People v. Krebs

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

REX ALLAN KREBS,

Defendant and Appellant.

S099439

San Luis Obispo County Superior Court

No. F283378

November 21, 2019

Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the

Court, in which Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, Kruger,

and Groban concurred.

PEOPLE v. KREBS

S099439

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

A jury convicted defendant Rex Allan Krebs of the first

degree murder of Rachel Newhouse and Aundria Crawford (Pen.

Code, § 187),1 one count of kidnapping Newhouse to commit rape

and one count of kidnapping Crawford to commit rape and

sodomy (§ 209, subd. (b)), one count of rape by force of Newhouse

and two counts of rape by force of Crawford (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)),

one count of sodomy by force of Crawford (§ 286, subd. (c)), and

one count of first degree burglary (§ 459). The jury found true

the special circumstance allegations that defendant committed

multiple murders, that the murder of Newhouse was committed

while engaged in kidnapping and rape, and that the murder of

Crawford was committed while engaged in kidnapping, rape,

and sodomy. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3), (17).) Defendant admitted

prior convictions for rape, sodomy, assault to commit rape,

residential burglary, and felony grand theft. The court found

the prior convictions to be true.

Following the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned

verdicts of death for each of the two murder convictions. The

trial court denied defendant’s motion to modify the death

penalty verdict and his motion for a new trial. (§ 190.4, subd.

(e).) The court sentenced defendant to death for each of the

murder convictions. It also sentenced him to a total of 166 years

1

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code

unless otherwise indicated.

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to life with the possibility of parole for the other offenses and

enhancements, a sentence it stayed pursuant to section 654.

This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) We affirm the

judgment in its entirety.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Evidence at the Guilt Phase

1. Investigation prior to defendant’s confession

Rachel Newhouse, a student at California Polytechnic

State University at San Luis Obispo, was last seen on November

12, 1998, at about 11:30 p.m., in Tortilla Flats, a restaurant and

bar in San Luis Obispo. Blood drops were found an hour or so

later on the Jennifer Street Bridge, a pedestrian bridge that

Newhouse would have crossed if she walked home from Tortilla

Flats. Samples taken from blood recovered from the bridge and

a nearby parking lot matched blood samples from Newhouse’s

parents.

Aundria Crawford, a student at Cuesta College who lived

in San Luis Obispo, spoke with a friend by telephone until 2:46

a.m. on March 11, 1999.2 Crawford missed an appointment and

failed to respond to texts on March 11, and an investigation

begun the next day failed to locate her.

Defendant’s parole officer, David Zaragoza, thought there

were similarities between the description in a newspaper article

of the abduction of Crawford and defendant’s prior crimes. In

mid-March, he visited defendant at his residence. When

defendant came out to meet Zaragoza, he was walking as if in

pain, and he was holding his rib area. Defendant stated that he

2

All further date references are to the year 1999 unless

otherwise specified.

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had hurt his ribs when he fell off a wall into some firewood, but

Zaragoza was suspicious because he did not see any injuries to

defendant’s hands or arms. Zaragoza reported his suspicions to

the lead investigator of the Crawford abduction.

Two days later, Zaragoza and other agents conducted a

parole search of defendant’s residence. Among the items seized

was an eight-ball keychain. Zaragoza also found BBs. One of

defendant’s parole conditions was that he was not allowed to

possess objects resembling a firearm. The next day, Zaragoza

seized a BB gun at defendant’s place of employment and caused

defendant to be arrested and transported to the San Luis Obispo

County jail.

Larry Hobson, an investigator with the County of San Luis

Obispo District Attorney’s Office, interviewed defendant a day

after his arrest. At this point, defendant had been arrested for

violating his parole by possessing a simulated firearm and

drinking alcohol. When Hobson asked defendant if he had any

idea why he was being interviewed, defendant stated he

assumed it related to the disappearance of the two victims,

because defendant was on parole for rape and had a prior sex

offense. He did not recall where he was the day Newhouse

disappeared. However, defendant said he stayed home all night

on March 10, the night of Crawford’s disappearance. At about

8:00 a.m. the next day, he walked to a woodpile, and his

landlord’s daughter, Debra Wright, stopped and talked to him

briefly. He said he had slipped on some lattice work and fallen

into the woodpile, injuring his ribs.

Defendant denied ever driving down Crawford’s street or

seeing the victims except on fliers posted around San Luis

Obispo. Hobson asked where defendant had acquired the eight-

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ball keychain found during the parole search, and he said he

found it on the yard while in Soledad prison in 1996. In response

to Hobson’s telling defendant that he might have to question

him again, defendant said he was willing to do anything to prove

that he was not responsible for the abductions, and he gave

Hobson permission to search his vehicle and his residence.

A few days later, a search of defendant’s truck disclosed

duct tape, binoculars, and a bottle of stain remover. Also, some

of the carpet had been cut out, and one of the jump seats was

missing.

In early April, Hobson interviewed defendant a second

time. Defendant gave an account of his whereabouts on March

11 that was partly inconsistent with his prior statements. When

asked why someone would identify him or his truck in the

vicinity of Crawford’s house, he stated he had driven down

Crawford’s street two or three times. With respect to the eight-

ball keychain that defendant claimed to have found in 1996,

Hobson asserted that it had not been manufactured until 1998.

Defendant responded, “ ‘that’s strange.’ ”

Five days later, a search of defendant’s home led to the

discovery of the jump seat from his truck. The seat had blood

stains on it.

On April 21, Hobson interviewed defendant a third time.3

Defendant again had difficulty recalling what he did on March

11. Hobson and defendant discussed defendant’s prior sex

3

In this appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s

admission of his various statements made after this interview

under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). We

discuss the circumstances of the interviews in more detail in

part II.B.1, post.

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crimes, and defendant admitted that he fantasized about

abducting women but claimed to have “worked through” that.

Hobson then showed defendant the eight-ball keychain and said

it belonged to Crawford. Defendant denied the keychain was

the one that had been found in his home. Hobson told defendant

that the police had found the missing jump seat, and that there

were traces of Newhouse’s blood on it. Defendant then stopped

talking for about 15 minutes while Hobson kept up a monologue.

Hobson asked defendant to take him to the victims, and

defendant stated he did not want to help Hobson at that time.

Hobson eventually returned defendant to the county jail.

2. Defendant’s confession

On April 22, Hobson returned to the jail, and correctional

officers brought defendant to an employee breakroom to meet

him. Some minutes into the conversation, defendant asked

what Hobson wanted him to say, and Hobson said he wanted the

truth. Defendant responded, “okay” and said that he wanted to

talk somewhere else. Before transporting defendant from the

jail and after giving him Miranda warnings, Hobson asked

defendant if he was responsible for the disappearance and death

of Newhouse and Crawford. Defendant responded, “yes.”

Hobson then took defendant to the police department, where the

ensuing interrogation was recorded. The jury was shown the

videotape, during which defendant described what he had done

to the victims.4

4

Video recordings of interviews conducted on April 22 and

April 27 were played for the jury, and transcripts of these two

interviews were provided to assist the jury. The jury was also

shown a video recording made on April 22, which depicted

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Defendant stated that starting at about 8:30 p.m. on

November 12, 1998, he drank six or seven shots of whiskey. At

about midnight, he saw Newhouse walking down a street in San

Luis Obispo. He told Hobson he had a premonition that

Newhouse would walk across a bridge, so he parked his truck

and walked onto the bridge. As Newhouse walked behind him

on the bridge, defendant turned around and hit her on the jaw

with his fist. When she screamed, defendant picked her up and

threw her down on her back. Then he hit her again, knocking

her unconscious, and dragged her by her hair down the stairs.

At this point, she was bleeding from the back of her head and

about her face. When he reached his truck, he put the still-

unconscious Newhouse behind the front passenger seat in the

area where the jump seats were located. He got rope from the

bed of his truck and tied her hands behind her back. He then

drove along railroad tracks for about 200 yards, where he

stopped and used the same rope to tie her legs. Finally, he

reached into her pants, ripped off her panties, stuffed them in

her mouth, and tied the rope through her mouth.

Beside the road that led to defendant’s residence was an

abandoned cabin. Defendant drove to the cabin, carried

Newhouse inside, removed her pants, and raped her. She was

conscious by this time, and was cursing at him. After he raped

her, he re-tied her legs, hogtied her legs to her hands, and

stuffed her panties back into her mouth. Then he drove up to

his residence, leaving Newhouse in the cabin. He returned to

the cabin 15 or 20 minutes later and found Newhouse dead. He

defendant pointing out the victims’ burial sites and items at his

house. In addition, Hobson testified about his subsequent

interviews of defendant in late April and early May.

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told Hobson that when he left her, the rope he had tied around

her neck was not in a position that would have prevented her

from breathing. Hobson asked whether defendant was saying

that Newhouse’s struggling had caused her strangulation. He

responded, “That or her legs relaxed or something, I don’t know.”

Defendant told Hobson that he panicked, put her body behind

the cabin, and went home.

The next morning, defendant drove his truck past a spot

where he had been cutting wood and dug a grave. He returned

home and, at some point, cleaned blood from his truck. When

he was unable to remove all of the blood, he cut out portions of

carpet, threw them in a dumpster, and put the stained jump seat

in his home. Sometime between 11:00 p.m. and midnight, he

put Newhouse’s body in the back of his truck, drove to where he

had dug a grave, and buried it.

Turning to the Crawford case, defendant stated that the

first time he saw her he was driving by her house as she was

getting out of her car. He followed her back to the house, got out

of his truck, and looked at her through a small gap at the bottom

of the curtains on a window. He left after a few minutes.

Over the following days, defendant twice more returned to

Crawford’s house to watch her. Each time he was intoxicated.

Finally, defendant returned for a third time, knowing that he

was going to abduct her. Again intoxicated, defendant was not

certain what time he went to her house, but it could have been

as late as 2:00 or 3:00 a.m.

Defendant found a small bathroom window that was not

latched, removed the screen, and crawled feet first into a shower

stall. He hurt his ribs going through the window. Defendant

told Hobson that he was “getting ready to go out the bathroom

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door. The only thing I’m thinking of is leaving right then” when

Crawford opened the bathroom door, wearing a T-shirt and

underwear. He punched her, knocking her back against the

wall, and kept punching her, causing her to lose consciousness.

He hogtied her with a rope he had brought with him and put

duct tape across her mouth. He went upstairs and got two

pillowcases. Although he was wearing pantyhose over his head,

he put a pillowcase over Crawford’s head and tied it on so she

could not identify him. He put CDs and some of Crawford’s

clothes in the other pillowcase. He also took a VCR, videotapes

of movies, and her keys with the eight-ball keychain, which he

put in his truck.

When defendant returned to the house, Crawford had

regained consciousness and was struggling. He put her in his

truck and went back to her house to clean up the blood. Then

he drove her to the abandoned cabin, left her on a couch, drove

home, and drank more whiskey. As it was starting to get light,

he drove to the woodpile to chop some wood so that his landlord’s

daughter, Debra Wright, would see him as she went to work.

After Wright left, defendant brought Crawford from the cabin to

his residence. He removed some of the rope, but he left her

hands tied together and kept the pillowcase and duct tape in

place. He raped and sodomized Crawford on the bed, tied her

feet back together, went to the kitchen for more liquor and

coffee, and fell asleep on the couch. When he woke up an hour

or so later, he replaced the pillowcase with a bandanna blindfold

and removed the duct tape. She asked him why he was doing

this, asked him to stop, pleaded with him to let her go, and cried.

He did not say anything to her, and raped her over a coffee table.

Leaving her hands tied and her legs untied, he clothed her in a

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sweatshirt and sweatpants he had brought from her home. He

put her back in his bed and went to sleep on the couch.

Defendant was awakened by a noise and saw Crawford

coming out of the bedroom without the blindfold. He threw her

to the floor and strangled her to death with a rope. He moved

her body to the bedroom and drank more whiskey. Then he dug

a grave in his yard and buried her. Defendant disposed of

everything he had taken except the eight-ball keychain, a second

black sweatshirt, and the CDs. He threw the VCR and

videotapes, which were in a garbage bag, near a road and burned

everything else.

After confessing, defendant accompanied Hobson and

others to his home and the locations of the graves and the

garbage bag that contained the VCR, videotapes, and CDs. The

jury was shown a videotape of the trip.

3. Exhumations and autopsies

The victims’ bodies were recovered the day after defendant

confessed. Newhouse’s body was found buried about 30 feet

above the road. Crawford’s body was found by defendant’s

residence, buried about two feet deep.

Dr. George Sterbenz, a forensic pathologist, observed the

exhumations. He testified that Newhouse’s body was in an

advanced state of decomposition. She had on a shirt that had

been cut in half up the back, and a bra with shoulder straps

pulled down from her shoulders. She had on no other clothing.

Two areas of her scalp were more decomposed, indicating that

they had been injured, and dried fluid on top of her head was

consistent with blood. Dr. Sterbenz believed the cause of death

was asphyxiation, but decomposition prevented him from

determining the specific mechanism by which this occurred.

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Decomposition also prevented a determination of whether

Newhouse suffered any trauma to the vaginal area.

Crawford’s body was not as decomposed as Newhouse’s

body, although the level of decomposition precluded a

determination of whether Crawford’s vaginal or anal area was

bruised. Crawford was wearing a black sweatshirt with a Hard

Rock Cafe logo and black sweatpants. A blindfold made from a

bandanna covered her eyes and nose. A rope circled her neck

two and one-half times and was also wrapped about her torso

and extremities. Two black flex ties were tied around her wrists,

and a third flex tie connected them and passed through the rope.

There were two lacerations inside her mouth that were

consistent with a blow by a fist to the face. There was also an

area of bruising on her scalp. Dr. Sterbenz concluded that her

cause of death was asphyxia by ligature strangulation.

4. Other corroborating evidence

On April 23, a search of the abandoned cabin close to

defendant’s residence disclosed a large blood stain on the pad

underneath the cushions of the couch. The next day, another

search of defendant’s home led to the discovery of black flex ties

that matched the flex ties on Crawford’s wrists. Searchers also

discovered some keys about 48 feet from his home. The keys

unlocked the doors to Crawford’s house.

Analyses of blood stains and hair at the Jennifer Street

Bridge and surrounding areas corroborated defendant’s

description of his abduction of Newhouse. Rodney Andrus, the

assistant director at the Attorney General’s laboratory in

Fresno, also tested blood stains from the jump seat and the

couch in the cabin. He found that their markers were consistent

with Newhouse’s blood and the blood stains on the bridge.

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An inspection of Crawford’s home further corroborated

defendant’s confession. Items that defendant confessed to

taking were indeed missing. The state of the bed also suggested

that Crawford had gotten out of bed shortly before she was

abducted. Blood stains matching Crawford’s were found in the

bathroom.

Evidence concerning Crawford’s clothes and belongings

was also consistent with defendant’s confession. Crawford’s

mother, Leslie Crawford, described some of her daughter’s

belongings, including an eight-ball keychain and a souvenir

sweatshirt with a Hard Rock Cafe logo which she wore only

infrequently. She recalled that her daughter normally wore a

T-shirt and panties to bed. A search of Crawford’s house failed

to find the dark sweatclothes that Crawford’s mother reported

missing.

