Joanne Blight v. City of Manteca

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOANNE BLIGHT, No. 17-17334

Plaintiff-Appellant,

D.C. No.

v. 2:15-cv-02513-

WBS-AC

CITY OF MANTECA, a municipal

corporation; ARMANDO GARCIA,

Manteca Police Department OPINION

Detective; IAN OSBORN, Manteca

Police Department Detective; CHRIS

S. MRAZ, Manteca Police

Department Sergeant; PAUL

CARMONA, Manteca Police

Department Sergeant,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

William B. Shubb, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 13, 2019

San Francisco, California

Filed December 11, 2019

Before: Ronald M. Gould, Carlos T. Bea, and

Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Gould

2 BLIGHT V. CITY OF MANTECA

SUMMARY *

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary

judgment in favor of the City of Manteca and Manteca Police

Department officials in an action challenging the issuance

and execution of a search warrant on plaintiff’s home and

her detention incident to the search as unconstitutional under

the Fourth Amendment.

Plaintiff alleged that the search warrant to investigate an

illegal marijuana operation was overbroad because there was

no probable cause to search her mobile home, which was

separate from the suspect’s main house and had a separate

address. The panel held that based on an informant’s

reliability and the probability that probative evidence or

contraband would be found in the residences on the property,

there was probable cause to issue a warrant authorizing a

search of the entire property, including the mobile home.

Because the search warrant’s breadth was co-extensive with

the scope of this probable cause, the warrant was not

overbroad.

The panel held that the officers acted reasonably when

they continued to search plaintiff’s mobile home once they

discovered that the named suspect did not live in the home.

The panel held that the probable cause to search the mobile

home did not depend on any suspect living there. Instead,

the officers had probable cause to continue the search

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

BLIGHT V. CITY OF MANTECA 3

because they could still reasonably believe that the entire

property was under the suspect’s common control,

regardless of whether he was on the property at the time of

the search, and regardless of who was found in the mobile

home.

The panel rejected plaintiff’s contention that the duration

of the search was unreasonable under the Fourth

Amendment because of her age (74), the lack of evidence

linking her to the marijuana operation, and the length of time

of the detention. The panel held that given that the officers

had a warrant to search the mobile home, they had

categorical authority to detain plaintiff, the occupant of the

mobile home at the time of the search. The officers also did

not detain plaintiff in an unreasonable manner and her

detention of no more than one hour was not an unreasonable

length of time given the circumstances.

Finally, the panel rejected plaintiff’s contention that the

search warrant was tainted by judicial deception. The panel

held that none of the alleged omissions in the supporting

affidavit were material to the issuing judge’s probable cause

determination.

COUNSEL

Jeff Dominic Price (argued), Santa Monica, California, for

Plaintiff-Appellant.

Lori A. Sebransky (argued) and Kevin P. Allen, Allen

Glaessner Hazelwood & Werth LLP, San Francisco,

California, for Defendants-Appellees.

4 BLIGHT V. CITY OF MANTECA

OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Joanne Blight challenges the

issuance and execution of a search warrant on her home and

her detention incident to the search as unconstitutional under

the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted summary

judgment to Defendants-Appellees City of Manteca and

Manteca Police Department officials Armando Garcia, Ian

Osborn, Chris S. Mraz, and Paul Carmona. We have

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

I

A

In September 2014, Defendants Armando Garcia and Ian

Osborn, detectives with the Manteca Police Department, met

with a confidential informant 1 who had information on an

illegal marijuana operation run by Marlin Lee Ford on his

4.26-acre rural property in Stockton, California. The

informant had provided Garcia with truthful and reliable

information on other marijuana operations in the past. The

informant was not paid for the information, but there was a

leniency arrangement related to whether other conduct

would be treated as felonies or misdemeanors if the

informant provided the Government information helpful to

further drug investigations.

The informant provided the detectives with extensive

firsthand knowledge of Ford’s operation: the informant had

known Ford for more than ten years from the informant’s

1

The informant’s identity remains confidential.

