The opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JAMES DAVID BECK and GERALD DEAN CRUZ,
Defendants and Appellants.
S029843
Alameda County Superior Court
110467-A and 110467-B
December 2, 2019
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Cuéllar,
Kruger, and Groban concurred.
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
S029843
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
Defendants James David Beck and Gerald Dean Cruz
were convicted of the first degree murders of Dennis Ian
Colwell, Emmie Darlene Paris, Franklin Delano Raper, and
Richard Talmadge Ritchey, and of conspiracy to commit
murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 187, subd. (a), former
§ 189 (all further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code).) The jury also found true, as to both Beck and
Cruz, a multiple-murder special-circumstance allegation and
allegations of personal use of a deadly weapon (baseball bats,
knives, and a baton). (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3), former § 12022,
subd. (b).) After separate penalty phases before the same jury,
the jury returned death verdicts — first for Cruz and then for
Beck — and the trial court entered judgments of death. This
appeal is automatic. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11, subd. (a);
§ 1239, subd. (b).)
We vacate as unauthorized the multiple-murder special-
circumstance true findings as to Count V (conspiracy to commit
murder) for Beck and Cruz, as well as the death sentences
imposed for that count. (See post, pt. II.C.5.) As so modified,
we affirm the judgments, including the judgments of death
based on the murders.
1
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
I. FACTS
A. Guilt Phase
Shortly after midnight on the night of May 20, 1990 and
early morning hours of May 21, 1990, Beck, Cruz, Jason
LaMarsh, Ronald Willey, Richard Vieira, and Michelle “Missy”
Evans, entered a house located at 5223 Elm Street in Salida
and killed Colwell, Paris, Raper, and Ritchey. A fifth resident,
Donna Alvarez, escaped the house during the attack and
subsequently identified LaMarsh as one of the perpetrators.
The original complaint charged all six perpetrators, but
the cases of Vieira and Evans were severed. Following a
change of venue from Stanislaus County to Alameda County,
Beck and Cruz were tried with LaMarsh and Willey, but the
jury was unable to reach a verdict on the charges against the
latter two men.
Evans entered a plea agreement under which, as
relevant here, she would plead guilty to being an accessory and
the district attorney would recommend a sentence of one year
(less six months for time served, and further reduced by
conduct and work credits) in exchange for her truthful
testimony at trial against Beck, Cruz, LaMarsh, and Willey.
The crime of accessory carried a maximum term of three years
of imprisonment and a fine not exceeding $5,000.
1. Prosecutor’s evidence
a. Events before May 20
In late 1989, Cruz, his girlfriend Jennifer S., and his two
small children moved into a studio apartment in a residential
area of Salida known as the “Camp.” Around the same time,
Beck and Vieira moved into a large trailer in front of the
studio. At some point, LaMarsh began to date Evans and
2
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
frequently stayed in a smaller trailer located behind Beck and
Vieira. Cruz, Beck, and Vieira often wore camouflage clothing.
In January 1990, Raper, who was about 50 years old,
moved his trailer into the Camp. Raper had several friends
who frequently visited, including Debbie “Little Debbie”
Smelser and James “Fat Cat” Smith. Raper had an
acrimonious relationship with Beck, Cruz, and LaMarsh. Cruz
told an acquaintance before the May 20, 1990 murders that he
would “like to get his hands on” Raper.
At least six weeks before the murders, Beck, Cruz, and
LaMarsh hooked Raper’s trailer to Beck’s van and moved it to
nearby 5223 Elm Street. A group of men, including Beck,
Cruz, Vieira, and LaMarsh, then pushed Raper’s car off the
property. The car was then set on fire.
Tanya Miller, Michelle Evans’s younger half-sister, had
previously lived with Evans at 5223 Elm Street. In April 1990,
while Miller was still living at 5223 Elm Street, she received a
30-day eviction notice. She left her furniture in the house and
moved in with Evans at their grandmother’s house. She
received a three-day notice shortly before the murders, became
anxious to move her furniture, and asked Evans to help her
move.
On Friday, May 18, 1990, about 9:00 p.m., Evans, Cruz,
Beck, LaMarsh, Willey, and Vieira went to 5223 Elm Street to
move out furniture. Cruz brought a 12-pack of beer and shared
it with everyone there, including victims Colwell, Ritchey,
Raper, and Paris. Raper and LaMarsh spoke for about
10 minutes and then briefly engaged in a fistfight. Beck and
Willey then started wrestling with Vieira. No furniture was
moved. After 45 minutes to an hour, Evans and the others
3
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
returned to the Camp. Later that night, Colwell visited the
Camp and was beaten by Beck, Cruz, LaMarsh, Willey, and
Vieira before being permitted to leave.
b. Events on May 20 and May 21, 1990
Around noon on May 20, Smith visited Raper at
5223 Elm Street. Victims Ritchey and Colwell were also there.
Sometime between 1:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m., Smith observed
LaMarsh visit the neighbor next door to Raper.
Sometime on the evening of May 20, Vieira visited Cruz’s
next-door neighbor, Dee Ann Messinger; Vieira was dressed in
camouflage clothes, a dark ski cap that resembled a cap found
at the murder scene, and black boots. He was carrying a silver
or gray bat that resembled the color and length of a bat found
at the murder scene and asked to borrow spray paint.
Around 6:00 p.m. on May 20, Evans visited the Camp.
Cruz asked Evans to draw a floor plan of the house at
5223 Elm Street. As she did so, Cruz sharpened a Ka-Bar
knife, a fixed blade about 10 inches long with serrations on one
side. Cruz also told Evans to call her half-sister Miller and
“tell her not to go home tonight.”
Late at night on May 20, Patricia Badgett was visiting
her boyfriend Willey when he received a telephone call from a
person who sounded like Cruz. Willey lived in Ceres and had
shoulder-length hair. Willey asked Cruz, “Can we move a
different day?” and explained he did not feel well. Willey left a
few minutes later.
Later that evening, Evans, Cruz, Beck, LaMarsh, Willey
(whose hair was in a ponytail), and Vieira gathered in
LaMarsh’s trailer and were given assignments of what to do at
5223 Elm Street. Everyone but Evans and LaMarsh was
4
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
wearing camouflage clothing. Cruz pointed to Evans’s floor
plan, gave each person a specific entrance and time to enter,
and said they should “go and do them all and leave no
witnesses.” Evans understood “do them all” to mean kill them
but did not believe Cruz was serious. Evans was to “count the
people and get them in the living room,” and then open the
back bedroom window for Beck and Vieira. Cruz said if
“anyone didn’t do their job right, they would join the people in
the house.” Cruz also said that if Little Debbie was there,
“she’s his,” and that he hoped Fat Cat was there. Cruz handed
out four paintball or camouflage masks to Beck, Willey, Vieira,
and himself. Cruz said that handguns would not be used
because they were “too noisy.” There was no discussion of
moving furniture.
Around midnight, Evans, Beck, Cruz, LaMarsh, Willey,
and Vieira, who were carrying weapons, drove to 5223 Elm
Street. Evans and LaMarsh were dropped off, and the others
parked the car. Evans entered the home and then from a
window observed Beck, Cruz, Willey, and Vieira running
toward the house wearing masks. Vieira also wore a dark ski
cap. Beck and Vieira entered the house through the window
where Evans was standing. Beck and Vieira ran toward the
living room, and about 30 seconds later Evans heard Paris
screaming, “Oh, God, oh, God,” and “I didn’t do it, I didn’t do
it,” and pleading for her life. Evans left the house and went to
the car. On the way, she saw Willey sitting on the back of a
person lying facedown in the street; Willey and Cruz, who had
a baton, did something to this individual.
Donna Alvarez, who was homeless and had been offered
a place to stay at 5223 Elm Street on May 20 by victim
Ritchey, fell asleep in a back bedroom around 8:00 p.m.
5
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
Alvarez was awakened around midnight by a woman she now
knew as Evans, who said Evans’s sister needed the bedroom
and Alvarez had to get up. Alvarez went into the living room
and asked Raper if there was anywhere else she could sleep.
He said she could sleep wherever she liked, so Alvarez, joined
by Ritchey, went into the other bedroom. A man, whom
Alvarez later identified as LaMarsh, was holding a silver gun
and said, “Everyone into the living room.” Alvarez ran and hid
under clothes in the garage. She heard people “wrestling” and
a woman scream. She managed to push up the garage door
and escape, and sought help from a neighbor who called the
police.
Around midnight, Earl Creekmore, who lived near
5223 Elm Street, heard someone running next to his house and
then a loud bang on his air conditioner. Creekmore went
outside to investigate. He saw two men “beating up on one
guy” on his knees in the street; the victim was screaming, “Oh,
God, help me.” The victim also said, “No, stop, please don’t.”
The assailants were kicking the victim in the ribs and
punching him in the back of the head. One assailant, whom
Creekmore identified at trial as Willey, had a ponytail that
reached the middle of his back. The other, whom Creekmore
identified at trial as Cruz, was heavyset and wore a red
baseball cap.
Creekmore asked the men what was going on, but they
did not respond. Cruz went into the house at 5223 Elm Street
and then immediately returned to the street. By this time, the
beating victim had fallen over and was lying motionless on his
back in the street. Cruz straddled the victim, picked him up by
his shirt, and “made a cutting motion on his throat.” The
victim made a gurgling sound. Creekmore started to leave,
6
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
looked back, and saw Willey swinging what appeared to be a
two-by-four over his head. Creekmore returned home, and his
roommate called 911.
Also around midnight, Kathy Moyers arrived at a friend’s
home, located across the street from 5223 Elm Street. She saw
three people “scuffling” on the shoulder of the street. One
person appeared drunk because he was falling down. When
she exited her car, she heard the man on the ground saying,
“Please don’t, no, please,” and “please, no, help me, stop.” He
was on his knees, and the other two were standing over him.
The other two persons were reaching for the fallen man to pick
him up. One of the assailants had broad shoulders, weighed
about 260 pounds, and was about five feet eight inches tall. He
had on a ski cap and resembled Cruz in size and shape. The
other assailant was smaller, about five feet five inches tall, 145
to 160 pounds, with a light-colored ponytail, and resembled
Willey in size and shape. Moyers called the police. She then
saw the body lying in the street and the assailants entering the
house at 5223 Elm Street.
About four minutes later, Moyers observed four persons
leave the house, including the two assailants and two men
similar in build to Beck and LaMarsh. They were all dressed
alike in heavy, dark clothing, and they wore ski caps similar to
one found at the crime scene. They looked at the body in the
street and walked toward the tracks.
Around 12:45 a.m. on May 21, William Duval, the rental
manager for 5223 Elm Street who lived nearby the home, was
awakened when something hit his bedroom window. He saw a
woman crawling on her hands and knees across his lawn. He
went outside and a few minutes later observed four men
7
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
leaving 5223 Elm Street in single file, going east “double-time”
or “trotting.” They all appeared to be dressed the same. The
two men at the front of the line were six feet to six feet two
inches, and weighed about 165 pounds. Beck’s and Willey’s
physical builds were consistent with these men. The third
man was five feet ten inches to six feet tall and heavyset,
weighing about 350 pounds. Cruz’s physical appearance was
consistent with this man. The last man was much shorter and
had a darker complexion than the other men. LaMarsh’s
general physical build was consistent with the last man.
LaMarsh and Vieira had the same complexion, but Vieira was
a bit shorter. The men held their hands at “port arms
position,” or one hand on the chest, and the other toward the
shoulder; Duval could not tell if they were carrying anything.
When Beck, Cruz, LaMarsh, Willey, and Vieira returned
to the car where Evans was waiting, Beck was covered in blood
and carrying a bloody knife, Cruz had blood on his hands, and
LaMarsh’s bat was bloody. The group drove to Willey’s home
in Ceres. On the way, LaMarsh said he did not think Raper
was dead, and Beck replied, “He’s dead. I saw his face crumble
as I was walking out the door.” Beck also said it was a “waste
that they only got three dudes and a chick.” Willey said,
“Someone watched us do” or kill “the guy in the front yard,”
and Cruz became angry because they did not kill the person
watching. Vieira said he had thrown away the Ka-Bar knife,
his bat, and the baton. LaMarsh wanted to throw his bat out
the window, but Cruz said he should keep it. Cruz was
disappointed Little Debbie and Fat Cat had not been there
because he would have liked to kill them.
When the group arrived at Willey’s house, everyone but
Evans and LaMarsh laundered their clothes. Vieira said he
8
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
left his hat at the crime scene, and Vieira and Willey said they
had left their masks. Cruz directed Vieira to clean the blood
off Cruz’s shoes and from the car. The remaining masks and
weapons were put under Willey’s house. Willey later moved
the weapons from this location.
Evans subsequently asked LaMarsh what he saw inside
the house, and he appeared frightened and said, “Missy, it was
the worst thing you ever want to see.” LaMarsh described
Raper raising his arm and LaMarsh then hitting Raper with
the bat and breaking his arm. LaMarsh also said he had
knocked down with the bat three individuals who were
attempting to flee the home.
About 1:00 am on May 21, 1990, Stanislaus County
Deputy Sheriff Charley Corle received a call regarding an
assault in the area of Elm and Mason in Salida. He arrived
about four minutes later, saw an ambulance next to a body
lying in the street, and was directed by Alvarez to 5223 Elm
Street. A blood-stained camouflage mask was found between
Ritchey’s legs, and a dark knit cap and a second camouflage
mask were found on the front lawn of 5223 Elm Street. Shoe
prints in the gutter area in front of the house were the same
size and type as shoes belonging to Evans.
Found nearby in a field and in the same general area
were a metal baton, a bloody aluminum bat, and a Ka-Bar
knife. About 15 feet from the knife was a knife sheath.
c. Additional evidence linking Beck and Cruz to
the murders
Shortly after the murders, Beck told an acquaintance,
Phillip Wallace, that “we” or “I” “slit some throats.” Wallace
9
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
was shocked and said something like, “You’re not serious.”
Beck smirked.
Sylvia Zavala worked at Crescent Supply Company, an
Army surplus store in Modesto that Beck and Cruz had
previously visited. On February 27, 1990, Zavala showed Cruz
camouflage masks that were similar to one found at the
murder scene. A store receipt for the purchase on that date of
four masks and camouflage clothing was found in Cruz’s home.
Sometime after February 27 and before March 13, Cruz
purchased 16-by-16-foot camouflage netting. On March 13,
1990, Cruz purchased a Ka-Bar knife similar to one found at
the murder scene; a receipt for the purchase on that date of
two knives was found in Cruz’s home.
Steve Miller worked at Gun Country, a retail gun shop in
Modesto. Cruz and the prosecutor stipulated that several
weeks before the murders, Cruz purchased the police baton
found at the murder scene. Cruz was accompanied by Beck.
The parties also stipulated that Exhibit No. 87, a .380-caliber
weapon that resembled the gun Alvarez saw LaMarsh holding
on the night of the murders, was purchased on July 25, 1989
and registered to Beck.
Dr. William Ernoehazy, a pathologist, performed
autopsies on Raper, Colwell, Paris, and Ritchey. Raper had
suffered extensive and fatal head injuries by a blunt force
instrument, most likely a baseball bat but possibly a baton.
The outline of his head and his facial features were distorted,
and bone fragments had been driven deep into his brain. He
had also been stabbed in the neck, with his right carotid artery
and larynx cut, and his left arm was broken.
10
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
Colwell had suffered a skull fracture, cut and stab
wounds to his face, multiple stab wounds to his skull, stabbing
and slicing wounds to his neck that cut his jugular vein,
carotid artery, and larynx, a slicing wound to his liver, stab
wounds to his chest, and defensive wounds to his left hand.
The cause of death was stab wounds to the neck and abdomen.
Paris had suffered multiple contusions and lacerations of
her scalp from a blunt force instrument, stab wounds to her
neck and chest, and defensive hand wounds. The cause of
death was a severed throat, a wound that cut her carotid
vessels, jugular vein, and larynx, and extended down to her
spine.
