United States v. Lindani Mzembe

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

Nos. 16-4258, 17-1060, 17-1412, 17-2268 & 17-2269

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

IVAN BRAZIER,

LINDANI MZEMBE, and

DEREK FIELDS,

Defendants-Appellants.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.

Nos. 15-cr-87-3, 15-cr-87-2, and 15-cr-87-1 — Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge.

____________________

ARGUED APRIL 5, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 12, 2019

____________________

Before KANNE, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. In the early hours of September

8, 2015, in South Bend, Indiana, appellants Ivan Brazier, Derek

Fields, and Lindani Mzembe kidnapped, shot, and ruthlessly

beat Adrian Harris as he left his home. Charged with federal

kidnapping and firearms crimes, the three defendants were

tried and sentenced separately, but their appeals have been

2 Nos. 16-4258, 17-1060, 17-1412, 17-2268 & 17-2269

consolidated. The defendants do not challenge their convic-

tions for the underlying crimes of kidnapping or holding Har-

ris for ransom, and the two defendants convicted of being fel-

ons in possession of firearms do not challenge those convic-

tions. Defendants Fields and Mzembe were also convicted

and sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for using and dis-

charging firearms during a crime of violence. The district

court complied with circuit law applicable at the time of its

decisions. Later decisions by the Supreme Court and this

court, however, require us to reverse Fields’ and Mzembe’s

convictions and sentences under § 924(c). We also conclude

both of their cases should be remanded for resentencing.

Those defendants have raised other challenges to their sen-

tences that either are moot in light of our decision on the

§ 924(c) charges or fail to show any error or abuse of discre-

tion by the district court. We also affirm Brazier’s sentence.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

A. Shooting, Kidnapping, and Ransom Demands

Around 3:30 a.m. on September 8, 2015, Ivan Brazier,

Derek Fields, and Lindani Mzembe attacked Adrian Harris as

he approached his car, which was parked in front of his home.

The defendants demanded money from Harris and beat him

with their guns. While picking Harris up from the ground,

one defendant accidentally shot him. The bullet broke apart

in Harris’s arm. Part of it went through his arm, and other bits

lodged in his elbow.

The defendants drove Harris and his car to Brazier’s house

where they used duct tape to bind, blindfold, and gag him. At

Brazier’s, the defendants continued to pistol-whip Harris and

demanded money. Nearly three hours into the kidnapping,

Nos. 16-4258, 17-1060, 17-1412, 17-2268 & 17-2269 3

the defendants forced Harris to call his sister and ask for a

ransom. He said, “I need some money, they got me.” His sis-

ter collected roughly $3,000 from friends and delivered it to a

house near Brazier’s. As two of the defendants went to get the

ransom, Brazier continued to beat Harris, kicking him, pour-

ing alcohol on his wounds, and twisting his injured arm.

When the other two returned, the defendants demanded

more money from Harris and continued to torture him. Harris

again called his sister, pleading, “Please, Sis. Hurry up. Hurry

up. I can’t take it anymore.”

After the second telephone call, Harris had trouble breath-

ing because of his broken nose and swollen mouth. One at-

tacker noticed Harris taking irregular breaths and became

concerned that he would die in the house. Hearing this, Har-

ris thought he might have a way out. He began “breathing

funny” on purpose, and one defendant said, “He can’t die in

here.” The defendants decided to drop him in an alley. They

cut the duct tape from his hands and feet but kept him blind-

folded. Harris asked a man on the street to help. Police were

dispatched at 8:53 a.m. They arrived, and an ambulance took

Harris to a hospital.

Less than one hour before the defendants released Harris,

a police officer had received a tip from a confidential inform-

ant that Fields had kidnapped someone. As police gathered

more information on the kidnapping, the officer who received

the tip saw a car drive in front of him with Fields and Mzembe

riding as passengers around 9:00 a.m. The officer stopped the

car and detained its passengers. The driver—not Fields or

Mzembe—agreed to allow the police to search the car. They

found a pair of bloody gloves, Harris’s car keys, and a black

4 Nos. 16-4258, 17-1060, 17-1412, 17-2268 & 17-2269

mask. The police also obtained a search warrant for Brazier’s

residence.