BLIGHT V. CITY OF MANTECA 5

activities in the marijuana industry; the informant had helped

Ford grow and process marijuana on Ford’s property; the

informant knew where to find Ford’s property and could

describe the property in detail; and the informant said there

were guns and large dogs on the property. Detective Garcia

checked a private database to which the Manteca Police

Department subscribes and motor vehicle records to

corroborate that Ford lived at the property the informant had

described, which was located at 5858 E. Carpenter Road.

Detectives Garcia and Osborn drove with the informant

to the property. 2 The informant identified 5858 E. Carpenter

Road as the correct property. Garcia showed the informant

Ford’s DMV photo, and the informant identified Ford.

From the road, Garcia observed a long driveway leading

from the street to the property, a locked gate at the start of

the driveway, and a tall fence surrounding the property. The

fence extended up to ten feet high with an extension made of

ad hoc materials, and it enclosed the entire property. Osborn

testified that, in his training and experience, the character of

the fence and its ad hoc extension were suggestive of an

illegal marijuana grow.

The detectives could not see the interior of the property

because of the fence, but someone in the car opened Google

Maps on his or her cell phone and brought up an aerial image

of the property. The informant identified the field where the

marijuana was being grown and two residences. The

informant explained that Ford and his family lived in the

main house and Nicolas Serrano, who helped Ford with the

2

Detectives Garcia and Osborn also drove to the property a second

time without the informant.

6 BLIGHT V. CITY OF MANTECA

marijuana operation, lived in the mobile home. 3 It is

disputed whether the informant told the detectives that

Joanne and Dallas Blight, Ford’s mother and stepfather, also

lived on the property. But resolving that dispute in the light

most favorable to Blight, the informant told Garcia that the

Blights lived somewhere on the property.

Detective Garcia filled out an application for a warrant

to search Ford’s property. He attached to the application a

Google Maps aerial view of the property, which he noted

was consistent with the informant’s description that there

were two modular homes on the property. The search

warrant affidavit stated that the informant had told Garcia

that Ford, his wife, and two adult children lived in one of the

modular homes, and that Serrano lived in the other one. In

the affidavit, Garcia explained that, in his knowledge,

training, and experience, marijuana grown outside will

typically be harvested and processed in garages or residences

to avoid police detection, and that other types of evidence

related to marijuana cultivation and sales also often can be

found in residences. The premises to be searched included

the “two modular homes, chicken coops and a small barn and

various outbuildings.”

A California superior court judge met with Garcia for

about thirty minutes, reviewed the warrant application, and

issued the warrant. Detective Garcia also requested and

gained approval for SWAT officers to assist the police

officers with executing the warrant because of the

3

The informant did not provide Serrano’s last name, having referred

to him only as “Nick.” It is also not apparent that any law enforcement

officer learned Serrano’s last name before proceeding further with the

investigation.

BLIGHT V. CITY OF MANTECA 7

circumstances of the large property, its fence and gate

fortification, and the expected presence of dogs and firearms.

B

At about 7:00am on October 23, 2014, Manteca police

and SWAT officers executed the search warrant. SWAT

officers drove down the driveway in two armored vehicles

and breached the locked gate. Once on the property, SWAT

officers made announcements over the PA system for the

occupants to exit the residences. Serrano left the main

house, followed by his two children; Serrano was promptly

placed under arrest.

Serrano’s wife was not on the property at the beginning

of the search, but she drove up to the driveway soon after the

search began. She told Detective Garcia that an elderly

woman, Joanne Blight, was inside the mobile home. 4

SWAT officers again made announcements over the PA

system, and also at the front door of the mobile home

ordering Blight to exit. After there were six minutes with no

response, SWAT officers breached the mobile home’s front

door with a ram. After initially retreating to a back room,

Blight exited her home three minutes after the officers

breached the front door.

Once Blight was outside, officers told her that if she did

not get into the police car she would be handcuffed. Blight

got into the police car, and officers drove her to the street for

the duration of the search. Blight was never physically

searched or handcuffed. The dispatch transcription log

recorded the total time of Blight’s detention as 20 to

4

Joanne Blight was 74 years old and had hearing problems at the

time of the search.

8 BLIGHT V. CITY OF MANTECA

30 minutes; Blight remembers being detained for almost an

hour.

The police recovered 23 pounds of marijuana,

8 marijuana plants, 134 pounds of processed marijuana,

251 grams of loose marijuana shake, 78 grams of marijuana

buds, measurement scales, currency, and 27 rounds of

ammunition from various parts of the property. The police

did not recover any evidence or contraband from the mobile

home.