Ritchey had suffered stab wounds to his neck, back,
abdomen, and liver, and multiple defensive wounds on his
hands. There were slicing wounds of his heart and pulmonary
artery that caused extensive hemorrhaging in his chest cavity.
His jugular vein, windpipe, and carotid artery were cut; these
wounds extended down to the cervical vertebrae. Either the
stab wound to his chest or his severed neck would have caused
death.
Department of Justice Crime Laboratory Criminalist
Marianne Vick testified that blood on the baton was consistent
with Colwell’s blood, blood on the bat and the Ka-Bar knife was
consistent with Paris’s blood, and blood on one of the
camouflage masks was consistent with Ritchey’s blood.
2. Defense evidence
Cruz, Beck, LaMarsh, and Willey each testified in their
own defense.
11
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
a. Cruz
1. Cruz’s testimony
Cruz denied killing anyone on the night of May 20, 1990,
or conspiring to kill anyone on May 20 or in the preceding
days. On cross-examination, Cruz testified that in January
1990, Raper’s trailer appeared at the Camp about 50 feet from
Cruz’s home. Fat Cat, Little Debbie, and Colwell frequently
visited Raper. Raper was verbally abusive and uncooperative,
and Cruz was disturbed by the frequent fights and visible drug
use.
Raper had been arrested for tearing down Cruz’s fence.
Raper threatened Cruz by giving him an “evil eye” and saying,
“Better not press charges.”
Cruz, Beck, and others moved Raper’s trailer out of the
Camp after a child was seen playing with a discarded syringe.
After Raper left, his car was moved out of the Camp and
burned, but Cruz denied involvement.
Sometime after Raper’s car was burned, Raper — while
on the other side of a fence from Cruz — pulled a knife on Cruz
in front of Jennifer and Cruz’s children and told Cruz “he was
going to kill” him. Cruz could not recall whether he had
reported this incident to the police. Raper returned to the
Camp several times after making the threat. On one occasion,
he stood at the end of the driveway and yelled obscenities
“towards” Cruz and said he would kill Cruz “pretty soon,”
“[m]aybe today,” “[m]aybe tomorrow.” Raper then crossed the
street, stood completely still, and watched Cruz for a long time.
Cruz did not recall reporting this incident to the police.
About a month before May 20, 1990, Cruz began to hear
that the Camp might encounter problems with Raper’s biker
12
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
friends. In response, Cruz, Beck, and Vieira performed armed
patrols of the Camp perimeter. Cruz reported this information
at some point to the Sheriff.
Before the murders, Cruz had been to 5223 Elm Street
once. A week or some days before the murders, he went to the
home with Beck, Evans, Willey, LaMarsh, and Vieira to help
move a refrigerator and furniture; the group brought a 12-pack
of beer as a goodwill gesture. At different points during the
visit, Raper, Colwell, Ritchey, and Paris were there, as well as
Little Debbie and a woman named Diane Kiernan. Cruz
denied Colwell was beaten later that night.
On the evening on May 20, Evans told Cruz she needed
to retrieve some clothes, including a bridal gown that was an
heirloom, from 5223 Elm Street, and wanted Cruz and others
to accompany her for protection. Evans did not draw a
diagram of the house. Also that evening, Evans told Cruz that
Raper had threatened to kill Cruz and her, and said that
“Raper was sharpening knives.” Evans used “crank” (i.e.,
methamphetamine) and greatly disliked Raper and Paris.
Around midnight, Cruz, Beck, LaMarsh, Willey, Vieira,
and Evans, some of whom were armed, drove to 5223 Elm
Street. Cruz saw no one with a gun, black watch cap, or mask.
Cruz dropped off Evans and LaMarsh near 5223 Elm
Street and then parked where his car would not be noticed by
Raper’s friends. Beck, Willey, and Vieira got out of the car and
suddenly started running toward the victims’ house. Cruz
heard someone say something like “what’s up” and “he’s gone
crazy.” He assumed at the time of his testimony this had been
Earl Creekmore. Cruz exited the vehicle and started walking
with a cane toward the house. He saw Willey and a person he
13
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
later learned was Ritchey fighting in the middle of the street.
They were “rolling around, socking each other.” Cruz told
Willey, “Let’s go,” but Willey and Ritchey continued fighting.
Cruz entered the house and saw Raper sitting in a chair
“look[ing] like what’s on the film”; he did not move and did not
look to be in “good shape.” Cruz’s attention was diverted by
Beck pulling Colwell off Vieira and throwing him. Cruz told
Beck that somebody was “out there by Ron,” and Beck ran out
the front door. Vieira and Colwell continued fighting. Cruz
yelled, “Let’s go now,” and Evans “pop[ped] up” from behind
the counter. Vieira pulled out his Ka-Bar knife, and Cruz
turned away. Cruz asserted he was not physically capable of
fighting another individual on the night of the murders and
denied stabbing any of the victims, hitting Raper on the head,
or directing Vieira to cut Paris’s throat.
Cruz left the house, and later the entire group returned
to the car and drove off; Willey asked to be taken home. There
was no conversation. At Willey’s house, Cruz saw blood on
Evans’s face, and her hair was matted. Cruz denied he
“order[ed] anyone about” and specifically denied ordering
Vieira to clean blood off Cruz’s shoes or to clean the blood out
of the car on the night of the murders.
Cruz called Jennifer and told her to get out of town and
to meet him at an Oakdale hotel. Cruz, Beck, and Vieira left
Willey’s house and joined Jennifer at the Oakdale Motel. Cruz
did not call the police to report what had happened because he
would then “be involved.”
Cruz met with Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Detective
Gary Deckard on May 21, 1990 and denied being at 5223 Elm
Street on the night of the murders. Cruz asserted he did not
14
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
believe in the use of deadly force except in self-defense. He did
not like violence and did not want to see anybody get hurt.
2. Physical evidence
Detective Deckard testified he had seized Cruz’s cane
from him, visually inspected it, and saw no evidence of the
presence of blood.
Apparently in an effort to demonstrate that Cruz did not
match witness descriptions of the perpetrator, Stanislaus
County Sheriff’s Detective Darrel Freitas testified that at the
time of his arrest, Cruz weighed 350 pounds.
Stanislaus County Deputy Sheriff Michael Dulaney
testified he arrived at 5223 Elm Street at about 2:30 a.m. on
the morning of May 21, 1990. He did not bag the hands of
Raper, Paris, or Colwell because the coroner said that it was
unnecessary to do so. He did not collect into evidence a knife
with food particles found in the kitchen because it appeared
unrelated to the murders. Deputy Dulaney also attended the
autopsies of the four victims and did not observe the
pathologist taking fingernail scrapings.
3. Prior witness statements
Detective Freitas testified that when he spoke to Kathy
Moyers on May 21, 1990, she told him that all of the
individuals she observed were large and wearing dark clothing.
Moyers was with another person and appeared hesitant to
speak with Detective Freitas. Earl Creekmore said that he
saw two individuals, and one was larger than the other. One
had a long ponytail, was about six feet one inch tall, and
weighed about 170 pounds, and was beating someone on the
ground. The other was about six feet three inches tall,
15
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
weighed about 250 pounds, had short hair, and was wearing a
baseball cap.
4. Evans impeachment
Detective Deckard testified he had interviewed Evans
four times. On October 12, 1990, after Evans reached a plea
agreement with the district attorney’s office, she made a
complete statement to Detective Deckard. After testifying at
the preliminary hearing, Evans called Detective Deckard to
say that she now recalled she had been carrying a small
survival knife on the night of the murders. Evans appeared
concerned this information might affect her plea bargain.
Michelle Mercer, who was 18 years old, testified that she
had known Evans for 10 to 15 years, and that Evans was “not
well liked in the community” and had a reputation for violence
and dishonesty. About a week before the murders, Mercer had
observed Evans and Paris partially undressed and kissing. In
June 1991, Evans told Mercer she had been involved in killing
Paris and described in detail to Mercer “how they sliced
[Paris’s] throat and she loved every minute of what Raper got.”
Evans said she had “watched Franklin die, and . . . it was kind
of neat.” Evans was concerned that Mercer was going to
assault Evans’s little sister and threatened Mercer, saying that
she “still had friends out there that could take care of [her]
too.”
James Richardson testified that Evans had been a friend
since childhood. In May 1990, Evans told Richardson that she
had watched the murders the night before and had laughed as
she did so. She also said she had planned the murders.
Richardson said Evans had a reputation for being untruthful
and “exaggerated a lot.”
16
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Detective Mark Ottoboni
interviewed Evans on May 22, 1990, and she appeared to be
under the influence of Valium or alcohol. Evans said on the
night of the murders she had seen Paris hiding under the
kitchen table. Someone approached Paris who was of small
stature, was of Mexican descent, and was wearing camouflage
clothing and a mask. Evans also said that Colwell was beaten
up outside and that Beck was not at 5223 Elm Street during
the murders. Evans made several conflicting statements
during this interview. At some point Detective Ottoboni
caused Evans and Beck to be placed in a room together and
surreptitiously observed they had a whispered discussion
about the murders.
5. Raper
Cruz introduced certain testimony regarding alleged
illegal activity by Raper, apparently to demonstrate that Raper
could be violent. On April 16, 1990, at about 9:45 a.m.,
Stanislaus County Deputy Sheriff Bryan Grimm met with
Cruz at 4510 Finney Road and took an initial report of a
disturbance. Deputy Grimm returned later that day in
response to a call, and Cruz showed him a damaged fence.
Cruz made a citizen’s arrest of Raper, and Deputy Grimm
accepted the arrest and took Raper to jail. Deputy Grimm was
required to accept a citizen arrest regardless of its validity.
Raper told Deputy Grimm he had the money to post bail, and
he could then “be back on the street to harass” Cruz. Raper
was not hostile or violent in any way to Deputy Grimm.
In about February 1990, Robert Bowers, who had rented
Cruz the studio apartment at the Camp, hired Cruz to manage
the Camp. Cruz did not collect rent and was not authorized to
17
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
evict Raper. Raper did not have a lease agreement with
Bowers. Bowers received complaints about an unauthorized
trailer at the Camp, but did not know the occupant, and took
no steps to remove it. On cross-examination, he testified he
did not know Beck, Vieira, and LaMarsh were living there, and
their trailers would have also been illegal.
Greg Boynton had an automotive repair store in Salida.
At some point Raper moved his trailer onto a vacant lot next to
Boynton’s business. Raper was about 50 years old, about five
feet seven inches tall, and weighed about 100 pounds. Raper
and Boynton had an altercation in which Raper spoke
disrespectfully about Boynton’s father, and Boynton pushed
Raper down. Several days later, on October 13, 1989, Raper
and another man, perhaps named Fat Cat, arrived in a vehicle
and confronted Boynton, saying Fat Cat was going to kill
Boynton. Raper and Fat Cat then spun donuts in the vacant
lot until their car stalled, and they were beaten by Boynton
and his father James Boynton. James Boynton then had
Raper’s trailer moved. Thereafter he saw Raper frequently in
Salida. Raper said that “he was going to get” James Boynton
and would “holler or cuss” at him, making insulting gestures.
On August 18, 1989, about 4:00 a.m., Stanislaus County
Sergeant Jane Irwin encountered Raper sitting in his car in
Salida. She observed a knife handle and, when backup
arrived, she removed Raper from the car and searched it.
Raper was belligerent, refused to put his hands up, and told
officers to “[g]o ahead and shoot me.” He was carrying an ice
pick, and a razor and knives were found in his car. He did not
resist arrest.
18
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
b. Beck
Beck testified he was close friends with Cruz and Vieira
and had lived with Rosemary M. in Oakdale. On May 20,
1990, Beck was 34 years old and weighed about 260 pounds.
That evening at the Camp, Evans told Beck and Cruz
that she had gone to 5223 Elm Street earlier to retrieve certain
items. Raper refused to let her take the items and said he and
his friends were going to go to the Camp and kill Evans and
those with whom she associated there. “A little later” Beck
drove to Ceres and picked up Willey to “help us protect
ourselves.” They returned to the Camp about 11:30 p.m. and
found Cruz, Evans, LaMarsh, and Vieira there. Evans said it
was urgent she retrieve a wedding gown and other clothes from
5223 Elm Street and asked that someone accompany her so
that Raper would not again interfere. There was no discussion
of “leaving no witnesses,” and no weapons were distributed.
No map of 5223 Elm Street was drawn, nor did Evans orally
describe the house layout.
The entire group went “in case something happened, so
they wouldn’t be caught so then they couldn’t get out.”
Although Beck was concerned for his life, he was not armed
when he and the others went to the Elm Street house.
Evans and LaMarsh were dropped off at the Elm Street
house and left the car carrying bats. After the car was parked
in a different location, Beck, Vieira, and Willey got out and
began walking toward the house. They heard a girl scream,
and the three men ran toward the house. When Willey, who
was ahead of Beck, reached the yard, he was confronted by a
man and they began to fight. Beck followed Vieira into the
house and observed LaMarsh holding a baseball bat and
19
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
standing in front of Raper. Raper was sitting down and Beck
watched his body “slump[] down.” Beck was “shock[ed],” stood
there briefly, and then moved toward noises in the house. He
saw Vieira and Colwell struggling. Vieira’s back was on the
floor, and Colwell was on top of Vieira. Beck hit Colwell
“pretty good” a “few times” on his back and then threw him
several feet into the cupboards. Beck observed Evans on top of
victim Paris, punching her.
Cruz said someone was “out there by” Willey, so Beck ran
outside. He observed Willey “standing over there by a guy
laying down there on the ground,” and “some guy walking off.”
Beck told Willey, “Let’s go,” and Willey started running to the
car. Cruz exited the house, and he and Beck walked back to
the car. Evans and Vieira ran past them. No one walked in
single file. Beck and Cruz were the last members of the group
to return to the car. They drove to Willey’s house. Beck denied
saying, “[O]nly three guys and a chick, what a waste,” having a
bloody arm, or waving around a knife. He saw no weapons,
other than the bats, and no blood on anyone. Beck had never
seen Cruz run, and he did not run the night of the murders.
Beck did not know anyone had died on Sunday night until late
Monday morning or early afternoon.
Beck denied killing anyone, cutting anyone’s throat, or
doing anything wrong on the night of May 20. Beck was
present, but denied fighting with victim Colwell when Colwell
visited the Camp two nights before the murders. He denied
telling Phillip Wallace he had cut someone’s throat. He
identified a mask found at the crime scene as the type of mask
he had seen in Cruz’s home.
20
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
Beck was arrested the night after the murders. He was
untruthful in his statement to police because he did not want
to “get [his] friends in trouble.”
c. LaMarsh
LaMarsh testified that he met Beck, Cruz, and Vieira
about two months before the murders. Soon after, while at the
Camp, LaMarsh heard someone yelling and saw Beck standing
at attention with Vieira standing at attention behind him, and
Cruz next to Beck. Cruz yelled at Vieira that he was “going to
have to learn more responsibility.” Cruz then said, “Okay,
Dave,” and Beck “socked” Vieira. Vieira “doubled over and fell
on the ground,” and Beck said, “Get up.” Vieira stood up and
was crying.
Cruz, Beck, and Vieira appeared to be a survivalist
group. During LaMarsh’s first conversation with Cruz, Cruz
showed him about 30 weapons. Cruz, Beck, Vieira, and Willey
invited LaMarsh to their group by having LaMarsh cut himself
and leave a bloody print on a piece of paper. About the time
Cruz had Raper arrested for pulling up a fence signpost, Cruz
told LaMarsh, “[I]t would be a lot easier if they had just went
in the trailer and did him” or killed Raper “than going through
all this hassle.”
On the night of May 20, LaMarsh returned to his trailer
about 11:30 p.m. Cruz, Evans, and Vieira visited, and Evans
said they were going to 5223 Elm Street so that Evans could
retrieve some of her clothes and items that belonged to her
half-sister Miller. Evans asked LaMarsh to accompany her
into the house. LaMarsh brought a bat in case “there was any
problems,” along with a gun Cruz had lent him two weeks
earlier. LaMarsh did not agree to beat anyone up. He was told
21
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
“nothing about murder” or that “they were going to kill
anybody.”