5. Additional interviews of defendant

After the interview on April 22, during which defendant

confessed, Hobson interviewed defendant six more times. Two

days after the confession, Hobson interviewed defendant to

review some of the details of the crimes and his interactions with

the victims. Hobson next contacted defendant the following day

to discuss his childhood and upbringing. The day after that,

Hobson met with defendant to talk about defendant’s relatives.

On April 27, after driving defendant to view the area

where he abducted Newhouse, Hobson conducted a videotaped

interview, which was shown to the jury. Defendant told Hobson

that Newhouse cursed at him and the more she cursed, the

angrier he became. Hobson asked, “When you get mad, what do

you want to do?” Defendant responded, “Rape her.” He stated

that after he raped her, he was no longer angry, and he denied

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intentionally tying her so tightly that she would strangle

herself. He confirmed, however, that he had tied her differently

when she was in the truck.

In contrast to Newhouse, Crawford did not curse at

defendant; he had placed duct tape over her mouth. When

raping Crawford, defendant was acting out a fantasy that

involved sexual pleasure and dominance. Control was part of

the fantasy, and he had used plastic restraints on Crawford

because they were a better means of control. He agreed with

Hobson’s theory that once Crawford saw defendant, “it took

away the rest of the fantasy and you just knew you had to kill

her.” He also agreed that when he hogtied her, he was hoping

that she would die like Newhouse so he would not have to kill

her himself, but when she broke a thin rope he had put around

her feet, he pulled on both sides of the rope around her neck and

strangled her. When Hobson pointed out the inconsistency

between this description and an earlier account in which

defendant said he hogtied Crawford, left to drink more, and then

came back and took a small piece of rope and strangled her,

defendant said his current description was more accurate. He

said that if Crawford had not struggled, he would have released

her that night.

With respect to defendant’s assertion that he had planned

to release both of the victims, Hobson asked how he planned to

avoid being identified as the perpetrator, given that he had not

used a condom. Defendant stated that he planned to wash them

in the bathtub at his home and use a bottle to wash out his

semen.

Hobson asked whether defendant committed his first rape

when he was 21 years old, and defendant said he committed an

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attempted rape when he was 18, in Sandpoint, Idaho. The

victim was a young girl. By the time he abducted Crawford, his

fantasies always involved tying his victims up and cutting their

clothes off. Torture had never been part of his fantasy, which

involved only dominance and the ability to have sex repeatedly.

He was uncomfortable when he killed Crawford; it made him

feel sick and angry at himself. When he saw fliers about

Newhouse or Crawford, he felt sick and sorry for them. Finally,

he denied taking a camera from Crawford’s house, and said he

had not committed any other crimes while on parole. He also

denied shooting a person in the chest in Santa Barbara over a

drug deal before he went to prison. The transcript of the

interview included parenthetical statements, added to inform

the jury that defendant later admitted off-camera to stealing

Crawford’s camera and shooting a man in Santa Barbara.

Hobson met again with defendant in the last days of April,

when they discussed Hobson’s intention to go to Idaho and

interview defendant’s relatives. Then in early May, after

interviewing defendant’s friends and relatives, Hobson met with

defendant to discuss what Hobson had learned.

6. Defendant’s prior sexual assault of Shelley C.

At trial, the prosecution introduced testimony regarding

defendant’s prior assault of Shelley C. Shelley testified that

early one morning in 1987 when she was living in San Luis

Obispo County, she woke to a man’s hand over her mouth. He

held a knife to her throat and tied her hands behind her back.

He cut off her clothes, started to gag and blindfold her, but

stopped when she said she would not say anything or look. He

raped and sodomized her and then hogtied her. When he heard

Shelley’s roommate’s car, he fled. There was a strong odor of

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alcohol on the assailant. When he was interrogated concerning

this assault, defendant stated that he wanted counseling, but

was afraid of the time he would spend in prison. Defendant

confessed to the crimes and pleaded guilty to residential

burglary, rape and sodomy.

7. Defense case

The defense offered no evidence at the guilt phase.

B. Evidence at the Penalty Phase

1. Defense case

Defendant introduced extensive evidence at the penalty

phase. The evidence falls into two general categories. In the

first category is testimony that painted defendant as a

sympathetic character, a child who was abused by a violent

father and a person who, despite the abuse suffered, still had a

moral compass, good personality traits, and the ability to form

positive relationships. In the second category is testimony that

aimed to reduce defendant’s moral culpability. Defendant

introduced evidence to show that he suffered from a mental

illness, one that impaired his ability to control himself, and that

the various institutions under which he was placed — including

California’s Department of Corrections — failed to afford him

any treatment.

Through the testimony of his mother, sisters,

grandmother, aunts, uncles, stepmother, stepsister, elementary

school classmates, teacher, principal, neighbor, and others,

defendant described the serious mental and physical abuse he

suffered as a child. Born in 1966 to Connie Ridley and Allan

Krebs, defendant was the second of four children. Allan Krebs

drank, abused drugs, and beat Ridley. When she left Allan,

Ridley, then an alcoholic, began living with a man who spanked

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defendant, forced him to wear soiled underwear on his head, and

once made defendant go to school in a diaper. Ridley eventually

sent defendant back to live with his father. Allan beat

defendant, once severely enough to leave “black and blue” marks

and cuts from the “waistline, all the way down to his ankles.”

In 1981, when defendant was 15 years old, he broke into a

neighbor’s home and stole a gun and some other items. As a

result, defendant was sent to the North Idaho Children’s Home

(Children’s Home), a “private, nonprofit, residential treatment

facility.” Defendant introduced the testimony of several staff

members from the Children’s Home, who described his good

behavior while at the facility. Consistent with the defense

presentation of defendant as a person capable of empathy for his

victims and remorse for his actions, a childcare worker from the

Children’s Home, Scott Mosher, testified that defendant was

“very remorseful” if he “did something wrong during this period

of time.” Toward the end of this testimony, counsel asked

Mosher whether he felt defendant “should receive the death

penalty.” The prosecution objected, and the trial court sustained

the objection, explaining that Mosher’s opinion lacked relevance

because Mosher last saw defendant in 1983 and no longer had

any relationship with him.

When he was at the Children’s Home, defendant dated an

11-year-old girl, Adonia Krug. Krug testified that defendant

“helped [her] through a lot.” The relationship ended amicably

when Diana Scheyt, Krug’s mother, told defendant how old Krug

was. Scheyt thought defendant had a positive influence on her

daughter and allowed the two to keep in contact as friends.

In 1984, after defendant turned 18, he assaulted a 12-

year-old girl in Sandpoint, Idaho. Defendant pleaded guilty to

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a misdemeanor assault charge and spent three months in the

county jail for the attack. The victim, Jennifer E., testified for

the prosecution during the penalty phase, and the prosecution

used this incident to cross-examine several witnesses who

opined that defendant should not receive the death penalty.

During the same year, defendant was convicted of grand

theft of an automobile. For this infraction, defendant served a

prison term at the North Idaho Correctional Institute at

Cottonwood (Cottonwood). Defendant presented the testimony

of a Cottonwood correctional officer who recounted his generally

positive attitude and good behavior while incarcerated.

Shortly after he was released from prison in 1986,

defendant went to California to live with his mother and her

then-husband, John Hollister. Hollister testified that he and

defendant had a friendly relationship, and that defendant had a

girlfriend during this time, Liesel Turner. According to

Hollister, defendant and Turner had “[a] good relationship” and

defendant was “infatuated with her, wanted to impress her.” As

described post, the prosecution called Turner as a rebuttal

witness.

In 1987, defendant was arrested and convicted of the

attempted rape and rape of two women, A.C. and Shelley C.

Defendant served his sentence at Soledad prison. He introduced

the testimony of three correctional officers who worked at the

facility. According to Officer Jeanne Pullano, defendant was “a

model prisoner.” Pullano further testified that there was no

counseling for “sexual predators” available at Soledad at that

time, and even if there had been, inmates “probably would not

attend because they would be identified as sex offenders if they

did” and “child molesters” and “rapists” were “low . . . on the

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totem pole” “within the prison population.” The other

correctional officers offered similar testimony.

In September 1997, defendant was paroled to San Luis

Obispo County. Defendant found a job in the surrounding area,

made friends, and began a relationship with a woman named

Rosalynn Moore. Moore testified that defendant treated her

“fairly well.” In particular, defendant was never

“inappropriately forceful with [her]” “in a sexual way,” and if she

“didn’t want to do something, he would say okay and . . . that

was the end of it.”

Three of defendant’s friends testified that they were

present at a bar called Outlaws in August 1998 when defendant

got into a fight with a man. One of the friends, Melissa

Copeland, said that defendant had gotten into the fight because

the man had threatened her and defendant “was defending

[her],” “defending [her] honor.”

Defendant pressed the theme of institutional failure as it

pertained to his parole. For example, his counsel drew from

Parole Officer Zaragoza the statements that (1) although San

Luis Obispo referred all sex offenders to a “parole outpatient

clinic,” the program was “more monitoring” than “confidential

psychotherapy,” and (2) other than the parole outpatient clinic,

there was no other program “available to parolees of rape

convictions for their treatment.” Defendant also introduced the

testimony of Dr. Randall True, who worked at the parole

outpatient clinic and saw defendant while he was on parole.

True testified to the “limited resources” that he had to do his

work. In response to the question, “if the resources were

available — for a person such as [defendant] at the time you saw

him — what programs would you put him in,” True named a

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number of treatment programs that defendant, in fact, was not

afforded. True admitted, however, that defendant never told

him that he had fantasies about raping women. Had defendant

done so, True would have undertaken additional work.

In addition to the lay witnesses, defendant introduced the

testimony of two experts, Drs. Craig Haney and Fred Berlin.

Haney, a psychologist, examined defendant’s background with

an eye to forming an opinion concerning (1) the “opportunities

in which [defendant] might have been treated for the problems

from which he suffered and whether or not there was evidence

that, in fact, he had been treated,” and (2) the “kind of

adjustment [defendant] would make . . . under a sentence of life

in prison without the possibility of parole.” After interviewing

defendant and people who knew him, Haney came to the

following conclusions. First, defendant has lived “a traumatic

and traumatically damaging life.” His manifestations of certain

“long-lasting problems” were observed throughout his life by

various people. Yet, despite the fact that “[o]ftentimes the

observations were accompanied with very clear

recommendations that [defendant] receive treatment,”

defendant “received no psychotherapy, really no psychotherapy

throughout his entire life, including the ten-year period of time

during which he was incarcerated in the California Department

of Corrections.” Second, defendant was “a person who [would]

make[] a remarkably good adjustment to institutional settings,”

including life in prison.

The main defense expert was Dr. Berlin, a board-certified

psychiatrist who interviewed defendant and “made two

diagnoses with conviction.” Berlin first diagnosed defendant

with sexual sadism, a sexual disorder characterized by “intense,

recurrent, erotically arousing fantasies and urges [that] are

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about having sex in a coercive and sadistic fashion rather than

in a consenting fashion.” Crucially, Berlin opined that sexual

sadism impaired defendant’s “ability to be in full control of

himself.” In slightly more technical terms, Berlin said that

sexual sadism caused defendant to be volitionally impaired.

According to Berlin, sexual sadists, like alcoholics or heroin

addicts, “on their own, often can’t stop doing it [giving in to their

urges] because they have an impairment in their ability to be in

control.” Like a kleptomaniac who is “driven to repeatedly

steal,” defendant was driven to engage in his behavior.

Anticipating the prosecution’s argument, Dr. Berlin

explained that a person suffering from volitional impairment is

nonetheless able to plan and premeditate his or her actions.

Berlin also explained that such a person is able to defer his or

her urges. A volitionally impaired person could desist from

acting out his or her urges given sufficient “external controls,”

for example, those controls that exist in a prison setting. This

does not mean that the person has the internal controls

necessary to control his or her behavior. Berlin opined that

sexual sadism is a treatable disorder.

In addition to his diagnosis of sexual sadism, Dr. Berlin

diagnosed defendant with alcoholism. Berlin testified that the

impact of alcoholism “on sexual sadism is like pouring a fuel on

the fire.” The witness elaborated that “both because he was

intoxicated and because he had a disorder that does impair a

person’s ability to be in full control of himself,” defendant’s

capacity “to conform his conduct to the requirements of law” was

“impaired.” Finally, Berlin considered but did not diagnose

defendant with antisocial personality disorder.

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At the point in his testimony in which Dr. Berlin discussed

the ability of a sexual sadist to defer his actions, defense counsel

attempted to ask the witness about a law in California known

as the Sexually Violent Predator Act. The prosecution objected,

and after an extensive discussion with counsel, the court

sustained the objection.

On cross-examination, the prosecution attacked Dr.

Berlin’s opinion that defendant could not control his urges. For

instance, the prosecution inquired about a test known as the

“policeman at the elbow,” which asked whether an individual

would have acted on his or her impulses if there had been a

police officer present. Berlin conceded that “if the policeman

had come, [defendant] would have stopped and tried not to be

apprehended.” However, a police officer was an external control,

and once that external control was removed, Berlin did not

“believe for a minute that [defendant] wouldn’t have been driven

to then seek out somebody else.” Last, the prosecution asked

Berlin what defendant did to resist the urge to kidnap

Newhouse or break into Crawford’s house. Berlin replied that

defendant “didn’t say he tried to resist.” “In fact,” elaborated

the doctor, “he said that after these urges had come back, and

he dates it to the incident in which he was in the bar fight [at

Outlaws], that after fighting so hard for so many years to resist

it, he kind of became demoralized and gave up and kind of

stopped fighting as hard as he had previously.”

2. Prosecution case

The prosecution presented three types of aggravating

evidence: defendant’s prior criminal activities, surviving family

members’ victim impact statements, and testimony to rebut

defendant’s mitigating evidence.

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To establish defendant’s prior criminal activities, the

prosecution introduced evidence of his assaults on Jennifer E.

and A.C. Jennifer E. testified that in 1984, when she was 12

years old, she met defendant. One night in February 1984,

Jennifer was downtown with a group of friends that included

defendant. At some point, defendant pulled Jennifer “off to one

side” and tried to kiss her. She said, “no, I’m only 12.” When

she tried to walk away, defendant grabbed her, and they both

fell to the ground. Defendant then attempted “to undo his pants

and [her] pants.” Jennifer fought to get defendant off, and

defendant struck her three or four times with a closed fist.

Eventually, the two rolled over an embarkment, and Jennifer

was able to get away.

A.C. testified that in 1987, she lived in San Luis Obispo

County. On a night in mid-June, she was in bed with her

daughter when defendant broke into the house and climbed on

top of her. Defendant was carrying a knife and a screwdriver.

A.C.’s daughter cried and screamed. A.C. asked defendant to

take her to another room. When they were walking down the

hallway, defendant attempted to tie A.C. up and “got really

upset” when she did not cooperate. He “hit [her] head against

the wall.” When A.C. tried (unsuccessfully) to stab defendant

with his knife, defendant “got mad . . . and bit [her] finger.”

Defendant then left. A.C. later underwent surgery on her finger

but could not make full use of it again.

To show the impact that defendant’s crimes had on the

victims’ families, the prosecution introduced the testimony of

Newhouse’s mother and aunt and Crawford’s mother and

grandmother. The family members testified about the victims’

lives and plans they had for the future. They also described the

devastation brought by the victims’ deaths.

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Finally, the prosecution produced rebuttal testimony. It

called Liesel Turner, who was defendant’s girlfriend in 1987.

