Pink A. Robinson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),

this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED

regarded as precedent or cited before any Oct 07 2019, 5:31 am

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK

the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court

Court of Appeals

and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Mark D. Altenhof Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Goshen, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

Monika Prekopa Talbot

Supervising Deputy Attorney

General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Pink A. Robinson, October 7, 2019

Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-2218

v. Appeal from the Elkhart Circuit

Court

State of Indiana, The Honorable Michael A.

Appellee-Plaintiff. Christofeno, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

20C01-1609-F3-45

Friedlander, Senior Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2218 | October 7, 2019 Page 1 of 20

[1] Pink A. Robinson appeals his three convictions of robbery with a deadly

1

weapon, all Level 3 felonies. He also appeals his aggregate sentence of forty-

eight years, with three years suspended. We affirm.

[2] Kristina Wortinger was an assistant manager at a women’s clothing store in

Elkhart, Indiana. On January 9, 2016, at 8:30 p.m., she was at work, along

with Reta Holley, a sales associate. A customer, Angela Heitzman, was also

present. The sun had set, and it was raining.

[3] Two men entered the store through the front door just as Heitzman had

finished paying Holley for a purchase. One of the men wore a hooded jacket

with the hood up and was carrying a bag bearing the store’s logo. Wortinger

greeted him, thinking he was returning a purchase. Next, Wortinger noticed

the second man was wearing a bandana over his face, leaving only his eyes

visible. At that point, the man in the hooded jacket walked around the counter

and pointed a handgun at her. The man in the bandana approached Heitzman

and pointed a handgun at her. The men yelled at all three women, ordering

them to go to the dressing room.

[4] Once they were all in the dressing room, the men asked which of them was the

manager and had keys. Wortinger admitted she was the manager, and the man

in the hooded jacket ordered her to come with him. As she complied, she

1

Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (2014).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2218 | October 7, 2019 Page 2 of 20

noticed he was wearing black gloves, and the man in the bandana was wearing

blue latex gloves.

[5] Wortinger and the man went to the safe, which was near the cash register. It

appeared to her that the man already knew where the safe was located.

Wortinger unlocked the safe, but it was empty. Next, the man ordered her to

open the cash registers. He took money from the registers and ordered

Wortinger to return to the dressing room.

[6] While Wortinger and the man in the hooded jacket were gone, the man in the

bandana had remained in the dressing room with Holley and Heitzman. In a

loud voice, he ordered them to undress down to their underwear as he

continued to point a handgun at them. They complied. The man in the

bandana also ordered Heitzman to give him her purse. She handed the purse to

him, but as she did so she attempted to dump it out, and some of the contents

fell on the floor. The man took the purse, which Heitzman later learned still

contained her wallet and car keys.

[7] When Wortinger and the man in the hooded jacket returned to the dressing

room, she noticed that a third man was present and was accompanying the two

gunmen. The men told her to deactivate the alarm on the store’s back door.

Wortinger initially lied, saying she did not know how to turn it off. Two of the

men pointed their guns at her face, and told her they knew she could deactivate

the alarm.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2218 | October 7, 2019 Page 3 of 20

[8] Wortinger, who was thinking of her daughter back home, turned off the back

door alarm. One of the men initially wanted to order the women to go with

them, but after a brief discussion they instead ordered the women to lie on the

ground for ten minutes. The men left, taking Holley and Heitzman’s clothes

with them. After the men left, Wortinger called 911 to report the robbery and

locked the doors. She was terrified and crying. Holley and Heitzman began to

put on clothes they found in the store.

[9] Corporal Dustin Young of the Elkhart Police Department (“EPD”) was

dispatched to the store along with other officers, and he arrived within a few

minutes of Wortinger’s call. He knocked on the front door, and Wortinger

unlocked it and let him in. She appeared to be very frightened and wanted to

lock the door behind the officer, even after he explained more officers were on

the way. Corporal Young also saw Holley and Heitzman putting on clothes.

[10] Wortinger continued to cry and had difficulty communicating, but she

managed to describe the three robbers’ clothes for Corporal Young. She also

told Corporal Young she was terrified and had thought that she was going to

die.