B. Trials and Sentencing

A federal grand jury indicted the defendants on charges of

kidnapping, making a ransom demand, possessing a firearm

in furtherance of a crime of violence, and being felons in pos-

session of firearms. See 18 U.S.C. § 875(a) (ransom demand);

§ 922(g)(1) (felon in possession of firearm); § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii)

(possessing firearm during and in furtherance of crime of vi-

olence); § 1201 (kidnapping). In three separate trials, juries

convicted Fields and Mzembe on all counts and convicted

Brazier on only the kidnapping and ransom charges.

Brazier was tried and sentenced first. One issue under the

Sentencing Guidelines was how to categorize Harris’s injuries

under U.S.S.G. §2A4.1(b)(2)(A), which adds four levels for

“permanent or life-threatening bodily injury,” two levels for

“serious bodily injury,” or three levels for something in be-

tween. Brazier argued that he should not receive a four-level

enhancement because the injury Harris suffered was not per-

manent or life-threatening. The court overruled the objection,

explaining that the defendants had denied Harris medical

care for his serious injuries and applying a four-level increase.

The court sentenced Brazier to a total of 444 months in prison,

with consecutive prison terms of 240 months for kidnapping

and 204 months for demanding a ransom.

The court sentenced Mzembe to a total of 528 months in

prison. The sentence included a combined 408 months for kid-

napping, demanding a ransom, and being a felon in posses-

sion of a firearm. The court then added a mandatory

Nos. 16-4258, 17-1060, 17-1412, 17-2268 & 17-2269 5

consecutive term of 120 months (ten years) under § 924(c) for

discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence.

The court sentenced Fields to a total of 656 months in

prison, with 536 months for the kidnapping, ransom, and

felon-in-possession charges, plus a mandatory consecutive

term of 120 months for his § 924(c) conviction. In imposing

the 536-month prison term, the court applied a two-level en-

hancement under § 2A4.1(b) because “a dangerous weapon

was used” in the crime.

The district court also ordered all three defendants to pay

more than $190,000 in restitution for Harris’s injuries.1 The

court held Fields, Mzembe, and Brazier jointly and severally

liable for that amount. Mzembe and Brazier objected to resti-

tution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act on the the-

ory that kidnapping is not a “crime of violence” subject to that

Act. The district court accepted this argument but decided to

order restitution under the Victim and Witness Protection

Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663.

II. Analysis

The parties have briefed and argued a number of issues.

Developments since the district court’s sentencings and our

oral argument have reduced the number we must decide.

First, we reverse the § 924(c) convictions and sentences for

Mzembe and Fields because recent precedents establish that

the underlying offenses do not qualify categorically as crimes

of violence under that provision. We then reject two Sentenc-

ing Guideline challenges. Brazier alone argues that the district

1Of the total restitution amount, the court held that the first $61,491

should be paid to Harris himself, with any additional funds paid to insur-

ers who paid for his health care and related costs.

6 Nos. 16-4258, 17-1060, 17-1412, 17-2268 & 17-2269

court erred in applying the guideline enhancement for life-

threatening or permanent bodily injury. Fields’ challenge to

the guideline enhancement for possessing a firearm is under-

mined by our reversal of his § 924(c) sentence. Finally, we af-

firm the district court’s restitution orders against all three de-

fendants.

A. Section 924(c), Kidnapping, and Crimes of Violence

Fields and Mzembe challenge their convictions under

§ 924(c). That statute imposes a series of escalating mandatory

minimum sentences for “any person who, during and in rela-

tion to any crime of violence … uses or carries a firearm ….”

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Section 924(c)(3) provides two alter-

native tests for a crime of violence:

For purposes of this subsection the term “crime

of violence” means an offense that is a felony

and—

(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force against the

person or property of another, or

(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk

that physical force against the person or

property of another may be used in the

course of committing the offense.

Subparagraphs (A) and (B) have become known more com-

monly as the “elements clause” and the “residual clause,” re-

spectively. Fields and Mzembe argue that they cannot be sen-

tenced under § 924(c) since their kidnapping and ransom of-

fenses do not categorically qualify as crimes of violence under

the elements clause and because the residual clause is uncon-

stitutional.