Turner testified that she ended the relationship with defendant

because she did not “feel safe” and gave reasons for her feelings.

In addition, the prosecution rebutted Dr. Berlin’s

testimony with the testimony of Dr. Park Dietz. Unlike Berlin,

Dietz testified that individuals “whose only problem is sexual

sadism” did not suffer from volitional impairment. Dietz

nonetheless afforded a role to mental illness, opining “the reason

[defendant] behaves in this way toward victims is because he

has an antisocial personality disorder.” Finally, Dietz rested his

conclusion that defendant did not suffer volitional impairment

on the particular facts of the case. Specifically, Dietz testified

that defendant’s decisions to drink, lie to his doctor, “cruise” for

victims, carry a “rape kit,” and stop resisting his impulses

showed that his “volitional control was there.” When asked

“whether at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant

. . . to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was

impaired as a result of a mental disease or defect,” Dietz’s

answer was that defendant’s “decision to stop resisting, to stop

trying to conform his conduct, is a choice, a bad choice, he made,

rather than his not having the ability to control himself.”

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jury Selection Issues

Defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly used his

peremptory challenges to remove Catholic prospective jurors in

violation of People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler) and

People v. Batson (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson). Although

defendant argued before the trial court that the prosecution

wrongfully removed six prospective jurors on the basis of their

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religious affiliation, Catholicism, defendant’s Batson/Wheeler

claim on appeal is restricted to the removal of a single

prospective juror, Juror No. 6.5 For the reasons explained below,

we reject his claim.

1. Background

Prospective Juror No. 6, along with more than 150 other

venire members, filled out a written questionnaire and was

individually questioned by the court and counsel. Jurors who

were not excused during the individual questioning were asked

to return some days later. Upon their return, the remaining

jurors were subject to peremptory challenges by the prosecution

and defense — each of which had 20 such challenges. In quick

succession, the parties struck 25 jurors, with the prosecution

striking Juror No. 6 as his eighth strike. After the prosecution

also struck Juror Nos. 122 and 126, the defense raised a

Batson/Wheeler challenge, arguing that the prosecution had

improperly removed these three jurors because they were

Catholic.6 Defense counsel acknowledged that defendant was

5

Batson has been held to preclude the removal of a

potential juror based solely on the venire member’s religious

affiliation. (U.S. v. Brown (2d Cir. 2003) 352 F.3d 654, 667-669;

see People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1158 (Gutierrez)

[“At issue in a Batson/Wheeler motion is whether any specific

prospective juror is challenged on account of bias against an

identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or

similar grounds”].) The Attorney General does not contend

otherwise.

6

Defense counsel also mentioned Prospective Juror No. 49

but admitted that “the record is a little more ambiguous” about

whether he was Catholic. The trial court did not inquire about

this juror much thereafter, and we infer that the court

determined Juror No. 49 was not Catholic.

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not Catholic but stressed that he “has received religious

counseling from a Catholic nun.”

Before asking the prosecution to give its reasons for

striking the three jurors, the court made the following

statement. “[T]here’s some question as to whether — in the case

law the record assumes that the finding has been made of a

reasonable inference if you ask for justification from the other

party. And on this record I don’t think I can make a finding that

there’s a reasonable inference although there does seem to be at

least the beginnings of a trend. [¶] But with three jurors — I

know there are a lot of Catholics on this panel, just in my

memory. I don’t know which numbers they are, but I know there

are a lot.” The court then stated, “with that caveat, I’ll ask the

prosecutor to state what his reasons were for those three jurors.”

The prosecutor offered his reasons for excusing the venire

members. With regard to Prospective Juror No. 6, the

prosecutor stated that he was concerned with the juror’s stance

on “psychiatric issues.” Citing questions from the written

questionnaire, the prosecutor described the juror’s answers as

revealing that she “puts faith in psychiatric testing, thinks

psychology and psychiatry is very useful, and believes it can

explain a lot about a person.”7 These responses concerned the

7

The questions and answers from the written questionnaire

the prosecutor referred to are as follows:

“Q111. Are you familiar with psychological testing?

“A. [Juror circled “Yes.”]

“Q. Which tests?

“A. Not sure.

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prosecution because “the defense has hired one of the top

psychologists in the country, Dr. Fred Berlin.”

The prosecutor also cited Prospective Juror No. 6’s

response to Question No. 129 on the questionnaire. This

question asks, “Is there any type of information regarding a

defendant’s background or character that would be important to

you when choosing between life without parole and death (e.g.

work record, childhood abuse, brutal parents, alcoholism,

former good deeds, illnesses, etc.)?” In response, the juror wrote,

“childhood abuse, brutal parents, alcoholism, illnesses.” The

“Q. How do you feel about these tests?

“A. It determines what is the true feelings of that

person.”

“Q113. What is your opinion about the use of

psychology or psychiatry to explain human

behavior?

“A. I think it[’]s very useful.”

“Q114. Have you ever studied psychiatry, psychology,

or any related subjects?

“A. [Juror circled “No.”]

“Q. Do you have an interest in the psychology of

the mind?

“A. I’m curious to know.

“Q. Have you read articles or watched information

and/or entertainment programs relating to

this subject?

“A. Yes.

“Q. What are your general opinions about this

subject?

“A. I think it can explain a lot about a person.”

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prosecution noted that childhood abuse, brutal parents, and

alcoholism were things “we know will be offered in this case” as

mitigating factors at the penalty phase.

The court made its ruling after hearing the prosecution’s

reasons and the defense’s response. Directing its comments at

the prosecutor, the court stated, “Actually went a lot further

than you needed to, but on the basis of this record, I can’t find a

reasonable inference, as I indicated earlier, based on just three

jurors. My feeling was there were probably about 20 [Catholic

prospective jurors] in the field of 83. Ms. Ashbaugh’s [one of

defendant’s attorneys] indicating that there are 18. [¶] But in

any event, it appears that there certainly are secular reasons for

excusing each of the jurors, and it clearly — in the process that

we’ve gone through, the record obviously reflects that the

questionnaire is replete with questions that would give you

information for preempts on both sides. . . . [¶] But, as I say, in

this case I don’t at this point even find a reasonable inference.

I only asked for the response just for the record.” The court

denied defendant’s Batson/Wheeler motion.

The defense renewed its motion upon dismissals of more

prospective jurors, and the court deferred discussion until jury

selection had finished. Once both parties had exhausted their

peremptory challenges, the defense contested the prosecution’s

excusal of Prospective Juror Nos. 127, 201, and 141. Juror No.

141 was the prosecution’s last challenge; the prosecution had

previously accepted a panel with Juror No. 141 on the panel, but

after the defense struck another juror, the prosecution exercised

its two remaining peremptory challenges to strike more jurors,

including Juror No. 141. The court heard the parties’ arguments

regarding the strikes and once again denied the Batson/Wheeler

motion. In so ruling, the court stated, “I don’t find a reasonable

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inference of a group bias, but I did get reasons on the record from

the prosecutor as to why the excusals were made. . . . [¶] And

the fact that there are . . . two jurors still on the panel who are

Catholics is of some weight, except that all the challenges have

been exhausted.”

Despite the objections raised to the excusals of multiple

panelists during jury selection, defendant, as noted earlier, now

challenges the trial court’s ruling only with respect to

Prospective Juror No. 6. Because “reviewing courts must

consider all evidence bearing on the trial court’s factual finding

regarding discriminatory intent,” we bear the above record in

mind as we examine defendant’s Batson/Wheeler arguments

with regard to this single juror. (People v. Lenix (2008) 44

Cal.4th 602, 607 (Lenix).)

2. Analysis

The framework for analyzing a Batson/Wheeler challenge

is well established. The analysis proceeds in three stages.

“First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant

has made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a

peremptory challenge based on [religious affiliation]. Second, if

the showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to

demonstrate that the challenges were exercised for a [group]-

neutral reason. Third, the court determines whether the

defendant has proven purposeful discrimination.” (Lenix, supra,

44 Cal.4th at p. 612.)

A preliminary question is whether defendant’s

Batson/Wheeler challenge here should be reviewed at the first or

third stage. Defendant presses that we should conduct a third-

stage inquiry. The Attorney General concedes the point, but her

brief was filed before we decided People v. Scott (2015) 61

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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

Cal.4th 363, 391 (Scott). In Scott, we acknowledged that our

jurisprudence in distinguishing between a first- and a third-

stage review “has not always been entirely consistent.” (Id. at

p. 386.) We sought to rectify the inconsistency by clarifying that

“where (1) the trial court has determined that no prima facie

case of discrimination exists, (2) the trial court allows or invites

the prosecutor to state his or her reasons for excusing the juror

for the record, (3) the prosecutor provides nondiscriminatory

reasons, and (4) the trial court determines that the prosecutor’s

nondiscriminatory reasons are genuine, an appellate court

should begin its analysis of the trial court’s denial of the

Batson/Wheeler motion with a review of the first-stage ruling.”

(Id. at p. 391.) Accordingly, if the trial court makes a first-stage

ruling before the prosecutor states his or her reasons for

excusing the prospective jurors, an appellate court reviews that

first-stage ruling. In contrast, when the trial court listens to the

prosecutor’s reasons before purporting to rule on the first stage

inquiry, “we infer an ‘implied prima facie finding’ of

discrimination and proceed directly to review of the ultimate

question of purposeful discrimination.” (Id. at p. 387, fn. 1.)

The trial court here found that defendant did not make out

a prima facie case of discrimination. This was what the court

meant when it said it did not find a “reasonable inference.” But

of course, the court said it could not make “a reasonable

inference” twice, once before inviting the prosecutor to offer his

reasons and once after hearing those reasons. If the court’s first

statement — “on this record I don’t think I can make a finding

that there’s a reasonable inference” — constitutes a ruling, then

we should review that first-stage ruling. On the other hand, if

the court did not make a ruling until after it heard the

prosecutor’s reasons — when it stated more definitively that “on

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the basis of this record, I can’t find a reasonable inference” —

then we should treat the prima facie case as moot and “instead

skip to Batson’s third stage.” (People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th

158, 174.) The record is susceptible of both readings, but the

ambiguity proves immaterial in this case. Even were we to

assume — as defendant urges — that his challenge has arrived

at the third stage, still we would find against him.

“At the third stage of the Wheeler/Batson inquiry, ‘the

issue comes down to whether the trial court finds the

prosecutor’s [group]-neutral explanations to be credible.’ ”

(Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613.) “Review of a trial court’s

denial of a Wheeler/Batson motion is deferential, examining only

whether substantial evidence supports its conclusions. . . . ‘So

long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to

evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its

conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal.’ ” (Id. at pp. 613-

614.) Defendant urges us not to accord deference to the trial

court’s decision because, in his view, the court did not make a

“sincere and reasoned effort” to evaluate the prosecutor’s

reasons. In particular, defendant faults the court for not

evaluating “any of the actual reasons given by the prosecutor”

and instead speaking only in the hypothetical, stating that “the

questionnaire is replete with questions that would give you

information for preempts.”

Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the trial court’s

statements indicate it did generally evaluate the prosecutor’s

proffered reasons — responses on the written questionnaire —

for excusing the prospective jurors. As the trial court observed,

“it appears that there certainly are secular reasons for excusing

each of the jurors, and it clearly — in the process that we’ve gone

through, the record obviously reflects that the questionnaire is

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replete with questions that would give you information for

preempts on both sides.” Defendant makes much of the fact that

the court used the conditional tense, i.e., that it stated the

questionnaire “would give you information for preempts on both

sides” and not that the questionnaire did supply information to

strike the jurors. But the court’s phrasing is understandable in

light of the fact that it ruled against defendant at the first stage

and made a third-stage finding only were it, counterfactually, to

reach the matter.

In any event, we find substantial evidence to support the

trial court’s denial of defendant’s Batson/Wheeler challenge. The

prosecutor’s reasons for striking Prospective Juror No. 6 are

plausible and supported. The prosecution expected defendant

to argue — partly through the use of psychiatric testimony —

that he did not deserve the death penalty because he suffered

childhood abuse, alcoholism, and mental illnesses. Juror No. 6

indicated that she was receptive to such arguments. It was

therefore sound trial strategy for the prosecution to have struck

her. (See, e.g., Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1168; see also

People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 665 [crediting a

prospective juror’s receptivity to psychological testimony as a

race-neutral reason for the prosecutor to have struck her when

the defense was expected to rely heavily on such testimony];

People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 676-678 [finding no

Batson/Wheeler error when a juror was struck because she may

have been “overly sympathetic” to the defendant’s evidence “of

abuse and neglect during his childhood”].)

Defendant argues that the prosecution had no genuine

reason to want to strike a prospective juror who was receptive

to psychiatry. Defendant contends that a juror’s attitude to

psychiatry was a neutral factor, as a psychiatrist was also

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expected to testify for the prosecution. But the prosecution

could have judged that a juror not so inclined to believe in

psychiatric testimony altogether might be better for its case.

However correct was its judgment, we see little to suggest that

it exercised its peremptory challenge improperly. (See, e.g.,

Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1171.)

Defendant also argues that the prosecution should not

have relied on Prospective Juror No. 6’s response to Question

No. 129 because the question was asked in a leading manner.

Yet, simply because the juror may not have focused on

“childhood abuse, brutal parents, alcoholism, [and] illnesses”

until prompted by the question does not mean her response was

unreliable. There is nothing to indicate that the prosecution

behaved disingenuously in reading the juror’s answer as

indicating that she was sympathetic to defendant’s case in

mitigation.

Other evidence supports the conclusion that the

prosecutor’s reasons for striking Prospective Juror No. 6 were

genuinely held. (See, e.g., People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56,

76.) First, we have the prosecution’s oral examination of the

juror. Far from being desultory, the prosecutor during voir dire

explored the same topics from the questionnaire that ultimately

motivated him to excuse the juror. For example, the prosecutor

asked Juror No. 6 about her “curios[ity] about the criminal

mind,” and she responded that she wanted an explanation for

why criminals do what they do and that “childhood abuse or

brutal parents or alcoholism” could be an explanation for why

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people commit crimes.8 The juror also confirmed that she

wanted to know about “abuse or alcoholism, or illness” before

deciding on the penalty. The fact that the prosecutor took the

time to ask Juror No. 6 about areas that concerned him suggests

that he was not using her written answers as a pretext for

excluding her.

Second, we note that two Catholic jurors sat on the jury.

Of course, the presence of Catholic jurors on the jury is “not

conclusive” to our inquiry, because the “[e]xclusion of even one

prospective juror for reasons impermissible under Batson and

Wheeler constitutes structural error” regardless of how many

other venire members were not so erroneously excluded. (People

v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 168; Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th

at p. 1158; see also People v. Motton (1985) 39 Cal.3d 596, 607-

608; People v. Snow (1987) 44 Cal.3d 216, 225.) Nonetheless, a

prosecutor’s acceptance of a jury with members of a group that

the prosecutor allegedly discriminated against “strongly

suggests that [bias] was not a motive in his challenge” and, as

such, is “an appropriate factor . . . to consider” in the

Batson/Wheeler analysis. (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 629;

Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 168; see also People v. Blacksher

(2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 802; People v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal.4th

346, 362-363 (Jones); People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 780.)

The trial court did not give this circumstance much weight

because it thought that the prosecution had run out of

8

The prospective juror went so far as to state that none of

the people she knew who had been abused as children grew up

“normal,” as they either “abused their kids or . . . follow[]

through with how they were raised.” “In a way,” she said, “it

seems like they can’t help it because that’s the way they were

raised, but it’s not an excuse.”

