Opinion

Edward A. Crapo, in his capacity as Alachua County Property Appraiser v. Academy for Five Element Acupuncture, Inc., a Florida Non-Profit Corporation

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
Filed: Jul 8, 2019
Status: Published
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 8.2%

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Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D17-1895

_____________________________

EDWARD A. CRAPO, in his

capacity as Alachua County

Property Appraiser,

Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

ACADEMY FOR FIVE ELEMENT

ACUPUNCTURE, INC., a Florida

Non-Profit Corporation,

Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.

Toby S. Monaco, Judge.

July 8, 2019

ON REHEARING EN BANC

PER CURIAM.

Alachua County Property Appraiser Edward A. Crapo appeals

a circuit court decision awarding the Academy for Five Element

Acupuncture, Inc. an educational property tax exemption under

section 196.198, Florida Statutes. On the merits, Property

Appraiser Crapo argues that the Academy does not qualify for the

exemption because it is not an “educational institution” as defined

in section 196.012(5)—and we agree. Procedurally, the Academy

raises a tipsy-coachman argument 1 urging us to affirm the circuit

court’s ruling because an earlier Value Adjustment Board decision

favoring the Academy was preclusive under the administrative

finality doctrine—but we disagree. We therefore reverse the circuit

court’s judgment.

I. Facts

The Academy operates a not-for-profit private post-secondary

school in downtown Gainesville that teaches and trains students

in acupuncture, health sciences, and herbal studies. For years,

while located in Broward County, the Academy received an

educational tax exemption on its property. But when it moved to

Gainesville in 2008 and applied for the same exemption, Property

Appraiser Crapo denied it. He asserted that the Academy was not

an “educational institution” under the tax code and did not qualify

for the property tax exemption. The Academy petitioned the

Alachua County VAB to resolve the dispute, and a special

magistrate heard the case. The special magistrate concluded, with

substantial hesitation, that the Academy qualified as an

educational institution under section 196.012(5), and

recommended that the VAB grant the exemption. The VAB did so,

summarily granting the Academy’s property tax exemption.

Property Appraiser Crapo did not seek the de-novo hearing in

circuit court authorized under section 194.036(3), Florida Statutes.

The Academy received the educational exemption on its

Alachua County property from 2008 through 2013. In 2014,

Property Appraiser Crapo again raised the education exemption

issue. He issued a notice to the Academy disapproving its

exemption for failing to meet the definition of an educational

institution. The Academy responded by again petitioning the VAB.

The VAB upheld the tax exemption, the same result as in 2008.

This time, however, Property Appraiser Crapo filed suit in circuit

court for de-novo determination of the issue. See § 194.036(3), Fla.

1 The “tipsy coachman” doctrine allows an appellate court to

affirm a trial court that “reaches the right result, but for the wrong

reasons” so long as “there is any basis which would support the

judgment in the record.” Dade Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station

WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638, 644 (Fla. 1999).

Stat. The circuit court ruled that the Academy qualified for the

exemption.

In addition to deciding the tax exemption issue, the circuit

court considered the Academy’s alternative administrative-finality

argument. The Academy argued that Property Appraiser Crapo

was prohibited from litigating the tax exemption issue because the

underlying facts had not changed, and he lost the same issue

before the VAB in 2008. But the circuit court rejected the

Academy’s decisional-finality argument under the theory that each

tax year stands on its own.

Property Appraiser Crapo then appealed the property tax

exemption issue to this Court, and the Academy cross-appealed on

the administrative-finality issue. A three-judge panel affirmed the

trial court’s final judgment for the Academy based on

administrative finality, holding that Property Appraiser Crapo

could not revisit or challenge the Academy’s tax exemption any

more after the VAB’s 2008 decision. The panel opinion did not

reach the merits of Property Appraiser Crapo’s argument against

the Academy’s tax exemption. Property Appraiser Crapo then filed

a motion for rehearing en banc, which we granted. See Fla. R. App.

P. 9.331(d).

II. Merits: The Exemption

Real property in Florida is annually assessed and subject to

an ad valorem tax unless an exemption applies. Art. VII, § 4, Fla.

Const.; §§ 192.042, 196.001(1), Fla. Stat.; see also Sowell v.

Panama Commons, L.P., 192 So. 3d 27, 30 (Fla. 2016). One of the

available exemptions under Florida law applies to property used

for educational purposes by an “educational institution.”

