had been a fire, he did

not file any documentation to support his filing of a claim for the initiation

of a claim. Further, he did not comply with the requirements for filing a

claim because he did not file a proof of loss. For the same reasons that

Allstate could have denied the defendant coverage for not adequately filing

a claim, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support that he

fraudulently filed an insurance claim against Allstate.

Mitchell, 2018 WL 6439502, at *12 (emphasis added). The majority dismissed the

significance of the Advance Payment Agreement that the defendant signed and the

$1,000 advance payment that Allstate made to the defendant thereunder on the basis that,

“[b]y the plain language of the agreement[,] the $1,000 is an advance, and not part of the

coverage pursuant to the policy.” Id.

Judge John Everett Williams dissented from the majority’s holding that the

evidence was not sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for presenting a false or

fraudulent insurance claim, reasoning as follows:

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The majority reasons that the defendant did not initiate a claim

because he did not submit the documentation required to file a claim under

the insurance policy, including a proof of loss, in the requisite time period.

In my opinion, the language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-

133, which criminalizes insurance fraud, is broad and does not limit a

conviction for the offense to those instances in which a defendant has

adhered to the provisions and niceties of the insurance policy. Under the

majority’s analysis, an insurance company may determine what constitutes

a criminal offense for filing a false insurance claim through its provisions in

its insurance policies. Had the legislature intended for insurance companies

to have such authority, the legislature would have stated so in the statute.

Mitchell, 2018 WL 6439502, at *13 (Williams, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part). We agree with Judge Williams’ reasoning.

Initially, we note that, as defined in our criminal code: “‘Fraud’ means as used in

normal parlance and includes, but is not limited to, deceit, trickery, misrepresentation and

subterfuge, and shall be broadly construed to accomplish the purposes of” the criminal

code. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106(13) (2010).

The false or fraudulent insurance claims statute does not define the word “claim.”

However, when a statute does not define one of its terms, we may turn to other sources

for guidance, including Black’s Law Dictionary. See, e.g., State v. Edmondson, 231

S.W.3d 925, 928 (Tenn. 2007) (“When the Legislature does not provide a specific

definition for a statutory term, this Court may look to other sources, including Black’s

Law Dictionary, for guidance.”); see also, e.g., State v. Fitz, 19 S.W.3d 213, 216 (Tenn.

2000) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for guidance in construing the word “violence”

as used in the robbery statutes). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “claim,” as apposite in

this context, as “[t]he assertion of an existing right; any right to payment or to an

equitable remedy, even if contingent or provisional.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.

2019), available at Westlaw BLACKS. In addition, Black’s offers a subordinate

definition of “insurance claim”: “A policyholder’s formal report to an insurance company

about a loss with a request for a payment based on the insurance policy’s terms.” Id.

Significantly, the statute does not use the term “insurance claim.” Rather, it uses

the much broader term, “claim.” Moreover, as Judge Williams recognized, the statute is

drafted very broadly. The statute’s clear and unambiguous intent is to criminalize a

person’s intentional efforts to obtain monies under an insurance contract through the

presentation of false or fraudulent information to the insurer. The statute does not require

any precise methodology that a person must follow in his efforts to convince an insurance

company, through the provision of false or fraudulent information, to pay him money

under an insurance policy. The statute certainly does not criminalize some

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methodologies and not others based on the technical requirements of different insurance

policies.

In this case, the Policy required the defendant to submit a written proof of loss

within sixty days of the loss. Well within that time frame, however, Allstate concluded

that the fire was not a covered loss. Therefore, any proof of loss subsequently submitted

by the defendant would have been pointless. More importantly, within a few days of the

fire, the defendant made sufficient verbal representations to Allstate to cause Allstate to

assign a claim number to the alleged loss and to make an advance payment of $1,000 to

the defendant, pending further investigation. The defendant accepted this payment and

signed the Advance Payment Agreement, which refers repeatedly to “the claim.” The

defendant’s words and actions represented to Allstate that the fire was a covered loss

under the Policy, that is, a “sudden and accidental direct physical loss” to the defendant’s

house and its contents. (Emphasis added). Thus, it can certainly be inferred that the

defendant was claiming that the fire was accidental based on his conduct in this case.

The defendant’s signature on the Advance Payment Agreement also indicated that

he understood that the advance payment was provisional pending further investigation of

his claim prior to an eventual payment under the Policy. The Court of Criminal Appeals’

majority opinion emphasized that, because the $1,000 delivered to the defendant pursuant

to this Agreement “shall not be considered payment under any portion of the policy,” the

$1,000 was not payment of a claim under the Policy. This interpretation elevates form

over substance. The common-sense construction of the Advance Payment Agreement is

that it enabled Allstate to alleviate an insured’s immediate financial concerns resulting

from an alleged covered loss while also allowing it to investigate the alleged loss and

determine whether a covered loss had been established. If Allstate then determined that

the alleged loss was not covered by the policy, Allstate was not obligated to pay any

benefits under the policy. Indeed, in that event, the recipient of the advance payment was

obligated to repay it to Allstate. The Court of Criminal Appeals erred in interpreting the

advance payment, and the defendant’s acceptance thereof, as independent, separate, and

distinct from the underlying Policy and the defendant’s apparent intent to recover under

the Policy.

We conclude that the defendant’s conduct satisfied the statute’s elements of

intentionally presenting a false or fraudulent claim because, in making his verbal

representations to Allstate representatives, signing the Advance Payment Agreement, and

accepting the $1,000 advance payment, the defendant was clearly and unambiguously

asserting a right to payment under his homeowner’s policy, even if that right was

contingent or provisional insofar as Allstate had the contractual right to require further

documentation, such as a written proof of loss, for final payment. The defendant’s words

and conduct were fraudulent because they involved, at a minimum, “subterfuge” and led

Allstate to consider, at least provisionally, that the fire was a covered loss. Because the

Policy entitled the defendant to recover losses resulting from accidental direct physical

10

losses, and because the jury determined that the fire was not accidental but, rather, was

set deliberately by the defendant, the jury was entitled to conclude that the defendant had

violated the statute prohibiting the presentation of a false or fraudulent insurance claim.

In short, the evidence in this case presented the jury with a textbook example of

presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim. The defendant intentionally informed

Allstate that there had been a fire at his house. His description of the fire to Allstate and

ELI clearly implied that the fire had been accidental. He subsequently accepted a

payment and signed a document referring to his claim in conjunction with Allstate

investigating his report. The defendant’s words and conduct clearly implied to Allstate

that he considered the fire to be a covered loss under the Policy, i.e., accidental; however,

the jury determined that he set the fire knowingly. Thus, the defendant’s words and

conduct entitled the jury to conclude that the defendant intentionally presented a false or

fraudulent claim for the payment of a loss or other benefit upon the Policy.

Accordingly, we conclude that the proof was sufficient to support the jury’s

conclusion that the defendant violated the false or fraudulent insurance claims statute.

The Court of Criminal Appeals committed reversible error in concluding otherwise.

IV. CONCLUSION

We conclude that the proof was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of

presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim. Therefore, we reverse the decision of

the Court of Criminal Appeals on this point and reinstate the defendant’s conviction of

presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim in the amount of $10,000 or more but less

than $60,000.

_______________________________

JUSTICE ROGER A. PAGE

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