K.W.P. v. Kansas City Public Schools

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 17-3602

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K.W.P., By His Parent and Next Friend

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Kansas City Public Schools; Brandon Craddock, In His Individual Capacity; Anne

Wallace, In Her Individual Capacity

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants

____________

Appeal from United States District Court

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

____________

Submitted: February 13, 2019

Filed: August 1, 2019

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Before SMITH, Chief Judge, BENTON and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

____________

SMITH, Chief Judge.

K.W.P., an elementary student, sued Kansas City Public Schools (KCPS),

Officer Brandon Craddock, and Principal Anne Wallace for violations of K.W.P.’s

rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

K.W.P. alleged that Officer Craddock unreasonably seized him and used excessive

force by handcuffing him and failing to remove the handcuffs. He alleged that

Principal Wallace approved Officer Craddock’s seizure by failing to instruct Officer

Craddock to remove the handcuffs despite K.W.P. posing no imminent threat to

anyone and complying with instructions. K.W.P. sued KCPS for municipal liability

and failure to train and supervise Officer Craddock on the use of handcuffs on

elementary-age children. Officer Craddock and Principal Wallace moved for

summary judgment based on qualified immunity on the claim of unreasonable seizure

and excessive force, and KCPS moved for summary judgment on the municipal

liability claim. The district court determined that disputed material facts precluded

dismissal of K.W.P.’s claims against Officer Craddock and Principal Wallace. The

court also denied summary judgment to KCPS. KCPS, Officer Craddock, and

Principal Wallace appeal the denial of summary judgment.

Construing the facts in the light most favorable to K.W.P., we conclude that

neither Officer Craddock nor Principal Wallace violated K.W.P.’s constitutional

rights; thus, they are entitled to qualified immunity on K.W.P.’s claim of

unreasonable seizure and excessive force. As a result, we necessarily hold that

K.W.P.’s municipal liability claim also fails. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s

denial of summary judgment to Officer Craddock, Principal Wallace, and KCPS and

remand for entry of summary judgment in their favor on K.W.P.’s claims.

I. Background

a. Underlying Facts

“We recite the facts in the light most favorable to [K.W.P.], as the nonmoving

part[y].” O’Brien v. Dep’t of Agric., 532 F.3d 805, 808 (8th Cir. 2008).

K.W.P., a seven-year-old boy in the second grade, attended George Melcher

Elementary School within the KCPS system. On April 30, 2014, while in Ms. Beverly

Cole’s class, a classmate teased K.W.P. incessantly, distracting him from his school

work. The classmate’s actions antagonized him to the point of frustration. In

response, K.W.P. yelled at the classmate and desired to physically confront him,

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stating that he “didn’t get to push [the student], but [he] wanted to.” Defs.’

Suggestions in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 2, K.W.P. Dep., at 14, K.W.P. v. Kan.

City Pub. Schs. (W.D. Mo. Aug. 30, 2017), ECF No. 70-2. As tensions escalated, a

second adult school employee entered the classroom. According to K.W.P., she was

“yelling” at him to “sit down” and telling him “you better sit down, you are about to

get in trouble, the security guard [is] coming.” Id. at 14–15. According to K.W.P., that

woman made him “even madder.” Id. at 15. K.W.P. did not pay any attention to what

she was saying. K.W.P. admitted that he was “hollering” at the other student things

such as “leave me alone, I’m not paying attention to you.” Id. at 14.

At this point, Officer Craddock, who was in the school at the time, was asked

by a staff member to step inside Ms. Cole’s classroom to assist with an “out of

control” student. Pl.’s Suggestions in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 20, ¶ 27,

K.W.P. v. Kan. City Pub. Schs. (W.D. Mo. Sept. 20, 2017), ECF No. 86.1 Officer

Craddock is employed by KCPS as a patrol officer. Officer Craddock did not know

K.W.P. or have any previous dealings with him. K.W.P. testified that by the time he

noticed Officer Craddock, he was “sitting in [his] seat.” Defs.’ Suggestions in Supp.

of Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 2, K.W.P. Dep., at 15. K.W.P. believed he had “stopped”

“hollering” when he noticed Officer Craddock. Id. K.W.P. clarified:

I remember, [Officer Craddock]—like at first I was yelling, because I

didn’t know he was there, I said [omitted], I just heard somebody shout

. . . “if you don’t get up in three seconds, I’m going to come and get

you.” And then—like it was a very deep voice. And then as soon as I

heard that, like I just had turned around and then I looked back at

[omitted] and then I just started to be still.

1

K.W.P. contests that he was “out of control” but does not contest that Officer

Craddock was told that K.W.P. was out of control. Compare id. at ¶ 29, with id. at

¶ 27.

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And then that’s when he was counting down to three. And as soon

as he said 1[,] I had pushed like, pushed out my chair like that and then

got up and walked towards him.

Id. at 17.

Officer Craddock asked K.W.P. to accompany him into the hallway. After the

second request, K.W.P. complied and went into the hallway. K.W.P. admitted that he

did not want to go with Officer Craddock. K.W.P. testified that he responded to

Officer Craddock’s request to accompany him by “push[ing] [his] chair out in a

negative way” because he was “angry,” “emotional,” and “didn’t want to go with

[Officer Craddock].” Id.

Once in the hallway, Officer Craddock told K.W.P. that he was not in trouble.