Nos. 16-4258, 17-1060, 17-1412, 17-2268 & 17-2269 7

Fields and Mzembe did not raise this argument at the time

of their trials, so we review for “plain error.” Plain-error re-

view requires the defendants to show (1) an error that has not

been intentionally waived; (2) that the error was “plain—that

is to say, clear or obvious;” (3) that the error “affected the de-

fendant’s substantial rights;” and (4) that the error “seriously

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338,

1343 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States

v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 73238 (1993).

The defendants did not intentionally waive this argument,

so we proceed to the second requirement that the error be

plain. That inquiry asks whether the error is plain at the time

of appellate consideration. Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S.

266, 279 (2013). In United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019),

the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split and held that the

residual clause in the § 924(c) definition of a crime of violence

is unconstitutionally vague, so the defendants’ convictions

cannot be upheld on that basis. The other way to satisfy

§ 924(c) is the elements clause, but we explained in United

States v. Jenkins that kidnapping and holding a person for ran-

som does not categorically satisfy the elements clause. 849

F.3d 390, 393 (7th Cir. 2017). In short, kidnapping may be ac-

complished without force, by “inveigling” or “decoying” a

person without a threat of force, and by holding the person

simply by locking him or her in a room, again without threat

of violence. Id., quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a).2

2 The 2017 decision in Jenkins was vacated by the Supreme Court and

remanded for further consideration of the residual clause issue in light of

Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). That issue was ultimately re-

solved by the Supreme Court in Davis, and these later developments do

8 Nos. 16-4258, 17-1060, 17-1412, 17-2268 & 17-2269

Under the categorical method of analysis that applies to

both the elements and residual clauses of the definition of

crimes of violence in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), Mzembe’s and Fields’

convictions for kidnapping and demanding ransom cannot

support the mandatory consecutive sentences imposed under

§ 924(c). The categorical method focuses on the essential ele-

ments of the counts of conviction, requiring courts in essence

to focus on the least culpable conduct that could violate the

relevant statutes, without considering the actual facts of the

defendants’ conduct. In resentencing Mzembe and Fields on

the remaining charges, however, the district court will of

course be free to consider their actual conduct in exercising its

judgment and discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Mzembe and Fields ask that we limit any remand to vacat-

ing only the sentences for the § 924(c) convictions, leaving in-

tact the sentences for the underlying offenses. That would ef-

fectively cut ten years from Mzembe’s and Fields’ sentences

without giving the district court the opportunity to reconsider

any other aspects of their cases. Sentences for multiple of-

fenses are generally treated as “packages,” so that when part

of the package is removed on appeal, the district court may

reconsider the overall sentencing package on remand. Pepper

v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 507 (2011), quoting United States

v. White, 406 F.3d 827, 832 (7th Cir. 2005); see also United States

v. Barnes, 660 F.3d 1000, 1007 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v.

not cast any doubt on the Jenkins analysis of the elements clause as applied

to kidnapping and ransom offenses. See United States v. Jackson,—F.3d—,

2019 WL 3423363 (7th Cir. July 30, 2019) (deciding Jenkins’ appeal and re-

lated cases in wake of Supreme Court decision in Davis, ordering resen-

tencing without § 924(c) sentences). We have held these appeals for deci-

sion until the Supreme Court resolved the issue decided in Davis.

Nos. 16-4258, 17-1060, 17-1412, 17-2268 & 17-2269 9

Rivera, 327 F.3d 612, 614–15 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v.

Shue, 825 F.2d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir. 1987).

Mzembe and Fields argue that the general “package” rule

should not apply here because of another feature of circuit

law that has been overruled by the Supreme Court since they

were sentenced. Before 2017, our circuit precedent held that a

judge sentencing a defendant for a § 924(c) offense and other

related offenses was not permitted to take into account the

mandatory consecutive sentence under § 924(c) when decid-

ing the sentence on the other offenses. United States v. Rob-

erson, 474 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 2007) (prohibiting discounts

based on § 924(c) sentence in sentences for other convictions).

The district court said here that it was complying with that

rule when it sentenced Fields and Mzembe on the kidnap-

ping, ransom, and felon-in-possession convictions. In Dean v.

United States, however, the Supreme Court effectively abro-

gated our holding in Roberson and held that a sentencing court

is not prevented from considering a mandatory minimum

sentence under § 924(c) when deciding the sentence for un-

derlying offenses. 137 S. Ct. 1170, 1178 (2017). Dean held, in

essence, that § 924(c) does not prevent the sentencing judge

from considering multi-count sentences as a package.