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peremptory challenges and thus had to accept the jury. This

was incorrect. Prior to exhausting its peremptory challenges,

the prosecution had accepted the jury with three Catholics on

the panel. It was only after the defense struck one more juror

that the prosecution exercised its two remaining challenges and

excused another Catholic prospective juror (Prospective Juror

No. 141). The fact that the prosecution accepted a panel with

three Catholic jurors on it when it could have winnowed the

number to one is another piece of evidence suggesting that the

prosecutor did not harbor group bias against Catholics.

Against the substantial evidence supporting the trial

court’s decision, defendant urges us to undertake a comparative

juror analysis. According to defendant, a comparison of

Prospective Juror No. 6’s answers against those of seated jurors

shows that the prosecutor’s reasons for excusing Juror No. 6

were pretextual, as many jurors gave answers similar to those

of Juror No. 6 but the prosecution did not strike them. Having

examined the record ourselves, we do not agree that the seated

jurors were comparable to Juror No. 6.

“Comparative juror analysis is evidence that, while

subject to inherent limitations, must be considered when

reviewing claims of error at Wheeler/Batson’s third stage when

the defendant relies on such evidence and the record is adequate

to permit the comparisons. In those circumstances, comparative

juror analysis must be performed on appeal even when such an

analysis was not conducted below.” (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at

p. 607.) Because defendant did not attempt such a comparison

during trial, “the prosecutor was not given the opportunity to

explain his reasons for dismissing [the challenged jurors] while

later retaining [the seated jurors].” (People v. O’Malley (2016)

62 Cal.4th 944, 977.) Under such circumstances, we “ ‘must not

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turn a blind eye to reasons the record discloses for not

challenging other jurors even if those other jurors are similar in

some respects to excused jurors.’ ” (Ibid.; see Jones, supra, 51

Cal.4th at pp. 365-366.) Hence, to determine whether the seated

jurors were truly comparable to the challenged juror, we may

look at more than just the specific questions from the

questionnaire that the prosecutor cited in explaining his

decision to strike Prospective Juror No. 6. (O’Malley, supra, 62

Cal.4th at p. 977; Jones, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 365 [rejecting

the defendant’s argument that the court “may not consider

reasons not stated on the record for accepting other jurors”].)

Defendant is wrong to suggest otherwise and did not respond to

the Attorney General’s extensive showing that the unexcused

jurors were, in many respects, more favorable to the prosecution

than Juror No. 6.

Furthermore, the sworn jurors did not give substantially

the same answers as Prospective Juror No. 6 on the specific

questions mentioned by the prosecutor. Defendant strings

together a number of jurors whose answers were somewhat

similar to Juror No. 6’s on either the questions about psychiatric

attitude (Question Nos. 112 and 113 in particular) or the

question about the important factors in deciding on penalty

(Question No. 129). However, just three of those jurors gave

purportedly similar answers to Juror No. 6 on both sets of

questions. Other jurors gave answers similar to those of Juror

No. 6 on only one of the two areas. These jurors are thus not

comparable to Juror No. 6 at the outset. (See Lenix, supra, 44

Cal.4th at p. 624 [“Two panelists might give a similar answer on

a given point. Yet the risk posed by one panelist might be offset

by other answers, behavior, attitudes or experiences that make

one juror, on balance, more or less desirable.”]; id. at p. 631

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[“Advocates do not evaluate panelists based on a single answer.

Likewise, reviewing courts should not do so.”].)

The answers of the remaining three jurors do little to

strengthen defendant’s case. Of these jurors, none said — as

Prospective Juror No. 6 did — that psychological testing

“determines what is the true feelings of [a] person.” Unlike

Juror No. 6, they also did not say that psychology or psychiatry

is “very helpful” “to explain human behavior.” Instead, when

asked for an opinion on “the use of psychology or psychiatry to

explain [such] behavior,” Juror No. 253 simply said, “I do not

know what other field deals with human behavior”; Juror No.

334 gave the circumspect answer of, “It could be reasonable

depending on how it is presented”; and Juror No. 338 answered

somewhat ambivalently, “Perhaps to explain the motivational

factors behind the crime. Also, to permit introduction of

mitigating/extenuating circumstances.” Moreover, these seated

jurors did not identify specific factors that were important to

them at the penalty phase. Juror Nos. 253 and 338 simply said,

“yes” when asked if there is “any type of information regarding

a defendant’s background or character that would be important

to you when choosing between life without parole and death.”

Juror No. 334 gave the even weaker answer of, “Depend on the

evidence.” None of the three jurors singled out “childhood abuse,

brutal parents, alcoholism, illnesses” as did Juror No. 6.

The comparative juror analysis, in short, does not

persuade us that it is more likely than not that the prosecution’s

reasons for excusing Prospective Juror No. 6 were pretextual.

Defendant’s other arguments fare no better, and we affirm the

trial court’s denial of defendant’s Batson/Wheeler challenge.

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B. Guilt Phase Issues

1. Admission of defendant’s confession

Defendant contends his confession on April 22, 1999 and

all subsequent statements should have been excluded because

his invocation of the right against self-incrimination on April 21

was not honored and his waiver under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S.

436 was involuntary. As explained below, we agree that the

investigator should have stopped the interrogation on April 21

sooner than he did but disagree that the failure compels the

exclusion of the confession obtained on April 22 or thereafter.

We therefore reject defendant’s claim that the court erred in

admitting his statements.

a. Background

Before trial began, defendant filed a motion to suppress

his April 22 confession and all following statements. At the

hearing on the motion to suppress, Hobson testified. Hobson

stated that he met with defendant for the first time in March

1999, after defendant had been arrested for violating his parole.

At that time, defendant was one of 13 to 16 individuals who,

because of their prior commission of sexual offenses, were being

questioned regarding the disappearance of the two victims.

Without giving defendant the warnings required by Miranda,

Hobson interviewed him for an hour or so. Defendant told

Hobson that he knew he would be questioned about the

disappearance of the two women, and he was willing to

cooperate in the investigation because he was confident the

investigation would establish his innocence. He also told

Hobson the police could search his vehicles and his house at any

time, and that he was willing to answer questions that arose in

the future.

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In early April 1999, Hobson met again with defendant at

the San Luis Obispo Police Department. Hobson asked

defendant to submit to a polygraph examination, and defendant

eventually agreed. The polygraph examiner advised defendant,

both orally and in writing, of his Miranda rights, and defendant

signed a statement waiving those rights. Defendant began the

polygraph examination, but terminated it before the

examination was completed.

After the polygraph examination ended, Hobson again

talked to defendant. Hobson asked defendant if he remembered

the Miranda rights that the polygraph examiner had read him.

Defendant indicated that he remembered them and stated that

he was willing to talk to Hobson. During the 30- to 40-minute

interview that followed, Hobson asked him again where he was

on various dates. Defendant readily answered questions and

reiterated that he was confident that the investigation would

clear him of any involvement in the two cases.

On April 21, 1999, Hobson met defendant at the jail and

asked if he was still willing to talk and cooperate with the

investigation. Defendant said he was. Hobson transported

defendant to the police department, where the subsequent

questioning was recorded. At the beginning of the interview,

Hobson asked defendant if he still knew the rights the polygraph

examiner had read him. Defendant confirmed that he knew

those rights, and Hobson stated, “those are the rights that still

apply here.”

Defendant was initially cooperative. However, once

Hobson began confronting him with physical evidence

connecting him to the crimes — the eight-ball keychain found in

defendant’s possession that resembled Crawford’s and the blood

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found on defendant’s jump seat that matched Newhouse’s —

defendant lapsed into silence. During the next 15 or 16 minutes,

defendant remained silent while Hobson urged him to give an

account of what happened. Defendant eventually stated, “Put

me down in a holding cell and let me think, all right?” When

Hobson did not honor the request, defendant said that if Hobson

“sit[s] there and tr[ies] [to] keep beating on [him],” he was “not

gonna say nothing.” After some more back-and-forth, Hobson

agreed to give defendant a 10-minute break and left.

Hobson returned approximately five minutes later, telling

defendant, “we know you did it . . . . What matters is why you

did it.” In response, defendant whispered, “Take me back to

jail.” Hobson asked if defendant did not want to help him, and

defendant confirmed, “Not right now.” Hobson continued

talking, and defendant said, “Nothing to say Larry.”

Hobson then spoke some more. Defendant indicated for

the second time that he had “[n]othing to say.” At this point,

Hobson agreed to take defendant back to jail, saying that

defendant should call him when he was ready to talk. Hobson

then stated, “I’ll take you back out just like I brought you in.

You’re on a parole hold,”9 and defendant responded, “I’m on

parole hold forever.”

As Hobson and defendant were leaving to return to the

jail, defendant asked Hobson for a cigarette and for him to drive

around a while so defendant could smoke. During the ride,

Hobson asked defendant more questions. For instance, when he

9

The transcript included the parenthetical “(Meaning he

was not being arrested for the murders of Rachel and Aundria)”

following Hobson’s statement that defendant was “on a parole

hold.”

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heard defendant in the back seat crying and mumbling to

himself, Hobson asked what defendant was thinking. When

they arrived at the entrance to the jail facility, Hobson asked

defendant whether he was willing to take him to the victims.

Defendant told Hobson to turn into the facility instead, and

Hobson complied. As they were walking to the jail, Hobson also

asked if, in the event Hobson did not hear back from defendant,

he would be willing to let Hobson return the next day.

Defendant responded, “ “Maybe I’ll deal with it tomorrow.’ ”

Their conversation ended at approximately 2:00 or 2:30 p.m.

At approximately 9:45 a.m. on April 22, Hobson arrived

uninvited back at the jail facility. He met with defendant in an

employee break room, and had defendant brought to him

without handcuffs or other restraints. Hobson testified at the

suppression hearing that he chose the break room instead of the

police department because he “wanted it to be a noncustodial-

type situation,” where defendant would not “feel any type of

coercion.” Once defendant arrived, Hobson began talking,

observing that the situation with the disappearance of the two

victims was not going to go away. Hobson stated that the

investigation painted a terrible picture, and he wanted to hear

defendant’s side of the story, which might be different.

Defendant told Hobson that Hobson was wrong, that “I’m

nothing but an animal, and I don’t deserve to live.” Defendant

also mumbled, “Nothing can justify what I did.” The first

statement (“I’m nothing but an animal, and I don’t deserve to

live”) came within five minutes of Hobson initiating

conversation with defendant, and the second (“Nothing can

justify what I did”) followed shortly thereafter.

When Hobson returned to topics he had broached

previously, defendant asked Hobson what he wanted defendant

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to tell him. Hobson said he wanted the truth. Defendant

responded, “Okay. But I don’t want to talk here.” Hobson

agreed to take him to the police department.

Before transporting defendant from the jail, Hobson

informed defendant that he “wanted to make sure [defendant]

understood exactly what we were going to be doing and the

questions I was going to be asking . . . so we didn’t spend another

two hours of wasted time.” Hobson then read defendant his

Miranda rights, and defendant acknowledged that he

understood them. Hobson asked defendant if he was responsible

for the disappearance and deaths of the two victims, and

defendant said he was. Hobson subsequently arranged for

defendant to be transported to the San Luis Obispo Police

Department. The interaction at the jail took “a total of 30

minutes from the time [Hobson] walked in until the time [he]

left.”

Upon arriving at the police department, Hobson advised

defendant of his Miranda rights for the second time that day

and asked if he understood them. Defendant answered in the

affirmative. He then provided a detailed confession to the

crimes as described ante, part I.A.2.

Hobson followed the same advisement procedure when he

interviewed defendant on April 27. During this interrogation,

Hobson asked defendant if he had “always talked to [Hobson]

voluntarily.” Defendant agreed that he had. Although the

interview was primarily devoted to obtaining more details about

the kidnappings and killings of Newhouse and Crawford,

Hobson also asked defendant toward the end of the

interrogation what prompted him to confess. Defendant

responded, “[c]ause what I did was wrong.” When asked if

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anything Hobson told him “convinced [him] that [he] should

talk,” defendant responded, “[b]lood on my car seat.” Defendant

distinguished between the two pieces of physical evidence the

police had at that time, the eight-ball keychain and the blood.

With regard to the blood, defendant said he “knew what was

there” and so knew that the police were not “bluffing.” He

confirmed that if all Hobson had was the keychain, he would not

have confessed.

After listening to Hobson’s testimony and reviewing the

taped confessions, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to

suppress. In its order, the trial court noted that defendant had

first been advised of his Miranda rights on April 1 and had

agreed to discuss the case with Hobson. It further noted that on

April 21, defendant said he recalled his rights. The court found

that on April 21 “defendant had invoked his right to remain

silent” but did not resolve when exactly he did so. The court

further reasoned that Hobson “stumbled in his attempt to

honor” defendant’s invocation when Hobson asked defendant at

the end of the drive to take Hobson to the victims. However, the

court concluded that Hobson’s inappropriate “contact was

terminated at the jail in late afternoon at approximately 4:00

p.m” when Hobson dropped defendant off. Furthermore,

“[d]efendant at that time indicated that he might be willing to

speak with Hobson the next day: ‘Maybe. I’ll deal with it

tomorrow.’ ”10 Based on these facts, the court concluded that

10

The trial court’s order includes a period after “Maybe.”

The court reporter transcribed Hobson’s testimony as stating,

“Maybe I’ll deal with that tomorrow.” Moreover, Hobson

testified that their conversation on April 21 ended at

approximately 2:00 or 2:30 p.m., rather than at 4:00 p.m. as the

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defendant’s “request to cease questioning then was honored

within the meaning of federal law.”

Turning to the events of April 22, the trial court rejected

the Attorney General’s argument that defendant was not in

custody when Hobson approached him that morning. Although

defendant’s jailed status “was due to parole violations,” the court

found that a reasonable person would believe he was in custody

“on the case in question.” As such, defendant was in custody for

Miranda purposes and “should have been advised of his

Miranda rights or at least reminded of them by Investigator

Hobson.” Because Hobson failed to do so, the court excluded

defendant’s inculpatory statements that were made before

Hobson read defendant his Miranda rights, i.e., the statements

“I’m nothing but an animal. I don’t deserve to live” and “Nothing

can justify what I did.” The court nonetheless concluded that

these admissions were voluntary.

Finally, the trial court found all statements taken after

Hobson gave defendant his Miranda warnings on April 22 were

admissible. It reasoned that Hobson had “obtained implied

waivers,” and “[t]here is no evidence that defendant’s will was

overcome.” We review these findings below.

b. Analysis

We begin with the uncontroverted premise that

statements made by a defendant subject to custodial

interrogation are inadmissible (for certain purposes) unless the

defendant was “warned that he has a right to remain silent, that

trial court’s order stated. The Attorney General’s brief quotes

the reporter’s transcript, with no period after “maybe,” and

recites that Hobson dropped defendant off at the jail at about

2:00 or 2:30 p.m.

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any statement he does make may be used as evidence against

him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney,

either retained or appointed.” (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at

p. 444; see Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 224.) “The

defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the

waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”

(Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444.)