Officer Craddock wanted K.W.P. to follow him and would not allow K.W.P. back

into the classroom. K.W.P. admitted that he “didn’t want to go with the officer” and

that he was “attempting to not go with the police officer.” Id. at 17–18. He also

admitted he was “trying to get away” and “wanted to stand up for [himself].” Id. at

18. Officer Craddock bent down to K.W.P.’s level and said, “Son, I need you to calm

down.” Pl.’s Suggestions in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 25, ¶ 38. K.W.P.

told Officer Craddock that he “didn’t want to go with [him].” Defs.’ Suggestions in

Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 2, K.W.P. Dep., at 18. K.W.P. admitted that he was

“resisting going with him” and “didn’t want to cooperate with the officer.” Id.

According to K.W.P. he “tried to calm down, . . . but [he] couldn’t.” Id.

K.W.P. recalled Officer Craddock telling him “several times to stop walking

away.” Id. Officer Craddock put his hand on K.W.P.’s back to guide him in the

direction that Officer Craddock was walking. Eventually, Officer Craddock “grabbed

[K.W.P.’s] [left] wrist.” Id. During this time, K.W.P. admitted he was “crying real

loud” and “screaming.” Id. K.W.P. recalled “jerking [his] body away” because he has

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“a problem with people just grabbing [his] wrists and like trying to make [him] go

somewhere.” Id. K.W.P. admitted that during the encounter, Officer Craddock told

him that he “wasn’t in trouble.” Id. Yet, K.W.P. testified that when Officer Craddock

tried to grab his left wrist, K.W.P. “tr[ied] even more to get away from him.” Id.

K.W.P. agreed that he “could have got[ten] hurt” when he was “trying to go in the

opposite direction and [Officer Craddock] [was] trying to pull [K.W.P.] towards the

front office.” Id. at 19. K.W.P. admitted that he was “aggressively trying to pull

away.” Id. When Officer Craddock reached out his arm to block K.W.P. from getting

away, K.W.P. tried to push past him. K.W.P. continued to forcefully pull away from

Officer Craddock’s grasp. K.W.P. began crying. Officer Craddock told K.W.P., “Son,

if you don’t calm down, I’m going to have to put the cuffs on.” Pl.’s Suggestions in

Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 28, ¶ 49. K.W.P. saw a handrail on the side of

the hallway and grabbed it.

Officer Craddock handcuffed K.W.P. with his hands behind him.2 K.W.P.

admitted getting “more upset after [Officer Craddock] put the handcuffs on” him and

that he was “still trying to get away.” Defs.’ Suggestions in Supp. of Mot. for Summ.

J., Ex. 2, K.W.P. Dep., at 19. Officer Craddock double-locked the handcuffs so they

would not tighten on K.W.P.’s wrists. K.W.P. finally “got tired and stopped trying to

resist what was happening to him.” Pl.’s Suggestions in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for

Summ. J. at 31, ¶ 58. According to K.W.P., once in the front office, he obeyed Officer

Craddock’s directions, sat in a chair, and did not attempt to leave.

Principal Wallace first saw K.W.P. while he was seated in the front office and

in handcuffs. Principal Wallace did not advise Officer Craddock to remove the

handcuffs. Principal Wallace had a prior history with K.W.P., having restrained him

2

The amount of time that elapsed between Officer Craddock’s arrival to the

classroom and the handcuffing of K.W.P. is not established in the record.

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a couple of months prior.3 Principal Wallace left to go to an adjoining office to

complete unrelated paperwork. Officer Craddock also left the front office. When

K.W.P.’s father arrived, only the secretary was present in the front office. K.W.P.’s

father then left the office to retrieve Officer Craddock. K.W.P.’s father asked Officer

Craddock why he had handcuffed K.W.P. Officer Craddock responded that he did it

for “safety.” Defs.’ Suggestions in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 8, Wiley Dep., at

3, K.W.P. v. Kan. City Pub. Schs. (W.D. Mo. Aug. 30, 2017), ECF No. Doc. 70-8.

According to K.W.P.’s father, Officer Craddock told him that “he made a split

decision of what he thought was right and [took K.W.P.] . . . out of the classroom

. . . and [took] him out into the hallway and tr[ied] to calm him down or resolve

. . . what he thought was the problem in the situation.” Id. When Officer Craddock

and K.W.P.’s father returned to the front office, Officer Craddock removed the

handcuffs from K.W.P.

3

In February 2014, Principal Wallace witnessed K.W.P. punch a student while

in line after a fire drill. Principal Wallace advised K.W.P. to keep his hands to

himself; in response, K.W.P. responded, “Quit talking to me.” Defs.’ Suggestions in

Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 3, Wallace Dep., at 3, K.W.P. v. Kan. City Pub. Schs.

(W.D. Mo. Aug. 30, 2017), ECF No. Doc. 70-3. Principal Wallace advised K.W.P.

that his response was unacceptable and that she was going to call his mother. K.W.P.

“got mad, and he tried to leave the school playground, which [Principal Wallace]

would not allow him to do.” Id. Principal Wallace grabbed K.W.P. by the wrist “to

guide him into the office so that [she] could call [his] [m]om.” Id. K.W.P. was

“screaming the whole way and pulling and resisting, trying to pull away from

[Principal Wallace].” Id. K.W.P. confirmed that he was, in fact, “trying to get away

from [Principal Wallace].” Defs.’ Suggestions in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 2,

K.W.P. Dep., at 9. Once in the office, Principal Wallace called K.W.P.’s mother and

told her that K.W.P. “was trying to leave out of her office.” Defs.’ Suggestions in

Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 1, Primm Dep., at 8, K.W.P. v. Kan. City Pub. Schs.