Fields and Mzembe argue that because the district judge

complied with the now-abrogated Roberson rule, there is no

need for him to take a fresh look at their sentences on the un-

derlying offenses. The argument has logical force, to the effect

that two errors (each made by complying with controlling law

at the time) offset one another, so that a simple subtraction of

120 months from their total sentences will fix the problem en-

tirely. Complicating matters, though, reversal of the § 924(c)

convictions means that the two-level Sentencing Guideline

10 Nos. 16-4258, 17-1060, 17-1412, 17-2268 & 17-2269

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(b)(3) for use of a danger-

ous weapon can properly apply to Fields and Mzembe. And

complicating matters still further, the district court did not ap-

ply that enhancement to Mzembe but did apply it to Fields.

At the time of sentencing, it was an error to apply it to Fields

in light of the § 924(c) conviction and sentence. Under U.S.S.G.

§ 2K2.4, cmt. n.4, courts should not impose a weapons en-

hancement on an underlying crime when the defendant has

also been convicted under § 924(c). Now that the § 924(c) con-

victions and sentences are being vacated, however, the dis-

crepancy is reversed: that enhancement will now apply to

both Fields and Mzembe. Looking at the situation in its en-

tirety, we conclude that there have been enough changes in

the legal sentencing frameworks that apply to both Fields and

Mzembe that complete resentencing for both defendants is

the appropriate course here.3

B. Sentencing Guideline Issues

1. Life-Threatening Injury Enhancement for Brazier

Next, we consider the district court’s application of two

guideline enhancements the district court applied to Brazier

and Fields at sentencing. In applying the Sentencing Guide-

line for kidnapping, the district judge applied a four-level sen-

tencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(b)(2)(A), finding

that Harris suffered a life-threatening bodily injury. Brazier

argues that he should have received only a two- or three-level

enhancement because Harris’s injuries were not actually life-

3Because the convictions under § 924(c) cannot stand in the wake of

Davis and Jenkins, we need not address defendants’ arguments that the

district court erred under Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), and

Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170 (2017).

Nos. 16-4258, 17-1060, 17-1412, 17-2268 & 17-2269 11

threatening. The judge’s characterization of those injuries as

life-threatening at sentencing was a factual finding that we re-

view for clear error. United States v. Snyder, 865 F.3d 490, 499

(7th Cir. 2017).

The district court did not clearly err in finding that Har-

ris’s injuries were life-threatening. The Guidelines define a

life-threatening injury in a way that focuses on the dangers

posed by kidnapping, and which was realized here:

“Permanent or life-threatening bodily injury”

means injury involving a substantial risk of

death; loss or substantial impairment of the

function of a bodily member, organ, or mental

faculty that is likely to be permanent; or an ob-

vious disfigurement that is likely to be perma-

nent. In the case of a kidnapping, for example, mal-

treatment to a life-threatening degree (e.g., by denial

of food or medical care) would constitute life-threat-

ening bodily injury.

U.S.S.G. 1B1.1, cmt. n.1(K) (2018) (emphasis added). Under

this definition, the enhancement in § 2A4.1(b)(2)(A) can apply

even if the injuries inflicted on the victim would not, if

properly treated, cause death on their own. The enhancement

can also apply when defendants have inflicted serious harm

and have exacerbated those injuries to create a risk of death

by denying a victim medical treatment for those injuries.

The facts in this case would not necessarily have required

the full four-level enhancement, but they provide sufficient

support for the district court’s factual finding that it should

apply. One defendant shot Harris in the arm. The defendants

then beat Harris on the head, repeatedly and with their guns,

12 Nos. 16-4258, 17-1060, 17-1412, 17-2268 & 17-2269

and kicked him as he lay helpless and bound on the floor.

They aggravated his gunshot wound by pouring alcohol on it

and yanking on his injured arm. After this abuse, Harris “got

to breathing funny,” and only after one of the defendants said,

“He can’t die in here” did they release him. Even though the

defendants thought Harris might be dying, they did not take

him to a hospital. Instead, they dumped him in an unfamiliar

alley. The person who called for emergency help for Harris

described his appearance: “He was drenched in blood. …

[H]is shirt was all covered and everything. … He was kind of

just walking around in a daze.” Harris’s blood was found in

Brazier’s kitchen on the floor, wall, and refrigerator.

