"[A]ny authorization of criminal counsel to undertake representation in Title Nine litigation would be subject to the strictures of N.J.S.A. 9:6- 8.10a(a)."
How later courts described this case
- "[A]ny authorization of criminal counsel to undertake representation in Title Nine litigation would be subject to the strictures of N.J.S.A. 9:6- 8.10a(a)."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1556-17T2
NEW JERSEY DIVISION
OF CHILD PROTECTION
AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
K.G.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
M.K.-G. and J.W.,
Defendants.
_____________________________
IN THE MATTER OF M.G.
and J.C.W.,
Minors.
_____________________________
Argued December 20, 2018 – Decided June 3, 2019
Before Judges Simonelli, Whipple and DeAlmeida.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Sussex County,
Docket No. FN-19-0024-16.
Jill Nanci Alintoff, Designated Counsel, argued the
cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
Defendant, attorney; Jill Nanci Alintoff, on the briefs).
Sara M. Gregory, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
General, attorney; Jason Wade Rockwell, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel; Sara M. Gregory, on the
brief).
Olivia Belfatto Crisp, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for minors (Joseph E.
Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney;
Olivia Belfatto Crisp, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant K.G.1 appeals from the May 23, 2017 order of the Family Part
finding that he abused and neglected two children pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-
8.21(c)(3) and N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4). Because the trial court erred when
denying K.G. his choice of counsel, we reverse and remand.
I.
The following facts are derived from the record. K.G. is married to and
resided with M.K.-G. The couple has one son, M.G., who was less than a year
1
We use initials to protect the anonymity of the children. R. 1:38-3(d)(11) and
(12).
A-1556-17T2
2
old at the time of the alleged abuse. M.K.-G. has two other sons, D.J. and
J.C.W., who are not biologically related to K.G. and were approximately eight
and six years old, respectively, at the time of the alleged abuse. M.G. and J.C.W.
resided with the couple. D.J. resided with his maternal grandmother, but
frequently visited his mother at the family home.
In July 2015, D.J. spontaneously reported to his maternal grandmother
that K.G. sexually abused him while he was visiting the family and while the
infant M.G. was present in the home. After an investigation, on July 29, 2015,
plaintiff Division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCPP) filed a complaint
against defendant, M.K.-G., and J.W., the father of J.C.W., seeking care and
custody of J.C.W. and M.G., the two children living in the family home. The
Division alleged that K.G.'s sexual abuse of D.J. placed the children who lived
with him at imminent harm and substantial risk in violation of N.J.S.A. 9:6-
8.21(c)(4)(b) (the Title Nine proceeding). Because D.J. lived in New York, he
was not alleged to be a subject of K.G.'s abuse and neglect, even though he was
the victim of K.G.'s alleged sexual assault. After an initial hearing, the court
A-1556-17T2
3
restrained K.G. from the family home, and any physical, telephonic, or
electronic contact with J.C.W. or M.G. that was not supervised by DCPP. 2
On September 30, 2015, K.G. was arrested and charged with the sexual
assault of D.J., pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2. K.G. thereafter retained Remi
Spencer, Esq., to represent him in both the criminal proceeding and the Title
Nine matter. He has consistently denied the allegations lodged against him. 3
On January 13, 2016, the trial court sua sponte issued a letter to Spencer,
which provided as follows:
I am advised you are entering an appearance on behalf
of [K.G.] on [sic] the above matter. Staff unilaterally
researched Promise Gavel which exposed you are
representing [K.G.] on the criminal matter arising out
of the same allegations. That dual representation has
been found to be inconsistent because Division
proceedings are confidential and may not be used in
criminal court. You must therefore make a choice
whether you are representing [K.G.] in the criminal or
Division matter, but not both.
DCPP later filed an objection to Spencer representing K.G. in both matters.
2
After the complaint was filed, J.C.W. disclosed that he was sexually abused
by K.G. as well as by D.J. and several other boys. DCPP did not amend the
complaint to include allegations of sexual abuse by K.G. against J.C.W.
3
K.G. has also stressed that a convicted sex offender, who was the
grandmother's paramour, lived with D.J. and the grandmother for several years.