(W.D. Mo. Aug. 30, 2017), ECF No. Doc. 70-1. Principal Wallace also advised

K.W.P.’s mother that she “restrained [K.W.P.] because she didn’t want him to run out

into the street.” Id.

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K.W.P. was handcuffed for a total of 20 minutes. For 15 of those 20 minutes,

K.W.P. was seated in the front office. The handcuffs made K.W.P.’s wrists tender and

red. He also alleged that he suffered mental and emotional distress.

b. Procedural History

K.W.P. sued KCPS, Officer Craddock, and Principal Wallace for violations of

K.W.P.’s rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. The complaint alleged that Officer Craddock unreasonably seized K.W.P. and

used excessive force by handcuffing him and failing to promptly remove the

handcuffs. He alleged that Principal Wallace approved Officer Craddock’s seizure by

failing to instruct Officer Craddock to remove the handcuffs despite K.W.P. posing

no imminent threat to anyone and complying with instructions. KCPS was sued for

failure to train and supervise Officer Craddock on the use of handcuffs on

elementary-age children. Officer Craddock and Principal Wallace moved for

summary judgment based on qualified immunity on the claim of unreasonable seizure

and excessive force, and KCPS moved for summary judgment on the municipal

liability claim.

The district court denied the defendants’ summary judgment motions because

of disputed material facts. Specifically, it concluded that “extensive factual disputes”

prevented it from determining “whether Officer Craddock deprived [K.W.P.] of his

constitutional rights when he handcuffed [K.W.P.] in the hallway.” K.W.P. v. Kan.

City Pub. Sch., 296 F. Supp. 3d 1111, 1118 (W.D. Mo. 2017). The court determined

that

the following facts are genuinely disputed—whether [K.W.P.] was

screaming upon Officer Craddock’s arrival to the classroom; whether

[K.W.P.] attempted to flee from Officer Craddock’s grasp; whether

[K.W.P.] continued to scream in the hallway with Officer Craddock;

whether [K.W.P.] posed a safety threat once in the hallway; the time

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elapsed from Officer Craddock’s arrival to the handcuffing; and whether

anyone else was in the hallway and at risk due to [K.W.P.’s] behavior.

Id. (internal citations omitted). According to the court, it was not able “to point to

sufficient undisputed facts to support a finding of qualified immunity at this stage.”

Id. “For the same reason,” the district court concluded it could not “determine

whether the right was so clearly established that a reasonable officer would have

realized that his actions were unlawful.” Id.

The court also concluded that it was “unable to decide whether Office[r]

Craddock is immune from suit for the decision to keep [K.W.P.] in handcuffs in the

front office because too many facts are in dispute.” Id. at 1119. The court identified

the following facts as “genuinely disputed—whether [K.W.P.] was screaming in the

front office; whether [K.W.P.] posed a safety threat once in the front office; and how

long [K.W.P.] was handcuffed.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Thus, the court was

“unable to point to sufficient undisputed facts to support a finding of qualified

immunity at this stage.” Id.

Because the court found it “unclear whether a deprivation occurred,” the court

likewise determined that it was “unable to point to sufficient undisputed facts to

support a finding of qualified immunity” in Principal Wallace’s favor. Id.

The district court also denied summary judgment to KCPS due to the existence

of disputed material facts. While neither party disputed “that KCPS provided Officer

Craddock with handcuffs” and did not “provide training specific to handcuffing

minors,” the court concluded that “to prevail on a failure to train claim, [K.W.P.] must

show a deprivation of a federal right caused by a policy or custom. Because so many

material facts [were] disputed . . . , th[e] [c]ourt denie[d] summary judgment for

KCPS on the grounds of municipal liability.” Id. at 1121.

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II. Discussion

On appeal, the defendants argue that, construing the facts in the light most

favorable to K.W.P., (1) Officer Craddock did not violate K.W.P.’s constitutional

rights in handcuffing K.W.P., and (2) Officer Craddock and Principal Wallace did not

violate his rights by keeping him in handcuffs once seated in the front office. They

assert that Officer Craddock’s and Principal Wallace’s actions were reasonable based

on “(1) the severity of K.W.P.’s conduct, (2) the fact that he was a safety threat, (3)

he was aggressively resisting, and (4) he had a history of being a flight risk and

engaging in unsafe behavior.” Appellants’ Br. at 12. They also argue that neither

Officer Craddock nor Principal Wallace violated a clearly established constitutional

right. Thus, they assert, Officer Craddock and Principal Wallace are entitled to

qualified immunity on K.W.P.’s claim of unreasonable seizure and excessive force.

Finally, they argue that KCPS was entitled to summary judgment on K.W.P.’s

municipal liability claim because (1) “no employee of KCPS violated K.W.P.’s

constitutional rights,” and (2) “no evidence [exists] that . . . KCPS’s training practices

were inadequate, . . . that it was deliberately indifferent to the rights of others such

that its failure to train reflects a deliberate or conscious choice by KCPS, or . . . [that]

KCPS’s alleged deficiency ‘actually caused’ K.W.P.’s injury.” Id. at 21–22 (quoting

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989)).

A. Qualified Immunity

We will first address Officer Craddock’s and Principal Wallace’s arguments

that they are entitled to qualified immunity on K.W.P.’s claim of unreasonable seizure

and excessive force.

Courts apply a two-part test in determining whether a government official is

entitled to qualified immunity:

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First, “whether the facts alleged, construed in the light most favorable

to [the plaintiff], establish a violation of a constitutional or statutory

right,” and second, “whether that right was clearly established at the

time of the alleged violation, such that a reasonable official would have

known that her actions were unlawful.”