Given the denial of medical care to the gunshot wound,

the beatings, Harris’s trouble breathing, and the blood found

covering his body as well as at several scenes and on items

found by investigators, the district court made the reasonable

determination that Harris sustained life-threatening injuries.4

Brazier contests none of these facts, but he argues in effect

that Harris’s injury could have been worse. He also cites cases

showing that the lines between the different-level enhance-

ments under similar guideline provisions for different levels

of injury are not sharp and that appellate courts stick to the

deferential review of such findings under the clear-error

standard. E.g., United States v. Eubanks, 593 F.3d 645, 651–52

(7th Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s assessment of

4 On this record, the judge could have found in the alternative that

Harris suffered permanent injury, which the Guidelines treat the same as

a life-threatening injury. The defendants not only shot Harris, they also

aggravated the injury considerably. And at the time of Brazier’s trial, ten

months after the kidnapping, Harris still could not use or straighten his

arm.

Nos. 16-4258, 17-1060, 17-1412, 17-2268 & 17-2269 13

severity); United States v. Samuels, 521 F.3d 804, 816 (7th Cir.

2008) (same, collecting cases, all but one of which affirmed

district court findings). These cases do not show, as Brazier

argues, that Harris’s injuries must be characterized as serious

rather than life-threatening. If the district court had used a

two- or three-level enhancement, that might also have been a

reasonable application of the Guidelines, but the district court

did not clearly err in applying four levels, particularly in light

of the defendants’ denial of medical care to their kidnapping

victim. The court’s factual findings are sufficient to support

the enhancement, and those findings fall squarely in the prov-

ince of the district court.

2. Dangerous-Weapon Enhancement for Fields

As noted above, in sentencing Fields, the district court ap-

plied a two-level guideline enhancement because “a danger-

ous weapon was used” during the crime. U.S.S.G.

§ 2A4.1(b)(3). Fields challenges this enhancement because an

application note directs courts not to apply “any specific of-

fense characteristic for possession, brandishing, use, or dis-

charge of an explosive or firearm” when a sentence is imposed

under § 924(c). U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4, cmt. 4. Because Fields failed

to object to this enhancement at sentencing, we would review

for plain error. Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897,

1904 (2018). Because Fields has prevailed in having his con-

viction and sentence under § 924(c) reversed, however, the in-

struction in comment 4 no longer applies and will not prohibit

application of the enhancement upon resentencing.

C. Order of Restitution

Finally, all three defendants challenge the judge’s decision

to order restitution because they are indigent. Brazier raises

14 Nos. 16-4258, 17-1060, 17-1412, 17-2268 & 17-2269

alone a separate issue, a challenge to the district court’s deci-

sion to hold the three defendants jointly and severally liable

for the entire amount of restitution. Brazier and Mzembe ob-

jected to the order in the district court, but Fields did not. We

review restitution imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3663 for abuse

of discretion, but when a defendant like Fields has forfeited

an argument in district court, we review the district court’s

decision for plain error. United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937,

941 (7th Cir. 2012) (abuse of discretion standard); United States

v. Dokich, 614 F.3d 314, 318 (7th Cir. 2010) (plain error). We

need not dwell on the defendants’ different approaches in the

district court or the higher bar for plain-error review for this

issue. The district court did not act contrary to law or abuse

its discretion in imposing restitution, with joint and several

liability, on all three defendants.5

The defendants contend that the district court abused its

discretion by not adequately considering their “financial re-

sources,” “financial needs,” and “earning ability” as required

by § 3663(a)(1)(B) before imposing restitution. As defendants

acknowledge, however, the district court considered in depth

their financial resources. The court expressly recognized it is

unlikely they would pay the restitution in full. The court

chose to order restitution despite their poverty.

The decision to impose restitution despite the defendants’

likely inability to pay was within the district court’s discretion

under § 3663. The court noted that it was not “impossible that

5The government asks that we affirm the district court’s decision un-

der the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, which makes

restitution mandatory for crimes of violence. We do not reach this issue

because the judge did not abuse his discretion in ordering restitution un-

der § 3663.