Once at 5223 Elm Street, LaMarsh encountered Raper
and broke his arm in self-defense. Cruz then hit Raper several
times on the head with his baton. LaMarsh saw Beck stab
Colwell in the stomach. LaMarsh fled out a window because
“all hell had broken loose and these guys were in there doing
serious shit.”
After the murders, in the car on the way to Willey’s
house, Cruz asked Evans how many people were in the house,
and she said there were five. Cruz asked Beck, “Well, how
many did we get?” Beck said, “Four,” and Cruz said, “Fuck,”
and was angry that one person had escaped. Cruz then asked
Beck, “[W]ho all did we get?” Beck replied, “Dennis [Colwell],
some dude, a chick, and Frank [Raper].” Cruz said, “[T]hey’re
all dead, aren’t they?” Beck replied, “Yeah.” LaMarsh said,
“Well, Frank [Raper] ain’t dead.” Beck laughed and said:
“He’s dead. I seen his face crumble on the way out the door.”
At Willey’s house, Cruz ordered Vieira to clean the blood
off Cruz’s shoes and to clean the car; Vieira did so. Beck had
fresh scratches on his stomach. Cruz told Beck, “We’re going to
have to get an alibi.”
Rosemary testified she had known Beck and Cruz for
about seven years and Vieira for about five years, and she had
lived with them for about two years. Rosemary and Beck had
been romantically involved. Beck and Cruz told Vieira what to
do, and Vieira would do it “on command” and be “very
obedient,” including standing at attention for long periods of
time. Cruz was the leader, even when Beck, Cruz, and
Rosemary lived in Beck’s home, and Beck and Rosemary
22
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
obeyed him. Beck and Jennifer were allowed to object, but
Rosemary had never seen Beck refuse to do something Cruz
wanted him to do. Beck and Cruz would not “physically hurt
anybody” but would “tell them that’s the way it was going to
be.” Rosemary, Beck, Vieira, and a man named Steven Perkins
were the ones in the household who were employed, but Beck
and Cruz received all of their earnings. Beck, Cruz, and Vieira
were nice to LaMarsh to get him to join their group, and
Rosemary had observed them attempt to similarly recruit
other members.
On the evening of May 20, 1990, Cruz called Rosemary
and asked that she and her boyfriend, Phillip Wallace, come
over, and that Rosemary stay with Jennifer. He said, “[T]he
guys were going to go even a score, get in a fight” at a house
“on the other side of the park there” in Salida. Cruz said he
wanted to settle a score with Fat Cat.
The following evening, Beck visited Rosemary. Beck was
wearing brand new sneakers. When asked by the prosecutor
whether Beck had mentioned doing anything to the people who
were killed, Rosemary testified that Beck said, “[T]hey had to
do them.” Beck also said Vieira had been ordered to clean the
blood off “everybody’s shoes at Ron Wi[l]ley’s house.” He
smiled and said he had purchased new shoes because his were
covered in blood and he could not get them clean.
d. Willey
Willey testified he had known Beck and Cruz since 1985.
In 1986 he attended a one-year trade school in Phoenix, and
when he returned to California in 1987, his relationship with
Beck and Cruz had changed. Beck and Cruz were “best
friends,” Cruz “was the one that was running the show,” and
23
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
Beck “always did whatever [Cruz] said.” Cruz told Vieira how
to act, when he could go to bed, and what he could do when he
was awake. Beck, to a lesser extent, also gave orders to Vieira.
If Vieira did not act as expected, Beck would slap him on the
back of his head or punch him in the stomach. Sometimes
Cruz told Beck to inflict pain on Vieira.
In the beginning of May 1990, Cruz called Willey and
invited him over to the Camp. Willey had not had any contact
with Cruz for about eight months and did not know where he
lived. At some point after Willey arrived, a group including
Willey, LaMarsh (whom Willey met that night), Beck, and
Cruz, gathered in a small trailer. Cruz had LaMarsh sign a
piece of paper, cut his hand and place a bloody fingerprint on
the paper, and said that he was joining their group. Willey
had engaged in a similar ritual in 1985.
On May 20, about 11:15 p.m., Cruz called Willey and
asked him to help move furniture from 5223 Elm Street. After
they arrived at the home, Willey had a fistfight with Ritchey
outside. Beck suddenly knocked Willey off Ritchey, fell on
Ritchey, and slit Ritchey’s throat. Later at Willey’s house,
Evans and LaMarsh appeared nervous and frightened. Willey
did not kill anyone and did not know anyone was going to be
killed that night.
3. Rebuttal
Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Lieutenant Myron Larson
testified he searched Cruz’s home on May 21, 1990 after the
murders but did not find a Ka-Bar knife or camouflage masks.
Detective Deckard similarly testified that he had examined all
the evidence found in Cruz’s home, and there were no masks.
24
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
4. Cruz surrebuttal
Pete Rarick testified he had previously been married to
Rosemary. Rosemary had lied to Rarick, and he did not trust
her.
B. Penalty Phase
Many of the testifying individuals shared the same
surname, so for clarity, we use first names to identify certain
witnesses.
1. Prosecutor’s case against Cruz
Jennifer, Cruz’s former girlfriend and the mother of his
three children, testified. Jennifer met and moved in with Cruz
in 1987 when she was about 16 years old and he was 25 years
old. Jennifer had known Vieira and Steven Perkins, another
person who had lived with Jennifer and Cruz, for about the
same amount of time she had known Cruz. On about
25 occasions between 1987 and 1990, Cruz made Vieira stand
in the middle of the room and punched him in the stomach as
hard as he could. Cruz told Vieira to “stand still and take it.”
Cruz performed a similar ritual about 50 times against
Perkins, at least once causing injuries that sent Perkins to the
hospital.
Cruz also on several occasions and without warning used
a Scorpion stun gun on Vieira; Vieira would scream and jump.
Cruz twice used the stun gun on Jennifer. Cruz once placed a
loaded long-barreled rifle in Rosemary’s mouth and threatened
to kill her. On that same occasion Cruz also placed the rifle in
Jennifer’s mouth and asked, “Are you going to get your shit
together or are you going to die?”
On January 6, 1990, when Jennifer was about two
months pregnant, Cruz pushed her to the ground. He then
25
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
kicked her in the stomach and between her legs, causing
bleeding. Jennifer fled barefoot and without a jacket to a
woman’s shelter for four days. Cruz asked Jennifer to return
and was kind to her, so she moved back in with him.
During their relationship, Cruz struck Jennifer about
100 times with a cane or other object. Whenever Cruz thought
Jennifer had “got[ten] out of line” or the couple fought, Cruz
would threaten to kill her. Cruz also told Jennifer the “only
way out of this relationship is when one of us dies.”
Cruz hit their infant daughter A. on her legs or bottom
with a fly swatter or a ruler. When A. was less than six
months old, Cruz punished A. by placing her in a dark room
and allowing Jennifer to feed, hold, or change her only every
six hours. When Jennifer objected to this treatment, Cruz beat
her. When A. was less than a year old, Cruz would suspend
her in a halter in the middle of a device he called the “rack,”
and attach to her legs Mason jars filled with water. He would
then make her cry so that her legs would go up and down.
Cruz also gave their daughter “clappings” in which he would
slap the back or side of her head with his open hand leaving
bruises on the inside of her ears. When A. was learning to
walk, Cruz found it humorous to ask A. if she wanted a
clapping, and watch her respond by falling to the ground and
hiding her head between her hands.
On cross-examination, Jennifer testified that at some
point after Raper had been moved out of the Camp, he had
returned and threatened to kill Cruz. On the night of May 20,
Evans told Cruz something similar to that “Raper was coming
over that night with some people to wipe everybody out.”
26
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
The parties stipulated that an agreement had been made
between Jennifer and the district attorney’s office that if
Jennifer testified truthfully in various proceedings, including
the Cruz penalty phase, two felony cases pending against her
would be dismissed.
2. Cruz defense case
a. Family and friends
Cruz and several of his relatives testified on his behalf,
and their recollections of his childhood and identification of
who was in which familial role were at times inconsistent.
Cruz presented evidence that he had been confused while
growing up as to who his biological parents were and that he
had experienced several situations in which he was
disappointed by the response of medical or law enforcement
personnel.
Cruz was born in Modesto in March 1962. Hortencia
Cruz, Cruz’s mother, testified that his father was Ausencio
Cruz. Because Ausencio had gone to Mexico and had not
returned, Hortencia put the name of a friend — Lawrence
Jimmy Cox — on Cruz’s birth certificate. At that time, the
family lived on a ranch in Oakdale owned by Drummond
Augustus Sproul and performed chores for him, apparently in
exchange for housing.
When Cruz was a young boy, he was told by Jesus
Hernandez, Hortencia’s former husband, that Ausencio was
not his father and that his father was a “drunk.” Cruz then
confirmed with Hortencia that she was his mother, and said,
“Well, as long as I know who my mother is, I don’t care who my
father is.”
27
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
Hortencia worked hard to provide for her children, and
Cruz never went without food or clothing. Hortencia and
Ausencio raised Cruz to tell the truth and to know right from
wrong. He rarely misbehaved or was physically disciplined.
He enjoyed playing with the many sheepdogs on the ranch and
running through the fields. He and Ausencio played together
and would “come home happy and laughing.” Cruz enjoyed
reading throughout his childhood.
Ausencio Cruz testified that he married Hortencia in
1961. Cruz was Ausencio’s only child. He learned he had a son
when Cruz was two years old. When Ausencio returned from
Mexico, Cruz had a different last name, so Ausencio was
advised to adopt him. He was not advised to get an amended
birth certificate.
Ausencio and Cruz were very close, and Ausencio
watched him play Little League Baseball, took him to Oakland
Athletics’ baseball games and to the movies, and taught him
how to drive. Ausencio did not believe Cruz had “anything to
do with all of that,” apparently referring to the capital crimes,
and if he did, Ausencio would “love him more.” If Cruz
received the death penalty, Ausencio would “feel like dying.”
Esperanza Hope Castillo Cruz (Hope), Cruz’s half-sister,
also testified that Hortencia was Cruz’s biological mother and
Ausencio was his biological father. When Cruz was born, Hope
was about 21 years old and a partner in a restaurant. The
family ran the restaurant for five or six months from 1961 to
1962 and during the day kept baby Cruz in a bun drawer.
After they left the restaurant, the family worked picking fruit
in Fresno from 1962 to 1964 and slept on a mattress placed
next to their car.
28
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
Ausencio returned from Mexico and was surprised to
learn he had a two-year-old son (Cruz). When Cruz was about
three years old, the family settled in Oakdale on Sproul’s
ranch. They worked on the ranch and it was a “beautiful time”
for the family. Sproul loved Cruz and spent significant time
with him. In 1970, the family purchased a large trailer to live
in on the ranch and, in 1976, purchased a house in Oakdale.
When Cruz was about six months old, Hope dropped him
and he hit his head on a concrete porch. He cried, had a bump,
and was uncomfortable that day. They could not afford to take
him to a doctor. Hope did not observe any lasting effects other
than that Cruz was not interested in taking a bottle for an
unspecified period of time. When Cruz was about four years
old, he went through a windshield when the car in which he
was riding stopped suddenly. He was stunned and weak after
the accident. The family thought he was “okay” and did not
consider the injury serious.
Hope had seen Jennifer frequently slap A. and once
throw her outside. Hope had never seen Cruz mistreat A.
Hope did not believe Cruz had done “these terrible acts,”
but even if he had, she would still love him.
Marlene Hernandez, Cruz’s half-sister, testified she was
14 years old when Cruz was born. Hope had been gone for a
period of time before she came home with baby Cruz, and said
someone had given her Cruz to care for. Marlene recalled
battles between her mother and Hope as to who would care for
Cruz, and the two women were “screaming at him all the
time.” Marlene saw Cruz disciplined with a switch, rope, iron
cord, and a hanger.
29
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
Marlene left her mother’s home when she was about
14 years old to live with her father in Los Angeles County, but
occasionally visited her mother. When Cruz was about
14 years old, he visited Marlene. He was well-mannered and
did not seem disturbed in any way. Marlene told him that his
mother was Hope, and his father was a man named Jim Cox.
At some point Hortencia’s pet canary was eaten by a cat,
and Hortencia slit open a cat’s stomach to see if the bird was
inside. When Cruz was about 17 years old, Hortencia was
angry that a neighbor’s dog had wandered into her yard, and
she cut off its back legs with an axe.
Marlene loved Cruz but believed the death penalty would
be fair.
Hope testified that Ausencio did not know that Hope and
her siblings were Hortencia’s children; they were referred to as
her nieces and nephews so that Ausencio would not learn
Hortencia had previously been married. Similarly, Armando
Hernandez, who was Cruz’s half-brother and who was about
24 years older than Cruz, testified that Hortencia told
Armando not to call her “Mom” because Ausencio did not know
she had been previously married. Ausencio thought that
Armando was a “friend.” Marlene similarly testified that in
1979 or 1981, Hortencia told her not to call her “[M]om” or
“mother” when Ausencio was around because he believed
Hortencia was Marlene’s aunt and that Marlene’s mother had
died. Marlene was never permitted to discuss her father.
Sharon Dennis, Cruz’s fourth grade teacher, knew him as
Gerald Cox and described him as “pretty bright” and a “good
reader,” but an unambitious student who preferred to engage
in activities other than schoolwork. It frustrated Dennis that
30
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
Cruz did not apply himself. He was not a troublemaker, and
she did not recall him as unkempt or dirty. In testimony from
an evidentiary hearing that was read into the record, Dennis
described being told by a school faculty member that Cruz
lived with his mother and sister but did not know that his
mother was actually his grandmother and his sister was his
mother. The information was not “idle gossip” but given in
confidence to Dennis to assist her in evaluating any problems
with Cruz in class or any emotional problems. She did not
believe this information was common knowledge, and she
never heard it discussed by other teachers or children.
Cruz testified that he first learned that his last name
might be Cox when he was in the first grade and his teacher
referred to him by that name. Until then he had thought his
last name was Cruz. Cruz was teased in school about not
having a father and about his hair and clothes. In the third or
fourth grade, he returned to the classroom during recess and
overhead his teacher and another person “saying . . . it was a
question . . . who [his] mom was.” Cruz immediately left.
Ausencio told Cruz that Hortencia had had a sister who died
and that all the other children in the home were Hortencia’s
nieces and nephews.
Cruz rarely completed a full elementary school year
because his family traveled and he neglected assignments to be
performed while he was away from school. He had no friends
in elementary school until the fourth grade.
Cruz believed he had been treated unfairly in elementary
school. On one occasion, his teacher left his class unsupervised
for an extended period of time and then spanked him in front
of the class because he went to the restroom while she was
31
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
gone. On another occasion, he was disciplined for throwing
sawdust at children who had beaten and bullied him, but the
other children received no discipline. On cross-examination,
Cruz agreed with the prosecutor that it was common for
children to be teased at school but that in his view he was
teased excessively. At some point Cruz was hit in the head
with a rubber mallet by an acquaintance, and shortly after this
incident, he took up karate. Cruz dropped out of high school in
the tenth grade.
Cruz’s mother was strict and his parents disciplined him
by hitting him with objects such as a stick, umbrella, coat
hanger, or iron cord. Cruz was of the view that his mother
raised him properly and that he was not abused. His parents
did not socialize, and Cruz was not allowed to date or to have
girls over to the house.
Sproul was a father figure and best friend to Cruz, and
the two spent a significant amount of time together. Sproul
expressed disdain for “stool pigeons” or persons who contacted
the police when they observed a crime or socially unacceptable
behavior, or who participated in an activity but then blamed
someone else.
Cruz asked Beck to make the rack for his daughter A. to
help her stand and to strengthen her legs. He did not use large
Mason jars but baby food jars. Cruz wanted A. to be strong
physically, emotionally, and mentally. He hit her with a fly
swatter to assist her efforts to crawl. He denied he ever
“clapped” her or slapped her. Jennifer resented the attention
Cruz gave A.