In addition, the grandmother had an acrimonious relationship with K.G. and
M.K.-G., once requiring police intervention during a verbal dispute.
A-1556-17T2
4
On January 29, 2016, Spencer appeared before the trial court. Having just
been served with DCPP's written objection, she requested time to respond in
writing. The court granted Spencer's request. In doing so, the court stated its
disinclination to permit K.G. to have the counsel of his choice in both matters:
I'm the one who triggered the question in the first place.
And although I will give you an opportunity to be
heard, I'm inclined not to let you represent him in this
matter. I think that the nature of the allegations against
your client and what will have to transpire in this case,
in terms of evaluations of the child and other things that
will go on, are just inappropriate for you to have any
access to if you're representing him in the criminal case.
The court also referred to our holding in N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
Servs. v. N.S., 412 N.J. Super. 593 (App. Div. 2010). In that case, we examined
whether a defendant may be represented by the same counsel in both criminal
and Title Nine proceedings involving the same alleged acts against a child. We
held that simultaneous representation is permissible where the trial court is able
to implement measures, such as protective orders and a prohibition on making
copies of documents, sufficient to protect the confidentiality of Division records
disclosed during the Title Nine proceeding. With respect to N.S., the trial court
stated:
Quite honestly, I don't understand Judge Lihotz's
decision. I mean she talks about the protections that the
court could put in place, and I quite honestly don't
A-1556-17T2
5
understand how somebody in your position would be
able to divorce yourself from what you're hearing in
this case even if there's a protective order in place.
And, again, because of the sensitive nature of this case,
which is sexual allegations [sic] by your client against
a child, I would really be loath to allow you to – to do
that. But, again, I will allow you the opportunity to be
heard[.]
On February 26, 2016, the trial court held a hearing to determine if K.G.
would be permitted to have Spencer represent him in both proceedings. Spencer,
relying on our holding in N.S., urged the court to allow her to represent
defendant and take whatever measures it deemed necessary to protect the
confidentiality of DCPP records disclosed during the Title Nine proceeding.
Spencer acknowledged that she would be required to obtain court approval to
use any confidential DCPP records in the criminal proceeding.
The court declined to undertake the analysis required by N.S. or consider
any of the protective measures identified in the opinion. The court described
N.S. as follows:
Judge Lihotz offers a prohibition on photocopies as a
remedy. Frankly, the [c]ourt doesn't understand how
that accomplishes anything. The Appellate Division's
decision is premised on the fact an attorney can create
a . . . wall within the attorney's mind, which is what Ms.
Spencer was also talking about. The fact that there are
rules of professional conduct and other rules that would
bar her from using things that she uses . . . . [S]he also
said and I agree with her . . . we're all human beings and
A-1556-17T2
6
when we hear, see or learn something you don't have
the ability to just block it out and forget it. So, there
may be some mechanisms in place to bar it from being
used in the criminal court, but there is really no – not
that division that Judge Lihotz seems to think we can
have. I don't think that's the way the human mind or
human nature works.
In addition, the court stated that "[t]hough the [c]ourt should follow Appellate
Division reported cases, the case here . . . is differentiated" from N.S. because
N.S. concerned the right to counsel in a "dispositional hearing" and K.G.'s right
to select counsel arose in a "fact finding setting[.]" The court did not elaborate
on its reasoning nor explain the significance of these two types of hearings on a
defendant's right to choose counsel. The court also cited State v. Cusick, 219
N.J. Super. 452 (App. Div. 1987), which it described as arguably inconsistent
with N.S., as a reason that N.S. was not binding. The court also found that our
directive in N.S. to consider issuing a protective order was "not the issue here"
because the source of the referral to DCPP was known to K.G.
The court did not allow K.G. to have Spencer represent him in both
proceedings. The court expressed its decision as follows:
I'm denying your application, you're going to have to
make a decision as to whether you're representing
[K.G.] in the Division case or the criminal case. I can't
block you from the criminal case, but I can block you
from this case, so you're going to make a judgment.
