People v. Guerrero

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Appellate Court Date: 2019.07.25

09:56:15 -05'00'

People v. Guerrero, 2018 IL App (3d) 170786

Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

Caption ELOY GUERRERO, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Third District

Docket No. 3-17-0786

Filed September 7, 2018

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Knox County, No. 11-CF-494; the

Review Hon. Scott Shipplett, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Vacated; cause remanded with directions.

Counsel on James E. Chadd, Peter A. Carusona, and Bryon Kohut, of State

Appeal Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (David L. Franklin,

Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Daniel B. Lewin,

Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for appellee.

Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court.

Justice Holdridge specially concurred, with opinion.

Justice Schmidt specially concurred, with opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Defendant, Eloy Guerrero, appeals from the denial of his motion to withdraw guilty plea,

arguing (1) his postplea counsel labored under a per se conflict of interest, (2) the circuit court

erred in denying his motion to withdraw guilty plea where his plea counsel failed to inform

defendant he was subject to mandatory deportation, and (3) he is entitled to $5-per-day credit

toward his fines. We vacate and remand with directions.

¶2 FACTS

¶3 On August 20, 2012, defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to commit the offense of unlawful

possession of more than 5000 grams of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(g) (West 2010); 720 ILCS

5/8-2 (West 2010)) in exchange for a six-year sentencing cap and defendant’s cooperation if

called to testify. Defendant was represented by Daniel O’Brien, a Knox County alternate

public defender. The court explained to defendant that the sentencing cap meant that the State

would not ask for more than six years’ imprisonment, but that the court could sentence

defendant to probation or a period of incarceration, even a period of incarceration greater than

six years. The court asked if defendant understood. Defendant stated, “I understand that but, I

mean, can I think about this? I mean, I wonder if I can get—it wouldn’t affect my immigration

status?” The court stated:

“By pleading guilty here today, this could affect your immigration status. If you’re

here as—illegally or if you’re a holder of a green card, there could be immigration

consequences; but immigration is a federal matter. It’s not a state matter. And while I

could tell you that it’s possible that any—that what you do here could lead to your

deportation from the United States, I have no idea. *** So I suppose that it could

conceivably result in your deportation, but I don’t know what will happen.”

Defendant’s plea counsel then stated, “I’ve explained it to him as best as I understand the

situation with immigration law.” Defendant asked if the sentence could be lower. The court

stated that defendant could ask for probation, but that it would have to hear and consider the

evidence in aggravation and mitigation before deciding on a sentence. Defendant said he

understood. Defendant then stated:

“I wonder if it’s possible to get—I mean, because—the way I see it is when after—even

if I get probation, I might get in trouble with immigration. I’m legally [sic]. I worked

too hard to get [to] this point. And, I mean, I committed a mistake. I—I know this. I

really—but I never intend to help these guys to sell or—.”

The court asked defendant if he believed six years’ imprisonment was excessive. Defendant

said he did. The court explained to defendant that he would have an opportunity to tell the court

he believed six years’ imprisonment was excessive at the sentencing hearing; the court would

consider defendant’s education, record, work history, and any other evidence before deciding

on a sentence; and defendant would not be sentenced on that day. Defendant conferred with his

attorney and then agreed to go forward with the plea.

¶4 As to the factual basis, the State said that agents of multiple federal and state agencies

would testify that defendant was overheard, via wiretaps, agreeing to take possession of more

than 5000 grams of cannabis that was to be delivered to Knox County, Illinois. There was an

interception in excess of 5000 grams of cannabis by Illinois State Police that was to be

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delivered to defendant. Defendant agreed that he still wished to plead guilty. The court

accepted the plea as knowingly and voluntarily made.

¶5 The case proceeded to a sentencing hearing. The State was represented by David Hansen

on the first day of the sentencing hearing. The court sentenced defendant to three years’

probation and 90 days in jail. Defendant was assessed a $1000 drug assessment, a $50 court

fund fine, a $5 teen court fine, a $30 child advocacy center fine, a $5 drug court fine, a $10

State Police Operations Assistance Fund fine, a $10 probation operations fine, a $25 drug

traffic prevention fund fine, and a $100 Trauma Center Fund fine.