Cruz denied ever hitting Vieira and said he hit Perkins
only when the two “sparred.” The stun gun was a first aid
32
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
treatment for snake bites. He had used the gun on Jennifer
but “[n]ot the way she says,” and claimed the gun made a
“wicked sound, . . . but it doesn’t do anything.”
Cruz felt “bad” that Paris was killed because she had
been “exploited” and apparently “wasn’t there because she
wanted to be.” Cruz also felt bad that Raper was killed, was
sure that Raper’s relatives loved him, and felt bad that “his
relatives are suffering.” Cruz also felt bad because of what he
and his parents were going through.
Several witnesses testified to Cruz’s negative experiences
with Sproul and with medical and law enforcement personnel.
Hope and Hortencia testified that Sproul had said Cruz would
inherit some of Sproul’s land when he died. After Sproul’s
death, his will could not be located.
Hope and Hortencia also testified that when Cruz was
about eight, the family went back into the restaurant business
in Hughson. Cruz and other family members worked in the
restaurant, and it was a happy period for the family. They
took business from a pool hall next door, and one night the pool
hall owners bombed the restaurant. Police responded an hour
and a half later. Cruz’s family fled the restaurant, leaving
behind all their possessions. It was a traumatic experience for
Cruz “because he was so young.”
Hope once observed a man siphoning gas from her car
and followed him home. At some point Cruz, who was about
17 years old, joined her. The police came but said they could
not do anything about it and suggested she make a citizen’s
arrest. She did so, and the police handcuffed the man and
another man hiding in the back of a car. The second man told
Hope and Cruz they would be sorry. Hope filed a complaint,
33
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
but the district attorney said the case was not worth
prosecuting. The second man was released the next day and
threatened Cruz.
Cruz was close to one of his half-brothers, Fred
Hernandez, who died from an aneurysm in 1976, after being
kicked or struck in the head by his wife. The wife was not
prosecuted.
Emanuel Furtado, Jr., met Cruz in the fifth or sixth
grade. Furtado and Cruz had a mutual friend, Alan Lutz, who
was killed when the pickup truck in which he and others were
riding crashed. Furtado and Cruz understood that if the
responding ambulance had been able to locate Lutz in the
weeds he might have been saved.
Hartley Bush, a lawyer, initiated a stepparent adoption
for Ausencio Cruz in about 1972. He obtained a 1965 divorce
decree between Hortencia and Hernandez and a 1968 marriage
certificate for Hortencia and Ausencio. The adoption
proceedings were later abandoned. About this time in 1972,
Cruz was charged in a juvenile proceeding with spray painting
an automobile and given probation.
b. Expert testimony
Dr. Hugh Ridelhuber, a psychiatrist, interviewed Cruz
twice, each time for three to four hours. He also interviewed
Dennis and Cruz’s sister Hope, reviewed “voluminous records”
from counsel, spoke to the defense investigator, and performed
testing on Cruz.
Dr. Ridelhuber believed that Cruz had a reluctance to
rely on authoritarian figures to protect his family when he
perceived they were in danger. Cruz was unsure who his
parents were, and that had “a very disturbing effect on him.”
34
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
He began a search for an identity that “compensated for his not
knowing and . . . his insecurity.” Cruz formed an “oddball”
belief about who he was “that gave him some sort of
satisfaction of feeling important.”
Cruz recounted several instances in which he had
experienced law enforcement or medical personnel not being
responsive or capable of dealing with the situation, such as
when his family’s restaurant was bombed, when someone
siphoned gas out of a car, and when Lutz was not immediately
discovered after the truck accident. Cruz told Dr. Ridelhuber
that he had called the police regarding Raper’s threats and
that Raper had been arrested and taken in, but was then
released and continued to harass Cruz. These circumstances
“really undermined his trust in authority.” Cruz also told
Dr. Ridelhuber he understood Sproul was going to leave the
ranch to him when Sproul died, and when that did not occur,
Cruz believed that a “shyster attorney” and other individuals
“had cheated them out of it” and that the court system did not
prevent this result.
In addition, Dr. Ridelhuber testified, teachers and other
school officials are “part of the authoritarian system that a
child adjusts to” and “needs to respect.” Dr. Ridelhuber
believed it was a “fairly common experience” for children to be
punished by a teacher when they are in fact the victims. For a
child who already has questions about authority, “that would
be an additional wedge in breaking . . . the sort of needed trust
that children have in authority.”
Cruz had great difficulty succeeding in society, so he had
withdrawn and collected around himself a band of people
“almost like a Neanderthal clan.” Dr. Ridelhuber believed the
35
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
punitive behavior Cruz had inflicted “towards his own clan and
family . . . [was] consistent with the way he was treated as a
child growing up.” Cruz was not a sadist but had a false belief
that his behavior would make people stronger and that similar
treatment had made him stronger.
Cruz’s loss of his half-brother Fred and friend Lutz
caused him to have a tendency to overreact to protect
remaining friends and family. Cruz had also suffered a major
loss when the identity of his biological parents was called into
question and when his purported parents did not give him a
sense of security or a feeling of being valuable and lovable. As
a result of his experiences, Cruz would have perceived Raper’s
behavior as a “mounting kind of catastrophic threat” because
Raper did not cease his behavior when confronted, because
Cruz did not perceive “police[] as being able to protect him,”
and because of Cruz’s own sense of fear or vulnerability.
Although Cruz had some of the traits of a borderline
personality and “some characteristics of a paranoid” person, he
did “not fit clearly into a definable disorder.” During
Dr. Ridelhuber’s interview of Cruz, he was “struck by how
normal he can be.”
Dr. Ridelhuber had spoken to some of Cruz’s jailers and
understood that he was a model prisoner. Dr. Ridelhuber
opined that Cruz would adapt well to prison because he was
30 years old and had an IQ of 130 that would allow him to
manage his affairs when a clear structure was provided.
Moreover, Cruz was “not a sociopathic or antisocial character,”
had “no history of violence outside of this crime,” and had no
“history of rebelling against authority.” In Dr. Ridelhuber’s
36
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
view, Cruz could “use the intellect that he has to . . . learn a
trade . . . in the prison system and be productive.”
The parties stipulated that “prison life is very structured
and authoritarian in nature for a person sentenced to life in
prison without the possibility of parole.”
3. Prosecutor’s case against Beck
Cynthia S., Jennifer’s younger sister, testified that she
met Beck in about 1987 when she was 16 years old. At the
time, Cruz and Jennifer were living together in Modesto. From
1987 to 1989, Cynthia worked with Beck, Vieira, and Perkins
installing vinyl and hardwood flooring. Once, when Cynthia
was working with Perkins, he accidentally cut an orange
extension cord with an electric saw and received an electric
shock. Several months later when Cynthia visited Jennifer’s
home, she observed Perkins on his hands and knees on the
floor feverously sanding a gun cabinet. An orange extension
cord was also on the floor. Beck and Cruz were seated to her
right, and Cruz asked Cynthia to flip on the light switch that
was adjacent to the door she entered. When she did so,
Perkins “started flopping around and screaming in the middle
of the living room like a fish out of water.” Cynthia shut off
the switch. Beck and Cruz were laughing, and Perkins started
moaning from the pain. Cynthia saw that the exposed wires of
the extension cord were wrapped around Perkins’s toes and
secured with duct tape, and the other end of the cord was
plugged into a wall outlet activated by the light switch. The
last time Cynthia had seen Perkins’s feet, they were “burnt
from shock, . . . still very infected, . . . like open wounds.”
Cruz appeared to be in control of the household, and
Beck and Perkins did what he requested. Cynthia frequently
37
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
witnessed Beck punch and kick Perkins and Vieira after being
ordered to do so by Cruz; neither Perkins nor Vieira fought
back. Cruz once put a rifle in Cynthia’s mouth and threatened
to pull the trigger because he believed she had stolen one of his
guns. Beck was present but did not intercede on her behalf.
Cynthia lost contact with Beck and Cruz for a time, and
she reestablished contact about two months before the murders
when she visited their home at the Camp. Cruz appeared to
still have the same control over individuals in the household.
Steven Perkins (Steven), the father of Perkins, testified
that in about 1987, when Perkins was about 20 years old, he
left home to live with Beck and Cruz and Cruz’s family for
about 17 months. During this period, his father saw him two
or three times. When Perkins left home, he was six feet five
inches tall and weighed about 370 pounds, and was happy-go-
lucky and outgoing.
When Perkins came home at the end of September 1989,
he had lost about 125 pounds since his parents had last seen
him at Christmas. His personality had also dramatically
changed. He was withdrawn and moody and would not speak
to anyone or answer the telephone, would not go outside, and
was intensely claustrophobic. Perkins refused to discuss what
happened when he lived with Beck and Cruz.
A few days after Perkins arrived home, he was
hospitalized. There Steven learned Perkins’s feet were
severely infected, he had shackle marks above his ankles, and
he had a large bruise covering his chest. Perkins subsequently
admitted himself to a psychiatric unit because he was afraid he
would hurt his parents or others. Steven observed Perkins had
begun to have mental lapses, and at the time of Steven’s
38
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
testimony, Perkins had trouble remembering what day of the
week or what month it was.
Perkins testified that the Becks were family friends and
that he had known David Beck, who was about 10 years older
than Perkins, since Perkins was about four years old. Perkins
had also grown up with Cruz. Perkins once told Cruz he had
observed Jennifer and her sister Cynthia engaging in oral sex.
Apparently in retaliation, Jennifer took Perkins to a house
where he was repeatedly kicked in his naked groin and
electrocuted through his legs and toes. After this attack,
Perkins tried to kill himself by having a motorcycle accident.
About a month later, shortly after moving back in with his
father, he was admitted to the hospital because he had severe
athlete’s foot and “chest problems,” and learned he had broken
his ribs, shattered his breast bone, and hurt his spleen in the
motorcycle accident. Once he was released, he tried to kill
himself again by attempting to overdose on prescription
medication. He was referred for psychiatric counseling
because he had hit his head in the accident and was having
cognitive difficulties.
Perkins was still friends with Cruz and spoke with him
on the telephone. He denied ever being hit, tortured, or
assaulted with a stun gun by Beck or seeing Beck beat Vieira.
Jennifer met Beck in 1986 about the same time she met
Cruz. In July 1987, Beck, Cruz, and Jennifer shared an
apartment. Jennifer had witnessed Beck beat Perkins about
30 times. Beck’s beatings of Perkins were sometimes on his
own and not at the direction of Cruz. Beck and Cruz used an
“orange line treatment” against Perkins and Vieira, where they
would attach an orange extension cord to the toes of one of
39
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
these individuals and turn on the electricity. Jennifer had also
seen Beck use a Scorpion stun gun on Vieira; Vieira would
jump and yell and try to escape.
Cruz was the leader of “The Cause,” which was
“supposed to be the advancement of mankind.” In Cruz’s
journal were signatures and fingerprints of individuals, such
as Beck, who had agreed to be in The Cause. The Cause
became “sick, distorted, [and] perverted,” Cruz’s “idea of some
type of twisted control over people.” Perkins “was beaten until
he could hardly move and then he had to go to the hospital.”
Jennifer denied arranging for Perkins to be beaten and
electrocuted. Cruz told Perkins to tell anyone who asked about
his injuries that he had been in a motorcycle accident.
Jennifer was beaten by Cruz several times while Beck
was present. She did not leave Cruz because she was afraid he
would kill her. Beck was devoted to Cruz. Jennifer never saw
Cruz beat Beck or put a gun in his mouth.
Rosemary testified that she met Beck in 1982 and, eight
months to a year later, began dating him. About two years
later, they moved in together, were happy, and frequently
discussed marriage. But at some point, Beck told Rosemary he
had to give her to Cruz because “that was the thing to do.”
Cruz told her that marrying her was the only way he could
ever control her and prevent her from leaving.
Rosemary and Beck eventually lived for six to eight
months on Claret Court in Modesto with Cruz, Jennifer, their
infant daughter A., Vieira, and Perkins. At one point,
Rosemary’s hand was cut and her bloody fingerprint placed in
a book “[s]o that you would . . . belong to them.” “[A]fter you
did that, they owned you.”
40
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
Cruz and Beck were the leaders of the group, but Cruz
was in charge. Cruz’s word was “[e]verybody’s law,” he
declared punishments, and Beck’s role was to administer
punishment to other members. Beck might be reprimanded,
but he was not punished in the same way as “everyone else.”
In Rosemary’s view, Cruz and his group were members of a
strange religious cult. They discussed Satanism and astrology.
Beck tied filled Gatorade bottles to A.’s ankles when she
was learning to crawl. If A. cried, Beck would give her ice-cold
water until she found it difficult to breathe.
While living with Beck, Rosemary was subjected to
physical violence by him. Once when she tried to leave, Beck
and Perkins drove after her, threw her into a van face first,
and took her back to the house. Beck then kicked her in the
back as she walked up the stairs.
Once, because someone lost an envelope containing
several postage stamps, Rosemary was forced to open her
mouth in the presence of Beck, Cruz, Vieira, Jennifer, and
Perkins, and someone placed a loaded rifle in her mouth. On
another occasion, Cruz told Rosemary in front of Beck that he
was going to take Rosemary’s “head off and keep it for a
trophy.” Beck seemed to agree with Cruz, but Rosemary noted,
“not all the time did we tell [Cruz] what . . . we really felt.” In
December 1988, Rosemary went to visit her parents for
Christmas and never returned to Claret Court, leaving behind
everything she owned.
4. Beck defense case
a. Beck’s family and friends
Several of Beck’s family members and friends testified.
Beck had grown up in Oakdale. His mother was strict but
41
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
caring and was respected in the community. When Beck was
about 17 years old, his father was sent to Atascadero State
Hospital for molesting his two younger sisters. His parents
divorced, and his mother married his father’s brother. They
were still married at the time of Beck’s penalty phase trial.
Beck got along well with his stepfather.
Beck presented evidence that he had regularly attended
Bethel Assembly of God church in Oakdale. He sang in the
choir for at least three or four years, and he was faithful in
attending church and choir rehearsals. The choir recorded an
album, and Beck’s photograph was on the back of the album
cover. Beck also played the trumpet at church, participated in
youth group activities, and his brother Steven observed he
knew the Bible “from front to back.” Beck and his close friend
David John Sondeno had built a six-foot kite together for a
church outing that featured a cross and the number one to
symbolize “[t]here’s only one way, and that’s through Christ.”
Sondeno described Beck as outgoing, pleasant, and generous
with his time and money even though he came from a family of
limited resources.
G.W. Wingo testified that he had been Beck’s wrestling
coach at Oakdale Union High School for four years. He saw
Beck every day for about three months of each year. Beck was
a quiet person who did everything that was asked of him, did
not cause any problems, and “got along well with everybody.”
Wingo could not have “asked for a better person during the
wrestling program.” Wingo had not had contact with Beck
since he graduated from high school about 20 years before
Wingo’s testimony.
42
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
In 1978, Beck married a woman named Barbara; they
had three children. He and his young family lived in Coalinga
in a three- or four-bedroom house with a swimming pool. Beck
attended oil well drilling school and worked in the oil business.
He got along well with his coworkers and supervisors, and did
not miss work. Beck later worked as a floor installer from
daylight to dark efficiently performing quality work. Beck
continued to attend church, and the preacher at times visited
Beck’s home. Beck was easygoing and not violent.
After the marriage ended, Barbara did not have custody,
and Beck and his children moved in with his mother and
stepfather so they could provide child care. Christy Shulze,
Beck’s stepsister and former cousin, testified that Beck was
gentle with his children and took care of them, and they loved
Beck “very much.” He was also good at interacting with
Shulze’s children, and they thought of him like a big brother.
She had never observed Beck to be violent or mean, or to
mistreat children. His half-sister Linda Willis testified that he
was a “[v]ery concerned and caring father” and his children
were happy. He did not physically discipline his children.
Beck was generous to others, and he once left food and
Christmas presents for one of Willis’s needy neighbors.