“On appeal, we review independently the trial court’s legal

determinations of whether a defendant’s . . . Miranda waivers

were knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made [citation],

and whether his later actions constituted an invocation of his

right to silence [citation]. We evaluate the trial court’s factual

findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the

defendant’s statements and waivers, and “ ‘ “accept the trial

court’s resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its

evaluations of credibility, if supported by substantial

evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 115

(Rundle).)

Independent of whether a defendant’s rights under

Miranda were observed, his or her statements may not be

admitted unless they were voluntary. “The court in making a

voluntariness determination ‘examines “whether a defendant’s

will was overborne” by the circumstances surrounding the

giving of a confession.’ ” (Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 114.)

The prosecution bears the burden of proof and must show “by a

preponderance of the evidence the statements were, in fact,

voluntary.” (Ibid.)

i. Custody status

As a threshold matter, the Attorney General argues that

defendant was not in custody when he confessed and so Miranda

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has no application. (People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824,

833 [“ ‘Miranda warnings are required only where there has

been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him

“in custody” ’ ”].) The Attorney General acknowledges that

defendant was under arrest and held in county jail when Hobson

questioned him, but maintains that such restriction on

defendant’s freedom related only to his parole violations. As

such, he was not in custody “for Miranda purposes as to the

Newhouse/Crawford cases at the time he confessed to the

crimes.” The trial court rejected this argument, and so do we.

We recognize that a formal arrest does not always

constitute custody for Miranda purposes. (See Maryland v.

Shatzer (2010) 559 U.S. 98, 112 (Shatzer); Howes v. Fields (2012)

565 U.S. 499, 509 (Howes).) In Shatzer, supra, 559 U.S. at page

112, the high court explained that such an arrest or the

equivalent restraint in freedom of movement is “only a

necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody.”

In particular, an incarcerated person who is interrogated by the

police is not necessarily in Miranda custody. This is because

such a person is not always exposed to “the coercive pressures

identified in Miranda.” (Id. at p. 113; see also Howes, supra, 565

U.S. at pp. 508-509 [“ ‘custody’ is a term of art that specifies

circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious

danger of coercion”].)

The high court returned to the same theme in Howes. The

court began by identifying “three strong grounds” why an

incarcerated person may not experience the coercive pressure of

Miranda custody. (Howes, supra, 565 U.S. at p. 511.) “First,

questioning a person who is already serving a prison term does

not generally involve the shock that very often accompanies

arrest.” (Ibid.) “Second, a prisoner, unlike a person who has not

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been sentenced to a term of incarceration, is unlikely to be lured

into speaking by a longing for prompt release.” (Ibid.) “Third,

a prisoner, unlike a person who has not been convicted and

sentenced, knows that the law enforcement officers who

question him probably lack the authority to affect the duration

of his sentence.” (Id. at p. 512.) Reviewing the facts of the case

before it, the court concluded that the prisoner “was not in

custody within the meaning of Miranda.” (Id. at p. 517.) In

coming to this conclusion, the court took “into account all of the

circumstances of the questioning” but thought the “[m]ost

important” factor was that the prisoner had been “told at the

outset of the interrogation, and reminded thereafter, that he

could leave and go back to his cell whenever he wanted.” (Id. at

pp. 517, 515.)

This case is different from Shatzer or Howes. In those

cases, a person serving a prison sentence was brought in for

questioning on an unrelated crime. By contrast, here defendant

was not serving a term of incarceration when he was questioned,

and it is difficult to separate his jailed status from the

investigation into the Newhouse and Crawford murders.

Although the legal justification for defendant’s detention was a

parole violation, the impetus for the arrest was the perceived

similarity between defendant’s prior crimes and Crawford’s

disappearance. Moreover, defendant’s interactions with law

enforcement after his arrest all concerned the Newhouse and

Crawford investigation. At the time of his confession on April

22, defendant had been repeatedly questioned about the

disappearance of these two women. With good reason then,

defendant appeared to have understood that his custodial

status, although technically a parole hold, was connected to the

Newhouse and Crawford matters. This explains defendant’s

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uncontradicted statement that he was going to be on parole hold

“forever,” something that seems unlikely were defendant held

only for drinking alcohol and possessing something that looked

like a firearm.

All this matters because, in such circumstances, the

rationales given in Howes concerning why a person would not

necessarily feel the coercive pressure of interrogation fall away.

Unlike the defendant in Howes, defendant was recently arrested

and presumably still experiencing “the shock that very often

accompanies arrest.” (Howes, supra, 565 U.S. at p. 511.) He

likely hoped for “prompt release” and so might have been lured

into speaking. (Ibid.) Finally, he might well have thought that

Hobson had “the authority to affect the duration” of his parole

hold. (Id. at p. 512.) Because law enforcement interest in

defendant appeared to have been motivated by the

disappearance of the two women, defendant might reasonably

have thought that if he could convince Hobson he was not

responsible for what happened to Newhouse and Crawford, he

might be released. This explains defendant’s willingness to

cooperate with the police — including by voluntarily answering

questions, giving law enforcement permission to search his

property, and undergoing a polygraph examination.

Moreover, we find that defendant was, in fact, subject to

the coercive pressure associated with interrogation. At no point

was defendant told that he “could leave and go back to his cell

[at the county jail] whenever he wanted.” (Howes, supra, 565

U.S. at p. 515.) Indeed, when defendant asked to be taken back

to jail on April 21, Hobson took some time to accede to the

request. Hobson also used the time in the interim to try to elicit

incriminating responses from defendant — that is, to subject

him to interrogation. (See Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S.

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291, 300-301; Shatzer, supra, 559 U.S. at p. 112 [reasoning that

“the coercive pressure that Miranda was designed to guard

against” was the “ ‘danger of coercion [that] results from the

interaction of custody and official interrogation’ ”, italics

omitted].) Considering the circumstances surrounding

defendant’s interrogation, we cannot say that a reasonable

person in his position “ ‘would have felt free to terminate the

interview and leave.’ ” (Howes, supra, 565 U.S. at p. 515.) We

therefore find that defendant was in custody for Miranda

purposes when he confessed.

ii. Waiver and confession

We now address the merits of defendant’s claim that his

confession should have been suppressed. Because defendant

seeks to suppress the statements that he gave on April 22 and

thereafter, we begin with the circumstances most immediately

surrounding these statements. The statements — detailed,

recorded admissions of how defendant kidnapped, raped, and

murdered Newhouse and Crawford — were taken after Hobson

advised defendant of his Miranda rights and confirmed that he

understood them. As long as defendant validly waived the

Miranda protection and voluntarily confessed, the statements

are admissible. (See Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542 U.S. 600,

608-609 (Seibert) [“giving the warnings and getting a waiver has

generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility; maintaining

that a statement is involuntary even though given after

warnings and voluntary waiver of rights requires unusual

stamina, and litigation over voluntariness tends to end with the

finding of a valid waiver”].)

A valid waiver need not be express, but “may be implied

from the defendant’s words and actions.” (People v. Parker

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(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1184, 1216 (Parker).) When a suspect “ ‘having

heard and understood a full explanation of his or her Miranda

rights, then makes an uncompelled and uncoerced decision to

talk, he or she has thereby knowingly, voluntarily, and

intelligently waived them.’ ” (Id. at p. 1216.)

There is no question that defendant “heard and

understood a full explanation” of his rights. (Parker, supra, 2

Cal.5th at p. 1216.) On April 22, Hobson twice read defendant

his rights, and defendant expressly stated that he understood

them. Moreover, defendant “had extensive prior experience

with the criminal justice system,” having been convicted of

numerous felonies before being interrogated in this case. (Ibid.)

Such familiarity bolsters the conclusion that defendant had “full

awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and

the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” (Moran v.

Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421; see also Parker, supra, 2

Cal.5th at p. 1216 [crediting such prior experience with the

criminal justice system].)

Likewise, there is no dispute that defendant spoke to

Hobson — and so “act[ed] in a manner inconsistent” with the

exercise of his Miranda rights. (Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010)

560 U.S. 370, 385 (Berghuis).) After being apprised of his rights,

defendant “proceeded to actively participate in the conversation

with the detective[] — answering questions, asking for

clarification, and generally contributing to a discussion he knew

was being tape-recorded.” (Parker, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1216.)

He did not once mention an attorney. Such conduct suggests

that defendant “has made a deliberate choice to relinquish the

protection those rights afford.” (Berghuis, supra, 560 U.S. at

p. 385.)

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We now turn to the question whether the waiver and

confession were voluntary. The waiver in this case is inferred

from defendant’s confession, and defendant maintains that both

were involuntarily given because he was coerced. Defendant

lists a host of “tactics” that he said were “designed to overcome

[his] decision not to incriminate himself,” including “repeated

questioning after invocation, lies and misrepresentations

concerning the evidence, implied promises of leniency and

benefits, verbal commands to talk, physical touching, and an

approach of ‘softening-up’ [defendant].”

Before addressing each of these interrogation techniques,

we note the following. First, when asked at the April 27

interview, defendant agreed that he had “always talked to

[Hobson] voluntarily,” and that Hobson had “never coerced

[him], threatened [him], [or] promised [him] anything.” (See,

e.g., People v. Spencer (2018) 5 Cal.5th 642, 673 (Spencer)

[taking account of the fact the defendant “acknowledged at the

end of the interview that his confession was ‘free and voluntarily

given’ ” and that “the officers made him no promises and that

they did not threaten him”]; People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th

731, 753 (Dykes) [similar].)

Second, and more important, defendant himself identified

why he confessed. The reasons did not involve any interrogation

tactic that he now claims was coercive. Instead, defendant said

he confessed because he felt “what [he] did was wrong” and

because the police had recovered blood from his vehicle’s seat.

Of all the things Hobson told him, defendant said it was

Hobson’s disclosure that the police had found blood on his

truck’s jump seat that “convinced [him] that [he] should talk.”

Hobson’s statement that the police had found Newhouse’s blood

on defendant’s jump seat was true and cannot be said to have

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been coercive. (People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 115

(Holloway) [stating that proper questioning “ ‘may include

exchanges of information, [and] summaries of evidence . . .’ ”].)

Defendant’s own words thus undermine his claim that he

involuntarily confessed because of coercion.

We nonetheless examine seriatim the complained-of

interrogation techniques. We do not find that, individually or

collectively, these techniques served to overbear defendant’s will

or to render his confessions involuntary. Defendant first claims

that Hobson improperly “continu[ed] to attempt to convince

[defendant] to talk on April 21st after repeated invocations of

[his] right to remain silent.” We will return below to the claim

that defendant “repeated[ly]” invoked his right to remain silent

on April 21. For the purpose of determining whether the

confessions were voluntary, however, it is enough to observe

that — even assuming Hobson failed to heed defendant’s

invocations of the right to remain silent on April 21 — that

failure did not produce the confession on April 22 or the

statements thereafter. (See People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.

4th 405, 437 (Williams) [“A confession is not involuntary unless

the coercive police conduct and the defendant’s statement are

causally related”].)

There is no evidence that what Hobson said to defendant

after he lapsed into silence — the earliest time defendant claims

he invoked his right against self-incrimination — caused

defendant to confess. Hobson had already told defendant about

the blood found in his truck before defendant stopped

responding to questions. Thereafter, Hobson repeated the same

exhortations to tell the truth that he employed before defendant

stopped talking. Defendant was not swayed by what Hobson

said, telling Hobson that if he “keep[s] beating on me,” “[t]hen

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I’m not gonna say nothing. I know me.” And indeed, defendant

made no inculpatory statement on April 21. It was not until the

following day, after a night away from any importuning by

Hobson, that defendant made the inculpatory statements.

In light of these facts, we find that Hobson’s “continuing

to attempt to convince [defendant] to talk on April 21” did not

cause defendant to confess and so did not render his confession

on April 22 or thereafter involuntary. (See People v. Carrington

(2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 172 (Carrington) [“we conclude that

Sergeant Sherman’s comments did not affect defendant’s

decision to confess to the murder of Esparza, because she

maintained her innocence during the remainder of the second

interview and, during the third interview, revealed that she

already was aware that [what the sergeant said was false]”];

Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 114 [“Coercive police tactics by

themselves do not render a defendant’s statements involuntary

if the defendant’s free will was not in fact overborne by the

coercion and his decision to speak instead was based upon some

other consideration”].)

We come to the same conclusion with regard to defendant’s

assertions that Hobson engaged in “lies and misrepresentations

concerning the evidence, implied promises of leniency and

benefits, verbal commands to talk, physical touching, and an

approach of ‘softening-up’ [defendant].” Defendant complains

that Hobson lied to him when he told him that the eight-ball

keychain had been “ ‘tested’ and found to have been

manufactured” later than when defendant said he found the

item. Defendant, however, expressly disclaimed that the eight-

ball keychain in itself caused him to confess, answering “[n]o”

when Hobson asked, “What if all I had was the 8 ball? . . . Would

you have confessed?” Moreover, “[t]he use of deceptive

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statements during an interrogation . . . does not invalidate a

confession unless the deception is ‘ “ ‘of a type reasonably likely

to procure an untrue statement.’ ” ’ ” (Carrington, supra, 47

Cal.4th at p. 172.) We do not think that Hobson’s representation

about the keychain is of such a type. (See People v. Smith (2007)

40 Cal.4th 483, 505-506 (Smith) [listing cases in which courts

have found similar deceptive interrogation tactics permissible].)

Defendant also claims that Hobson misrepresented that

“three witnesses will testify” to seeing defendant’s vehicle in

Crawford’s neighborhood. Defendant characterizes this as a

“lie,” because “[n]o such witnesses were ever called.” Yet, weeks

before he confessed, defendant himself admitted that he had

driven down Crawford’s street several times. Hobson’s

statement about the three witnesses, whether or not true, thus

was not likely to procure an unreliable admission. (Carrington,

supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 172.)

Defendant attempts to bolster his argument about the

supposed misrepresentations by claiming that Hobson

“maximize[d] the psychological effect of his lies by repeatedly

insisting that he could be trusted.” We do not find that such

statements are either inherently coercive or here served to

undermine defendant’s will. Certainly, however many times

Hobson told defendant that he could trust him, defendant was

not inclined to believe Hobson or confess because of the “lies.”

We should not forget that defendant was a grown man,

experienced with the criminal justice system, physically

healthy, and displaying no indication that he was especially

susceptible to Hobson’s representations. As such, defendant

was rather well placed to resist interrogation. (See, e.g., Dykes,

supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 752.)

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We are likewise unpersuaded that Hobson “falsely told

[defendant] that the authorities would give him favorable

consideration if [he] confessed.” Hobson told defendant no such

thing. The message Hobson conveyed was that both he and the

district attorney wanted to know defendant’s “story” and why

defendant did what he did. Such sentiment cannot fairly be

taken to imply that the district attorney would give defendant

favorable treatment. (See Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at

p. 174 [finding that the interrogators’ statements “did not

constitute a promise of leniency” when “[t]he interviewing

officers did not suggest they could influence the decisions of the

district attorney, but simply informed defendant that full

cooperation might be beneficial in an unspecified way”].) And

even if what Hobson said might be construed as suggesting that

defendant’s version of events could make a difference in how he

was prosecuted, this was not false. (Holloway, supra, 33 Cal.4th

at p. 116 [observing that some circumstances “can reduce the

degree of a homicide or, at the least, serve as arguments for

mitigation in the penalty phase”].) In any event, Hobson “did no

more than tell defendant of the benefit that might ‘ “flow[]

naturally from a truthful and honest course of conduct.” ’ ”

(Ibid.) Such statements did not render defendant’s subsequent

statements involuntary. (Id. at p. 115.)