¶6 On November 28, 2012, defendant, still represented by O’Brien, filed a motion to

withdraw his guilty plea. The motion stated that the plea was “made in error” as defendant “felt

pressured into pleading guilty although he didn’t fully understand the consequences.” The

motion further stated that defendant’s “attorney didn’t properly explain the consequences that

[defendant’s] conviction would have on his immigration status.” In an affidavit attached to the

motion, defendant averred:

“I feel that I was pressured into pleading guilty in that I didn’t understand the full

consequences that my guilty plea would have on my immigration status.

I also feel that my attorney improperly advised me as to how my guilty plea and

conviction could affect my status as an immigrant.”

¶7 A hearing was held on the motion. Defendant testified that when he pled guilty, he was

aware “that there could possibly be ramifications for [his] immigration status or ability to get

*** citizenship.” Defendant stated that he “hear[d] about being deported” and went to see an

immigration lawyer. The immigration lawyer told him that, even though he was sentenced to

probation, he could still be deported, even if he followed the guidelines of his probation.

Defendant stated he was surprised to hear that. Defendant said O’Brien had told him that he did

not know what would happen to defendant’s immigration status. However, O’Brien never told

him that he would not be deported. Defendant said that, at that time, no immigration

proceedings had been brought against him. O’Brien did try to have the charge amended based

on defendant’s immigration status so that defendant ultimately pled to a lower charge than the

original charge.

¶8 O’Brien then stated:

“I don’t actually feel like I erroneously advised [defendant] of the immigration

consequences, but I do believe that he was left with an erroneous impression of the

immigration consequences through some kind of miscommunication which was

certainly in part because of my own lack of familiarity with immigration law.

I talked to an immigration attorney and I did research on my own but it just isn’t

really my area of expertise and *** as [defendant] testified, I essentially said I didn’t

know what was going to happen in the end, whether he would get deported or wouldn’t

get deported. *** I get the impression that, again, through a combination of my not

fully understanding of the exact process by which immigration works and just the

process of communicating all this back and forth with [defendant], I do believe that he

*** had a misapprehension of what the actual immigration consequences were of this

plea.”

¶9 The court denied the motion, noting:

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“I don’t think Mr. O’Brien is—has led you astray by telling you that there could be

consequences and neither did I when we were talking about it in court. I told you that

there could be immigration consequences but nobody knows what’s going to happen.

That’s just a risk you have to take. And I think that you were fully aware that

there’s—there is a risk.”

¶ 10 Defendant appealed, and this court summarily remanded the case for proper

admonishments under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 605(c) (eff. Oct 1, 2001). The court

properly admonished defendant, and O’Brien filed another motion to withdraw guilty plea on

defendant’s behalf. The motion stated that defendant felt pressured into pleading guilty when

he did not fully understand the consequences. The motion further stated that the plea was made

in error because defendant “received ineffective assistance of counsel in that his attorney gave

him erroneous advice and failed to properly advise him of the consequences of his guilty plea

and that, but for this objectively unreasonable advice, he would not have pled guilty.” The

motion asserted that there was a doubt as to defendant’s guilt and that he had a meritorious

defense.

¶ 11 A hearing was held on the motion, during which David Hansen, now working for the public

defender’s office (see supra ¶ 5), represented defendant. No evidence was presented. The court

then denied the motion, stating:

“The fact that you could be deported does not mean that the government would deport

you. What you’re entitled to be advised of is that there could be immigration

consequences, and it could be deportation. And Mr. O’Brien said on the record that he

told you about that, and I explained it on the record as well.”