It later became known that the Blights had lived in and

owned the mobile home since 1997. The mobile home had

a dwelling use permit and an assigned address of 5846 E.

Carpenter Road, but the land on which the mobile home was

sited had the parcel’s address of 5858 E. Carpenter Road.

Ford owns the property and lived with his immediate family

in the main house from 1996 until 2012 but did not live there

at the time of the search. Serrano lived in the main house

from 2012 through the time of the search to help maintain

the property for Ford.

C

Blight filed a complaint against the City of Manteca and

individually named Manteca Police Department detectives

and sergeants, asserting Fourth Amendment violations under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law violations. Following

discovery, Defendants filed a motion for summary

judgment. The district court granted the motion for

summary judgment on Blight’s claims under § 1983 and

declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Blight’s

BLIGHT V. CITY OF MANTECA 9

state law claims. Blight appeals the grant of summary

judgment. 5

II

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo. Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1223

(9th Cir. 2009). We affirm a district court’s grant of a

motion for summary judgment “if the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248–50 (1986) (“If the evidence is merely colorable, or

is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be

granted.” (internal citations omitted)).

III

A

Blight claims that the search warrant was overbroad

because there was no probable cause to search her mobile

home. 6 The superordinate and controlling issue here is thus

whether there was probable cause to search the mobile home.

We hold that there was.

5

Blight does not appeal the district court’s grant of summary

judgment rejecting her claim that the officers violated the knock-and-

announce rule, nor does she appeal the district court’s determination that

the city could not be held liable under Monell v. Department of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). She also does not appeal the district

court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over her state law

claims.

6

Blight also had argued to the district court that the search warrant

was not particular, but she does not raise that issue on appeal.

10 BLIGHT V. CITY OF MANTECA

To be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a search

warrant must not be overbroad; its breadth must be limited

to the scope of the probable cause on which the warrant was

based. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 926 F.2d 847, 856–57

(9th Cir. 1991). To determine whether a warrant was

overbroad, we review, with deference, whether the issuing

judge had a substantial basis to conclude that the affidavit

supporting the search warrant established probable cause.

United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394, 1396 (9th

Cir. 1986). Probable cause “is not a high bar.” Kaley v.

United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014). A search warrant

affidavit will demonstrate probable cause “if, under the

totality of the circumstances, it reveals a fair probability that

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a

particular place.” United States v. Celestine, 324 F.3d 1095,

1102 (9th Cir. 2003). What is needed is only a fair

probability, and not a certainty, that evidence of crime or

contraband will be found. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.

213, 235, 238 (1983).

As a starting point, the issuing judge relied heavily on

Detective Garcia’s description of the statements that the

informant made to him. This reliance was entirely

reasonable because the issuing judge could reasonably find

the informant to be trustworthy under a totality-of-the-

circumstances analysis. See id. Notably, the informant had

given reliable information to law enforcement before, and

the information the informant provided in this case included

detailed, firsthand knowledge of Ford’s drug operation. 7 See

7

Although the detectives might have continued to investigate or

seek more corroboration than they obtained by reviewing records

showing that Ford lived at the property, they did not have to do so

because they already had probable cause. See Ewing v. City of Stockton,

588 F.3d 1218, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009).

BLIGHT V. CITY OF MANTECA 11

id. at 241–42. The issuing judge could also reasonably rely

on Detective Garcia’s opinions because of Garcia’s

extensive experience in narcotics-related investigations and

searches. See United States v. Seybold, 726 F.2d 502, 504

(9th Cir. 1984).

When a structure contains two residences or two

residences share a lot, there must be probable cause to search

each. United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1008 (9th

Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds by United States v.

Perez, 116 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). But in United

States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1301 (9th Cir. 1985), we

held that a warrant authorizing the search of an entire ranch

was not overbroad, even though there were multiple

dwellings on the ranch, because the entire property was

under the suspect’s control. We explained that “a warrant is

valid when it authorizes the search of a street address with

several dwellings if the defendants are in control of the

whole premises, if the dwellings are occupied in common,

or if the entire property is suspect.” Id.