Clayborn v. Struebing, 734 F.3d 807, 809 (8th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original)

(quoting Keil v. Triveline, 661 F.3d 981, 985 (8th Cir. 2011)). “If the answer to either

question is no, then [a defendant] is entitled to qualified immunity.” Doe v. Flaherty,

623 F.3d 577, 583 (8th Cir. 2010). Courts are “permitted to exercise their sound

discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis

should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

“We review a denial of summary judgment on the grounds of qualified

immunity de novo.” Nord v. Walsh Cty., 757 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2014).

“Jurisdiction over these interlocutory appeals reaches only to issues of law . . . .”

Ferguson v. Short, 840 F.3d 508, 510 (8th Cir. 2016). Thus, “we lack jurisdiction to

review the denial of summary judgment based on the pretrial record showing a

genuine dispute of material fact on a qualified-immunity issue.” Id.

Here, the district court denied qualified immunity to Officer Craddock and

Principal Wallace because it determined that “extensive factual disputes” exist.

K.W.P., 296 F. Supp. 3d at 1118. “True, but that is not the correct inquiry. The correct

inquiry is whether, even if we construe the facts in a light most favorable to [K.W.P.],

a reasonable official in [Officer Craddock’s or Principal Wallace’s] position would

have known that [he or she] was violating the [C]onstitution . . . .” Estate of Walker

v. Wallace, 881 F.3d 1056, 1060 (8th Cir. 2018). “The mere existence of some factual

dispute is not enough to defeat this court’s jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal:

If the disputed facts are not material to this legal question, ‘the denial of summary

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judgment is [immediately] reviewable as a question of law.’” Gonzales v. Dallas Cty.,

Tex., 249 F.3d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Mendenhall v. Riser, 213 F.3d 226,

230 (5th Cir. 2000)) (alteration corrects omission in Gonzales). “Thus, a defendant

challenging the denial of a motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified

immunity ‘must be prepared to concede the best view of the facts to the plaintiff and

discuss only the legal issues raised by the appeal.’” Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404,

410 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gonzales, 249 F.3d at 411). Therefore, in assessing

K.W.P.’s claim, we must construe the facts in the light most favorable to K.W.P. to

determine whether a constitutional violation occurred and whether any violation of

a constitutional right was clearly established. See id.

1. Constitutional Violation

K.W.P. has brought a claim of unreasonable seizure and excessive force against

Officer Craddock and Principal Wallace. K.W.P.’s allegations that Officer Craddock

unreasonably seized him and used excessive force in handcuffing him with Principal

Wallace’s approval are intertwined. See Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d

1295, 1304 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating that the “excessive force claim is not an

independent claim, but rather is subsumed in [the] illegal seizure claim”).

The Supreme Court has previously held that “the legality of a search of a

student . . . depend[s] simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of

the search.” New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (involving school

official’s search of a student). A two-fold inquiry applies in determining whether such

search is reasonable: “first, one must consider ‘whether the . . . action was justified

at its inception’; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted

‘was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference

in the first place.’” Id. (ellipsis in original) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20

(1968)). This standard balances “the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the

substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the

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schools.” Id. It “neither unduly burden[s] the efforts of school authorities to maintain

order in their schools nor authorize[s] unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of

schoolchildren.” Id. at 342–43. Instead, “[b]y focusing attention on the question of

reasonableness, the standard . . . spare[s] teachers and school administrators the

necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause and permit[s]

them to regulate their conduct according to the dictates of reason and common sense.”

Id. at 343. But it also “ensure[s] that the interests of students will be invaded no more

than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of preserving order in the schools.” Id.

We have held that T.L.O.’s reasonableness standard governs law enforcement

searches that school officials initiate. Shade v. City of Farmington, 309 F.3d 1054,

1061 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Because school officials initiated the investigation and search

of Shade in furtherance of the school’s interest in maintaining a safe learning

environment, and because they asked officers to assist them in furtherance of that

interest, we hold that T.L.O.’s two-part inquiry governs the lawfulness of the search

conducted by Officer Dau.”). We have not previously determined whether T.L.O.’s

reasonableness standard governs law enforcement seizures of students. Cf. Burlison

v. Springfield Pub. Sch., 708 F.3d 1034, 1039–40 (8th Cir. 2013) (applying T.L.O. to

the search and seizure of a student’s backpack).

Our sister circuits are divided on whether to apply T.L.O.’s reasonableness

standard or the objective reasonableness standard set forth in Graham v. Connor, 490

U.S. 386 (1989), to law enforcement seizures of students.4 Compare Gray, 458 F.3d

4

In Graham, the Supreme Court determined that “[t]he Fourth Amendment’s

objective reasonableness standard governs a claim that an officer used excessive force

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at 1304 (“apply[ing] the reasonableness standard articulated in . . . T.L.O. . . . to

school seizures by law enforcement officers”), with E.W. by & through T.W. v.

Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 179 (4th Cir. 2018) (applying Graham standard to school

resource officer’s seizure of student); Hawker v. Sandy City Corp., 591 F. App’x 669,

674 (10th Cir. 2014) (applying Graham standard to school resource officer’s seizure

of student). Some courts have opted to apply both the Graham and T.L.O. standards

in analyzing a claim of unreasonable seizure and excessive force. See, e.g., C.B. v.

City of Sonora, 769 F.3d 1005, 1030 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc); Hoskins v.

Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:13-cv-15, 2014 WL 7238621, at *11 (M.D.

Tenn. Dec. 17, 2014).

