Opinion

State v. Braden

  • 2019 Ohio 5256
Court
Ohio Court of Appeals
Filed
Dec 19, 2019
Status
Published
On the bench
Luper Schuster
Cited by
1 cases
Authority
More cited than 46.6%

remanding the case to the trial court for it to consider “whether to exercise its discretion to waive Braden’s court costs pursuant to R.C. 2947.23(C)” following the Supreme Court of Ohio’s conclusion that the statute “‘authorizes trial courts to waive, suspend or modify the payment of court costs imposed both before and after its effective date’”

How later courts described this case

  • remanding the case to the trial court for it to consider “whether to exercise its discretion to waive Braden’s court costs pursuant to R.C. 2947.23(C)” following the Supreme Court of Ohio’s conclusion that the statute “‘authorizes trial courts to waive, suspend or modify the payment of court costs imposed both before and after its effective date’”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

[Cite as State v. Braden, 2019-Ohio-5256.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 17AP-48

(C.P.C. No. 98CR-4601)

v. :

(REGULAR CALENDAR)

David L. Braden, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on December 19, 2019

On brief: Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L.

Gilbert, for appellee. Argued: Seth L. Gilbert.

On brief: Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and

Kathryn L. Sandford; Steven M. Brown, for appellant.

Argued: Kathryn L. Sandford.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

ON REMAND from the Supreme Court of Ohio

LUPER SCHUSTER, J.

{¶ 1} This case is before the court on remand from the Supreme Court of Ohio

pursuant to State v. Braden, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2019-Ohio-4204 ("Braden III"). After this

court decided State v. Braden, 17AP-48, 2017-Ohio-7903 ("Braden I"), the Supreme Court

of Ohio initially affirmed our decision in State v. Braden, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2018-Ohio-

5079 ("Braden II"). In Braden III, the Supreme Court then granted the motion for

reconsideration of defendant-appellant, David L. Braden, thereby reversing our judgment

in Braden I, and remanded the case for application of its holding that "R.C. 2947.23(C)

authorizes trial courts to waive, suspend or modify the payment of court costs imposed both

before and after its effective date." Braden III at ¶ 31.

No. 17AP-48 2

{¶ 2} In Braden I, Braden appealed from a December 21, 2016 entry of the Franklin

County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion to waive fines and court costs. We

concluded res judicata operated to bar Braden's arguments related to both fines and court

costs. Braden I at ¶ 7-8. Additionally, we concluded Braden's motion was an improper

means to challenge the collection process by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and

Correction or the prison warden. Braden I at ¶ 9. The sole issue in Braden III was whether

R.C. 2947.23(C) provided jurisdiction to a trial court to waive court costs even when the

conviction was finalized before the effective date of the statute. Thus, based on the

authority of Braden III, we now reverse in part the December 21, 2016 decision of the trial

court denying Braden's motion to waive court costs, and we remand the matter to that court

to consider, in the first instance, whether to exercise its discretion to waive Braden's court

costs pursuant to R.C. 2947.23(C).

{¶ 3} Additionally, both parties filed motions in this court in response to the

Supreme Court's remand order. The state filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of a

final appealable order. However, we find the order of the trial court to be a final appealable

order. State v. Thompson, 147 Ohio St.3d 29, 2016-Ohio-2769, ¶ 13 (holding "[a] trial

court's determination of a motion for jail-time credit pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii)

constitutes a special proceeding and affects a substantial right," so the denial of a motion

for jail-time credit pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) is a final, appealable order);

Braden III at ¶ 11-14 (relying on the similarities between a post-conviction motion to waive

court costs and a post-conviction motion for jail time credit, noting "[t]here are no material

differences between R.C. 2947.23(C) and former R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) regarding the

trial court's continuing jurisdiction to act"). Accordingly, we deny the state's motion to

dismiss the appeal for lack of final appealable order.

{¶ 4} Finally, Braden filed a motion to stay proceedings pending the decision of the

Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Taylor, Supreme Court Docket No. Ohio-0797,

scheduled for oral argument on January 7, 2020. However, having determined the

appropriate remedy is to reverse in part the decision of the trial court and to remand the

matter to that court for further proceedings, we deny Braden's motion to stay as moot.

{¶ 5} Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part the

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, and we remand the matter to

No. 17AP-48 3

that court to consider, in the first instance, whether to exercise its discretion to waive

Braden's court costs pursuant to R.C. 2947.23(C). Additionally, we deny the state's motion

to dismiss the appeal and deny as moot Braden's motion to stay the proceedings.

Judgement reversed in part; cause remanded; motions denied.

BROWN and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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