Defendant also complains that Hobson “physically

touched [him] and told him that talking to Hobson was

required.” We do not see how the physical touching that

occurred here was improper. Defendant makes “no claim of

physical intimidation or deprivation.” (Holloway, supra, 33

Cal.4th at p. 114.) Instead, he objects to the occasional touches

on his person because they were purportedly “psychologically

powerful.” Yet, even if the touches constituted “psychological

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ploys” and here “establish[ed] a false sense of rapport, intimacy,

and caring,” we still do not think that they were so coercive as

to “ ‘tend to produce a statement that is both involuntary and

unreliable.’ ” (Smith, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 501.)

In addition, although Hobson said things like, “you got to

talk to me man,” “[i]t’s not going away,” and, “[w]e have to deal

with it,” it is clear that that Hobson was not requiring defendant

talk to him but exhorting him to do so. Moreover, defendant’s

conduct indicates that he knew he did not have to talk to

Hobson. Even if his refusal to continue answering questions

was not immediately honored on April 21, still defendant

managed to stop the interrogation. He did not begin talking

again until the next morning, and he did not give a full

confession until Hobson transported him to a place (from the jail

to the police station) more to his liking.

Finally, defendant relies on People v. Honeycutt (1977) 20

Cal.3d 150 to argue that, because the waiver came on the heels

of Hobson’s “ ‘clever softening-up’ of [defendant] without

advising him of his rights,” the waiver was not valid. In

Honeycutt, we said that “[w]hen the waiver results from a clever

softening-up of a defendant through disparagement of the victim

and ingratiating conversation, the subsequent decision to waive

without a Miranda warning must be deemed to be involuntary

. . . .” (20 Cal.3d at p. 160.) That holding finds no application in

this case: Hobson did not disparage the victims, engage in

conversations that could be fairly characterized as

“ingratiating,” or fail to give defendant Miranda warnings

before he confessed. Moreover, Honeycutt has been limited to its

facts. In People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 478, we identified

“the two salient features of Honeycutt” as involving (1) an

interrogating officer who had a prior relationship with the

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defendant and who sought to “ingratiate” himself “by discussing

‘unrelated past events and former acquaintances’ ” and (2) the

officer disparaging the victim. (Id. at pp. 477-478.) When these

two features are not present, we found reliance on Honeycutt to

be “misplaced.” (Id. at p. 478; see also People v. Michaels (2002)

28 Cal.4th 486, 511 (Michaels) [rejecting the defendant’s

reliance on Honeycutt when the facts presented “are not at all

like Honeycutt, which . . . involved ‘an unrecorded 30-minute,

pre-Miranda conversation, discussing mutual acquaintances,

past events and finally the victim’ ”]; People v. Kelly (1990) 51

Cal.3d 931, 954 [finding Honeycutt “clearly distinguishable”

when “[n]o misconduct of [the type described in Honeycutt]

occurred here”].) It is likewise misplaced in this case.

iii. Failure to advise on April 22

Defendant alternatively argues that we should not focus

on the confessions obtained after the Miranda advisement on

April 22 but rather on the events preceding that advisement.

Specifically, defendant calls our attention to the fact Hobson did

not initially provide him with Miranda warnings when he

approached him on April 22.11 Only after defendant made two

inculpatory statements — “I’m nothing but an animal, and I

don’t deserve to live” and “Nothing can justify what I did” — did

Hobson read him his rights. Defendant claims that this shows

that Hobson engaged in an impermissible “question first, warn

later” technique that renders the warnings ineffective. As such,

11

Defendant seems to assume that the Miranda advisement

was necessary on the morning of April 22. It is not entirely clear

that this is so, as defendant was reminded of his rights on April

21 and readvisement the next day may not have been necessary.

(See, e.g., Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 434.) Nonetheless,

we engage with defendant’s arguments as he has laid them out.

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statements made after the warnings must be excluded. We

cannot agree.

Under the high court’s precedent, the mere fact that a

defendant has made unwarned admissions does not render

subsequent warned confessions inadmissible. (See generally,

Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298 (Elstad); Seibert, supra,

542 U.S. 600.) In Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at page 318, the court

held that “a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet

uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his

rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite

Miranda warnings.” Instead, as long as both the initial

unwarned statement and the subsequent warned statement are

voluntary, the warned statement may be deemed the product of

a defendant’s “rational and intelligent choice” to confess and so

is admissible. (Id. at pp. 314, 318; see also Williams, supra, 49

Cal.4th at p. 448 [“Even when a first statement is taken in the

absence of proper advisements and is incriminating, so long as

the first statement was voluntary a subsequent voluntary

confession ordinarily is not tainted simply because it was

procured after a Miranda violation”].)

Given that we already found the warned confession in this

case to be voluntary, we need only examine whether defendant’s

unwarned statements were also voluntary. The trial court here

found “no evidence that defendant’s will was overcome” when he

made the unwarned statements. We agree. The unwarned

portion of the interview on April 22 was short. Hobson testified

that his entire conversation with defendant at the jail lasted no

more than 15 minutes and defendant made the two inculpatory

statements within the first five minutes. During this time,

defendant was unrestrained and sitting in an employee break

room. Prior to defendant’s utterance of the two inculpatory

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admissions, Hobson’s statements to defendant that most

directly related to the crimes were “the situation . . . wasn’t

going to go away” and Hobson “needed him to tell . . . his side of

the story.” Consistent with our previous explanation, we do not

find such statements to be coercive.

For his part, defendant appeared to have readily

cooperated. When Hobson told defendant that he wanted him

to tell the truth, defendant answered, “Okay,” but requested to

be taken “someplace else” first. Hobson then said to defendant

that before he “transported him back to the police department,”

he “wanted to make sure he understood exactly what we were

going to be doing and the questions that I was going to be asking

him.” Hobson thereafter advised defendant of his Miranda

rights, and defendant admitted to being responsible for the

disappearance and death of Newhouse and Crawford. Nothing

about this exchange suggests that defendant’s statements prior

to receiving the advisement were involuntary. As such,

although the unwarned statements must be suppressed (and

they were), the warned confession on April 22 and subsequent

statements were properly admitted.

Defendant, however, argues that Elstad does not apply

because “Hobson deliberately used a ‘question first,’ warn later

technique in violation of Missouri v. Seibert.” In Seibert, the

high court confronted a situation where the interrogating officer

“made a ‘conscious decision’ to withhold Miranda warnings.”

(Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at pp. 605-606.) The police officer

testified that he did so in accordance with “an interrogation

technique he had been taught: question first, then give the

warnings, and then repeat the question ‘until I get the answer

that [the suspect] already provided once.’ ” (Id. at p. 606.)

Another police officer testified that his department “promoted”

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“the strategy of withholding Miranda warnings until after

interrogating and drawing out a confession.” (Id. at p. 609.)

Under such circumstances, a majority of the high court

found the warned confession inadmissible. (Seibert, supra, 542

U.S. at p. 604 (plur. opn.); id. at p. 618 (conc. opn. of Kennedy,

J.).) The court fractured, however, on why that is so. A

plurality of four justices explained that “when interrogators

question first and warn later” (id. at p. 611 (plur. opn.)), the

later, warned confession is admissible only if “in the

circumstances the Miranda warnings given could reasonably be

found effective.” (Id. at p. 612, fn. 4 (plur. opn.).) Under the

facts of the case, the four justices concluded that the

circumstances “do not reasonably support a conclusion that the

warnings given could have served their purpose,” and the

postwarning statements therefore were inadmissible. (Id. at

pp. 616-617 (plur. opn.).)

Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment but proposed

a different rule. In Justice Kennedy’s view, the plurality’s test

“cuts too broadly.” (Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at pp. 621-622 (conc.

opn. of Kennedy, J.).) Justice Kennedy instead “would apply a

narrower test applicable only in the infrequent case, such as we

have here, in which the two-step interrogation technique was

used in a calculated way to undermine the Miranda warning.”

(Id. at p. 622 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) Under that approach,

where the “deliberate two-step strategy” was not employed,

“[t]he admissibility of postwarning statements should continue

to be governed by the principles of Elstad.” (Ibid.)

The fractured nature of Seibert has given rise to a debate

over whether it is the plurality’s opinion or Justice Kennedy’s

concurrence that provides the controlling standard. (Compare

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U.S. v. Ray (6th Cir. 2015) 803 F.3d 244, 272 [“we adopt Seibert

plurality’s multi-factor test for this Circuit and direct the

district court to apply this test”] with U.S. v. Capers (2d Cir.

2010) 627 F.3d 470, 476 [“this Court joined the Eleventh, Fifth,

Ninth, Third, and Eighth Circuits in applying Justice Kennedy’s

approach in Seibert”]; U.S. v. Kiam (3d Cir. 2006) 432 F.3d 524,

532; U.S. v. Mashburn (4th Cir. 2005) 406 F.3d 303, 309

[“Justice Kennedy’s opinion therefore represents the holding of

the Seibert Court”]; U.S. v. Courtney (5th Cir. 2006) 463 F.3d

333, 338; U.S. v. Ollie (8th Cir. 2006) 442 F.3d 1135, 1142; U.S.

v. Williams (9th Cir. 2006) 435 F.3d 1148, 1157-1158; U.S. v.

Street (11th Cir. 2006) 472 F.3d 1298, 1313.) We need not decide

the matter here, as the result in this case would be the same

under either approach. (See U.S. v. Faust (1st Cir. 2017) 853

F.3d 39, 48, fn. 6 [“Because we find that Faust’s argument fails

under either [the plurality or the concurrence’s] approach, there

is no need to address this question here]; U.S. v. Heron (7th Cir.

2009) 564 F.3d 879, 885 [similar]; U.S. v. Carrizales-Toledo

(10th Cir. 2006) 454 F.3d 1142, 1151 [similar]; U.S. v. Straker

(D.C. Cir. 2015) 800 F.3d 570, 617 [similar].)

Under the plurality’s approach, the relevant inquiry in a

“question first” scenario is “whether it would be reasonable to

find that in these circumstances the warnings could function

‘effectively’ as Miranda requires.” (Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at

pp. 611-612 (plur. opn.).) In other words, “could the warnings

effectively advise the suspect that he had a real choice about

giving an admissible statement at that juncture? Could they

reasonably convey that he could choose to stop talking even if he

had talked earlier?” (Id. at p. 612 (plur. opn.).) In making this

determination, the trial court is to consider a number of factors,

including “the completeness and detail of the questions and

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answers in the first round of interrogation, the overlapping

content of the two statements, the timing and setting of the first

and the second, the continuity of police personnel, and the

degree to which the interrogator’s questions treated the second

round as continuous with the first.” (Id. at p. 615 (plur. opn.).)

A consideration of these factors cuts in favor of admitting

defendant’s confessions. Although all of the relevant

questioning here was conducted by a single person (Hobson)

over the course of a single day (thus satisfying the “continuity of

police personnel” factor), there was no extended questioning

before Miranda warnings were given; defendant’s prewarning

responses, though undoubtedly incriminating, were nonspecific

and lacking in detail; and, at defendant’s request, there was a

change of setting before he gave the detailed confession that was

ultimately used against him at trial. (Seibert, supra, 542 U.S.

at pp. 615-616 (plur. opn.).) Moreover, the conversation that

preceded the second round of interrogation alerted defendant

that he had a “real choice” whether to follow up on his earlier

incriminating statements or “stop talking.” (Id. at p. 612 (plur.

opn.).) Before reading defendant his rights, Hobson informed

defendant that he “wanted to make sure [defendant] understood

exactly what we were going to be doing and the questions I was

going to be asking . . . so we didn’t spend another two hours of

wasted time.” Hobson’s statements reasonably signaled to

defendant that it was up to him whether he wanted to answer

Hobson’s questions or, alternatively, to “waste” Hobson’s time.

Under these circumstances, we conclude that the warnings

“function[ed] ‘effectively’ as Miranda requires.” (Seibert, supra,

542 U.S. at pp. 612-613 (plur. opn.).)

Defendant’s statement was likewise admissible under

Justice Kennedy’s approach. According to Justice Kennedy,

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Seibert does not control unless Hobson employed “the two-step

interrogation technique . . . in a calculated way to undermine

the Miranda warning.” (Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at pp. 622

(conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) We find no such deliberateness

here.

Although Justice Kennedy “did not articulate how a court

should determine whether an interrogator used a deliberate

two-step strategy,” the facts of Seibert and Elstad afford us some

guidance. (U.S. v. Williams, supra, 435 F.3d at p. 1158.) On the

one hand, we have nothing here like the circumstances of

Seibert. There is no evidence that the San Luis Obispo Police

Department or District Attorney’s Office had a policy of

“withholding Miranda warnings until after interrogating and

drawing out a confession,” or that Hobson was following such a

policy when he interrogated defendant. (Seibert, supra, 542 U.S.

at p. 609 (plur. opn.).)

On the other hand, like the officers in Elstad, Hobson did

not provide warnings because he failed to “realize that a suspect

is in custody and warnings are required.” (Seibert, supra, 542

U.S. at p. 620 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.); Elstad, supra, 470 U.S.

at pp. 315-316.) Hobson testified that he did not advise

defendant of his Miranda rights on April 21 and did not

immediately provide him with those rights when he approached

him on April 22 because defendant “was not in custody on the

. . . disappearance of Rachel Newhouse and Aundria Crawford.

He was in custody on a parole violation.” In line with Justice

Kennedy’s identification of a failure to “realize that a suspect is

in custody and warnings are required” as a scenario properly

analyzed under Elstad principles, we find that Siebert does not

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control here. (Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 620 (conc. opn. of

Kennedy, J.).)12

Other aspects of Hobson’s conduct persuade us that he did

not engage in “a two-step questioning technique based on a

deliberate violation of Miranda.” (Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at

p. 620 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) Significantly, Hobson

advised defendant of his Miranda rights before defendant

confessed. (See Bobby v. Dixon (2011) 565 U.S. 23, 31 [“unlike

in Seibert, there is no concern here that police gave Dixon

Miranda warnings and then led him to repeat an earlier murder

confession, because there was no earlier confession to repeat”].)

Hobson also did not attempt to use defendant’s prewarning

12

Of course, Hobson did provide defendant with Miranda

warnings on the morning of April 22 after defendant made

vaguely incriminating statements. This raises the question of

whether Hobson thought that defendant’s custody status had

changed at that point. On this issue, we note that Hobson did

not tie his recitation of the Miranda warnings to defendant’s

custody status. Instead, he described the sequence of events in

this way: After defendant asked to be taken “someplace else,”

he (Hobson) “told [defendant] before I transported him back to

the police department I wanted to make sure he understood

exactly what we were going to be doing and the questions that I

was going to be asking him so we didn’t spend another two hours

of wasted time. [¶] So at that point I advised Rex Krebs of his

Miranda rights, as read from the DOJ form, and then I asked

him the two questions.” Thus, although Hobson never

pinpointed the precise moment he believed defendant’s custody

status changed, the timing of his advisement is consistent with

the (mistaken) belief that (1) defendant became “in custody”

after incriminating himself in response to Hobson’s “two

questions,” or (2) defendant acquired “in custody” status after

being transported to the police station, when Hobson got to

“doing” what he was going to do and asking “the questions [he]

was going to be asking.”