Here, there was a substantial basis for the issuing judge

to believe Ford was in control of the whole premises. The

informant told the detectives Ford owned the entire property

and said Serrano lived in the mobile home for the purpose of

helping Ford with his drug operation. Moreover, the entire

property was enclosed within one fence and there was a

concrete walkway connecting the two homes.

There was also a substantial basis for the issuing judge

to believe the entire property was suspect. The informant

told the detectives the marijuana was grown outside and then

processed in the buildings on the property. Detective Garcia

explained in the search warrant affidavit that, in his

experience, when marijuana is grown outside, processed

12 BLIGHT V. CITY OF MANTECA

marijuana and other evidence will usually be found inside

the residences and buildings on the property.

The issuing judge was also entitled to “draw reasonable

inferences about where evidence is likely to be kept, based

on the nature of the evidence and the type of offense.”

Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d at 1399. Here, the issuing judge

could reasonably infer that evidence of drug dealing would

likely be found in both Ford’s residence and what was

believed to be his assistant Serrano’s residence, thus making

both the main house and the mobile home suspect. See id.

Based on the informant’s reliability and the probability

that probative evidence or contraband would be found in the

residences on the property, there was probable cause to issue

a warrant authorizing a search of the entire property,

including the mobile home. Because the search warrant’s

breadth was co-extensive with the scope of this probable

cause, the warrant was not overbroad.

B

Blight next argues that the execution of the search

warrant was overbroad because the officers should have

realized there was no probable cause to search her home

once they began the search. Blight claims the officers were

put on notice that searching her home was outside the

warrant’s proper scope when they learned Serrano lived in

the main house, the Blights lived in the mobile home, and

Ford no longer lived on the property.

Officer authority to search property listed in a search

warrant is not unlimited. Mena v. City of Simi Valley,

226 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2000). If officers know or

should know there is a risk that they are searching a

residence that was erroneously included in a search warrant,

BLIGHT V. CITY OF MANTECA 13

then they must stop the search as soon as they are “put on

notice” of that risk. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79,

86–87 (1987).

But here the officers acted reasonably when they

continued to search Blight’s mobile home because the

probable cause to search the mobile home did not depend on

Serrano living there. Instead, the officers had probable cause

to continue the search because they could still reasonably

believe that the entire property was suspect and that the

property was still under Ford’s common control, regardless

of whether he was on the property at the time of the search,

and regardless of who was found in the mobile home. 8 See

8

Blight’s argument is premised on her position that the officers

should have realized—after Serrano walked out of the main house,

Serrano’s wife said that Blight was inside the mobile home, and Ford

was not found anywhere on the property—that the mobile home was the

Blights’ separate residence. But such information did not eliminate the

officers’ basis for believing that Ford controlled the entire property and

that the entire property was suspect. Moreover, to the extent probable

cause to search the mobile home was also linked to the officers’ belief

that Serrano lived there, they were not precluded from making credibility

judgments when faced with new information about that issue from

Serrano’s wife and Blight, each of whom was not disinterested. See

United States v. Ayers, 924 F.2d 1468, 1479–80 (9th Cir. 1991)

(upholding search where officers were told after arriving to execute a

warrant that the suspect no longer lived at the residence); United States

v. Ped, No. 18-50179, 2019 WL 6042813, at *4 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2019)

(holding that probable cause that parolee lived at a particular residence

was not eliminated by statements made by individuals at the residence

that the parolee no longer lived there because “[t]hose statements,

coming from ‘less-than-disinterested source[s], did not undermine the

information the officers previously had received’” (quoting Motley v.

Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1082 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)) (second alteration

in original)).

14 BLIGHT V. CITY OF MANTECA

United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1301 (9th Cir.

1985).

C

Blight argues that her detention for the duration of the

search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment

because of her age, the lack of evidence linking her to the

marijuana operation, and the length of time of the detention.

We hold otherwise.

Officers have categorical authority to detain incident to

a search. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005). A

detention for the duration of a search is generally reasonable

when a warrant exists to search the residence and an

occupant is inside the residence when the search begins.

Franklin v. Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1994). The

detention may be unreasonable if “the detention itself is

improper or because it is carried out in an unreasonable

manner.” Id.

The officers had a warrant to search the mobile home.