[11] Next, Officer Kacy Weaver (who subsequently married and changed her name

to Kacy Weaver Denesuk) arrived at the store. She had been trained in

collecting evidence and took photographs throughout the store. Officer Weaver

noted that the cash register area had been ransacked. When she entered the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2218 | October 7, 2019 Page 4 of 20

dressing room area, she photographed items that were scattered on the floor,

which Heitzman later identified as having been in her purse.

[12] Another officer arrived with a K9 unit and searched behind the store. He found

a boot near two blue latex gloves on the ground and contacted Officer Weaver.

She also found a dollar bill on the ground a little further away. Officer Weaver

photographed and collected the boot, gloves, and dollar bill. Holley later

identified the boot as hers.

[13] The blue latex gloves were sent to a state laboratory for DNA testing. An

analyst generated a DNA profile from one of the gloves and uploaded the

profile into Indiana’s DNA database. The analyst learned that the DNA profile

matched Robinson’s already-existing profile in the database. The EPD then

obtained a search warrant for a DNA sample from Robinson, collected the

sample, and submitted it to the laboratory for further testing. The analyst

developed a DNA profile from Robinson’s sample and compared it with the

DNA profile derived from the blue latex glove. The profiles were consistent

and estimated to occur once in more than eight trillion unrelated individuals.

[14] After the robbery, Holley continued to work at the store, but she works only

during daylight hours and is scared of male customers. When a male customer

enters the store, she hides in the bathroom until they leave. Heitzman did not

go back to the store for four months.

[15] On September 21, 2016, the State charged Robinson with three counts of

robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, all Level 3 felonies. The case was

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2218 | October 7, 2019 Page 5 of 20

tried by jury, and the jury determined Robinson was guilty as charged. The

trial court sentenced Robinson to an aggregate sentence of forty-eight years,

with three years suspended to probation. This appeal followed.

[16] Robinson raises five issues, which we consolidate and restate as:

1. Whether the trial court erred in granting the State’s

challenge for cause of a potential juror.

2. Whether the trial court erred in allowing a witness to

testify about fingerprint evidence.

3. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Robinson’s

convictions.

4. Whether Robinson’s sentence is inappropriate in light of

the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.

1. Jury Selection – Challenge for Cause

[17] Robinson argues the trial court erred in granting the State’s challenge for cause

of potential juror 1869. “An impartial jury is the cornerstone of a fair trial,

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and Article 1, Section 13 of our Indiana

Constitution.” Ramirez v. State, 7 N.E.3d 933, 936 (Ind. 2014). The purpose of

the jury selection process is to determine whether potential jurors can render a

fair and impartial verdict in accordance with the law and evidence. Lindsey v.

State, 916 N.E.2d 230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.

[18] Parties and trial courts achieve an impartial jury by removing potential jurors

who cannot render a fair and impartial verdict. Oswalt v. State, 19 N.E.3d 241

(Ind. 2014). Parties may seek to remove a potential juror using two processes:

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2218 | October 7, 2019 Page 6 of 20

a challenge for cause; or a peremptory challenge. See id. at 246 (discussing the

two processes).

[19] This case concerns a challenge for cause. A motion to exclude a potential juror

for cause may be granted when a potential juror’s views would prevent or

substantially impair the performance of a juror’s duties in accordance with the

court’s instructions or the juror’s oath. Id. (quotation omitted). Indiana Code

section 35-37-1-5 (1989) and Indiana Jury Rule 17 “list many additional bases

for removing a prospective juror for cause.” Oswalt, 19 N.E.3d at 246. For

example, Indiana Code section 35-37-1-5 states that a potential juror may be

challenged for cause if, among other grounds, “the person is biased or

prejudiced for or against the defendant.” In addition, Indiana Jury Rule 17

provides in relevant part that a “court shall sustain a challenge for cause if the

prospective juror: . . . is biased or prejudiced for or against a party to the case.”