A-1556-17T2
7
Spencer immediately stated that she would represent K.G. in the criminal
matter.4 She also informed the court that K.G. could not afford to retain a second
private attorney and would apply for appointed counsel for the Title Nine action.
On May 23, 2017, after trial at which K.G. was represented by appointed
counsel, the court found K.G. sexually abused J.C.W., pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-
8.21(c)(3), and abused or neglected J.C.W. and M.G., pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-
8.21(c)(4), by placing them in imminent harm and at substantial risk as a result
of his sexual abuse of both D.J. and J.C.W. The court amended the complaint
to conform to DCPP's proofs that K.G. sexually abused J.C.W. The court denied
DCPP's request to amend the complaint to conform to its proofs that K.G.
sexually abused D.J. because DCPP specifically excluded that child from the
complaint. This appeal followed.
K.G. challenges several evidentiary decisions of the trial court, as well as
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting its findings. In addition, K.G. argues:
K.G. WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO CHOOSE
HIS COUNSEL WHEN THE TRIAL COURT
REFUSED TO ALLOW HIS RETAINED COUNSEL
TO REPRESENT HIM IN BOTH THE TITLE NINE
AND CRIMINAL MATTERS.
4
The court assumes the election was made by K.G. prior to the hearing.
A-1556-17T2
8
Because we conclude that the trial court erred when it denied K.G. his choice of
counsel, warranting a new trial, we do not address K.G.'s other arguments.
II.
"Parents in New Jersey charged with civil abuse and neglect under Title
Nine . . . have a constitutional right to counsel under the due process guarantees
of Article I, paragraph 1 of the State Constitution, and a statutory right under
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.43(a) [and N.J.S.A.] 9:6-8.30(a)[.]" N.J. Div. of Child Prot. &
Permanency v. G.S., 447 N.J. Super. 539, 555 (App. Div. 2016). As we noted
in N.S., defendants in Title Nine matters often face parallel criminal proceedings
arising from the same allegations of abuse. 412 N.J. Super. at 634-35. The
parallel proceedings "have resulted in thorny constitutional issues[,]" including
whether a defendant has a right to be represented by the same counsel in both
the Title Nine and criminal matters. Id. at 635 (quoting Div. of Youth & Family
Servs. v. R.M., 347 N.J. Super. 44, 64 (App. Div. 2001)).
The primary concern in such situations is the need to protect the statutory
confidentiality of DCPP records.
All records of child abuse reports . . . , all information
obtained by the Department of Children and Families
in investigating such reports . . . , and all reports of
findings forwarded to the child abuse registry . . . shall
be kept confidential and may be disclosed only under
the circumstances expressly authorized . . . herein.
A-1556-17T2
9
[N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(a).]
The Title Nine proceedings will necessarily involve the disclosure to defendant's
counsel of confidential DCPP records, including notes from the child victim's
therapy sessions. See R. 5:12-3 (requiring the disclosure of "[a]ll relevant
reports of [DCPP] and other reports of experts or other documents upon which
the Division intends to rely" and requiring that the "Division's case file shall
also be available for inspection to the attorneys for the parties without court
order."). DCPP records may also be released for use in a criminal proceeding,
but only by court order. See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)(6) and (12) (DCPP records
relating to reports and investigations of child abuse are confidential but may be
released where a court determines the information they contain is relevant and
necessary for determination of an issue before the court).
Two oft-cited justifications for securing this level of
confidentiality are provided. First, the statute is
designed as a "procedural safeguard to protect victim
children from unnecessary disclosure . . . which may
cause the child further guilt, vulnerability or
humiliation." [Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. J.C.,
399 N.J. Super. 444, 447 (App. Div. 2006).] "DYFS
child abuse files often contain very sensitive
information, including psychologist evaluations and
diagnoses. Many individuals performing the
evaluations [and] treatments . . . are acting with the
knowledge that their treatments or evaluations will be
used for risk assessment and for therapeutic purposes
only." Id. at 449-50.
A-1556-17T2
10
Second, there is a need to protect those who come
forward to report child abuse and neglect, which are
often difficult to detect. In fact, the statute grants
immunity to persons who make such reports in good
faith. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.13.