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statements to induce him to talk after advising him of his rights

under Miranda. (Bobby v. Dixon, supra, 565 U.S. at p. 31 [“[n]or

is there any evidence that police used Dixon’s earlier

[unwarned] admission to forgery to induce him to waive his right

to silence later”]; contra, Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 605 (plur.

opn.) [interrogating officer “confronted [the suspect] with her

prewarning statements”].)

To be sure, Hobson could have read defendant his

Miranda rights before defendant made inculpatory statements

or agreed to tell the truth. Yet simply because an officer could

have given an advisement earlier is not enough to show that he

delayed “in a calculated way to undermine the Miranda

warning.” (Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 622 (conc. opn. of

Kennedy, J.); see People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614,

637, 639 [no finding of deliberateness despite the officer stating

“[i]f you want to talk to me, I’ll advise you of your rights” but

then forgoing the advisement when the suspect indicated that

he wanted to talk to an attorney first].) Likewise, that

advisement did issue after acquiescence to tell the truth does

not mean that the officer sought to undermine Miranda. (See

Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 448 [reasoning that the

principles of Elstad apply even when advisement came only

after “the defendant’s letting ‘the cat out of the bag’ ”].) Last,

even if Hobson had no good reason for failing to give Miranda

warnings when he first approached defendant on April 22, there

is no ground to believe Hobson acted deliberately “to obscure

both the practical and legal significance of the admonition when

finally given” or that his conduct had such an effect. (Seibert,

supra, 542 U.S. at p. 620 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).)

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In light of the preceding, we find that defendant’s warned

confessions were properly admitted despite his prior unwarned

statements.

iv. Failure to heed invocation on April 21

Defendant further argues that the trial court erred in

admitting the statements he made on April 22 and thereafter

because Hobson failed to honor defendant’s invocation of his

right to remain silent on April 21. We agree that Hobson should

have stopped his interrogation on April 21 sooner than he did.

However, in light of the facts that defendant made no

inculpatory statements on April 21, that Hobson did not

overcome defendant’s will that day or any time thereafter, that

Hobson’s failure to honor defendant’s invocation was not

causally related to defendant’s subsequent decision to confess,

and that, at the time of his confession on the next day,

defendant’s right to cut off questioning was honored, we find no

error in the admission of the confession.

As the trial court found and the prosecution conceded,

defendant invoked his right to remain silent on April 21.13 Like

the trial court, we need not decide the precise moment when

defendant made his invocation, except to observe that it was

later than when defendant claims he first asserted his right but

earlier than when Hobson said he understood defendant to have

done so.

13

Hobson testified that he thought defendant asserted his

right to remain silent when he stated near the end of the

interview on April 21, “Nothing to say.” The prosecution’s

opposition to the motion to suppress acknowledged that

defendant had invoked his right at “the end of the interview.”

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Defendant did not invoke his right to silence by merely

saying nothing for 15 minutes while Hobson talked. Prior to the

conversation arriving at this point, defendant had waived his

Miranda rights — first by signing a waiver on April 1 and again

by talking to Hobson after being reminded of his rights on April

21. (See, e.g., North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369, 373.)

Because defendant had previously waived his rights, a

subsequent invocation must be unambiguous to be effective.

(E.g., Berghuis, supra, 560 U.S. at pp. 381-382; People v.

Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 948 (Martinez).) In essence, he

needed to say “that he wanted to remain silent or that he did not

want to talk with the police.” (Berghuis, supra, 560 U.S. at

p. 382 [holding that a suspect who did neither of these things

following an earlier waiver “did not invoke his right to remain

silent”].) In the absence of such unambiguous statements,

Hobson was free to continue questioning defendant. (Martinez,

supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 948 [“ ‘Faced with an ambiguous or

equivocal statement, law enforcement officers are not required

. . . either to ask clarifying questions or to cease questioning

altogether’ ”].)

Likewise, when defendant requested that Hobson “[p]ut

me down in a holding cell and let me think,” he did not

unambiguously invoke his right to remain silent. Rather, he

likely “merely asked for a break from questioning.” (Rundle,

supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 116.) Because defendant was then

housed at the county jail and so presumably could not be left in

the police station’s holding cell for long, the request to be put

back in a holding cell (so he could “think”) is reasonably

interpreted as a request to be left alone for a moment.

Interpreted this way, the statement stands in contrast to what

defendant said when Hobson returned from giving him a five-

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minute break: “Take me back to jail.” At that point, defendant

has arguably indicated that, beyond wanting a temporary break

from questioning, “he did not want to talk with the police.”

(Berghuis, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 382.) And even if this later

statement was ambiguous in the context of defendant’s previous

request for a short break (see Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at

p. 429), any ambiguity was resolved when defendant said, for

the first of two times, “Nothing to say.” By this point at the

latest, defendant had unambiguously invoked his right to

remain silent and Hobson should have stopped the

interrogation.

Hobson did not stop. Instead, he continued questioning

defendant until defendant once again asserted that he had

“nothing to say.” Hobson testified that he understood defendant

to have invoked only at this point, when defendant repeated

himself. Even with this understanding, however, Hobson asked

defendant still more questions while transporting him back to

jail.

Yet, despite the failure to honor defendant’s right to

remain silent on April 21, Hobson made no contact with

defendant for the next 18 hours. Moreover, as the trial court

found, defendant did not foreclose the possibility of Hobson

returning the next day. Indeed, when Hobson returned the

following morning, defendant showed no reluctance to talk,

readily answering questions and voluntarily confessing.

The question is whether Hobson’s failure to honor

defendant’s invocation to remain silent on April 21 renders

inadmissible the statements obtained on April 22 and

thereafter. In Michigan v. Mosley (1975) 423 U.S. 96, 104

(Mosley), the high court held “the admissibility of statements

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obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent

depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off

questioning’ was ‘scrupulously honored.’ ”14 The court did not

address a situation in which the right to cut off questioning was

eventually, but not immediately, honored.

In the years since Mosley was decided, we have never

found that an initial failure to honor a defendant’s invocation —

whether of the to remain silent or the right to have counsel

present — poses a categorical bar to the admission of any

subsequent statement regardless of the circumstances. Instead,

in case after case, we have held that despite the initial failure to

14

California courts initially did not follow Mosley, rejecting

it in favor of the rule that “after a defendant has once

demonstrated he does not wish to waive his privilege against

self-incrimination, the police cannot lawfully subject him to a

new round of interrogation even if they repeat the Miranda

warnings.” (People v. Pettingill (1978) 21 Cal.3d 231, 238, 251.)

In 1982, however, California voters approved Proposition 8 and

amended the state Constitution to add a “Right to Truth-in-

Evidence.” Under this provision, “relevant evidence shall not be

excluded in any criminal proceeding.” (Cal. Const., Art. I § 28,

subd. (f)(2).)

Although we have never expressly held that Proposition 8

abrogated Pettingill, our cases have clearly nodded in this

direction. (See People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309, 318 [“Given

the probable aim of the voters in adopting section 28[(f)(2)], . . .

it is not reasonably likely that the California voters intended to

preserve, in the form of a ‘statutory’ privilege, a judicially

created exclusionary rule expressly rejected by the United

States Supreme Court under the federal Constitution”]; In re

Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 889 [similar]; Martinez, supra,

47 Cal.4th at p. 950 [applying Mosley without mentioning

Pettingill].) Perhaps for this reason, defendant does not seek to

rely on Pettingill, and we accept that the analysis should

proceed without reference to the Pettingill rule.

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honor a Miranda invocation, a voluntary confession obtained

during a subsequent interrogation is admissible. Thus, in People

v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1040-1043 (Bradford), we

held that a warned confession was admissible despite the fact

that (1) a day earlier, detectives had persisted in interrogating

the defendant after he answered, “ ‘No. I want my lawyer,’ ” in

response to the questions, “ ‘Do you wish to give up the right to

remain silent? Do you want to talk to me about what happened

last night?’ ” (id. at p. 1025), and (2) the continued questioning

produced an admission that the defendant killed the victim. We

reasoned that suppression was not necessary because the first

confession was “ ‘unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other

circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect’s ability to

exercise his free will’ ” and the second (warned) confession was

“ ‘knowingly and voluntarily made.’ ” (Id. at p. 1040.) We

likewise did not suppress warned statements in People v. Storm

(2002) 28 Cal.4th 1007, 1039, despite the police having ignored

the defendant’s invocation of the right of counsel during an

interrogation two days earlier. We reached the same result in

People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 444, even though the police

there interrogated the suspect despite his clear statement from

the day before that he “would not waive his [Miranda] rights.”

(Id. at p. 437.) In contrast, we suppressed the defendant’s

confession in a case where we found the police not only

“intentionally continued interrogation . . . in spite of defendant’s

invocation,” but also induced an involuntary confession. (People

v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 68, 74.)

In light of our precedent, we conclude that Hobson’s

failure to honor defendant’s invocation of the right to remain

silent on April 21 does not compel the suppression of the

voluntary, warned statements taken on April 22 and thereafter.

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Apart from his failure to immediately cease questioning,

Hobson’s interrogation techniques were not coercive. In

addition, no “ ‘other circumstances’ ” existed to “ ‘to undermine

the suspect’s ability to exercise his free will.’ ” (Bradford, supra,

14 Cal.4th at p. 1040.) Indeed, defendant’s will was not

overcome on April 21 or at any time thereafter. Although

defendant was subdued during the April 21 interrogation and

cried during the drive back to the county jail, he showed a clear

ability to exercise his free will, including by stopping the

interrogation, refusing to incriminate himself, controlling when

he would be dropped off at the jail (by requesting that Hobson

drive around so that he could smoke), and directing Hobson to

turn into the jail despite Hobson’s last request for defendant to

take him to the bodies. Likewise, as explained ante, in part

II.B.1.ii, he exercised his free will when he voluntarily confessed

on April 22 after receiving his Miranda advisement.

Nor should we forget that there was a period of about 18

hours in which defendant was subjected to no questioning after

invoking his right to remain silent. (Contra, People v. Peracchi

(2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 353, 362 [finding that a confession should

have been suppressed because “[d]espite Peracchi’s invocation of

his right to remain silent, the officer persisted in asking him

questions regarding why he did not wish to speak with the

officers at that time without even a momentary cessation in

questioning”]; Anderson v. Terhune (9th Cir. 2008) 516 F.3d 781,

791 [suppressing a confession when the court was “not faced

with a situation where there was a break in questioning after

the Miranda invocation”].) This was substantially longer than

the two-hour period in Mosley in which the suspect was left

alone and the court found questioning could be reinitiated.

(Mosley, supra, 423 U.S. at p. 104.)

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Finally, even though he did not do so immediately, Hobson

did honor defendant’s right to cut off questioning. On April 21,

Hobson asked if he could return to talk to defendant the next

day if he did not hear back from him, and defendant replied

“Maybe I’ll deal with it tomorrow,” or “Maybe. I’ll deal with it

tomorrow.” Whatever defendant’s exact response was, it seems

that Hobson could reasonably have understood it as conveying

that he could return the next day — if only to find out whether

defendant was willing to talk. When Hobson came to the jail on

April 22, defendant expressed no desire to remain silent, thus

indicating that he had decided that he would talk.

We reject defendant’s reliance on People v. Montano (1991)

226 Cal.App.3d 914. In Montano, the court found that

Montano’s confession was actually coerced. In that case, not

only did police officers ignore Montano’s double-digit number of

invocations, they “aggravated the situation by using their

common religion to conjure up in defendant’s mind the picture

of confessing to avoid going to hell.” (Id. at p. 935.) Moreover,

the tactics “succeeded because the officers were not employing

them on a person who had a history of experience with police

interrogation or on someone who in the circumstances would

have unlimited powers of resistance. At the time of the

interrogation defendant was 18 years old, having entered the

country illegally 8 months before.” (Id. at pp. 935-936.) In these

circumstances, Montano’s will was overcome and he “tacitly

admitted that he alone was responsible for the victim’s murder.”

(Id. at p. 937.) In contrast, defendant here was not merely 18

years old; he did have “a history of experience with police

interrogation” (id. at p. 935); and he made no admission during

the interrogation in which he invoked his right to silence. (Ibid.)

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Defendant simply was not coerced, and Montano supplies no

basis to suppress the confessions at issue here.

To summarize, defendant was at no time coerced. He was

given an 18-hour break from interrogation after invoking his

right to remain silent; he left open the possibility for the officer

to reinitiate contact, and upon being contacted, cooperated with

the interrogation. When he confessed, his confessions were

preceded by Miranda warnings that effectively apprised him of

his rights. Without suggesting that all of the above must be

present or that any of those factors is sufficient, we conclude

that under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in

admitting the postadvisement confession obtained on April 22

and thereafter.

2. Independent evidence of rape and sodomy of

Crawford

Defendant next argues his convictions for the rape and

sodomy of Crawford must be reversed because “insufficient

evidence aside from [his] confession exists to support” the

convictions. Defendant’s argument relies on the corpus delicti

rule, which “requires corroboration of the defendant’s

extrajudicial utterances insofar as they indicate a crime was

committed, and forces the People to supply, as part of their

burden of proof in every criminal prosecution, some evidence of

the corpus delicti aside from, or in addition to, such statements.”

(People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1178, italics omitted

(Alvarez).) We find that defendant’s confession was adequately

corroborated in this case.

“The amount of independent proof of a crime required [to

satisfy the corpus delicti rule] is quite small.” (People v. Jones

(1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 301.) The prosecution need not adduce

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“independent evidence of every physical act constituting an

element of an offense.” (Id. at p. 303.) Instead, it need only

make “some indication that the charged crime actually

happened,” so as to ensure “that the accused is not admitting to

a crime that never occurred.” (People v. Jennings (1991) 53

Cal.3d 334, 368 (Jennings).)

In challenging his convictions for the rape and sodomy of

Crawford, defendant’s sole contention is that there was no

independent evidence “corroborating that she was in fact

sexually assaulted.” He concedes that there was “sufficient

independent evidence of rape against Newhouse since her body

was naked from the waist down when found.” In contrast, he

asserts there was insufficient evidence as to Crawford because

“Crawford’s body was fully clothed in sweat pants and a

sweatshirt.” The Attorney General disputes that Crawford was

fully clothed when she was found. Dr. Sterbenz, the pathologist

who observed the exhumation of the victims’ bodies, testified

that Crawford was found “partially clothed,” wearing “black

sweat pants” and “a black sweatshirt” with “a logo on it for the

Hard Rock cafe.” Crawford’s mother testified that her daughter

normally wore to bed “T-shirt and panties,” items that were

missing when her body was found. She also testified that the

Hard Rock Cafe sweatshirt was a “souvenir-type sweatshirt”

that her daughter would “just wear . . . for special occasions.”

The testimony reasonably gives rise to the inference that

Crawford’s body was found “dressed differently” from when she

was taken from her house. Crawford was taken from her house

early in the morning after having gotten out of bed, as

independently corroborated by the state of her bed and the fact

that she was talking to a friend by phone until 2:46 a.m. on

March 11, 1999. Based on the timing and her mother’s

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testimony, the jury could have concluded that Crawford was

wearing underwear and a T-shirt when defendant abducted her.