[20] Whether a trial court should excuse a particular juror for cause rests within its

sound discretion, and we will reverse the trial court only when its decision is

illogical or arbitrary. Lindsey, 916 N.E.2d 230. We afford substantial deference

to trial judges regarding this decision because they see potential jurors firsthand

and are in a much better position to assess whether they can serve without bias

and reach a decision based on the law. Id.

[21] In Byers v. State, 709 N.E.2d 1024 (Ind. 1999), the trial court granted the State’s

request to exclude a potential juror for cause. The juror had previously been

represented by Byers’ trial counsel in a criminal case and stated that he had

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2218 | October 7, 2019 Page 7 of 20

been treated unfairly by police. The potential juror further agreed that serving

as a juror might present a problem, and if he were the defendant, having a

person like him on the jury would be “a plus.” Id. at 1026. A panel of this

Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, concluding the potential juror’s prior

representation by Byers’ counsel, plus the potential juror’s belief that he had

been treated unfairly by police, suggested he could not be impartial.

[22] In Robinson’s case, prospective jurors filled out questionnaires, which were

provided to the parties prior to jury selection. During jury selection, the

2

prosecutor asked potential juror 1869, a woman, about her questionnaire, and

the following exchange occurred:

Q: 1869, you had made a comment on your questionnaire

about, um, that you’re a victim of the unfairness of the country’s

judicial system. So, obviously, that was a red flag for me. Let’s

talk about that a little bit. Do you remember writing that?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. Now, while I’m curious and I want to know,

because I’m a fix it kind of person, I know that that’s not where

we’re supposed to be right now. So, I want to – I need to ask you

this question. Do you feel like the judicial system is flawed?

A: It’s two-fold.

Q: Okay. Tell me two-fold.

2

The potential juror’s race is unspecified in the record. The trial court noted: “[t]he Court does not know

whether Juror 1869 is, in fact, an African-American woman. I would say this, it is the Court’s perspective

that she certainly appeared to be an African-American woman, or at least she appeared not to be a Caucasian

woman.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 67.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2218 | October 7, 2019 Page 8 of 20

A: Yes, but I don’t think it’s my responsibility here today, nor

am I capable here today, to fix it.

Q: Okay. That makes sense to me. I understand that. So, is

that the twofold part of it?

A: Yes.

Q: So, why -

A: Yes, I think it’s flawed, but it is not my responsibility for

what you called me here for to fix it.

Q: Okay.

A: Nor can I do that here today for what I’ve been called to

do.

Q: Okay. You also talk about not judging people and not

being a busy body in other people’s business.

A: Yes.

Q: What do you mean by that?

A: That it is not for me to judge people one way or the other.

Q: Okay.

A: And that I have to be about the business of making sure

that I do what I have to do to be a productive member of society

and just try to make the world better from what I can do.

Q: Okay.

A: For whatever task that I am put to do in that moment.

Q: Do you think this process is about judging people?

A: No.

Q: Okay, what is it about?

A: Law breakers and bringing them to justice. Bringing

justice to people that’s been wronged.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2218 | October 7, 2019 Page 9 of 20

Q: So, if someone – if someone has broken the law, do you

believe they need to be held accountable for it?

A: Yes.

****

Q: . . . . Now, a long time ago.

A: Yes.

Q: A long time ago, you had some issues, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: Let’s see. Young and dumb?

A: Yeah, yeah, yes, young and dumb.

Q: Okay. Anything about that experience that left a bad taste

in your mouth?

A: No.

Q: Did you – how did it turn out?

A: I served time in the penitentiary.

Q: Did you think it was fair?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. Did you learn from it?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. And you had a member of your immediate family

that’s had something to do with the system. Anything about

that? Were they treated fairly?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. All right. Thank you.

Tr. Vol. II, pp. 36-41.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2218 | October 7, 2019 Page 10 of 20

[23] Robinson then questioned potential jurors. He had the following exchange

with potential juror 1869:

Q: You had made some statements on your juror

questionnaire previously. Um, were you talking, when you

wrote your juror questionnaire, were you talking about the

system as a whole, as opposed to a particular instance?