Applying the T.L.O. standard, the Eleventh Circuit has held “that a law

enforcement officer, acting as a school resource officer, who handcuffs a compliant

nine-year-old child for purely punitive purposes has unreasonably seized the child in

violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 720 F.3d 887,

‘in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure.’” Brossart v.

Janke, 859 F.3d 616, 624 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 388). “[T]he

question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the

facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent

or motivation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. When applying the objective

reasonableness standard, we must pay “careful attention to the facts and

circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue,

whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,

and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id.

at 396. We judge “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force . . . from the

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of

hindsight.” Id. The objective reasonableness standard “embod[ies] allowance for the

fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in

circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of

force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396–97.

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892 (11th Cir. 2013) (emphases added). In that case, a nine-year-old child threatened

to “do something” physically to her physical education coach after the coach told her

to “[c]ome to the wall” in gym class for not complying with his instructions. Gray,

458 F.3d at 1300 (alteration in original). A school resource officer witnessed the

exchange and intervened. Id. at 1301. He escorted the child out of the gym and into

a lobby area. Id. The officer then handcuffed the child, stating, “‘[T]his is how it feels

when you break the law,’ and ‘[T]his is how it feels to be in jail.’” Id. (alterations in

original). The child began crying. Id. The handcuffs remained on the child for five

minutes. Id. The reason the officer detained and handcuffed the student was “‘to

impress upon her the serious nature of committing crimes that can lead to arrest,

detention or incarceration’ and ‘to help persuade her to rid herself of her disrespectful

attitude.’” Id. The child brought claims against the officer for excessive force and

unreasonable seizure. Id. at 1302. The district court denied the officer’s motion for

qualified immunity, and the officer appealed. Id. at 1303.

The court, applying T.L.O.’s first prong, concluded that the officer “stopping

[the child] to question her about her conduct was reasonable” because he had

“witnessed [the child] threaten to do something physically to her teacher.” Id. at 1305.

But, under T.L.O.’s second prong, the court determined that “the handcuffing was

excessively intrusive given [the child’s] young age and the fact that it was not done

to protect anyone’s safety.” Id. at 1306 (emphasis added). The facts taken in the light

most favorable to the student showed that when the officer handcuffed the child,

“there was no indication of a potential threat to anyone’s safety. The incident was

over, and [the child], after making the comment, had promptly complied with her

teachers’ instructions.” Id. (emphasis added). The court found “no evidence that [the

child] was gesturing or engaging in any further disruptive behavior.” Id. (emphasis

added). Instead, the child “had cooperated with her teachers and did not pose a threat

to anyone’s safety.” Id. (emphasis added). In emphasizing that the child posed no

safety threat, the court cited the officer’s admission “that he handcuffed [the child]

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to persuade her to get rid of her disrespectful attitude and to impress upon her the

serious nature of committing crimes. In effect, [the officer’s] handcuffing of [the

child] was his attempt to punish [her] in order to change her behavior in the future.”

Id. As a result, the court held that the officer’s handcuffing of the child constituted

a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. Id.

The Fourth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in E.W. by applying the

Graham standard; in that case, the court concluded that a school resource officer’s

decision to handcuff “a calm, compliant ten-year-old” child for fighting with another

student three days prior was objectively unreasonable and violated the student’s right

to be free from excessive force. E.W., 884 F.3d at 180. At the outset, the court noted

that the undisputed facts showed “a calm, compliant ten-year-old being handcuffed

on school grounds because she hit another student during a fight several days prior.”

Id. (emphases added). The court concluded that the first Graham factor—severity of

the offense—weighed against the student “because assault is an offense that can be

considered violent if committed by any person, even a child.” Id. However, the court

observed such finding was “tempered” because “the offense [was] a misdemeanor.”

Id. The court next determined that the second Graham factor—whether the suspect

poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others—“weigh[ed] strongly

in [the student’s] favor.” Id. The court concluded that the officer “could not have

reasonably believed that [the student] presented any immediate risk of harm to

anyone”: the student “had no weapons and made no threats” and was “calm and

compliant as [the officer] spoke to her.” Id. at 181 (emphasis added). The court also

pointed out the student “was in a closed office and surrounded by two school

administrators and a deputy sheriff.” Id. Based on this fact, the court found that the

student “posed little threat even if she were to become aggressive.” Id. Furthermore,

the court explained, “[t]he significant time that had elapsed—without incident—since

the fight on the bus . . . negate[d] any notion that [the student] posed an immediate

threat.” Id. Three days after the fight occurred, the officer interacted with the student,

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who did not act “hostile or even disobedient. Rather, [the student] remained seated

and submissive during the entire interview, even as [the officer] placed the handcuffs

on her.” Id. (emphasis added). The court further found that the officer “had no reason

to think that the scuffle between [the students] was anything but an isolated incident”

because the student “had no prior behavioral issues or involvement with law

enforcement.” Id. (emphasis added). The court determined that the student “posed no

immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others to justify the use of handcuffs.”

Id. Finally, the court determined that the third Graham factor weighed in the student’s

favor because she was not “attempt[ing] to resist or flee from the office at any point.”

Id. at 182 (emphases added).

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the student, the court held that

the totality of the circumstances demonstrated that the officer’s actions were not

objectively reasonable and therefore violated the student’s right to be free from

excessive force. Id. at 184. The court explained:

[T]he circumstances here were by no means tense, uncertain, or rapidly

evolving such that [the officer] was required to make any split-second

decisions. [The officer] observed a ten-year-old girl sit calmly and

compliantly in a closed office surrounded by three adults and answer

questions about an incident with another little girl that had occurred

several days prior.