[N.S., 412 N.J. Super. at 636 (second alternation in
original) (citations omitted).]
It is, therefore, inappropriate to provide "unfettered access to the Division's file
outside the parameters of the Title Nine litigation, even for purposes of criminal
defense[.]" Id. at 639.
We have held, however, that the "wholesale rejection of all . . . requests"
to disclose such information to counsel in a Title Nine matter who will appear
in a parallel criminal proceeding is also improper. Ibid. We instead concluded
that concerns about the confidentiality of DCPP records should be addressed by
the court reviewing dual representation requests by considering various
available measures to "safeguard the goals of the State to uncover and treat abuse
and neglect, and to protect victim children, without unnecessarily sacrificing a
parent's right to exercise a desired choice of legal counsel." Id. at 640. As we
explained,
after balancing the competing concerns posed, the court
may allow dual representation subject to a protective
order, which preserves the confidentiality of the source
prompting the Division's protective services litigation.
In this way, the State's interest in eliminating any
A-1556-17T2
11
chilling effect on disclosure of abuse and neglect is
protected by assuring the anonymity of those
individuals and agencies who report abuse. So too,
necessary orders would be entered when the need to
safeguard a child victim and preserve the
confidentiality of the victim-child's records is more
compelling than the parent's right to employ a desired
choice of legal representative. See Cusick, 219 N.J.
Super. at 462. Additionally, a prohibition on providing
photocopies of various records to parent-defendants
could be effectuated.
[Ibid.]
The balancing of "these competing concerns" is to be made by the trial court "on
a case-by-case basis." Ibid.
Having carefully reviewed K.G.'s arguments in light of the record and
applicable legal principles, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying K.G.
his choice of counsel without considering whether it could have taken steps to
preserve the confidentiality of the DCPP records likely to be disclosed during
the Title Nine proceeding.
Our holding in N.S. was unequivocal: trial courts may not summarily
reject a defendant's request to have the same counsel represent him in parallel
Title Nine and criminal proceedings arising from the same alleged abuse of a
child. The court instead must weigh the competing demands of protecting the
confidentiality of DCPP records and the defendant's right to counsel of his
A-1556-17T2
12
choice. In this instance, the trial court failed to follow N.S. Instead, after
expressing its reservations about the wisdom and utility of our holding, the court
barred defendant from having the counsel of his choice in the Title Nine
proceeding without having undertaken the analysis required by N.S.
"It is beyond dispute that a trial judge has the responsibility to comply
with pronouncements of an appellate court." Triffin v. Automatic Data
Processing, Inc., 411 N.J. Super. 292, 306 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Tomaino
v. Burman, 364 N.J. Super. 224, 233 (App. Div. 2003)). "Trial judges are
privileged to disagree with the pronouncements of appellate courts; the privilege
does not extend to non-compliance." Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v.
Mack Props. Co. No. 3, 280 N.J. Super. 553, 562 (App. Div. 1995) (quoting
Reinauer Realty Corp. v. Borough of Paramus, 34 N.J. 406, 415 (1961)).
The trial court also erred when it concluded it was not bound by the
holding in N.S. because that case concerned choice of counsel for a dispositional
hearing while the question of counsel in the present matter arose prior to a fact
finding hearing. The defendant in N.S. first made a request for counsel in her
criminal proceeding to represent her at a Title Nine fact finding hearing. 412
N.J. Super. at 641. Because the request was procedurally defective, the court
did not consider its merits at that time. A renewed request was made at the
A-1556-17T2
13
dispositional hearing after the fact finding was complete, at which time the
request was denied. Id. at 633. While this procedural difference between N.S.
and the present case exists, there is nothing in our holding in N.S. suggesting
that it is inapplicable in the context of a fact finding hearing.
Nor is the procedural distinction meaningful. "[S]ignificant and
longstanding implications attach to a finding of abuse and neglect." Id. at 619.
"[A]n adverse determination could affect parents' 'constitutionally protected
right to maintain a relationship with their children.'" Ibid. (quoting Div. of
Youth & Family Servs. v. G.M., 198 N.J. 382, 397 (2009)).