A: It’s been so long since I wrote that statement, but, um, can

you read it?

Q: Sure.

A: I’m pretty sure.

Q: You discussed being a victim of unfairness of the judicial

system.

A: Yes.

Q: And were you talking about the judicial system as a

whole?

A: No, I was just talking about the incident that had

something to do with me at that time.

Q: Okay. So, are you able to put what happened to you at

that particular time aside and be a juror on this case and rule

fairly and impartially?

A: Yes, I could.

Id. at 60-61.

[24] After Robinson finished his questions, a sidebar was held off the record. The

trial court then excused several jurors, including potential juror 1869. After the

jury was selected and excused for the day, the trial court held a hearing on the

record. Robinson objected to the State challenging potential juror 1869 for

cause. He argued that the potential juror had “clarified her responses” to her

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2218 | October 7, 2019 Page 11 of 20

questionnaire and would be fair. Id. at 64. In response, the State contended

that the contradiction between the potential juror’s statements in her

questionnaire and her statements in court indicated that she may have “an

agenda” or may have been “trying to avoid being called as a juror when she

filled out her questionnaire.” Id. at 65-66. The trial court issued the following

ruling:

I believe [the prosecutor] accurately read the statements from the

perspective [sic] Juror 1869’s questionnaire, which that is good

because the Court wanted that as part of the record. Now, what

the Court notes, and this goes to questioning by both the State of

Indiana and the Defense, and it directly is related to the Court’s

decision to allow Juror 1869 to be struck for cause. Juror 1869’s

responses were inconsistent with the responses she gave on her

questionnaire. But just as importantly, her responses to the State

and her responses to the Defense, to questioning during voir dire,

was [sic] also inconsistent. And this is the response that was the

most troubling to the Court, and I cer -- I’m not arguing with

you, [Robinson], I – I heard what you said and I certainly

acknowledge your argument and what you said and I thought

you stated that accurately but the – but the – the statement that

prospective Juror 1869 made was to a question by [Robinson]

and her response was that she was a victim of unfair judicial

system to her, which means, it’s very personal to her, which is

that exactly what she expressed on her jury questionnaire.

From the Court’s perspective, I think when you look at the

totality of that, there is no question but what prospective Juror

1869 should have been released for cause.

Id. 67-68.

[25] We agree with the trial court that potential juror 1869’s statements in her

questionnaire sharply contradicted her statements during the hearing. In the

questionnaire, she described a prior interaction with the legal system in strongly

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2218 | October 7, 2019 Page 12 of 20

negative terms, stating that she, like the potential juror in Byers, had been a

victim of the country’s legal system. By contrast, during the hearing, although

the potential juror agreed with Robinson that her belief that the justice system

was unfair resulted from her prior criminal case, she also told the prosecutor

that the prior case did not leave a bad taste in her mouth, and she had been

treated fairly. The trial judge was in the best position to assess potential juror

1869’s credibility in light of these contradictory statements and could have

reasonably determined that she could not be impartial. The trial court did not

abuse its discretion. See Byers, 709 N.E.2d 1024 (potential juror’s statement that

he “had not been treated fairly by the police” was grounds for a challenge for

cause).

[26] On a related topic, Robinson argues that excusing proposed juror 1869 from

service violated the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Batson v.

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed.2d 69 (1986), which held that

racial discrimination in jury selection violates the Equal Protection Clause.

Batson is procedurally distinguishable from the current case because Batson

addressed racial discrimination in the context of peremptory challenges, not

challenges for cause, during jury selection. See, e.g., State v. Bowers, 482 N.W.2d

774, 776 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1992) (“To our knowledge, however, neither [the

United States Supreme Court] nor any state court has expanded Batson to

challenges for cause”).