Id. (emphases added). A reasonable officer would have considered the student’s

“small stature and calm and compliant disposition,” as well as the fact that the student

“attended school and sat in class among other children without incident” for the past

three days. Id. at 184–85. Accordingly, the court held, “No reasonable officer

confronted with this information would have determined that handcuffing [the

student] for any amount of time was justified under the circumstances.” Id. at 185.

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The Ninth Circuit likewise determined—utilizing both the T.L.O. and Graham

standards—that officers’ “use of handcuffs on a calm, compliant, but nonresponsive

11-year-old child was unreasonable.” C.B., 769 F.3d at 1030. There, a sixth-grade

student with ADHD experienced a period of unresponsiveness and refused to leave

the playground. Id. at 1010. A coach called the police out of concern for the student’s

safety. Id. at 1011. A police chief arrived, and the coach whispered to him that the

student was a “runner” not on his medicine, despite the fact the student had never

previously attempted to run from her. Id. The coach advised the police chief she no

longer wanted the student on school grounds. Id. The student “remained completely

quiet and unresponsive throughout the time [the police chief] was with him.” Id.

Another officer arrived, learned that the student was a “runner,” and tried to engage

in conversation with the student. Id. The student “remained unresponsive.” Id. The

police chief instructed the officer to handcuff the student. Id. The student immediately

complied with the officer’s directive to put his hands behind his back, and the officer

handcuffed the student. Id. The student began to cry upon being handcuffed. Id. The

officers and coach then escorted the student from the playground and “directed [the

student]—still in handcuffs—into the back seat” of the police car. Id. at 1012.

“During this entire time, no one spoke to [the student] or explained to him why he had

been handcuffed, that he was not under arrest, or where the police were taking him.”

Id. The student “remained handcuffed during the approximately thirty-minute ride to

his uncle’s place of business.” Id. The student filed suit for, among other things,

unlawful seizure and excessive force. Id. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury

returned a verdict in favor of the student. Id. at 1015.

On appeal, the officers argued that the district court had erred in denying them

judgment as a matter of law based on qualified immunity. Id. at 1022. The court first

determined that “applying T.L.O.’s reasonableness standard d[id] not aid [the

officers]” in defeating the student’s unlawful seizure claim. Id. at 1024. While the

officers were called to investigate a report of an “out of control” student, upon their

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arrival to the school, the officers “found . . . a quiet but nonresponsive child.” Id. The

officers never “consider[ed] any less intrusive solutions, such as ordering [the

student] to return inside the school building, or asking a guardian to pick up the

child.” Id. The court concluded that the circumstances demonstrated that “the

officers’ decision to seize [the student] and remove him from school grounds was not

reasonable.” Id. As a result, it held that “taking the evidence in the light most

favorable to [the student], a reasonable jury could conclude that [the officers] violated

[his] Fourth Amendment rights when they seized him and took him into custody.” Id.

at 1026.

The Ninth Circuit then separately analyzed the student’s excessive force claim

that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by removing him from school

and handcuffing him for 25 to 30 minutes. Id. at 1029. The court observed that

“whether T.L.O. or Graham governed [the officers’] actions at any given moment

[was] of little consequence” because the officers’ “use of handcuffs on a calm,

compliant, but nonresponsive 11-year-old child was unreasonable under either

standard.” Id. at 1030. While the officers were told the student might be a “runner,”

the student “never did anything that suggested he might run away or that he otherwise

posed a safety threat.” Id. As a result, the court held “that the decision to use

handcuffs on [the student] was unreasonable, notwithstanding [the coach’s]

unexplained statement that [the student] was a ‘runner,’” and that the “decision to

leave [the student] in handcuffs for the duration of the half-hour commute to his

uncle’s business—a commute that took place in a vehicle equipped with safety locks

that made escape impossible—was clearly unreasonable.” Id.; see also Hoskins, 2014

WL 7238621, at *6 (analyzing unreasonable seizure claim under T.L.O. and Graham

standards and holding that an officer’s handcuffing of an eight-year-old second grader

with special needs, who had threatened and swung his fist at his teacher, constituted

an unlawful seizure).

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In contrast to Gray, E.W., and C.B., where the courts found violations of the

students’ constitutional rights, the Tenth Circuit applied Graham in holding that a

school resource officer’s use of force was reasonable against a nine-year-old boy

when the officer arrested and performed a twist-lock on the student, who was

suspected of stealing an iPad at school. Hawker, 591 F. App’x at 671. In that case,

upon the officer’s arrival to the school, she saw the student “sitting on the floor in the

hallway against a wall.” Id. The principal informed the officer that she wanted to file

theft charges against the student. Id. The officer then advised the student, “We can

do this the easy way by you talking to me, or we can do this the difficult way or hard

way by you not talking to me.” Id. (citation omitted). The student looked at the

officer, but he said nothing. Id. The officer then “‘grabbed’ his arm and ‘yanked’ him

up off the floor.” Id. (citation omitted). The student responded by grabbing the

officer’s arm. Id. In response, the officer “put [the student] in a twist-lock, pushed

him against the wall, and handcuffed him. [The student] kicked at [the officer] and

cried ‘You’re hurting me.’” Id. (citation omitted). The officer then took the student

to the principal’s office and issued him a theft citation. Id. Subsequently, the student’s

parents brought suit against the officer for excessive force. Id. The sole issue on

appeal was “whether [the officer’s] use of a twist-lock to effectuate the arrest

constitute[d] excessive force.” Id. at 672.