[I]n addition to these custodial ramifications, numerous
collateral consequences flow from such a finding.
Specifically, a finding of abuse and neglect is
forwarded by [DCPP] to a central registry maintained
by the Department of Children and Families[.] On
written request, the records may be released to
individuals identified in the statute, "including doctors,
courts, child welfare agencies, and any person or entity
mandated by statute to consider child abuse or neglect
information when conducting a background check or
employment-related screening of an individual . . .
seeking employment with an agency or organization
providing services to children[.]"
[Id. at 619-20 (third alteration in original) (citations
omitted) (quoting G.S. v. Dept. of Human Servs., 157
N.J. 161, 169 n.2 (1999)).]
A-1556-17T2
14
Given the significant consequences of an adverse determination at a fact finding
hearing, K.G.'s interest in selecting counsel of his choice was in no way less
significant than it would have been had the question of his choice of counsel
arose at a dispositional hearing. 5
Nor do we agree with the trial court's conclusion that our holding in
Cusick conflicts with N.S. In Cusick, a defendant convicted of several criminal
charges related to the sexual abuse of a child argued on direct appeal that he was
denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him because he
was denied access to confidential records of the Division of Youth and Family
Services, the predecessor to DCPP. 219 N.J. Super. at 455. The judge presiding
at Cusick's criminal trial reviewed the records and determined that their
disclosure was not necessary to resolve any issue before the court and the
information they contained could be obtained from other sources. Id. at 457.
The court concluded that the Sixth Amendment interest in confrontation of
witnesses was outweighed by the State's interest in protecting the confidentiality
5
"[T]he statutory framework of Title Nine provides that upon a finding of abuse
and neglect, the offending parent or guardian is entitled to a dispositional
hearing to determine whether the children may safely return to his or her
custody, and if not, what the proper disposition should be." G.M., 198 N.J. at
387-88.
A-1556-17T2
15
of the documents. Id. at 459. We affirmed, finding that the trial court's
balancing of interests was appropriate. Ibid.
The holding in Cusick in no way conflicts without our holding in N.S. We
acknowledged in N.S. that the fact that an attorney may receive confidential
records during the Title Nine proceeding does not mean that those records would
automatically be available in the parallel criminal proceeding. 412 N.J. Super.
at 640 ("[A]ny authorization of criminal counsel to undertake representation in
Title Nine litigation would be subject to the strictures of N.J.S.A. 9:6-
8.10a(a)."). In fact, in N.S. we cited Cusick as standing for the proposition that
orders to "safeguard a child victim and preserve the confidentiality of the victim-
child's records" in the criminal proceeding may be necessary when that need "is
more compelling than the parent's right to employ a desired choice of legal
representative." Ibid. (citing Cusick, 219 N.J. Super. at 462).
The "erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of choice, with
consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate,
unquestionably qualifies as structural error." United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,
548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 282
(1993)); see also State v. Kates, 216 N.J. 393, 395-96 (2014) (finding that
"deprivation of the right to counsel of choice is a 'structural error,' so defendants
A-1556-17T2
16
who demonstrate that their right has been violated do not have to show
prejudice[.]" (quoting State v. Kates, 426 N.J. Super. 32, 44 (App. Div. 2012))).
The erroneous denial of K.G.'s right to counsel of his choice without applying
the holding in N.S. is sufficient to warrant reversal of the findings of abuse and
neglect against him. We leave to the trial court on remand to determine whether
developments, if any, in the criminal proceedings against K.G. affect the
necessity for a new trial on the Title Nine allegations and, if a new trial is held,
whether K.G.'s request to have the same counsel represent him in both the Title
Nine and criminal matters can be honored by implementing measures necessary
to preserve the confidentiality of DCPP's records.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. Because the trial judge has heard this matter and may have a
commitment to his findings, we direct that on remand the case be assigned to a
different judge. See Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 617
(1986); Graziano v. Grant, 326 N.J. Super. 328, 349-50 (App. Div. 1998). All
limitations on K.G.'s contact with the children established by the trial court are
to remain in place until further order of the trial court. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
A-1556-17T2
17