After Beck’s divorce from Barbara, he began to spend
time with Cruz and his friends. Beck spent little time with his
children or his family, and his sister Angela Morgan testified
he “just wanted to be with” Cruz. She agreed with defense
counsel that he was “the opposite person” and “seem[ed] like
somebody [she] didn’t know.” Although she would drive Beck
home when he lived with Cruz, she was never allowed inside
their home.
43
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
Beck’s brother Steven agreed with the prosecutor that
after Beck started associating with Cruz, he “didn’t care about
anything or about anybody,” and “when you were talking to
him,” it would “be like talking to a wall.” At one point Beck
told Steven, “I’ll take your soul.” Beck also told Steven he was
going to kill their sister Debbie apparently over a monetary
dispute, and Beck also threatened Steven’s infant son.
Raymond Greer met Beck in church about 18 years
before his testimony and recalled that Beck had attended
prayer meetings, carried a Bible with him everywhere, and
counseled youth group members. Greer last saw Beck about
five years earlier during Beck’s divorce. Beck was not his
usual “bubbly self,” but rather was disillusioned and did not
believe God could help him.
Willis met Cruz on several occasions and described him
as controlling and manipulative. Beck would only speak when
Cruz allowed. Cruz called himself a high priest and told Willis
he had powers and could place curses on individuals. Beck
appeared to believe Cruz’s claims and began to act like Cruz.
They spoke to Willis about Satanism and the occult, and at
some point tried to get Willis to join a Satanic church. It
appeared to Willis that Beck’s entire belief system had
changed.
About two weeks before the murders, Beck, Cruz, and
several other men visited Willis. Beck and the others appeared
to be controlled by Cruz. Cruz spoke to Willis in front of the
others about taking care of or taking out a person named
Raper, who lived in a trailer park, apparently because he was
dealing drugs to children in the trailer park. Willis understood
this to mean killing Raper. Cruz said, “I can do anything and
44
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
if I don’t like somebody, I’ll take them out.” He said that he
had powers and that “nobody could stop him or get in his way.”
Willis grew uncomfortable with the discussion and asked them
to leave. Everyone left but Beck, who tried to calm Willis by
saying that “nothing was going to happen and everything was
going to be all right.” Beck said that he believed in Cruz and
that Cruz was Beck’s friend. Willis told Beck he “better think
about what he was doing and get away from what was going
on.” She said he was headed for trouble and should
disassociate from Cruz. Beck said he was “involved, he
couldn’t get out.” Willis asked about others who would be
affected by Beck’s and Cruz’s actions. Beck said he knew what
he was doing, and the “only ones who are going to get hurt are
the ones who deserve it.”
Willis visited Beck in jail after the murders. Beck said,
“Don’t worry. I’m going to get out of this.” He said that Cruz
was “going to make sure” by using contacts on the outside and
that things were going to happen to people. Beck appeared to
feel remorse for the murders because he kept his eyes down
and would not look at Willis. When Beck’s brother Steven
visited Beck in jail after the murders, Beck laughed and said,
“If I had a chance to do it all over, I would.”
The parties stipulated that Beck had not been housed in
the general population in Alameda County and had not been a
disciplinary problem while incarcerated there. They further
stipulated that Beck had been in custody in Stanislaus County
from May 1990 to February 1992.
b. Expert witnesses
Jerry Enomoto, a former Director of the Department of
Corrections, testified that that he had reviewed Beck’s
45
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
Stanislaus County custodial records. After being informed of
evidence concerning Beck’s lack of custody and court
disciplinary problems in Alameda County, Enomoto agreed
with counsel that Beck would be an appropriate candidate for
housing in the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation system.
Randy Cerny, president of Central Valley Consultants,
Inc., a consulting firm that trained law enforcement officers in
the investigation of ritualistic activity, testified as a cult
expert. From 1979 to 1991, he was a Stanislaus County
Sheriff’s deputy and studied groups that exhibited cult-like
behavior.
Cerny defined a cult as group of individuals bound
together by a philosophy usually espoused by a central leader.
The leader usually has total control of the group and will use
various techniques to control the group members. Cults were
like gangs, except cults had an underlying religious
philosophy. Cults were also much more cohesive and the level
of control was more important than in a gang. Members had
little sense of individuality, lived at the whim of the leader,
and were subject to various types of mind control techniques
including torture. Members generally became mirror images of
their leader.
In September 1985, then Deputy Cerny learned of the
“Cruz Group” from Rosemary. Cerny had since performed
additional investigation by reading diaries, court transcripts of
cases involving the Cruz “situation,” and speaking to law
enforcement personnel. In his view, the Cruz Group was a cult
that continued at the time of Cerny’s testimony. Cruz was a
charismatic leader who demanded total allegiance from group
46
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
members and was very skilled in emotional manipulation. The
Camp had the characteristics of a cult compound.
The diaries Cerny read described ritualistic practices at
some of the homes in which Beck and Cruz had lived. They
also described Perkins’s torture with an orange cord and by
forced acts of sodomy and bestiality. Cerny read no accounts of
Beck being tortured or mistreated; rather, Beck was the one
who administered punishment at Cruz’s direction. Cruz was
the leader, and Beck was “second in command and everybody
else fell in underneath him.” Beck was Cruz’s enforcer and
was controlled by Cruz.
James Moyers, a psychotherapist who had published an
article on the religious psychotherapy issues of former
fundamentalists, testified he had interviewed Beck to assess
how his religious background might be involved in the case.
Beck had a Pentecostal background, and members of this
fundamentalist religious group tended to rely on spiritual
leaders to determine how to live their lives. When a
Pentecostal follower finds he can no longer believe in the
church’s teachings and breaks from the church, he or she can
experience “shattered faith syndrome.” This involves
confusion, often deep depression, and a sense of emptiness.
“There also can almost be a compulsive search for something to
give one’s life meaning and to explain one’s experiences . . .
some real desperate need to fill up a spiritual vacuum.”
Moyers opined that Beck had suffered from shattered
faith syndrome. Beck had described his growing
disillusionment with and departure from the church. His
marriage to a woman he had recently met was characteristic of
someone with the syndrome. In addition, a few weeks after the
47
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
marriage ended, Beck met Cruz and became “intensely
involved with him.” Cruz’s teachings seemed to have provided
Beck “with an explanation and meaning in his life that he
really hadn’t felt like he had had before.”
Shattered faith syndrome was common, and Moyers
agreed with defense counsel that “most of these people don’t
run out and kill four people.” Beck “had the misfortune of
being in a very vulnerable place and coming across something
in . . . Cruz that led him to the killings.” Had the timing been
different, or if he had come across someone with similar
teachings that did not lead to a violent episode, “things would
be far different.” Beck’s abandonment of his fundamentalist
background made him “particularly vulnerable to anybody who
had something that seemed to be true, that seemed to give him
some direction and meaning. . . . [I]t was unfortunate that it
happened to be [this] particular person and . . . set of
teachings.”
Dr. Lowell Cooper, a clinical psychologist, testified he
had administered psychological tests to Beck to gather
descriptive information about his functioning. These tests
included the Rorschach inkblot test, the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale, the Thematic Apperception test, the Draw-
a-Person test, and the Babcock Story Recall test. Dr. Cooper
concluded based on these tests that Beck had an “empty hole in
him” that consisted of “not having any emotions, not knowing
where they are, not knowing what they should be.” Much of
his functioning was driven by trying to manage this empty
hole. Beck was also unusual in the way he thought about
“what goes on around him” and was “definitely off the mark
relative to the way most people see these test materials and
48
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
respond to them.” Dr. Cooper believed Beck would do well or
would at least appear normal in a structured situation.
Beck was not violent, as his “feelings of aggression are as
absent as any other feeling.” He was “always on the search for
people who will fill up the emptiness, provide direction, provide
routine, provide structure.” His “loyalty is intense to the point
where he really loses the distinction between himself and the
other person” because if he loses the other person, “he will be
thrown . . . back into the emptiness.” Beck’s “social judgment”
was “the worst area of his intellectual functioning.” Dr. Cooper
agreed with defense counsel that when “Beck looks for
somebody or something, he’s looking [for] . . . something that
fulfills spiritual needs, his ideas of betterment for self and
mankind.”
On cross-examination, Dr. Cooper testified Beck did not
suffer from any mental disease, he had found no mental defect,
and there were no indications of brain damage. Beck had a
full-scale IQ of 102. Beck displayed no remorse about the
crimes. Nothing in the evaluation indicated that Beck was in a
dark hole and “functioning in some absurd manner” on the day
of the murders.
Richard Ofshe, a sociology professor at the University of
California, Berkeley, specialized in issues of influence and
control. He had interviewed Beck, read Beck’s diaries and his
penalty phase testimony, reviewed documents relating to
Vieira’s prosecution, and interviewed Vieira, his sister, and his
brother-in-law. Cruz’s group included “an ideology of belief in
magic, in the occult, that was to result in benefits to people.”
In Professor Ofshe’s view, the group was a “high control
group,” although Cruz’s techniques “were substantially more
49
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
brutal” than most groups he had studied. The fact that Beck
did not need to be tortured in order for Beck to accept orders
from Cruz “suggests that Mr. Cruz’s control over Mr. Beck was
at least as great, if not greater,” than for the other group
members.
Beck refused to tell Professor Ofshe how the Cruz group
developed or operated. Beck said that he had taken an oath
and that if he broke his oath, “people would be hurt.” When
Professor Ofshe told Beck, “[Y]ou’re afraid someone will kill
your children or your family,” Beck became visibly upset and
started to cry. Professor Ofshe subsequently said to Beck,
“Gerald Cruz is threatening to have your children killed if you
talk.” Beck did not affirm or deny the statement. In Professor
Ofshe’s view, on the night of the murders, Beck was “under
very substantial pressure to conform to the directives” of Cruz,
and he was experiencing duress because “Cruz’s control
involved . . . a general threat of death, should he not follow . . .
Cruz’s orders and break with the group.”
Dr. Daniel Goldstine, a psychologist, interviewed Beck
for 12 to 15 hours and relied on other information, including
listening to Cruz testify in his penalty phase and reading the
diaries of Beck, Cruz, Vieira, Perkins, Jennifer, and Rosemary,
Beck’s autobiographical sketch, notes from the defense
investigator, and trial transcripts.
Beck had no significant history of aggression but “was
simply a victim of a very despicable cult led by” Cruz. Beck
had suffered significant disappointments that made him
vulnerable, such as moving frequently during his childhood,
his father’s arrest for molesting his sister[s], the breakup with
his longtime girlfriend Sheryl for whom he had purchased an
50
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
engagement ring and whose father was more of a father to
Beck than his own father, and Barbara’s abuse of his trust and
the breakup of their marriage.
In Dr. Goldstine’s view, Cruz made Beck feel like a
lieutenant when he “was at best like a sergeant.” In the
interviews, Beck “simply defend[ed] Mr. Cruz all the time and
basically stuck with that loyalty.” “Never once did [Beck] say,
‘I was a victim myself of Mr. Cruz, I was manipulated.’ ”
Rather, Beck believed “he was a co-equal partner, that he [had]
joined in freely.” Beck denied punishing Vieira or Perkins, or
that Cruz had been cruel to the group members. When
Dr. Goldstine “would confront him with obvious evidence of
some of the monstrous acts that went on in this group, he
simply denied it” and was “clearly lying.” Dr. Goldstine
believed that Beck was still under Cruz’s control and that Beck
had lied in his guilt phase testimony.
Beck was not suffering from any mental illness and had
no brain damage. There was no history of head injuries or
fetal alcohol syndrome. Dr. Goldstine opined that Beck’s “flat
affect” and “his guardedness” were “directly attributable to
being part of this cult and what [had] happened to him.” In
Dr. Goldstine’s view, Beck had exhibited remorse.
5. Prosecutor’s Beck rebuttal
Jennifer testified that her daughter A. was born in
July 1988. Sometime later that year, Beck, Cruz, and Vieira
placed a tape recorder next to A. in her crib. As she was falling
asleep, they snuck up on her and screamed at her. A. woke up
and started to scream and cry. The tape recording of this
incident was played for the jury.
51
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
Jennifer received numerous threatening phone calls from
Cruz while he was in jail after the murders. They stopped just
before Cruz’s penalty phase when he learned Jennifer would be
a witness. Jennifer also received threatening phone calls from
Perkins. Jennifer had been afraid of Beck because “he would
do what [Cruz] told him to do.”
II. DISCUSSION
As to many claims, Beck and Cruz “allege for the first
time that the error complained of violated their federal
constitutional rights. To the extent that in doing so defendants
have raised only a new constitutional ‘gloss’ on claims
preserved below, that new aspect of the claims is not forfeited.
However, ‘[n]o separate constitutional discussion is required,
or provided, when rejection of a claim on the merits necessarily
leads to rejection of [the] constitutional theory.’ ” (People v.
Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 364 (Bryant,
Smith and Wheeler).)
A. Pretrial Issues
1. Motion to suppress
Cruz contends the trial court erred in denying his motion
to suppress items seized during the May 21, 1990 search of his
studio apartment located at 4510 Finney Road, No. 7 in Salida.
(Former § 1538.5.) He contends the affidavit submitted by
Detective Deckard to obtain a search warrant failed to
establish probable cause to search his home. He further
contends that even if the affidavit did demonstrate probable
cause to search the studio, Detective Deckard improperly
withheld material information from the affidavit that would
have undercut this showing. He also contends that
information obtained before the search warrant was executed
52
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
— that the suspect “Jason” stayed in one of trailers — vitiated
probable cause to search the studio. We conclude there was no
error.
a. Factual background
The murders occurred shortly after midnight on May 21,
1990. At 10:19 a.m. that day, Detective Deckard obtained a
warrant to search the studio apartment and any trailers. (The
original search warrant and supporting affidavit were
apparently destroyed. The parties rely on a copy of the
affidavit that was attached to the suppression motion and
made part of the settled record.)
Detective Deckard’s supporting affidavit and attached
statement of probable cause (the affidavit) stated that around
2:00 a.m. on May 21, he arrived at the quadruple murder
scene. Surviving victim Donna Alvarez described her
assailant, who was holding a handgun, as “a white male adult,
20 to 25 years of age, 6−0, medium build with brown afro type
hair.” Around 3:00 a.m., Detective Deckard spoke with
Kenneth Tumelson outside the victims’ house. Tumelson said
that a person he knew as “Jason” was “approximately 21 years
of age, ha[d] brown afro-type hair,” and frequented the victims’
residence. Jason was “staying in a group of apartments located
across the street from the Laundromat on Finney Road.”
Around 4:00 a.m., Detective Deckard spoke with Frank Raper,
Jr. (Frank), the son of victim Franklin Raper. Frank stated
that his father had experienced problems with someone named
“Jason” and had asked to borrow a gun because he “feared for
his life.” Jason had set fire to and destroyed Raper’s car about
a month earlier. Frank understood that Jason was “supposed
to be staying in a[n] apartment across from the Laundromat,”
53
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
and Frank described the residence “as having a large amount
of camo type material draped in front of the residence” and
said it was “located in the back or the rear of those . . .
apartments.”
The affidavit further recounted that around 5:00 a.m.,
Detective Deckard and other law enforcement officers went to
4510 Finney Road, No. 7. It appeared no one was home. A
“large camo type of material [was] in front of the residence.”
Around 5:30 a.m., Detective Deckard spoke with Kevin
Brasuell, who said that someone named “Jerald” lived in No. 7,
which was the manager’s apartment. Brasuell said a “white
male with a brown afro type hair . . . frequents that residence,”
but Brasuell did not know his name. Brasuell had seen
“several people coming and going out of the manager’s
apartment.”
At the suppression motion hearing, Detective Deckard
testified that when he arrived at 4510 Finney Road on May 21,
he spoke with Brasuell, who lived in front of the studio.
Brasuell said that a person fitting the suspect’s description
frequented the studio and the small trailer, and that Gerald
and his wife lived in the studio. The studio was a freestanding
building. Deckard observed an extension cord running from
the studio to the small trailer. A SWAT team officer entered
the large trailer to see whether any perpetrators were inside.