Applying Graham, the Tenth Circuit determined that the use of the twist-lock

was objectively reasonable based on the facts. The court concluded that the first

Graham factor—the severity of the crime—weighed in favor of the student because

the crime was misdemeanor theft offense and “relatively minor.” Id. at 674. But it

found that the second and third factors—immediate threat to safety and resisting

arrest—weighed against the student because the officer “could objectively and

reasonably view [the student’s] grabbing her arm as resisting arrest and escalating a

tense situation. For safety, it was objectively reasonable for [the officer] to deescalate

the situation and command [the student’s] compliance by using a twist-lock.” Id. at

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675. The court acknowledged the student’s age (nine years old) and weight (67

pounds) as “factors in the totality-of-the circumstances reasonableness calculation,”

but it concluded that such “factors alone do not render force used against him

unreasonable per se.” Id. According to the court, “An arrestee’s age and small

demeanor do not necessarily undermine an officer’s concern for safety and need to

control the situation.” Id. The key, according to the court, is if force was used “on an

individual posing no immediate threat.” Id. The court determined that a reasonable

officer could have viewed the student’s grabbing of the officer’s arm “an act of

violent resistance” and that officer’s “actions in this case simply d[id] not rise to the

level of a constitutional violation.” Id. Therefore, the court held that the officer was

entitled to qualified immunity. Id.

In the present case, K.W.P. avers that we need not resolve whether the Graham

or T.L.O. standard applies because “the result in this case would be the same under

either standard.” Appellee’s Br. at 16. We agree but reach a different conclusion as

to the result. We hold that, applying either the Graham or T.L.O. standard, and

construing the facts in the light most favorable to K.W.P., neither Officer Craddock

nor Principal Wallace violated K.W.P.’s right to be free from unreasonable seizure

and excessive force.

First, as to the initial handcuffing, unlike the calm, compliant children in Gray,

E.W., and C.B. who did not engage in further disruptive behavior and posed no risks

to anyone’s safety, K.W.P.’s own admissions indicate that he attempted to flee from

Officer Craddock upon his removal from the classroom and that his escape efforts

posed a safety risk to himself. K.W.P. does not challenge as unlawful Officer

Craddock’s initial removal of him from the classroom for being disruptive. Once

removed from the classroom, K.W.P. resisted Officer Craddock’s directive for K.W.P.

to accompany Officer Craddock to the office. K.W.P admitted, among other things,

that he “didn’t want to go with the officer,” was “attempting to not go with the police

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officer,” was “trying to get away,” “wanted to stand up for [himself], told Officer

Craddock that he “didn’t want to go with [him],” was “resisting going with [Officer

Craddock],” “didn’t want to cooperate with the officer,” “tried to calm down . . . but

[he] couldn’t,” was “crying real loud” and “screaming” when Officer Craddock

grabbed his left wrist, was “jerking [his] body away,” “tr[ied] even more to get away

from” Officer Craddock when he grabbed K.W.P’s wrist, tried to push past Officer

Craddock, continued to aggressively pull away from Officer Craddock’s grasp, and

grabbed a handrail. Suggestions in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 2, K.W.P. Dep.,

at 17–18. K.W.P. further admitted that his actions could have resulted in him getting

hurt. In applying the objective reasonableness standard to the undisputed facts, a

reasonable officer could have concluded that K.W.P.’s admitted conduct constituted

“an act of violent resistance.” Hawker, 591 F. App’x at 675.

Second, K.W.P. challenges as unlawful the 15 minutes that he was seated in the

front office and handcuffed. Once again, applying either the Graham or T.L.O.

standard, neither Officer Craddock nor Principal Wallace violated K.W.P.’s right to

be free from unreasonable seizure and excessive force in the extended handcuffing.

Construing the facts in the light most favorable to K.W.P., K.W.P. had stopped

resisting by the time that he reached the front office, sat in a chair pursuant to Officer

Craddock’s commands, and did not attempt to leave. Nevertheless, the case remains

distinguishable from other cases in which courts have found extended handcuffing

violative of the Fourth Amendment. Here, K.W.P. remained handcuffed in the front

office for only 15 minutes; by comparison, the student in C.B. remained handcuffed

for 25 to 30 minutes, 769 F.3d at 1029, and the student in Hoskins remained

handcuffed for 45 minutes, 2014 WL 7238621, at *11. Our conclusion that no

constitutional violation occurred also rests on K.W.P.’s behavior justifying the initial

handcuffing. Unlike the students in Gray, E.W., and C.B. who were complaint with

the school resource officer from the outset of their encounter, K.W.P. had actively

resisted Officer Craddock just prior to arriving to the front office. A reasonable

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officer could conclude that, based on K.W.P.’s recent resistance, keeping him in

handcuffs for 15 minutes until a parent arrived was a reasonable course of action and

was necessary to prevent K.W.P. from trying to leave and posing harm to himself. Cf.

Hoskins, 2014 WL 7238621, at *11 (“[T]he scope of the seizure—that is, the

handcuffing of the child for forty-five minutes, even after his parents arrived at the

school and were present in the room with him—was unreasonable.” (emphasis

added)).

Furthermore, Principal Wallace’s failure to intervene and have Officer

Craddock remove the handcuffs was reasonable in light of her previous experience

with K.W.P. The undisputed facts show that just two months prior to the incident at

issue, K.W.P. tried to leave the playground after getting mad at Principal Wallace for

instructing him not to hit others. When Principal Wallace grabbed K.W.P.’s wrist to

take him to the office to call his mother, K.W.P. actively resisted by trying to pull

away from Principal Wallace.