Yet, her body was found with no underwear, no T-shirt, and

clothed in a “special occasion[]” sweatshirt that she did not

normally wear to bed. Thus, there was circumstantial evidence

that Crawford was “ ‘disrobed’ ” and “ ‘covered . . . again’ ” after

she was kidnapped. (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353,

404.) This evidence suffices to satisfy the corpus delicti of

rape.15 (Id. at pp. 404-406 [finding the requisite corpus delicti

for rape when the victim was found with her pants on backwards

and her sweatshirt inside out, allowing for the inference that

she was disrobed and reclothed]; see also Alvarez, supra, 27

Cal.4th at p. 1171 [“[t]he independent proof may be

circumstantial and need not be beyond a reasonable doubt”].)

Because the People have established the corpus delicti for

rape, they have also established the corpus delicti for sodomy.

(See People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 302-304 [finding the

corpus delicti for oral copulation satisfied although there was no

physical evidence on victim’s mouth because there was semen in

the victim’s other orifices and “we have never interpreted the

corpus delicti rule so strictly that independent evidence of every

physical act constituting an element of an offense is necessary”];

accord, Robbins, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 886.) Accordingly, we

affirm the convictions for the rape and sodomy of Crawford.

15

Because we find “the physical evidence, and reasonable

inferences drawn therefore, satisfy the corpus delicti rule,” we

need not decide whether other-crimes evidence, including the

rape and sodomy of Shelley C. and the rape of Newhouse, also

establish the corpus delicti with regard to Crawford. (Jennings,

supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 367; cf. People v. Robbins (1988) 45 Cal.3d

867, 886 (Robbins).)

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C. Penalty Phase Issues

1. Arguments involving testimony of defendant’s

volitional impairment

Defendant makes a series of arguments relating to Dr.

Dietz’s testimony that sexual sadism does not impair an

individual’s ability to control his or her behavior. The gist of

defendant’s arguments is that the testimony is inconsistent with

the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code,

§ 6600 et seq.) or is demonstrably false as shown by the

existence of the act. Defendant also argues that the trial court

erred by excluding references to the SVPA and by failing to “give

proper instruction in light of the State’s expert testimony.” On

these bases, defendant urges us to reverse the death sentence.

a. Background

Despite being an expert for the prosecution, Dr. Dietz

agreed with Dr. Berlin, the defense expert, on many substantive

points. In particular, Dietz agreed with Berlin’s diagnosis of

defendant as a sexual sadist and an alcoholic. Dietz also

“agree[d] entirely” with Berlin that “people do not choose their

sexual deviations. They do not choose to become a sexual

sadist.”

Dr. Dietz, however, disagreed with Dr. Berlin regarding

his diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder. In Dietz’s

opinion, defendant did have antisocial personality disorder.

Dietz explained the criteria for diagnosing the disorder, and

cited examples from defendant’s history to show that he met the

diagnostic criteria.

In addition, although Dr. Dietz agreed with Dr. Berlin’s

diagnosis of sexual sadism, he offered a different understanding

of the disorder. According to Dietz, the sexual disorder

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“amounts to saying what is it that turns the person on.” For a

person who is a sexual sadist, the things that he or she finds

sexually arousing include “bondage,” “captivity,” dominance,

“humiliation,” “spanking and whipping,” and “choking and

strangulation.” Dietz did not deny that it was “a problem to

have in life to want to do that to another person.” He explained,

however, that “[t]he way that people cope with that problem is

quite variable.” Although there were sexual sadists who

“commit violent crimes in order to fulfill their fantasies,” Dietz

stressed that “just a tiny group of the sexual sadists . . . ever get

to that point.”

Crucially, Dr. Dietz disagreed with Dr. Berlin regarding

whether sexual sadism compromised an individual’s ability to

control his or her actions. As Dietz categorically stated,

“[s]omeone whose only problem is sexual sadism has only one

fundamental difference from normal people and that is a

difference in what excites them sexually. It doesn’t affect how

they think. It doesn’t affect their emotions. It doesn’t affect

their capacity to control themselves. It only affects what it is

that turns them on sexually.”

The prosecution then asked Dr. Dietz about the

“policeman at the elbow” test. Dietz responded that “[t]hat’s a

test . . . long . . . used in the field of forensic psychiatry as a way

of looking at whether someone has volitional control, do they

have the free will to conform to the law.” Dietz, like Berlin,

stated that “had there been a policeman at [defendant’s] elbow,

he certainly would not have committed these crimes.” As such,

Dietz concluded that defendant “was fully aware that this was

wrong behavior and capable of stopping it with those kinds of

external controls.”

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The prosecution then asked Dr. Dietz to evaluate Dr.

Berlin’s opinion. In particular, the prosecution asked, “Dr.

Berlin talked about the sexual sadism and the fantasies almost

becoming a compulsion. Is that — is that an opinion that’s

widely held in your field?” Dietz answered, “No, it isn’t. But

there is a group of people who are not in my field who come at it

from a Christian counseling point of view who have become very

fond of the idea of this being an addiction that begins with

masturbation, exposure to pornography, obscene phone calls.

And if one doesn’t find some spiritual relief or additional aid, it

can degenerate into horrible kinds of behavior such as this. [¶]

That’s not an accepted medical or psychological view. It’s the

fad that’s been around the last ten or fifteen years. [¶] And

that’s like the theory of this being a compulsion.” When cross-

examined, Dietz nonetheless agreed that “the jury, as part of the

process of making a decision in this case, should consider and

listen to Dr. Berlin,” specifically his opinion that “sexual sadism

. . . opens the door to irresistible impulse.” “[T]he jury’s got a

difficult job here,” Dietz explained, and “we’re in an area where

there are competing points of view.” Later in his testimony,

Dietz reiterated that “it’s arguable — that this [sexual sadism]

affects impulse control. It’s arguable that you could look at it

the way Dr. Berlin does. I respect his opinion, but I disagree

with him.”

Despite his testimony that sexual sadism does not cause

volitional impairment, Dr. Dietz acknowledged that a mental

disorder contributed to defendant’s behavior. In his opinion,

however, that mental disorder was antisocial personality

disorder, not sexual sadism. As Dietz opined, “I think that the

reason [defendant] behaves in this way toward victims is

because he has an antisocial personality disorder. I think if he

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were a sexual sadist who didn’t have the — this disorder, he

wouldn’t be doing these bad acts.” In response to further

questioning, Dietz confirmed, “If he were only sexually sadistic

and did not have any other impairment, he wouldn’t have done

that [assaulted Jennifer E. or raped Shelley C.].”

Dr. Dietz, like Dr. Berlin, was ultimately asked to opine

“whether at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant

. . . to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was

impaired as a result of a mental disease or defect.” Dietz gave a

two-part answer. First, he said that defendant did not suffer

from a mental disease or defect, as he defined those terms:

“mental diseases . . . are those conditions that cause a person to

have a profoundly entirely different view of reality than a

normal human being” and mental defects referred to “mental

retardation.” Second, Dietz said, “even if he did [suffer from a

mental disease or defect], we have evidence that his volitional

control was there.” Dietz then detailed the various decisions

defendant made that demonstrated he made a choice to rape

Newhouse and Crawford. These included “his decision to drink,”

as “he’s never even attempted rape when he’s sober”; “his

decision to lie to Dr. True,” telling “Dr. True he wasn’t having

sexual temptations, that he wasn’t drinking”; the decision to

“cruise,” or look for victims; the decision to “carry a rape kit,

which eventually came to include a mask, precut lengths of rope,

duct tape for gagging the victim . . .”; and finally, the decision,

“after the fight at Outlaws Bar,” to “stop[] trying to control his

fantasies and urges and . . . not make the effort anymore to

resist the urges that he had.” This last decision, “rather than

his not having the ability to control himself,” led to the deaths

of Newhouse and Crawford.

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b. Analysis

i. Asserted inconsistent theories

Defendant argues that the prosecution “committed

prejudicial error by presenting evidence and theories regarding

volitional impairment [that are] inconsistent with those

presented by the People in civil commitment cases.” According

to defendant, the People’s experts in civil commitment

proceedings routinely testify that sexual disorders impair a

person’s ability to control him- or herself. Yet, the prosecution

in this case called an expert who said that sexual sadism has no

such effect. Defendant contends that this amounts to

inconsistent prosecutorial theories and the use of such theories

violated his right to due process under both the United States

and California Constitutions.16

Defendant is correct that “[a]t least where the punishment

involved is death, due process is as offended by the People’s

inconsistent and irreconcilable attribution of culpability-

increasing acts as by the inconsistent and irreconcilable

attribution of crimes.” (In re Sakarias (2005) 35 Cal.4th 140,

160.) But he ignores the principle that where “the asserted

inconsistencies in prosecutorial theory were not the subject of

16

In a cursory manner, defendant also argues that the same

asserted inconsistencies violated the Eighth Amendment.

Neither of the cases he cites supports the idea that “the Eighth

Amendment . . . could be violated when the State takes

inconsistent positions for tactical advantages in a capital

sentencing proceeding.” (See Bradshaw v. Stumpf (2005) 545

U.S. 175, 187 [stating only that the court “express[ed] no opinion

on whether the prosecutor’s actions [in arguing inconsistent

theories about who shot the victim] amounted to a due process

violation”]; Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320 [no

mention of inconsistent theories].)

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any proceeding in the trial court and, hence, neither the

inconsistencies nor any explanations the prosecutor may have

been able to offer appear in the appellate record, any due process

claim defendant can state should be ‘presented by petition for

writ of habeas corpus rather than by appeal.’ ” (People v.

Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 635 (Sakarias); see Spencer,

supra, 5 Cal. 5th at p. 694 [citing cases supporting the

proposition that “an inconsistent theories claim should be

brought — not on appeal — but in a habeas corpus petition”].)

Defendant’s claim thus must be rejected because “the

asserted inconsistencies . . . were not the subject of any

proceeding in the trial court.” (Sakarias, supra, 22 Cal.4th at

p. 635.) Defendant concedes he did not argue before the trial

court that Dr. Dietz’s testimony was inconsistent with the

SVPA, and our review of the record confirms that to be the case.

Although defendant alerted the court that he wanted to ask Dr.

Berlin about the SVPA, the bases on which he sought to

introduce the testimony were not to show any inconsistencies

between the SVPA and Dietz’s opinion. Instead, defendant

argued that the SVPA was relevant because the program

showed that (1) a “mental disorder that lead to this lack of

volitional control was treatable” and (2) defendant’s lack of

treatment was due to institutional failure.

To be sure, defense counsel mentioned in passing that the

SVPA “is impeachment of what I believe is Dr. Dietz’s position

that there is not volitional impairment.” However, counsel

never developed this position. Instead, he pressed the argument

concerning the treatability of sexual disorders and the issue of

institutional failure. Unsurprisingly, the court ruled only with

respect to these bases for admissibility.

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In addition, when the court rejected defendant’s

arguments and so excluded references to the SVPA, it made

clear that its ruling was tentative. The court expressly stated

that it would be willing to reconsider its position. Despite the

court’s invitation, however, defendant never brought a motion

or thereafter called the court’s attention to any purported

inconsistencies between the SVPA and Dr. Dietz’s opinion.

Probably for this reason, the record contains no explanation

from the prosecutor about the asserted inconsistencies.17

Under such circumstances, we find that “the asserted

inconsistencies in prosecutorial theory were not the subject of

any proceeding in the trial court.” (Sakarias, supra, 22 Cal.4th

at p. 635.) We therefore reject defendant’s inconsistent theories

claim, leaving it to be raised on habeas corpus.

ii. Asserted false or misleading testimony

Similar to his claim that Dr. Dietz’s testimony was

inconsistent with the SVPA, defendant contends that Dietz’s

testimony was false, as demonstrated by the existence of the

SVPA. Defendant argues the prosecution violated his due

process rights by relying on and failing to correct such false or

misleading testimony. (See, e.g., People v. Morrison (2004) 34

17

Because defendant never raised the argument at trial, he

never had to explain why the fact that other prosecutors, in

unrelated civil cases, may call experts to opine that individuals

suffering from certain mental disorders are predisposed to

committing criminal sexual acts here amounts to the use of

inconsistent prosecutorial theories. (See Welf. & Inst. Code,

§ 6600 et seq.) At a minimum, defendant’s theory of a due

process violation is quite different from the situation we

confronted in In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th 140, and nothing

we say here should be taken as suggesting that we find them

similar or endorsing an expansion of In re Sakarias.

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Cal.4th 698, 716-717.) Unlike the inconsistent-theories claim,

we can decide this false-evidence claim on appeal.

First, we note that the claim is forfeited. Defendant

complains that four different statements offered by Dr. Dietz

were false or misleading. These include: (1) “a paraphilia does

not impair volition”; (2) “Dr. Berlin’s view that it does is

unaccepted”; (3) “the ‘police man at elbow’ test is the appropriate

test for volitional impairment”; and (4) “sexual sadism [is] not

. . . a ‘mental disease or defect.’ ” Yet, defendant did not object

to any of this testimony at the time it was offered. Accordingly,

the claim that the evidence should not have been introduced or

that the prosecution violated due process by introducing such

evidence is forfeited. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a); People v.

Hajek and Vo (2014), 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1214 (Hajek and Vo);

People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 436 [“To the extent, if

any, that defendant may be understood to argue that due

process required exclusion of the evidence for a reason different

from his trial objection, that claim is forfeited”].)

Second, even if we were to overlook defendant’s forfeiture,

we still would not be convinced that the SVPA shows Dr. Dietz’s

testimony to be false. The SVPA is a civil commitment scheme

that permits the state to involuntarily confine individuals

proved to be “sexually violent predators.”18 (In re Howard N.

(2005) 35 Cal.4th 117, 127.) A “sexually violent predator” is “a

person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense

against one or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental

disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety

of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually

18

Defendant was never found to be a sexually violent

predator.

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violent criminal behavior.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd.

(a)(1).)) “Diagnosed mental disorder,” in turn, is defined as “a

congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or

volitional capacity that predisposes the person to the

commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting the

person a menace to the health and safety of others.” (Welf. &

Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (c).) The SVPA does not specify that

any particular condition meets this definition. It makes no

mention of any sexual disorder, let alone the specific disorder of

sexual sadism. The language of the SVPA thus furnishes no

evidence to suggest that Dr. Dietz’s testimony regarding the

volitional effect of sexual sadism was false.

Perhaps for this reason, defendant cites a number of

“published cases regarding SVP trials.” We question the value

of such cases to show that Dr. Dietz’s testimony was false. First,

we are aware of no authorities establishing that an expert’s

testimony is false as a matter of law, just because it purportedly

conflicts with other expert opinions given in other trials. Thus,

the fact that various experts may have offered opinions contrary

to Dietz’s does not mean these opinions have established that

any particular disorder precludes a defendant from controlling

his or her behavior. Instead, that remained an issue to be

resolved by the jury upon hearing the opposing experts’

testimony. (Accord, Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) 470 U.S. 68, 81

[“Psychiatry is not . . . an exact science, and psychiatrists

disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental

illness, on the appropriate diagnosis to be attached to given

behavior and symptoms, on cure and treatment, and on

likelihood of future dangerousness. Perhaps because there often

is no single, accurate psychiatric conclusion . . ., juries remain

the primary factfinders [and] . . . must resolve differences in

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opinion within the psychiatric profession on the basis of the

evidence offered by each party.”].)

Second, the opinions in the cases cited do not conflict with

Dr. Dietz’s testimony. Dietz opined that for a person “whose

only problem is sexual sadism,” the disord

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