The small trailer was not entered apparently because officers
were able to see all of the interior simply by looking through a
window. Before Detective Deckard left to obtain the warrant,
he was of the view that the two trailers were “part and parcel
of” the studio.
54
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
Brasuell testified that on May 21, he told Detective
Deckard that Jason lived or “frequently stayed” in the small
trailer and “frequently stayed” at the studio. Detective
Deckard asked him “who all stayed back there,” which Brasuell
took to mean the studio and trailers. The studio and the two
trailers were “all one unit close together.” He told Detective
Deckard that Cruz, Jennifer, Beck, Jason, and Vieira “all lived
there together.” Brasuell testified it appeared to him that
these individuals “all had access to each and every other
thing.” Brasuell had several conversations with Detective
Deckard on May 21 and could not recall when during the day
he made each particular statement.
Detective Deckard further testified that when he
returned with a search warrant, he had information that at
least four individuals had committed the murders and that
“Jason” was in a group that frequented the studio and the
trailers. Jennifer was standing outside the studio. Detective
Deckard asked Jennifer whether LaMarsh lived in the studio
or in either trailer. Jennifer said that Jason slept in the small
trailer. Detective Deckard at this point came to the view that
there were separate living accommodations in the trailers or
that Jason “stay[ed] in the small trailer” while Beck and Vieira
“stay[ed] in the large trailer.” After Detective Deckard read
the warrant to Jennifer, officers searched the studio.
Jennifer testified that on May 21, 1990, she lived with
Cruz and her two infants in a studio apartment located at
4510 Finney Road, No. 7. There were two trailers on wheels at
that location. They did not have separate unit numbers. The
small trailer in which LaMarsh lived was about 20 feet away.
It lacked toilet facilities and obtained electricity from the
studio through an extension cord.
55
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
The trial court granted the suppression motion, as
relevant here, as to items seized from the large trailer where
Beck and Vieira resided. It denied the motion as to Cruz’s
studio “only” on the ground of good faith (see United States v.
Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897), implicitly finding that the search
warrant was not supported by probable cause. The court
stated: “Of the three pieces of property searched, the actual
Apartment No. 7 [the studio] has caused the Court the most
difficulty. As I previously commented, Mr. Deckard, in the
Court’s opinion, had probable cause to obtain a search warrant
for Apartment 7 and he properly did so. However, by the time
he returned with the search warrant to search Apartment 7, he
knew now or by then that it was a separate residential
accommodation and he knew that Mr. LaMarsh actually lived
in the small trailer. However, he also knew that Mr. LaMarsh
frequented Apartment No. 7 and may in fact have stayed in it
at times, and he did have a search warrant authorizing its
search. Here the court did not say that Mr. Deckard was not
acting in good faith and reasonably believing that if he had
returned to the magistrate with the additional information
that Mr. LaMarsh actually lived in the trailer right next to the
apartment and connected to that apartment with an extension
cord, that the magistrate would also have authorized a search
of the trailer in addition to the apartment rather than just
substituting the trailer for the apartment. Thus on the Leon
good faith doctrine and on that doctrine only, the search of
Apartment 7 is ruled valid and what is adequately described in
the search warrant is not suppressed.”
b. Analysis
“In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress evidence, we defer to that court’s factual findings,
56
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
express or implied, if they are supported by substantial
evidence. [Citation.] We exercise our independent judgment in
determining whether, on the facts presented, the search or
seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment . . .”
(People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1119.)
Here, it appears that the trial court implicitly found as to
the studio that although the search warrant was supported by
probable cause when it was issued, Detective Deckard’s
subsequent discovery that LaMarsh actually lived in the
smaller trailer vitiated that probable cause. We reach a
different conclusion.
In determining whether a search warrant is supported by
probable cause, we consider “whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place.” (Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S.
213, 238; People v. Camarella (1991) 54 Cal.3d 592, 601.)
“ ‘[S]ufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.’ ” (Maryland v.
Garrison (1987) 480 U.S. 79, 87.)
We agree with the trial court that the search warrant
affidavit, which referred to an individual matching the
description of one of the murder suspects living in the same
residential area as the studio and “frequent[ing]” the studio,
set forth sufficient facts to demonstrate a fair probability that
evidence of the murders would be found in the studio. (See
Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 238; People v. Farley
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1099−1100.) Detective Deckard’s
subsequently acquired information that LaMarsh actually
lived in the small trailer while frequenting and at times
57
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
staying in the studio does not vitiate the fair probability that
evidence of the murders would be found in the place LaMarsh
frequented, i.e., the studio. There was also evidence that the
small trailer was dependent on the studio for electricity; it was
so small as to be able to be thoroughly visually inspected for
suspects from a window, and it was “part and parcel of” the
studio.
To the extent Cruz’s claim that the affidavit’s reference
to firearms, blood spatters and clothing tending to establish
the identity of the perpetrator, documents or videotapes of the
victim or others tending to show motive, and documents
identifying who controlled the premises failed to describe
evidence relating to the four murders and thus establish
probable cause, is preserved, we reject it. Cruz does not claim
the warrant lacked particularity in its description of the items
sought, and given that Alvarez had described her assailant as
displaying a firearm and there were four slain victims, these
items related to the circumstances surrounding the murders.
Moreover, it was “necessary to establish” who had “control over
any evidence seized.” (Bryant, Smith, and Wheeler, supra,
60 Cal.4th at p. 370.)
Cruz contends the warrant was invalid because Deckard
omitted material information from his affidavit, rendering it
deliberately or recklessly false and misleading. (Franks v.
Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154, 155–156, 171–172.) A “warrant
is presumed valid,” and a “defendant claiming that the
warrant or supporting affidavit is inaccurate or incomplete
bears the burden of alleging and then proving the errors or
omissions.” (People v. Amador (2000) 24 Cal.4th 387, 393.)
58
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
“This court has applied the rule in Franks to deliberate
omissions of material facts from an affidavit for a search
warrant. . . .” (People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 409
(Sandoval).) At the same time, we have recognized “that a
claim that material facts were omitted from an affidavit differs
from a claim that the affidavit contains falsehoods: ‘Though
similar for many purposes, omissions and misstatements
analytically are distinct in important ways. Every falsehood
makes an affidavit inaccurate, but not all omissions do so. An
affidavit need not disclose every imaginable fact however
irrelevant’. . . . ‘[A]n affiant’s duty of disclosure extends only to
“material” or “relevant” adverse facts.’ [Citation.] ‘[F]acts are
“material” and hence must be disclosed if their omission would
make the affidavit substantially misleading. On review under
section 1538.5, facts must be deemed material for this purpose
if, because of their inherent probative force, there is a
substantial possibility they would have altered a reasonable
magistrate’s probable cause determination.’ ” (Sandoval, at
pp. 409–410.)
Cruz contends Detective Deckard should have included
information in his affidavit that the trailers were used as
residences and that Cruz, Jennifer, and their two infants lived
in the studio. We have concluded that the search warrant
affidavit set forth sufficient facts to demonstrate a fair
probability that evidence of the murders would be found in the
studio. Information that the trailers were also used as
residences would not lessen that probability. Thus, the
affidavit was not substantially misleading in this respect.
As for the number of studio occupants, although Deckard
testified that Brasuell told him that “Jerald” and his wife lived
in the studio, his affidavit stated that he spoke to Brasuell,
59
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
who said that someone named “Jerald” lived in the studio.
Cruz fails to demonstrate how omitting mention of “Jerald’s”
wife in the affidavit constituted a “deliberate falsehood” or
“reckless disregard for the truth.” (Franks v. Delaware, supra,
438 U.S. at p. 171.) Nor is it clear that Detective Deckard
knew that the couple’s two infants also lived in the studio
before the warrant was issued or how such a circumstance
“ ‘would have altered a reasonable magistrate’s probable cause
determination.’ ” (Sandoval, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 410.) Cruz
fails to persuasively demonstrate that these omissions from
Detective Deckard’s affidavit rendered the search warrant
invalid.
Cruz also challenges the execution of the warrant,
relying on Maryland v. Garrison, supra, 480 U.S. 79. In
Garrison, an officer obtained a warrant to search the third
floor apartment of a suspect named McWebb; the officer
reasonably believed McWebb’s apartment was the only one on
the third floor. (Id. at p. 81.) When officers arrived, they
encountered McWebb, who used his key to give the officers
access to the third floor vestibule. There, the officers
encountered the defendant, Garrison, and saw two open doors.
They entered one of the doors and observed heroin, cash, and
drug paraphernalia. At that point, the officers realized there
were two apartments on the third floor and that they had
entered Garrison’s, not McWebb’s. The officers immediately
discontinued the search of Garrison’s apartment. (Ibid.) The
high court concluded that execution of the warrant in
Garrison’s apartment was objectively reasonable based on the
information available to the officers. (Id. at pp. 88−89.)
Cruz contends that here, unlike in Garrison, Detective
Deckard wrongly executed the search warrant and searched
60
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
the studio after learning from Jennifer that LaMarsh did not
live there, and that Cruz and Jennifer lived there with two
children. In fact, Detective Deckard’s affidavit stated that
“Jerald” lived in the studio and Jason “frequent[ed]” the studio.
Deckard’s interview of Jennifer merely confirmed those
circumstances, and the presence of two infants would not
reasonably have led Detective Deckard to believe Jason did not
frequent the studio.
In sum, we conclude Cruz’s suppression motion was
properly denied.
2. Severance
Beck and Cruz contend the trial court erred in denying
their severance motions. There was no error.
a. Factual background
Before trial, Beck moved for severance on the ground
that items seized from his trailer had been suppressed as to
him, but each of his codefendants planned to introduce the
evidence in their defense. Cruz moved for severance on the
grounds that certain evidence had been suppressed as to some
defendants but not others, that some of the defendants had
made statements that would be damaging to other defendants,
and that he was entitled to a separate penalty phase from the
other defendants. At the hearing, Cruz asserted severance was
also warranted because the defendants would present
inconsistent defenses.
As to Beck’s motion, at the severance motion hearing, the
prosecutor said he would not introduce at trial any evidence
found in Beck’s trailer or Willey’s home that was later
suppressed. The trial court stated that the purpose behind the
exclusionary rule was to prevent police misconduct and ordered
61
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
the prosecutor not to use the evidence found in Beck’s trailer at
trial. It further stated that the other defendants were not
precluded from using this evidence, and defense counsel would
have a “full and through opportunity to cross-examine any of
the witnesses” presenting that evidence. On that basis, it
denied Beck’s severance motion.
As to Cruz’s motion, Detective Deckard testified that
none of the defendants had implicated any other defendant in
his statements to law enforcement. LaMarsh had made
incriminating statements to his friend Karen Spratling but
had not incriminated any other defendant. The prosecutor
said it appeared Spratling was not “going to be able to testify.”
The trial court denied Cruz’s severance motion. It said it
was aware of no authority holding that defendants were
entitled to separate trials simply because there were
inconsistent defenses. Although the court was concerned about
LaMarsh’s statement to Evans that Cruz had “helped him beat
Raper,” it found that this statement, in light of other
statements by LaMarsh made in Cruz’s presence, did not
warrant severance. The court incorporated that portion of its
ruling on Beck’s severance motion stating that defendants
were not precluded from using evidence suppressed as to some
but not all defendants, and that defense counsel would have a
“full and through opportunity to cross-examine any of the
witnesses” presenting that evidence. It also ruled there would
be separate and sequential penalty phases for each defendant,
with Cruz going first, then Beck, LaMarsh, and Willey.
Beck unsuccessfully filed a motion to reconsider the
denial of his severance motion and the order of the penalty
trials and a writ challenging that denial. At the end of trial,
62
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
the court instructed the jury, “You must decide separately
whether each of the defendants is guilty or not guilty.”
b. Analysis
Section 1098 states in relevant part: “When two or more
defendants are jointly charged with any public offense,
whether felony or misdemeanor, they must be tried jointly,
unless the court order [sic] separate trials.” This provision
indicates the Legislature’s “strong preference for joint trials.”
(People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 455 (Winbush).)
“Joint trials ‘play a vital role in the criminal justice system’ ”
because they “promote efficiency and ‘serve the interests of
justice by avoiding the scandal and inequity of inconsistent
verdicts.’ ” (Zafiro v. United States (1993) 506 U.S. 534, 537.)
“Joint proceedings are not only permissible but are often
preferable when the joined defendants’ criminal conduct arises
out of a single chain of events. Joint trial may enable a jury ‘to
arrive more reliably at its conclusions regarding the guilt or
innocence of a particular defendant. . . .’ ” (Kansas v. Carr
(2016) 577 U.S. __, __ [136 S.Ct. 633, 645]; see People v.
Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 819 (Daveggio
and Michaud).) We have found persuasive the high court’s
statement that when defendants are properly joined, severance
should be granted “only if there is a serious risk that a joint
trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the
defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable
judgment about guilt or innocence.” (Zafiro v. United States, at
p. 539 [addressing severance under Fed. Rules Crim. Proc.,
rule 14]; see People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 452
(Lewis).)
63
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
“We review a trial court’s denial of a severance motion for
abuse of discretion based on the facts as they appeared at the
time the court ruled on the motion.” (People v. Avila (2006)
38 Cal.4th 491, 575.) As can be seen, the concerns raised by
Beck and Cruz in their severance motions were ameliorated by
the prosecutor’s representations and the trial court’s rulings.
None of the four defendants had implicated any other
defendant in his statement to police; the prosecutor was
precluded from introducing against any defendant evidence
suppressed as to some defendants; the prosecutor said
Spratling was unable to testify; and the defendants were
granted separate penalty phases.
Cruz contends that the trial court made a blanket
rejection of the argument that inconsistent defenses warranted
severance without considering the potential prejudice in this
case. But throughout the motion hearing the court actively
sought to clarify what evidence was expected to be introduced
and noted in its ruling that although it was concerned about a
statement LaMarsh had made to Evans about Cruz, that
statement alone did not warrant severance given other
statements LaMarsh had made in Cruz’s presence.
Cruz further contends that the trial court ignored
relevant information “crucial to an informed evaluation” of the
potential “undue prejudice from a joint trial.” In particular, he
contends LaMarsh offered to provide “specific information
about documents and evidence regarding prior acts of
LaMarsh’s codefendants which he intended to introduce” and
that he anticipated would elicit vigorous objection from the
codefendants, but the trial court “failed to hold the requested
in camera hearing, without comment.”
64
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
In the colloquy to which Cruz refers, however, it appears
LaMarsh was discussing evidence he intended to introduce at
the penalty phase, not at the guilt phase. LaMarsh stated,
“[E]ven though the guilt phase is not severed, the Court
[should] seriously consider a separate penalty phase” because
of prior acts evidence LaMarsh would seek to introduce and to
which his codefendants would “object vigorously.” Because the
court then ordered separate penalty trials for each defendant,
the court had no need to hold an in camera hearing to evaluate
the evidence of any codefendant’s prior acts that LaMarsh
would seek to introduce at the penalty phase.
“[E]ven if a trial court acted within its discretion in
denying severance, ‘ “the reviewing court may nevertheless
reverse a conviction where, because of the consolidation, a
gross unfairness has occurred such as to deprive the defendant
of a fair trial or due process of law.” ’ ” (People v. Thompson
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1079 (Thompson).) “Defendants bear
the burden of establishing that the trial was grossly unfair and
denied them due process of law, and ‘a judgment will be
reversed on this ground only if it is “reasonably probable that
the jury was influenced [by the joinder] in its verdict of
guilt.” ’ ” (Daveggio and Michaud, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 821.)
Beck and Cruz contend that such gross unfairness arose here
because “the four defendants presented differing defenses.”
“Mutually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per
se.” (Zafiro v. United States, supra, 506 U.S. at p. 538.)
Although Beck, Cruz, LaMarsh, and Willey “each may have
sought to cast blame on [each] other, it was undisputed that
[all] had been involved in some manner” in the murders.