Accordingly, we hold that, applying either the Graham or T.L.O. standard and

viewing the facts in the light most favorable to K.W.P., neither Officer Craddock nor

Principal Wallace violated K.W.P.’s right to be free from unreasonable seizure and

excessive force and are therefore entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

2. Clearly Established

Alternatively, “‘even if the reasonableness of [Officer Craddock’s and Principal

Wallace’s] actions was questionable,’ [K.W.P.] cannot ‘show that a reasonable

[official] would have been on notice that [their] conduct violated a clearly established

right.’” Cravener v. Shuster, 885 F.3d 1135, 1140 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting De Boise

v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 892, 896 (8th Cir. 2014)). “For a right to be clearly

established, its contours must be ‘sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in

the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it.’” Moore-Jones

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v. Quick, 909 F.3d 983, 985 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct.

1148, 1153 (2018) (per curiam)). “‘When determining whether an action was a clearly

established constitutional violation, we look to the state of the law at the time of the

incident,’ here [April 2014].’” Cravener, 885 F.3d at 1140 (quoting De Boise, 760

F.3d at 896). “A case need not be ‘directly on point, but existing precedent must have

placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’” Moore-Jones, 909

F.3d at 985 (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam)). A

plaintiff’s failure “to ‘identify a case where an officer acting under similar

circumstances . . . was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment’ is often fatal to

a claim outside of obvious cases.” Id. (emphasis added) (ellipsis in original) (quoting

White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (per curiam)).

“Our circuit subscribes to a broad view of what constitutes clearly established

law; in the absence of binding precedent, a court should look to all available

decisional law, including decisions of state courts, other circuits and district courts.”

Tlamka v. Serrell, 244 F.3d 628, 634 (8th Cir. 2001) (cleaned up). “Notice of

constitutionally impermissible conduct may be provided by the Constitution itself or

the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the lower federal courts.”

Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 531 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc).5

5

We note that “[i]n a series of recent decisions, the Supreme Court has

emphasized that for a plaintiff to overcome qualified immunity, existing precedent

must have placed the constitutional question ‘beyond debate.’” Hollingsworth v. City

of St. Ann, 800 F.3d 985, 989 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting City & Cnty. of S.F., Calif. v.

Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015)). The Supreme Court has assumed, without

deciding, that “a controlling circuit precedent could constitute clearly established

federal law.” Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1776 (quoting Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348,

350 (2014) (per curiam)); see also Reischle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 665–66 (2012)

(“Assuming arguendo that controlling Court of Appeals’ authority could be a

dispositive source of clearly established law in the circumstances of this case, the

Tenth Circuit’s cases do not satisfy the ‘clearly established’ standard here.”).

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Here, K.W.P. relies on C.B. and Gray to show that it was clearly established

in April 2014 “that a police officer’s conduct in handcuffing a child constituted an

obvious violation of the child’s constitutional rights.” Appellee’s Br. at 35. We reject

the notion that these cases gave notice to Officer Craddock and Principal Wallace that

their conduct violated K.W.P.’s constitutional rights. First, while the Eleventh Circuit

decided Gray in 2006, the Ninth Circuit decided C.B. in October 2014—after the

incident here occurred in April 2014. Therefore, C.B. could not have given Officer

Craddock or Principal Wallace notice of their alleged unconstitutional conduct. See

Cravener, 885 F.3d at 1140.

Second, C.B. and Gray are distinguishable from the present case. In Gray, the

Eleventh Circuit concluded that “[e]very reasonable officer would have known that

handcuffing a compliant nine-year-old child for purely punitive purposes is

unreasonable.” 458 F.3d at 1307 (emphases added). In C.B., the Ninth Circuit

similarly concluded that “[i]t is beyond dispute that handcuffing a small, calm child

who is surrounded by numerous adults, who complies with all of the officers’

instructions, and who is, by an officer’s own account, unlikely to flee, was completely

unnecessary and excessively intrusive.” 769 F.3d at 1030–31 (emphases added). As

explained supra, by K.W.P.’s own admission, he was not compliant; instead, he

actively resisted Officer Craddock and attempted to get away from his grasp. This

active resistance precipitated the handcuffing of K.W.P. and it was not for purely

punitive reasons.

We likewise reject K.W.P.’s argument that “Officer Craddock’s conduct in

handcuffing K.W.P. in the hallway also constituted an obvious violation of K.W.P.’s

constitutional rights.” Appellee’s Br. at 37. Both the Fourth and Tenth Circuits have

granted qualified immunity to school resource officers despite the officer handcuffing

“a calm, compliant ten-year-old,” E.W., 884 F.3d at 186, and handcuffing a student

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who “posed no flight risk and ‘was not combative,’” A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123,

1130 (10th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). If school resource officers who had

handcuffed compliant children received qualified immunity, then no obvious

violation results from Officer Craddock’s handcuffing of K.W.P, an admittedly

resistant child.

In summary, we hold that the district court erred in denying qualified immunity

to Officer Craddock and Principal Wallace.

B. Municipal Liability

Because we hold that no violation of K.W.P.’s constitutional rights occurred,

we necessarily hold that the district court erred in denying summary judgment to

KCPS on K.W.P.’s municipal liability claim for failure to train and supervise its

school resource officers on the use of handcuffs on young children. See Sanders v.

City of Minneapolis, 474 F.3d 523, 527 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Without a constitutional

violation by the individual officers, there can be no § 1983 or Monell failure to train

municipal liability.”).

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s denial of summary judgment to

Officer Craddock, Principal Wallace, and KCPS and remand for entry of summary

judgment in their favor on K.W.P.’s claims.

_____________________________

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