[27] This is not to say that racial discrimination is permissible in the context of

challenges for cause. Rather, “if a prosecutor has demonstrated a challenge for

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2218 | October 7, 2019 Page 13 of 20

cause is necessary,” then the prosecutor has presented a racially neutral

explanation for removing the juror, thus meeting the standard set forth in

Batson. Bowers, 482 N.W.2d at 776. In the current case, the prosecutor

questioned potential juror 1869’s impartiality due to the strong contradictions

between her questionnaire and her answers at trial. Further, the prosecutor did

not challenge for cause another potential juror of color. We conclude Robinson

has failed to demonstrate reversible error.

2. Admission of Fingerprint Evidence

[28] Robinson claims the trial court erred in admitting testimony about fingerprint

analysis from Sergeant Denise Houser, claiming she was not qualified as an

expert. The State argues that Robinson waived this claim for failure to timely

object and for failure to state the reason for the objection. Based on our review

of the transcript, we disagree with the State and address the merits of

Robinson’s claim.

[29] Indiana Evidence Rule 702 provides:

(a) A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an

opinion or otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other

specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the

evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

(b) Expert scientific testimony is admissible only if the court is

satisfied that the expert testimony rests upon reliable scientific

principles.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2218 | October 7, 2019 Page 14 of 20

[30] Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb a trial court’s determination

that a witness is qualified to testify as an expert and render an expert opinion.

Ross v. State, 665 N.E.2d 599 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). An abuse of discretion

occurs if the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the

facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual

deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id.

[31] During Robinson’s trial, Sergeant Houser explained that she is in charge of the

EPD’s crime scene unit and evidence facility. She has bachelor’s degrees in

criminal justice and psychology, and she graduated from the Indiana Law

Enforcement Academy. She was an evidence technician for three years,

reporting to crime scenes to collect evidence including fingerprints and DNA

swabs. In 2010, Sergeant Houser was promoted to an evidence technician with

the EPD’s Criminal Investigations Division, which required more advanced

training. During her employment with the EPD she has regularly attended

additional training courses on topics including crime scene processing and

discovering latent fingerprints on skin. In addition, Sergeant Houser supervises

and trains the EPD’s evidence technicians.

[32] Robinson objected to Sergeant Houser explaining how fingerprints are

generated, identifying the processes that evidence technicians use to detect and

preserve fingerprints, and describing the circumstances under which EPD

evidence technicians would or would not search for prints. We conclude from

the preceding paragraph that the State set forth sufficient evidence from which

the trial court could conclude that Sergeant Houser qualified as an expert

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2218 | October 7, 2019 Page 15 of 20

witness on fingerprint evidence. The court did not abuse its discretion. See

Ross, 665 N.E.2d 599 (no abuse of discretion in qualifying witness as DNA

expert; witness testified about his education and experience).

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[33] Robinson argues the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to sustain his

three convictions for armed robbery. He specifically claims the State failed to

demonstrate he participated in the robberies.

[34] When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a

conviction, we look to the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom

which supports the verdict. Parsley v. State, 557 N.E.2d 1331 (Ind. 1990). The

identity of the perpetrator of a crime is a question of fact, not law, and the

weight given to identification evidence is a function of the trier of fact. Watkins

v. State, 551 N.E.2d 1145 (Ind. 1990). If there is evidence of probative value

from which a reasonable trier of fact could infer that appellant was guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt, then the conviction must be affirmed. Parsley, 557

N.E.2d 1331.

[35] To obtain three convictions of armed robbery as charged, the State was required

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Robinson (2) knowingly (3) took

property (money or clothing) (4) of another person (Wortinger, Holley, and

Heitzman, respectively) (5) by putting the person in fear (6) while armed with a

deadly weapon (a gun). Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2218 | October 7, 2019 Page 16 of 20

[36] One of the gunmen who participated in the store robbery wore blue latex gloves

and had placed a bandana on his face. That man worked with the suspect in

the hooded jacket, who emptied the cash registers. Meanwhile, the man in the

bandana ordered Holley and Heitzman to disrobe. He took Heitzman’s purse,

and when the robbers fled from the store through the back door, he also took

Holley and Heitzman’s clothes.

[37] When the police searched behind the store, they found Holley’s boot near a set

of blue latex gloves. The gloves were submitted for DNA testing, and a DNA

profile generated from one of the gloves matched Robinson’s DNA profile.