(Daveggio and Michaud, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 820.) “The only
material inconsistency concerned the degree to which each
65
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
participated in the murderous acts.” (Winbush, supra,
2 Cal.5th at p. 457.) “Moreover, when there is sufficient
independent evidence of the defendants’ guilt, the actual
presentation of conflicting defenses at trial does not reduce the
prosecution’s burden or otherwise result in gross unfairness.”
(Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 380.)
Here there was sufficient evidence of Beck’s and Cruz’s
guilt for the charged crimes that was independent of their
codefendants’ testimony. Shortly before the May 1990
murders, Cruz, accompanied by Beck, purchased the police
baton that, according to a stipulation by Cruz and the
prosecutor, was found near the crime scene. Also, on
February 27, 1990, a store clerk had shown Cruz camouflage
masks similar to one found at the crime scene. A receipt for
four masks purchased on that date was found in Cruz’s home
after the murder, but no masks were found during that search.
Beck and Cruz testified at trial that on the night of the
murders they traveled to 5223 Elm Street with Evans,
LaMarsh and Vieira, and went into the home. Evans testified
Beck and Cruz had participated in the planning and
commission of the murders, and that when they returned to
the car, Beck was covered in blood and carrying a bloody knife,
and Cruz had blood on his hands. Cruz was identified by a
witness as one of the assailants who attacked Ritchey. Shortly
after the murders, Beck told acquaintance Wallace that “we” or
“I” “slit some throats.” The jury could reasonably infer Beck
was referring to the murder of the victims in this case, the
throats of three of whom were slit and the fourth stabbed.
Rosemary testified that Beck visited her on the evening of
May 21, 1990. When the prosecutor asked whether Beck had
mentioned doing anything to the people who were killed,
66
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
Rosemary testified that Beck said, “[T]hey had to do them,”
and that he had purchased new shoes because his were covered
in blood and he could not get them clean.
Cruz contends that severance was compelled because the
evidence of conspiracy was weak and provided only by Evans;
hence, in his view, it is reasonably probable a different verdict
would have resulted absent “the antagonistic tactics of
LaMarsh and Willey.” We conclude more fully below, in
rejecting Beck’s claim, joined by Cruz, that no substantial
evidence supports his conspiracy conviction, that even aside
from Evans’s testimony, there was substantial evidence of a
conspiracy. (See post, pt. II.B.1.a.)
Cruz further contends that evidence that he, Beck, and
Vieira were a “close-knit group and secretive” had no probative
value against him, and therefore the guilty verdicts for Cruz
and Beck and hung jury for LaMarsh and Willey must have
resulted from LaMarsh’s and Willey’s “prejudicial and
inflammatory character evidence.” But evidence that Cruz,
Beck, and Vieira were close and secretive was relevant to the
prosecutor’s theory that the three had conspired with LaMarsh
and Willey to commit murder. (People v. Rodrigues (1994)
8 Cal.4th 1060, 1135 (Rodrigues) [“ ‘The existence of a
conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct, relationship,
interests, and activities of the alleged conspirators before and
during the alleged conspiracy.’ ”].) We also reject below Cruz’s
claim that evidence of the relationship between Cruz, Beck,
and Vieira was prejudicial character evidence. (See post,
pt. II.B.2.)
Cruz asserts that LaMarsh and Willey acted as
additional prosecutors because “[t]heir testimony, and the
67
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
evidence they presented through other witnesses, clearly
constituted far more evidence of [Cruz’s] guilt than anything
the prosecution presented or would have been able to present
at a separate trial.” Beck makes a similar argument but
identifies Cruz, LaMarsh, and Willey as additional
prosecutors.
Specifically, Cruz contends that LaMarsh’s claim that
Cruz, not LaMarsh, “committed the fatal assault on Raper,”
LaMarsh’s defense expert’s opinion that a baton rather than a
bat had caused Raper’s wounds, and Rosemary’s emotional
testimony against Cruz would not have occurred in a separate
trial, thus avoiding prejudicial character evidence against
Cruz. But evidence regarding the instrument likely used to
inflict Raper’s wound would have been admissible in a separate
trial, and the trial court sustained objections to questions by
LaMarsh asking Rosemary if she was afraid of Cruz. Nor is it
obvious how LaMarsh’s assignment of blame was unduly
prejudicial. Beck similarly contends that evidence regarding
the “cult-like” nature of the group was introduced by his
codefendants and could not have been admitted in a separate
trial, but the trial court sustained objections to testimony
about cults, white supremacy, and the occult. Nor was
LaMarsh’s single statement that Beck, Cruz, and Vieira
appeared to be a “survivalist” group so grossly prejudicial that
severance was required. Moreover, as discussed below in
rejecting Cruz’s character evidence claim, evidence that Beck
possessed firearms was not unduly prejudicial since none of the
firearms was illegal or used to shoot any victim.
Beck also contends that a Ka-Bar knife box from his
trailer that had been suppressed was introduced by LaMarsh.
During LaMarsh’s cross-examination of Beck, Beck denied
68
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
having seen a Ka-Bar knife box on May 20, 1990. After
marking a box as an exhibit, counsel asked why the box had
been found in Beck’s trailer, and Beck’s foundation objection
was sustained. Beck was then asked whether any police officer
had asked him about “any Ka-Bar box that was found in your
trailer after May 20, 1990,” and Beck said “Yes.” Even
assuming this evidence was improperly introduced, it was not
prejudicial in light of other evidence of Beck’s guilt and did not
render the joint trial grossly unfair. (Ante, at pp. 67–68.)
Beck further contends that he was prejudiced by the
denial of his severance motion when considered with the order
of the separate penalty trials. In particular, he asserts that
the prosecutor “exploited the jury’s knowledge of the Cruz
evidence during Beck’s penalty trial by calling many of the
same witnesses to testify that Beck was present or had
knowledge of Cruz’s bad acts.”
In Kansas v. Carr, supra, 577 U.S. __ [136 S.Ct. 633], the
high court rejected a similar claim. Carr involved two
defendants who were brothers. (Id. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at
p. 637].) The older brother claimed he was prejudiced at their
joint penalty trial “by his brother’s portrayal of him as the
corrupting older brother,” and by his brother’s cross-
examination of their sister, who equivocated about whether the
older brother had admitted to her he was the shooter. (Id. at
p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 644].) The younger brother claimed that
“he was prejudiced by evidence associating him with his
dangerous older brother, which caused the jury to perceive him
as an incurable sociopath,” and by the jury’s observation of his
older brother in handcuffs. (Id. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 644];
see id. at p. __, fn. 4 [136 S.Ct. at p. 644, fn. 4].)
69
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
The high court held that joint capital sentencing
proceedings do not violate the Eighth Amendment right to an
individualized sentencing determination. (Kansas v. Carr,
supra, 577 U.S. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 644].) Although the
due process clause protects defendants against unduly
prejudicial evidence that would render a trial fundamentally
unfair, that standard was not met by the “mere admission of
evidence that might not otherwise have been admitted in a
severed proceeding.” (Id. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 645]; see id.
at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 644].) The high court observed that the
trial court had instructed the jury that it must give “ ‘separate
consideration to each defendant’ ” and that evidence admitted
as to one defendant should not be considered as to the other
defendant. (Id. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 645].) The high court
presumed that the jury followed these instructions, while
observing such limiting instructions “ ‘often will suffice to cure
any risk of prejudice.’ ” (Ibid.) Moreover, the high court
concluded that the penalty verdicts were not a result of the
challenged penalty evidence against one brother or the other,
but of the guilt phase evidence of “acts of almost inconceivable
cruelty and depravity.” (Id. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 646.].)
Likewise here, the court instructed the jury that it must
“[d]isregard any . . . evidence that you heard during Mr. Cruz’s
penalty phase” and “determine what the facts are from the
evidence received during the guilt phase of the trial and this
penalty phase.” We presume it followed this instruction.
Moreover, no evidence of Beck’s unadjudicated criminal acts
was introduced at Cruz’s penalty trial. Thus, as in Carr, the
Beck penalty verdict was not based on “guilt by association”
with Cruz, as Beck contends, but on penalty evidence that
Beck had tortured Perkins, physically assaulted Vieira and
70
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
Rosemary, and physically abused Cruz’s infant daughter, and
on the guilt phase evidence that Beck had participated in
planning and committing four murders.
3. Reopening of jury selection
Beck, joined by Cruz, contends that the trial court erred
in finding there was good cause to reopen jury selection to
allow the prosecutor to exercise a peremptory challenge
against Prospective Juror M.L. We reject the claim.
Code of Civil Procedure section 226, subdivision (a)
provides: “A challenge to an individual juror may only be
made before the jury is sworn.” “Subdivision (d) of [Code of
Civil Procedure] section 231 then explains: ‘Peremptory
challenges shall be taken or passed by the sides alternately,
commencing with the plaintiff or people; and each party shall
be entitled to have the panel full before exercising any
peremptory challenge. When each side passes consecutively,
the jury shall then be sworn, unless the court, for good cause,
shall otherwise order.’ ” (People v. Cottle (2006) 39 Cal.4th 246,
255, italics omitted.) After the parties have passed on the jury
but before the jury is sworn, the trial court may reopen jury
selection and allow a peremptory challenge to be exercised if
good cause is shown. (Id. at p. 256 [“ ‘[T]he jury is sworn’ when
those 12 trial jurors have been sworn.”].)
When Prospective Juror M.L. was asked on his juror
questionnaire if his “religious views [would] in any way affect
[his] service as a juror,” and whether “[f]or religious or any
other reason, do you feel you cannot sit in judgment on the
conduct of a fellow human being,” he responded “No” to each
question but commented, “I’m not sure in certain cases.” When
asked his “general feelings regarding the death penalty,” M.L.
71
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
answered, “Undecided.” When asked which “entry . . . best
describes your feeling about the death penalty,” he chose “[w]ill
consider” the death penalty. He was “[n]ot sure” how he would
vote if the issue of whether California should have a death
penalty law were on the ballot. When asked, “Under what
circumstances, if any, do you believe that the death penalty is
appropriate,” he answered, “On extreme cases, when the public
is or will be endangered and the criminal is beyond reform.” In
response to the question, “Could you set aside your own
personal feelings regarding what you think the law should be
regarding the death penalty, and follow the law as the Court
instructs you,” he replied, “Yes.”
On voir dire, the trial court observed Prospective
Juror M.L. had answered he was “[u]ndecided” about the death
penalty and asked if he had heard anything in court that
allowed him to further describe his feelings. M.L. replied
“Yes,” explaining: “Your explanation of the law. I would have
to follow the law.” The court asked, “Are you satisfied that you
could follow the law regarding the death penalty as I’ve
explained it to you?” M.L. answered, “Yes.” M.L. answered
“No” when asked if he had “feelings about the death penalty
which are so strong that [he] would never impose the death
penalty in any case whatsoever,” or “feelings about the death
penalty which [he] believe[d] would substantially interfere
with [his] ability to function as a juror in this case.” When
asked if he had “any thoughts about [when] the death
penalty . . . should be imposed,” he replied, “I believe it should
be applied to some cases.” The court asked, “Do you have any
preconceived ideas as to what cases it should be applied to?”
M.L. replied, “No, I don’t.” M.L. was passed for cause by all
parties.
72
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
The following day, after both sides had passed the jury
and the trial court was preparing to have the jury sworn, the
court inquired of the prospective jurors: “Ladies and
gentlemen, do any of you feel there is any reason that you
could not be a fair and impartial juror in this case? If so,
please raise your hand. I see no one raising their hand.” The
court also inquired, “Are there any rules of law that I
explained that you could not follow? I see no affirmative
responses. Ladies and gentlemen, please stand and be sworn
as the jurors of this case.” As the clerk began to swear the
jury, she observed Prospective Juror M.L. had raised his hand.
Outside the presence of the other prospective jurors,
Prospective Juror M.L. told the court and counsel: “I am not
really certain about the death penalty, sir, whether I can
render [the] death penalty as a judgment. I would rather
choose life in prison for the convicted person. I am not sure
because of religio[us] reasons and other reasons that . . . I can
render [the] death penalty. I believe that a man [who] has
done something wrong, that he should be punished. I just am
not absolutely certain right now, due to religious reasons, that
I’m doing the right thing if I have to decide on the death
penalty.” After the court conferred with counsel about what
questions to ask, Beck and Cruz then changed their position
and unsuccessfully objected to any questioning. The court
asked M.L., “[A]s you sit here right this minute, do you know
for a fact that you could vote for the death penalty if you felt it
was appropriate?” M.L. replied he could do so in “one case,”
explaining, “[i]f the persons are repeat offenders or the [c]ourt
can prove that they will kill again.” When the court asked if
M.L. had “feelings about the death penalty which are so strong
that [he] would never impose the death penalty in any case
73
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
whatever,” he replied, “No, sir.” The court asked whether M.L.
had “feelings about the death penalty which [he] believe[d]
would substantially interfere with [his] ability to function as a
juror in this case?” M.L. responded, “I’m not sure whether that
is substantial to your point of view or to the other people’s
point of view[,] but as I have stated . . . when I first answered
my questionnaire, I am really not sure about the death penalty
in the sentencing of a person to death. I know I can go through
Phase 1 and find the person — you know, whether he’s guilty
or not. I’m just not absolutely sure whether I’m doing the right
thing if I have to sentence a person to death.” Beck and Cruz
objected to any further questioning of M.L. The court
nonetheless continued, subsequently asking M.L., “[H]ave your
feelings about the death penalty changed in any manner since
you answered the questions yesterday?” M.L. replied, “Sir,
since you mentioned last week that this is a case regarding
[the] death penalty, I have been asking myself . . . how to judge
the case or what to do in case I get selected. To this point I’m
not one hundred percent sure whether . . . I can do it or
not . . . . [I]f I get selected as a juror, I don’t want to be the last
person to say or to be the only different person.” After further
colloquy, the court explained that M.L. was not “to concern
[him]self . . . in any manner” with the possibility of a hung
jury, noting, “That’s allowed by the law, and it certainly
happens. Do you understand that?” M.L. replied, “Yes, sir.
And I just have this feeling inside that if it comes to the death
penalty, it may end up that way, sir.” The court asked, “Do
you know whether it will end up that way?” M.L. replied, “No
sir.”
The prosecutor moved to reopen jury selection to exercise
a peremptory challenge on the grounds that Prospective
74
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
Juror M.L.’s comments that day indicated “he would not follow
the law and would only be able to impose the capital penalty in
one limited situation.” Beck and Cruz opposed the motion, and
Beck asked the court to swear the jury. The trial court initially
denied the prosecutor’s request to reopen jury selection, but it
delayed having the jury sworn to allow the prosecutor time to
file a writ challenging the ruling. The prosecutor instead filed
a motion for reconsideration, and the court ultimately granted
the motion to reopen jury selection, ruling that although M.L.
was not subject to a challenge for cause, “[i]n the instant case
there were new facts, [M.L.’s] return to his questionnaire state
of mind. . . . The Court finds that [M.L.’s] volunteered
comments to the Court, along with his subsequent answers to
questions put to him, establish the good cause for the district
attorney to reopen to exercise peremptory challenges.” The
prosecutor subsequently exercised a peremptory challenge
against M.L.
When originally questioned on voir dire, Prospective
Juror M.L. expressed no hesitation about setting aside his
feelings about the death penalty and applying the law as he
was instructed by the court and stated he had no preconceived
idea of the cases in which the death penalty would be
appropriate. But the following day, M.L. so questioned his
ability to impose the death penalty he believed it possible he
would be the cause for a hung jury. He was now of the view
that he could only impose the death penalty in “one case,”
which would be “if the persons are repeat offenders or the
[c]ourt can prove that they will kill again.” Under these
circumstances the trial court properly found good cause and
acted well within its discretion in reopening jury selection.