¶ 12 ANALYSIS

¶ 13 On appeal, defendant argues (1) his postplea counsel, David Hansen, labored under a

per se conflict of interest where he appeared on behalf of the State at defendant’s sentencing

hearing, (2) the court erred in denying his motion to withdraw the guilty plea where plea

counsel was ineffective for failing to affirmatively inform defendant that he was subject to

mandatory deportation if he pled guilty to conspiracy to commit the offense of unlawful

possession of more than 5000 grams of cannabis, and (3) he is entitled to $5-per-day credit

towards his fines. We will consider each argument in turn.

¶ 14 I. Per Se Conflict

¶ 15 Defendant first contends that his postplea counsel labored under a per se conflict of

interest, as he appeared for the State at defendant’s sentencing hearing. The State confesses

error. After reviewing the record, we accept the State’s confession.

¶ 16 The right to effective assistance of counsel includes the right to conflict-free

representation. People v. Hernandez, 231 Ill. 2d 134, 142 (2008). A per se conflict of interest

exists “when defense counsel was a former prosecutor who had been personally involved in the

prosecution of the defendant.” Id. at 143-44. When a per se conflict exists, the defendant need

not show that the conflict prejudiced him, and the court on appeal must reverse unless the

defendant affirmatively waived the conflict. People v. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d 1, 14-17 (1988).

Where counsel represented the prosecution in the same case, “inquiry into the precise nature

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and extent of [counsel’s] personal involvement is [n]either necessary [n]or desirable.” People

v. Kester, 66 Ill. 2d 162, 168 (1977).

¶ 17 Here, Hansen appeared on behalf of the State during defendant’s sentencing hearing. He

then went to work for the public defender’s office and represented defendant during his motion

to withdraw guilty plea. Because Hansen represented the interests of the State during

defendant’s case before representing defendant, Hansen labored under a per se conflict of

interest. There is nothing in the record to show that defendant affirmatively waived this

conflict. As stated above (supra ¶ 16), defendant is not required to show that he was prejudiced

by such conflict.

¶ 18 Therefore, we vacate the circuit court’s order denying defendant’s motion to withdraw

guilty plea and remand for new postplea proceedings, including (1) the appointment of

conflict-free counsel, (2) the opportunity to file a new motion to withdraw guilty plea, if

counsel deems a new motion is necessary, (3) certification under Illinois Supreme Court Rule

604(d) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016), and (4) a new hearing on the motion to withdraw guilty plea.

¶ 19 II. Ineffective Assistance of Plea Counsel

¶ 20 Defendant next argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to withdraw guilty

plea. Specifically, defendant argues that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to

affirmatively inform defendant that he was subject to mandatory deportation if he pled guilty

to conspiracy to commit the offense of unlawful possession of more than 5000 grams of

cannabis. Because we vacated defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty plea and remanded for

new postplea proceedings (supra ¶ 18), we need not answer the question of plea counsel’s

ineffectiveness. Instead, the circuit court will be tasked with determining anew whether

defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea and, thus, whether plea counsel was

ineffective.

¶ 21 However, we would be remiss if we did not provide some guidance to the circuit court to

use when making such a determination. In order for defendant to withdraw his guilty plea

based on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant has to show that (1) counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable

probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different but for counsel’s

errors. People v. Valdez, 2016 IL 119860, ¶ 14; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687

(1984). “It is quintessentially the duty of counsel to provide her client with available advice

about an issue like deportation, and the failure to do so ‘clearly satisfies the first prong of the

Strickland analysis.’ ” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010) (quoting Hill v.

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 62 (1985) (White, J., concurring in judgment)).