During questioning by a detective, Robinson denied that he had ever been to

that store. This is sufficient evidence to establish that Robinson participated in

the store robbery. See Curtis v. State, 42 N.E.3d 529 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)

(evidence sufficient to sustain conviction for armed robbery; Curtis had

discarded a plastic bottle before entering the store, and his DNA was later

discovered on the bottle), trans. denied.

[38] Robinson notes that none of the three women identified him or anyone else as a

participant in the robberies. This is a request to reweigh the evidence, which

our standard of review forbids. We affirm the trial court on this issue.

4. Appropriateness of Sentence

[39] Robinson argues his sentence is inappropriately high and asks the Court to

order two or all three of his sentences to be served concurrently rather than

consecutively. Article 7, section 6 of the Indiana Constitution authorizes this

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2218 | October 7, 2019 Page 17 of 20

Court to “review and revis[e]” sentences. This constitutional authority is

implemented through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides: “The

Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of

the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in

light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.”

[40] The principal role of appellate review under Rule 7(B) is to attempt to leaven

the outliers, not to achieve a perceived correct result in each case. Threatt v.

State, 105 N.E.3d 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. As a result, the

question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate, but whether the

sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265 (Ind. Ct. App.

2008). “[W]hether we regard a sentence as appropriate at the end of the day

turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime,

the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a

given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). Robinson

has the burden of proving his sentence is inappropriate. Estrada v. State, 969

N.E.2d 1032 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.

[41] At the time Robinson committed his three offenses, the maximum sentence for

a Level 3 felony was sixteen years, the minimum sentence was three years, and

the advisory sentence was nine years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5 (2014). The trial

court sentenced Robinson to sixteen years on each conviction, with three years

suspended to probation for Count I. The court further ordered Robinson to

serve the three sentences consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of forty-eight

years, with three suspended to probation.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2218 | October 7, 2019 Page 18 of 20

[42] Starting with the nature of the offenses, Robinson notes his aggregate executed

sentence is close to the maximum and claims there “was nothing particularly

heinous about the offenses.” Appellant’s Br. p. 21. We disagree. Robinson

and his accomplices attempted to conceal their identities and appeared to have

advance knowledge of the store’s layout and security, which indicates a degree

of planning.

[43] Although use of a deadly weapon is an element of the offenses here, Robinson

and his accomplices chose to use the handguns by pointing them directly at the

three women. Further, when Wortinger claimed she did not know how to

deactivate the back door alarm, Robinson and his companion pointed their

guns at her head. His actions placed all three women in greater danger and

terror than the elements of the offense required.

[44] In addition, Robinson committed robbery against Holley and Heitzman by

ordering them to disrobe at gunpoint and then stealing their clothes and

Heitzman’s purse. This act terrified and humiliated them, and he presumably

gained very little from taking their clothes.

[45] Finally, the robberies had long-term negative effects on Holley and Heitzman.

Holley stopped working at night, and she is still fearful every time a man enters

the store. Heitzman did not return to that store for four months. Nothing

about the nature of the robberies merits a downward sentencing adjustment.

[46] Turning to the character of the offender, Robinson was thirty-nine years old at

sentencing. His criminal history includes convictions of dealing in cocaine or a

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2218 | October 7, 2019 Page 19 of 20

narcotic drug, robbery, battery resulting in bodily injury, two counts of resisting

law enforcement, being a felon in possession of a handgun, operating a vehicle

without ever receiving a license, and operating a vehicle without ever receiving

a license with a prior conviction. It is troubling that Robinson continues to

commit robberies and gun-related offenses. In addition, he was serving a

sentence in community corrections when he committed the offenses at issue in

this case. The State further alleged during sentencing that Robinson has a child

support arrearage dating back to 2015, and Robinson’s employment history is

spotty at best. Robinson has failed to demonstrate that a reduction of his forty-

eight-year sentence is appropriate in light of his character.

[47] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[48] Judgment affirmed.

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2218 | October 7, 2019 Page 20 of 20