Nos. 16-4258, 17-1060, 17-1412, 17-2268 & 17-2269 15

either might win the lottery” and that, in that case, each de-

fendant should “have to share that good fortune with the man

he shot, beat, bound and ransomed in 2015.” The defendants

point to several cases that discouraged imposing restitution

on indigent defendants. See, e.g., United States v. Jaroszenko, 92

F.3d 486 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Lampien, 89 F.3d 1316

(7th Cir. 1996). The problem with defendants’ reliance on

these cases is one we acknowledged in United States v. Day,

418 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2005): the Mandatory Victim Restitution

Act changed the calculus in these earlier cases because it

amended the Victim and Witness Protection Act provisions at

issue in this case. Section 3664(f)(1)(A) now orders courts im-

posing restitution to order restitution for “the full amount of

each victim’s losses as determined by the court and without

consideration of the economic circumstances of the defend-

ant.” We explained in Day that the amendment made clear

that “the law should be concerned first with the victim’s right

to full restitution and the defendant’s concomitant recogni-

tion of the duty to pay full restitution, albeit a largely sym-

bolic one.” 418 F.3d at 758.

Judge Miller took notice here of both the victim’s right to

restitution and the defendants’ financial circumstances, as re-

quired by § 3663. He also acknowledged the largely symbolic

nature of the restitution order. He then decided to award res-

titution “in the full amount of each victim’s losses as deter-

mined by the court and without consideration of the eco-

nomic circumstances of the defendant” as required by

§ 3664(f)(1)(A). We do not see in this record any indication

that the district judge abused his discretion in imposing a sub-

stantial but likely symbolic order of restitution against all de-

fendants.

16 Nos. 16-4258, 17-1060, 17-1412, 17-2268 & 17-2269

Brazier alone challenges the district court’s decision to

hold all defendants jointly and severally liable for the full res-

titution amount. He argues that he should be on the hook for

only a percentage of the restitution amount that is propor-

tional to his culpability, which he calculates by comparing his

sentence duration to the length of his co-defendants’ sen-

tences. Section 3664(h) provides:

If the court finds that more than 1 defendant has

contributed to the loss of a victim, the court may

make each defendant liable for payment of the

full amount of restitution or may apportion lia-

bility among the defendants to reflect the level

of contribution to the victimʹs loss and economic

circumstances of each defendant.

The district court exercised its discretion under § 3664(h)

and chose to impose joint and several liability for all three de-

fendants. The law did not require the district court to accept

Brazier’s calculation of relative culpability based on compari-

sons of prison sentences. And in an interesting version of try-

ing to turn lemonade back into bitter lemons, Brazier com-

plains that his lighter prison sentence will be unfair to him

because he will probably have to start making monthly resti-

tution payments upon his release, years before Fields and

Mzembe will because of their longer prison terms.

The district court acknowledged Brazier’s arguments but

rejected them, finding that the facts that had led the court to

impose different prison sentences did not justify different res-

titution awards. We find no abuse of discretion here, particu-

larly since the focus of restitution, as distinct from prison

terms, is more on compensation for the victim than on precise

calibration of relative culpability among multiple defendants.

Nos. 16-4258, 17-1060, 17-1412, 17-2268 & 17-2269 17

Brazier was not convicted of a firearm offense like Mzembe

and Fields, but he played an integral part in kidnapping and

torturing Harris. He was present when Harris was shot. He

does not argue that he was unaware that Mzembe and Fields

carried guns, which might have rendered the accidental

shooting unforeseeable to him. And Brazier did nothing to

treat Harris’s wounds. In fact, he intensified Harris’s suffering

by continuing to beat and torture him after the gunshot, or by

at least aiding and abetting Harris’s beatings.

Finally, Fields points out that the district court made a fac-

tual error in setting his restitution amount about $3,000 above

the restitution amount for Mzembe and Brazier. The district

court itself recognized this mistake in ordering restitution for

Fields’ confederates. On remand, the court must adjust the

restitution amount for Fields.

Brazier’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED. The

§ 924(c) convictions of Fields and Mzembe are REVERSED.

Fields’ and Mzembe’s sentences are VACATED, and their

cases are REMANDED for resentencing consistent with this

opinion.