(See People v. DeFrance (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 486, 503−504
75
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
[the trial court properly found good cause to reopen jury
selection when before the jury was sworn a juror “concluded it
would be difficult for him to serve on the jury because it would
require him to stay up all day and night for several days in a
row”].) Contrary to Beck’s assertion in his reply, nothing in
Code of Civil Procedure former section 231, subdivision (d),
required the trial court to immediately have the jury sworn
once the court initially denied the motion to reopen jury
selection. Rather, the court had authority to stay its ruling
and allow the prosecutor time to file a writ or, as the
prosecutor actually filed, a motion for reconsideration.
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
reopening jury selection and allowing the prosecutor to
exercise a peremptory challenge.
4. Excusals for cause
a. Prospective Juror D.D.
Beck and Cruz contend that the trial court wrongfully
excused Prospective Juror D.D. for cause based on her death
penalty views. We reject the claim.
1. Factual background
Prospective Juror D.D.’s juror questionnaire was lost
after trial, but the court recounted without objection or
correction by counsel many of her written responses in its
ruling on the prosecutor’s challenge for cause.
At voir dire, the trial court explained the general factual
circumstances of the murders to the prospective jurors. It also
described the guilt and penalty phases, defined mitigating and
aggravating evidence, and explained “only if the jury decides
the aggravating factors are so substantial in comparison with
76
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
the mitigating factors that death is warranted, can the jury
impose the death penalty.”
At voir dire, the trial court asked Prospective Juror D.D.,
“What are your feelings about the death penalty?” D.D.
responded, “I am against the death penalty.” The court asked,
“If called upon as a juror in this case or if you are selected as a
juror in this case and the jury got to the place where the
penalty was to be decided, and that if after hearing all the law
and the evidence you felt that the death penalty was the
appropriate disposition, would you be able to vote for it?” She
replied, “If I felt it was appropriate, yes. I guess the thing is
whether or not I would believe it was appropriate.” The court
asked, “Do you believe there are any circumstances, any types
of murders, where the death penalty could be appropriate?”
D.D. replied, “Yes,” explaining, “I think that somebody such as
someone like Jeffrey Dahmer, if the death penalty had been
appropriate in his case, I may be able to go with the death
penalty. Severe human crimes, mass murders of numbers, lots
of different people, and other, I guess, heinous circumstances
involved would lead me to impose the death penalty; but it
would have to be something very extreme and very severe.
Otherwise, I really am not — I do not believe that the death
penalty serves any purpose.” The court asked, “Are your
feelings about the death penalty so strong that you would
never vote for first degree murder?” D.D. replied, “No.” The
court asked, “Are your feelings about the death penalty so
strong that you would never find a special circumstance to be
true?” D.D. replied, “Possibly.” The court asked, “Are your
feelings about the death penalty so strong that you would
never impose a death penalty in any case whatsoever?” D.D.
replied, “No.”
77
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
The trial court asked, “Do you believe your feelings about
the death penalty are so strong that they would substantially
interfere with your ability to function as a juror in this case?”
Prospective Juror D.D. replied, “Yes,” explaining, “I would be
fine during the guilt phase of the proceeding; but once we got
to the penalty phase, I’m sure that it would . . . take a lot — it
would take really a serious leap of some sort — and I’m not
sure I’d be able to make it — to impose the death penalty.”
The court asked if D.D. understood that she would have to
choose a sentence of life imprisonment if “the mitigating
factors outweighed the aggravating factors” or if the factors
“were essentially equal,” and D.D. replied that she did. The
court then asked, “Do you understand that if the aggravating
factors were so bad in comparison with the mitigating factors
that death was warranted, that you could impose the death
penalty?” She replied, “I understand.” The trial court asked,
“If . . . the only evidence presented in the penalty phase were
aggravating factors, bad things about the defendants, and they
were very bad, would you be able to vote for the death
penalty?” D.D. replied: “Well, when you say very bad, it would
have to be very bad. I mean, it’s a qualitative statement.
What is very bad? You know, what’s very bad to me is
probably different from what’s very bad to someone
else . . . [W]e may have the same feelings about what is very
bad, but I would still believe it was not right to have a part in
the death of someone else in this manner.” The court asked,
“Is your belief such that you do not believe that you have the
right to take part in a decision which would deprive a person of
his life?” D.D. replied, “Yes.” The court asked, “Do you believe
that you could ever participate in a [courtroom] decision that
would result in the taking of a person’s life?” D.D. replied,
78
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
“Possibly, the case I mentioned before. It would have to be
something very bad.”
The prosecutor challenged Prospective Juror D.D. for
cause. Beck and Cruz objected, and Cruz also objected to
denial of their request for sequestered voir dire. Cruz
requested the court present D.D. with “a hypothetical of the
Dahmer case and see if she would consider that would be very
bad where she would look for the death penalty.” Beck
asserted that D.D. was death qualified and that although she
had “indicated that it would be very difficult for her to impose
the death penalty,” he was sure the prosecutor “doesn’t want
people who would find it easy to impose the death penalty.”
The trial court sustained the challenge for cause. In its
ruling, the court reviewed Prospective Juror D.D.’s answers on
the written juror questionnaire. The court stated: “[I]n her
questionnaire [D.D.] has stated that . . . she felt she could be
fair to both parties, she was an unbiased person.” She said
that “she does not believe in the death penalty except in
extreme Dahmer-type cases, where a death penalty should not
be entirely ruled out.” “[S]he strongly opposes the death
penalty.” When asked about “a situation where the death
penalty could be appropriate,” she responded, “multiple
murders, if no remorse or promise of rehabilitation,” and
further stated she “could follow the law, although it would not
be easy for her to sentence someone to death.” She believed
that the “death penalty should only rarely be imposed when
there is absolutely no . . . hope of rehabilitation” and that “she
would vote against the death penalty were it on a ballot.”
D.D. stated that “life without [the] possibility of parole is okay
for the most heinous crimes imaginable.” She “acknowledge[d]
that the death penalty may be appropriate for only repeat
79
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
offenders” and stated “the death penalty is never appropriate
for first-time offenders.” When asked, “Is there anything about
your present state of mind that you feel any of the attorneys
would like to know,” she responded, “I doubt seriously that I
would impose a death penalty. My verdict would be affected if
I was asked to vote guilty with a punishment of death as
opposed to guilty with life imprisonment.” Upon considering
Prospective Juror D.D.’s written and oral responses, the court
found that her “current state of mind is such that her feelings
against the death penalty would substantially interfere with
her ability to perform as a juror in a case in which the death
penalty was a possible penalty.”
2. Discussion
“ The federal constitutional standard for dismissing a
prospective juror for cause based on his or her views of capital
punishment is ‘ “[w]hether the juror’s views would prevent or
substantially impair the performance of h[er] duties as a juror
in accordance with h[er] instructions and h[er] oath.” ’ ”
(People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 56, quoting Uttecht v.
Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 7.) “ ‘ “There is no requirement that
a prospective juror’s bias against the death penalty be proven
with unmistakable clarity.” ’ ” (People v. Abilez (2007)
41 Cal.4th 472, 497.) As the high court has observed, many
prospective jurors “simply cannot be asked enough questions to
reach the point where their bias has been made ‘unmistakably
clear’; these [prospective jurors] may not know how they will
react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be
unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings.
Despite this lack of clarity in the printed record, however,
there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the
definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to
80
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
faithfully and impartially apply the law.” (Wainwright v. Witt
(1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424–426, fn. omitted.) “[W]hen there is
ambiguity in the prospective juror’s statements, ‘the trial
court, aided as it undoubtedly [is] by its assessment of [the
prospective juror’s] demeanor, [is] entitled to resolve it in favor
of the State.’ ” (Uttecht v. Brown, at p. 7.) We review the trial
court’s ruling for substantial evidence.
Prospective Juror D.D. said she was against the death
penalty and did not believe that she had the right to take part
in a decision that would deprive a person of his life. She also
believed her feelings about the death penalty would
substantially interfere with her ability to function as a juror in
this case and were so strong she “[p]ossibly” would never find a
special circumstance to be true.
Although Prospective Juror D.D. acknowledged her
feelings about the death penalty were not so strong that she
would never impose the death penalty in any case, she
described a death verdict as “really a serious leap of some sort
— and I’m not sure I’d be able to make it — to impose the
death penalty,” and she said she “doubt[ed] seriously that [she]
would impose a death penalty.” She suggested she might be
able to impose the death penalty on “someone like Jeffrey
Dahmer, if the death penalty had been appropriate in his
case. . . . Severe human crimes, mass murders of numbers, lots
of different people, and other . . . heinous circumstances
involved would lead me to impose the death penalty; but it
would have to be something very extreme and very severe.”
Beck and Cruz also assert Prospective Juror D.D. was
qualified to serve because she offered examples of when she
believed the death penalty was appropriate. “But the mere
81
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
theoretical possibility that a prospective juror might be able to
reach a verdict of death in some case does not necessarily
render the dismissal of the juror” erroneous. (People v.
Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399, 432.) We concluded
substantial evidence supported the excusal of the prospective
juror in Martinez (id. at p. 433) who said she might be able to
impose the death penalty for “ ‘particularly heinous’ ” crimes,
to “recidivists” (id. at p. 428), and “ ‘it would have to be
something that would push me beyond the way I normally feel
about the death penalty’ ” but “ ‘that could happen’ ” (id. at
p. 429). The same reasoning supports the excusal of D.D. The
trial court, which heard D.D.’s responses, was left with the
definite impression that she was substantially impaired, and
that determination is supported by substantial evidence.
Beck asserts that the trial court’s voir dire was
inadequate because it denied counsel the opportunity to ask
Prospective Juror D.D. follow-up questions or to rehabilitate
her. Likewise, Cruz asserts that no deference is due a trial
court’s determination of a prospective juror’s state of mind
when the defense objects to excusal but is not permitted to ask
follow-up questions and that the erroneous refusal to allow
counsel to ask questions on voir dire was prejudicial.
The United States Constitution “does not dictate a
catechism for voir dire, but only that the defendant be afforded
an impartial jury.” (Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719,
729, italics omitted.) At the time of the 1992 trial, the jury
selection provisions of Proposition 115, codified in Code of Civil
Procedure former section 223, applied to this case. (Code Civ.
Proc., former § 223, added by Prop. 115, as approved by voters
Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990); Tapia v. Superior Court (1991)
53 Cal.3d 282, 299−300 [jury voir dire provisions of Prop. 115
82
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
apply to all trials occurring after the proposition’s effective
date].) Former section 223 provided in relevant part: “In a
criminal case, the court shall conduct the examination of
prospective jurors. However, the court may permit the parties,
upon a showing of good cause, to supplement the examination
by such further inquiry as it deems proper, or shall itself
submit to the prospective jurors upon such a showing, such
additional questions by the parties as it deems proper.”
Accordingly, the trial court here properly assumed primary
responsibility for questioning prospective jurors. (People v. Box
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1178−1179.) Moreover, as Cruz’s
counsel observed when discussing the voir dire of a different
prospective juror, “[t]he Court has permitted us to submit
questions in the course of jury selection.”
In addition, a trial court “has wide discretion in deciding
what questions should be asked on voir dire to determine
potential jurors’ biases. [Citation.] ‘It abuses that discretion if
its failure to ask questions renders the defendant’s trial
“ ‘fundamentally unfair’ ” or “ ‘ “if the questioning is not
reasonably sufficient to test the jury for bias or
partiality.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 831
(Harris); People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 540 (Stitely)
[“the trial court has broad discretion over the number and
nature of questions about the death penalty”].) Here, Beck and
Cruz fail to identify how the trial court’s voir dire was lacking
or what questions trial counsel could have asked Prospective
Juror D.D. that would have resolved the ambiguity in her
responses. Hence they fail to demonstrate the trial court
abused its discretion in not permitting the parties to further
question D.D.
83
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
Beck and Cruz further contend that Prospective
Juror D.D.’s missing juror questionnaire and proposed voir dire
questions counsel submitted to the court render the record
inadequate for appellate review and require reversal of the
penalty judgment. Although we do not condone the loss of any
prospective juror questionnaires in a capital case (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.610(a)(1)(R)), “[t]he record on appeal is
inadequate . . . only if the complained-of deficiency is
prejudicial to the defendant’s ability to prosecute his appeal.
[Citation.] It is the defendant’s burden to show prejudice of
this sort.” (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 196, fn. 8
(Alvarez); cf. People v. Townsel (2016) 63 Cal.4th 25, 69 [record
lacking either specification of “the materials the trial court
reviewed in ruling on the Pitchess motion or any particularized
description of them, is inadequate to permit meaningful
appellate review”].)
As can be seen from the discussion above, much of
Prospective Juror D.D.’s now missing juror questionnaire was
read into the record during the trial court’s ruling on the
challenge for cause. At no time did any of the four defendants
or the prosecutor object that the trial court had misstated a
question or answer in the questionnaire. “In the absence of
any indication from defense counsel at the time of the trial
court’s ruling” that the court “was misrepresenting the
contents of the questionnaire[] upon which” the court relied, we
see no reason to question the court’s recitation of that
questionnaire. (People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 971
(Heard).) Nor is it apparent how D.D.’s responses to other
questions not recounted by either the trial court or counsel
could possibly remove the ambiguity present in her voir dire
responses or alter the deference accorded to the trial court’s
84
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
ruling. (See People v. Haley (2004) 34 Cal.4th 283, 305−306
[“Defendant fails to show prejudice because he does not explain
how the missing juror questionnaires undermine” the
circumstance that on voir dire “each of the challenged jurors
gave equivocal or conflicting statements as to whether they
could impose the death penalty”].)
As for counsels’ proposed questions to Prospective
Juror D.D., we have already observed that Beck and Cruz fail
to identify how the trial court’s voir dire was lacking or what
questions trial counsel could have asked D.D. that would have
resolved the ambiguity in her responses. Contrary to their
assertion, they could provide this information on appeal
without reference to the proposed questions actually given to
the trial court that are apparently now no longer in the record.
Hence the absence of what questions counsel previously
proposed does not deprive them of meaningful appellate
review. In sum, the record is adequate to address Beck and
Cruz’s claims that the trial court improperly excused
Prospective Juror D.D.
b. Other Prospective Jurors
Cruz further asserts that the trial court erred in
sustaining challenges for cause to Prospective Jurors B.D. and
C.F. based on their death penalty views. Beck also challenges
the excusal of these two prospective jurors as well as the
excusal of Prospective Jurors E.D., C.S., C.D., D.M., C.G., P.J.,
and E.M.
1. Prospective Juror B.D.
On Prospective Juror B.D.’s juror questionnaire, when
asked, “What are your general feelings regarding the death
penalty,” B.D. replied, “Undeci[d]ed.” When asked, “Do you
85
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
feel that a jury should determine the punishment in a criminal
case,” he replied “No.” When asked, “Under what
circumstances, if any, do you believe that the death penalty is
appropriate,” he answered, “None.” When asked, “Under what
circumstances, if any, do you believe that the death penalty is
not appropriate,” B.D. replied “All.” In response to the
question, “Could you set aside your own personal feelings
regarding what you think the law should be regarding the
death penalty, and follow the law as the Court instructs you,”
he replied, “No,” explaining, “I can’t change my opp[osition] of
the [d]eath penalty.”
Prospective Juror B.D. also responded, “No,” when asked
if either the death penalty or life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole “should be automatic for any particular
type of crime.” He believed in the adage, “[a]n eye for an eye.”
He answered, “Not sure,” when asked how he would vote if the
issue of whether California should have a death penalty law
were on the ballot. When asked if he believed “the state should
impose the death penalty on everyone who, for whatever
reason, murders another human being,” B.D. responded “No,”
explaining, “not in self-[d]efen[s]e.”
Prospective Juror B.D. did not provide answers to
numerous other questions regarding the death penalty, such as
whether his views about the death penalty had changed
substantially in either intensity or nature in the last few years,
his feelings about the punishment of life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole, his level of support for imposition of
the death penalty, what purpose he believed the death penalty
served, what information he would like to make a penalty
decision, and whether he believed the death penalty was
imposed too often, too seldom, or randomly.
86
PEOPLE v. BECK and CRUZ
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
On voir dire, the court asked Prospective Juror B.D.,
“Have your views about the death penalty changed
substantially in the last few ye
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.