¶ 22 We note that Padilla is particularly applicable here. In Padilla, the defendant pled guilty to

drug distribution charges in Kentucky. Id. at 359. His plea counsel not only failed to inform

him that he faced deportation consequences if he pled guilty, but told him he “ ‘ “did not have

to worry about immigration status since he had been in the country so long.” ’ ” Id. The United

States Supreme Court determined that “constitutionally competent counsel would have

advised [the defendant] that his conviction for drug distribution made him subject to automatic

deportation.” Id. at 360. In doing so, the Court stated:

“In the instant case, the terms of the relevant immigration statute are succinct, clear,

and explicit in defining the removal consequence for Padilla’s conviction. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (‘Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a

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violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the

United States or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance …, other than a

single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana,

is deportable’). Padilla’s counsel could have easily determined that his plea would

make him eligible for deportation simply from reading the text of the statute, which

addresses not some broad classification of crimes but specifically commands removal

for all controlled substances convictions except for the most trivial of marijuana

possession offenses. Instead, Padilla’s counsel provided him false assurance that his

conviction would not result in his removal from this country. This is not a hard case in

which to find deficiency: The consequences of Padilla’s plea could easily be

determined from reading the removal statute, his deportation was presumptively

mandatory, and his counsel’s advice was incorrect.” Id. at 368-69.

The Court went on to advise that

“When the law is not succinct and straightforward ***, a criminal defense attorney

need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may

carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences. But when the deportation

consequence is truly clear, as it was in this case, the duty to give correct advice is

equally clear.” Id. at 369.

Therefore, the Court determined that plea counsel’s performance was deficient and remanded

for the Kentucky courts to determine whether Padilla had been prejudiced by his counsel’s

deficient performance. Id.

¶ 23 Here, defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit the offense of unlawful possession

of more than 5000 grams of cannabis falls under section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) of title 8 (8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006)), the same federal statute as Padilla’s conviction. See supra ¶ 22.

The Supreme Court determined that that portion of the statute explicitly provided for

mandatory deportation and that Padilla’s counsel was required to inform him of that mandatory

deportation. Therefore, for a defendant whose conviction falls under the same statute,

deportation is also “presumptively mandatory” and plea counsel must inform him or her of

such. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368-69; see also People v. Guzman-Ruiz, 2014 IL App (3d)

120150, ¶¶ 19-20.

¶ 24 We take no position on whether plea counsel’s advice to defendant regarding the

deportation consequences satisfied the requirement set forth in Padilla. Instead, we leave that

finding for the circuit court to make on remand. Should the court find that counsel’s

performance was deficient, defendant must then establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s

deficient performance. To establish prejudice, defendant must show a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going

to trial. People v. Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d 403, 457 (2003). To do so, defendant must present “either

a claim of innocence or the articulation of a plausible defense that could have been raised at

trial.” People v. Hall, 217 Ill. 2d 324, 335-36 (2005).

¶ 25 III. $5-Per-Day Credit

¶ 26 Lastly, defendant argues that he is entitled to $5-per-day credit toward his fines. The State

confesses error, but argues that defendant is not entitled to credit towards the $10 probation

operations assessment, contending that it is a fee and not a fine. After reviewing the record, we

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accept the State’s confession and award defendant the credit towards his fines. We further find

that the probation operations assessment is a fine for which credit can be applied.

¶ 27 “Any person incarcerated on a bailable offense who does not supply bail and against whom

a fine is levied on conviction of such offense shall be allowed a credit of $5 for each day so

incarcerated upon application of the defendant.” 725 ILCS 5/110-14(a) (West 2012). The

application for monetary credit for time spent incarcerated prior to sentencing may be raised at

any time and at any stage of court proceedings. People v. Caballero, 228 Ill. 2d 79, 88 (2008).

¶ 28 At sentencing, defendant was given 354 days of presentence custody credit, but was not

given any monetary credit. Defendant was also assessed the following fines, which are subject

to be offset by the $5-per-day credit (see People v. Johnson, 2015 IL App (3d) 140364

(appendix)): (1) $1000 drug assessment (People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 588 (2006)); (2) $50

court fund fine (People v. Graves, 235 Ill. 2d 244, 253 (2009)); (3) $5 teen court fine (People v.

Richards, 394 Ill. App. 3d 706, 709 (2009)); (4) $30 child advocacy center fine (People v.

