William Sours v. Chad Karr

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 18-2814

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William Scott Sours

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant

v.

Chad Karr, City of Duquesne, MO Police Officer; Tommy Kitch, City of

Duquesne, MO Chief of Police; J. Bland, City of Joplin, MO K-9 Officer; Darren

McIntosh, City of Joplin, MO Police Department Detective

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees

Dean Dankelson, Jasper County Prosecuting Attorney

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant

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Appeal from United States District Court

for the Western District of Missouri - Joplin

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Submitted: December 5, 2019

Filed: December 10, 2019

[Published]

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Before LOKEN, WOLLMAN, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

William Sours appeals the district court’s adverse grant of summary judgment

in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against City of Duquesne police chief Tommy Kitch,

City of Duquesne police officer Chad Karr, and City of Joplin police officers Jeremy

Bland and Darren McIntosh. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, vacate in

part, and remand for further proceedings.

First, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment

on Sours’s official-capacity claims. See Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 997 (8th Cir.

2010) (official-capacity suit against municipal official is suit against municipality);

see also Mick v. Raines, 883 F.3d 1075, 1079-80 (8th Cir. 2018) (de novo review of

grant of summary judgment; discussing municipal liability under § 1983). We further

conclude that Chief Kitch was entitled to summary judgment in his individual

capacity. See Brockinton v. City of Sherwood, 503 F.3d 667, 673 (8th Cir. 2007)

(discussing failure-to-supervise and failure-to-train claims).

Next, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment

on Sours’s claim that Karr violated his rights by conducting a traffic stop of his

vehicle. See United States v. Washington, 455 F.3d 824, 826 (8th Cir. 2006) (traffic

stop is reasonable if it is supported by probable cause or articulable and reasonable

suspicion that traffic violation has occurred). We also conclude that the district court

did not err in granting summary judgment on Sours’s claim that Karr violated his

rights by extending the traffic stop for a drug-dog sniff, because, at the time of the

May 2014 traffic stop, it was not clearly established that the extension of the stop was

unconstitutional. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (official is

entitled to qualified immunity if, at time of violation, it was not clearly established

that conduct was unconstitutional); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 741 F.3d

905, 907 (8th Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015). In addition,

we conclude that Karr and Bland were entitled to summary judgment on Sours’s

claim that they violated his rights by searching his truck. See United States v.

Olivera-Mendez, 484 F.3d 505, 512 (8th Cir. 2007) (alert by reliable drug dog is

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sufficient to establish probable cause for presence of controlled substance; if probable

cause justifies search of lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies search of every part of

vehicle and its contents that may conceal object of search). In addition, McIntosh

was entitled to summary judgment on Sours’s claim related to his arrest on a stolen-

property charge, as it was beyond genuine dispute that, when McIntosh submitted his

probable cause statement, he was aware of facts warranting a belief that Sours had

possessed stolen property. See United States v. Perry, 908 F.3d 1126, 1129 (8th Cir.

2018) (probable cause exists if facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant

person of reasonable caution to believe person to be arrested has committed offense).

Sours also asserted a claim that Karr violated his rights by arresting him for

violating a City of Duquesne obstruction ordinance. We conclude that the district

court did not resolve the issues surrounding that claim with sufficient clarity to allow

for effective appellate review.1 See TriMed, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 608 F.3d 1333,

1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (district court must state its reasons for granting summary

judgment when its underlying holdings would otherwise be ambiguous or

unascertainable); cf. Robbins v. Becker, 715 F.3d 691, 694 (8th Cir. 2013) (district

court must resolve issues surrounding qualified immunity with sufficient clarity to

allow for effective appellate review).

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While we express no opinion as to the merits of this claim, we note that it is

unclear whether the obstruction charge remains pending in the municipal court,

whether the allegedly obstructive conduct occurred in the City of Duquesne, and

whether there was at least arguable probable cause to support the arrest. See Wallace

v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007); Tony Alamo Christian Ministries v. Selig, 664

F.3d 1245, 1249 (8th Cir. 2012); see also Hoyland v. McMenomy, 869 F.3d 644, 652-

58 (8th Cir. 2017); cf. State v. M.L.S., 275 S.W.3d 293, 299 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008)

(interpreting Mo. Rev. Stat. § 576.030).

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Accordingly, we vacate the grant of summary judgment on Sours’s claim that

Karr violated his rights by arresting him for obstruction, remand for further

consideration of that claim, and affirm in all other respects.

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