Thus, they had categorical authority to detain Blight, the

occupant of the mobile home at the time of the search. The

reasons for such a detention are particularly applicable in the

context of a narcotics search because there is a heightened

risk that an occupant could destroy evidence. And, as

explained above, their probable cause to search the mobile

home was not eliminated at any point after they began the

search, and thus their authority to detain Blight pursuant to

that search was never extinguished.

The officers also did not detain Blight in an unreasonable

manner. Although she was elderly, her age does not make

the detention per se unreasonable. See id. Old age

customarily and traditionally earns a measure of respect

BLIGHT V. CITY OF MANTECA 15

from others, but old age cannot be seen to be a “pass” against

government investigation when the government has

probable cause to believe that an older person’s property

may yield evidence of crime and when the manner of

detention is reasonable under the circumstances.

Turning to examine how Blight herself was treated, we

observe that Blight was never personally searched or

interrogated and that she was detained for the duration of the

search—no longer than one hour—which is not an

unreasonable length of time given the circumstances. For all

of these reasons, the detention was reasonable under the

Fourth Amendment.

D

Blight argues next that the search warrant was tainted by

judicial deception and identifies five allegedly deliberate or

reckless omissions that were material to the issuing judge’s

probable cause determination. We conclude that none of

these alleged omissions amounts to judicial deception.

To make out a claim for judicial deception on summary

judgment, the plaintiff must make a substantial showing that

the defendant made a deliberate or reckless omission that

was material to the finding of probable cause. Chism v.

Washington State, 661 F.3d 380, 386 (9th Cir. 2011).

“Omissions or misstatements resulting from negligence or

good faith mistakes will not invalidate an affidavit which on

its face establishes probable cause.” United States v. Smith,

588 F.2d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 1978).

16 BLIGHT V. CITY OF MANTECA

1

The affidavit stated that no promises or inducements

were made to the informant, but the informant testified that

he or she was “promised” a reduction of prior felony

convictions to misdemeanors if he or she provided

information helpful to further drug investigations. Any

potential discrepancy here is immaterial to the probable

cause determination because, even if the informant had been

promised leniency, there is no reason to think in this case

that such a promise created an incentive for the informant to

provide inaccurate or unreliable information, and there were

sufficient indicia in the search warrant affidavit that the

informant was credible.

2

The affidavit did not mention that the Blights lived on

the property, but the informant had testified that he or she

told that to the detectives. Even if the warrant had included

that information, the issuing judge would still have had a

reasonable basis to find probable cause to search the mobile

home, which was on property controlled by Ford and that

was being used to grow and process marijuana.

3

The affidavit stated that Detective Garcia had located

Ford “living” at 5858 E. Carpenter Road through a “law

enforcement database,” but Blight argues that Garcia had

failed to verify whether Ford was an owner, possessor, or

renter of the property. DMV records and the database

subscribed to by the Manteca Police Department reasonably

constitute law enforcement databases and it was not

necessary to determine with greater precision Ford’s legal

BLIGHT V. CITY OF MANTECA 17

relationship to the property before representing that he lived

there.

4

The affidavit did not mention that Ford owned a second

home in a different city. This omission was immaterial

because a second home is not inconsistent with a marijuana

operation and additional residence in Stockton. A criminal,

like anyone else, can own or control more than one property.

5

The affidavit stated that the entire property to be

searched was located at 5858 E. Carpenter Road, but the

Blights’ mobile home, although sited on the 5858 E.

Carpenter Road parcel, had its own address of 5846 E.

Carpenter Road. Even if the affidavit had included the two

addresses, it would not have affected the probable cause

determination. The issuing judge knew there were two

homes on the property, and a separate address would not

have been inconsistent with Serrano also living in the mobile

home and the fair probability that evidence of crime or

contraband would be found inside.

IV

Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The issuance and execution of the search warrant did not

violate Blight’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from

18 BLIGHT V. CITY OF MANTECA

unreasonable search and seizure. 9 We affirm the district

court’s grant of summary judgment.

AFFIRMED.

9

In light of our holding that, as a matter of law, Blight’s Fourth

Amendment rights were not violated, we need not address whether the

individual Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity on the

basis that the rights at issue were not clearly established at the time of

the incident.