Jones, 397 Ill. App. 3d 651, 660-61 (2009)); (5) $5 drug court fine (People v. Williams, 2011

IL App (1st) 091667-B, ¶ 19); (6) $10 State Police Operations Assistance Fund fine (People v.

Bell, 2012 IL App (5th) 100276, ¶ 42); (7) $25 Drug Traffic Prevention Fund fine (People v.

Devine, 2012 IL App (4th) 101028, ¶ 10); and (8) $100 Trauma Center Fund fine (Jones, 223

Ill. 2d at 593).

¶ 29 Moreover, this court has held that the probation operations assessment is a fine subject to

$5-per-day credit. People v. Carter, 2016 IL App (3d) 140196, ¶¶ 55-56. In doing so, we

stated,

“The probation operations assistance fee is assessed against all criminal defendants

‘upon a judgment of guilty or grant of supervision’ regardless of whether probations

services were actually utilized in each defendant’s case. 705 ILCS 105/27.3a(1.1)

(West 2012). As such, we conclude the probation operations assistance assessment

qualifies as a fine, created to generate a fund to support probation and court services,

regardless of a defendant’s actual utilization of those services.” Carter, 2016 IL App

(3d) 140196, ¶ 56.

We noted that in People v. Rogers, 2014 IL App (4th) 121088, ¶ 37, the Fourth District created

a dichotomy: finding the assessment would be a fee when a defendant was sentenced to

probation and a fine when a defendant was not sentenced to probation. Carter, 2016 IL App

(3d) 140196, ¶ 57. We declined to follow this, instead solely finding that the assessment was a

fine. Id. We continue to reject Rogers, and instead adhere to our holding in Carter that the

assessment was a fine. Defendant is therefore entitled to $5-per-day credit toward the $10

probation operations assessment as well.

¶ 30 Accordingly, as defendant was incarcerated 354 days before he was sentenced, he is

entitled to a full reduction of his $1235 of eligible fines.

¶ 31 CONCLUSION

¶ 32 The judgment of the circuit court of Knox County is vacated and remanded with directions.

¶ 33 Vacated; cause remanded with directions.

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¶ 34 JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring:

¶ 35 I join in the majority’s judgment, and I agree with Justice Carter’s analysis, with one

exception. Citing People v. Hall, 217 Ill. 2d 324, 335-36 (2005), Justice Carter states that, to

establish prejudice in this case, the defendant must present “ ‘either a claim of innocence or the

articulation of a plausible defense that could have been raised at trial.’ ” Supra ¶ 24 (quoting

Hall, 217 Ill. 2d at 335-36). However, this standard for establishing prejudice does not apply

where, as here, the defendant’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is predicated on his

plea counsel’s failure to inform him of the potential immigration consequences of pleading

guilty. People v. Deltoro, 2015 IL App (3d) 130381, ¶¶ 21-27. To establish prejudice in this

context, a defendant must merely demonstrate that his decision to reject the plea bargain

“would have been rational under the circumstances.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372

(2010); Deltoro, 2015 IL App (3d) 130381, ¶ 22. “A defendant facing potential deportation

may show that his decision to reject a plea offer and go to trial is rational without showing that

he would have likely succeeded at trial.” Deltoro, 2015 IL App (3d) 130381, ¶ 22.

¶ 36 For the reasons set forth in Deltoro (and in my dissent in People v. Valdez, 2015 IL App

(3d) 120892, ¶¶ 46-47 (Holdridge, J., dissenting), and my partial concurrence in People v.

Guzman, 2014 IL App (3d) 090464, ¶¶ 77-80 (Holdridge, J., dissenting in part and specially

concurring in part)), I disagree with Justice Carter’s articulation of the governing standard for

establishing prejudice in this case. I join Justice Carter’s analysis in all other respects.

¶ 37 JUSTICE SCHMIDT, specially concurring:

¶ 38 I concur in the judgment.

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