§ 196.198, Fla. Stat.; see also Art. VII, § 3(a), Fla. Const. (allowing

for exemptions on property used for educational purposes); Nat’l

Ctr. for Constr. Educ. & Research Ltd., Corp. v. Crapo, 248 So. 3d

1256, 1257-58 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). The tax code further defines an

“educational institution” as follows:

“Educational institution” means a federal, state,

parochial, church, or private school, college, or university

conducting regular classes and courses of study required

for eligibility to certification by, accreditation to, or

membership in the State Department of Education of

Florida, Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, or

the Florida Council of Independent Schools . . . .

§ 196.012(5), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).

The parties disagree about whether the Academy falls within

the section-196.012(5) definition of an “educational institution”

and thus qualifies for this particular exemption. We review such

questions of statutory interpretation de novo. See State v. Purdy,

252 So. 3d 723, 725 (Fla. 2018). Statutes providing for an

exemption to an ad valorem tax are construed strictly, such that

any ambiguity is resolved against the claimed exemption. Nat’l

Ctr., 248 So. 3d at 1257-58 (citing Sowell, 192 So. 3d at 30). A

claimant bears the burden of clearly showing its entitlement to a

tax exemption. Id. at 1258.

In this case, no one disputes that the Academy is a state-

licensed private post-secondary school that grants certificates and

degrees in acupuncture, Chinese herbal studies, and health

science. But Property Appraiser Crapo argues that the Academy is

not entitled to the exemption because it is not credentialed by, and

does not offer classes or courses as required for credentialing by,

one of the three entities identified in section 196.012(5): the State

Department of Education of Florida, the Southern Association of

Colleges and Schools, or the Florida Council of Independent

Schools. Rather, the record evidence here only shows that the

Academy’s classes and courses satisfy licensing requirements of

the Florida Commission for Independent Schools, which is not one

of the entities the statute identifies. The circuit court concluded

that Commission-issued licenses satisfy the statute’s reference to

certification by “the State Department of Education,” but Property

Appraiser Crapo argues that the Commission and Department are

different entities for purposes of the exemption statute.

We cannot read section 196.012(5)’s reference to the

“Department” as applying equally to the Commission, because

Florida law distinguishes between Commission- and Department-

certified schools. Although the education statute creating the

Commission places it within the Department as an administrative

matter—see sections 1005.21(1), 1001.22, Florida Statutes—the

Department’s and Commission’s school-certification regimes are

not referenced interchangeably. Under section 1005.06(1), for

example, institutions under the Department’s jurisdiction are

distinguished as “not under the jurisdiction and purview of the

commission.” (Emphasis added.) The statute dealing with

barbering schools requires “a license issued by the Commission . . .

pursuant to chapter 1005.” § 476.178, Fla. Stat. But it also “shall

not be construed to prevent certification [of barber training

programs] by the Department of Education.” Id. The same

distinction between Commission licensing and Departmental

certification is found in the cosmetology statute. § 477.023, Fla.

Stat. It requires “a license issued by the Commission . . . pursuant

to chapter 1005,” but then also allows for the Department to certify

cosmetology training programs. Id. An educational assistance

program for National Guard members refers to institutions

“licensed by the Commission” separately from training programs

leading to certifications approved by the Department of Education.

§ 250.10(7), Fla. Stat. The Massage Practice Act does not mention

Commission licensing at all, but rather defines a “[b]oard-

approved massage school” as being “licensed by the Department of

Education.” § 480.033(9), Fla. Stat. Additionally, section 1005.05,

Florida Statutes, distinguishes between the Commission and the

Department with respect to pre-program application requirements

for nonpublic colleges, by instructing as follows:

Colleges under the jurisdiction of the Commission for

Independent Education shall apply to the commission.

Colleges that are not under the jurisdiction of the

commission shall apply to the Department of Education.

§ 1005.05, Fla. Stat. These statutes undermine the Academy’s

argument that institutional licensing by the Commission is the

same as certification by the Department.

In addition to having different school-approval regimes, we

recognize that Florida law grants authority to the Commission

independent from the Department, section 1005.21(1), Fla. Stat.;

that Commission members are appointed through the Governor

and Senate instead of via the Commissioner of Education,

section 1005.21(2), Fla. Stat.; and that the Commission possesses

its own rulemaking authority, section 1005.22(1)(e), Fla. Stat. The

Commission’s independence from the Department in these areas

also indicates that their respective school-certification regimes

operate on different tracks.

In light of these statutes, we agree with Property Appraiser

Crapo that the Commission’s licensure is not the same as the

Department’s certification within the meaning of the tax-

exemption statute. On the record presented, we cannot conclude

that the Academy’s programs satisfy the Department’s

certification requirements under section 196.012(5) merely

because the programs satisfy the Commission’s licensing

requirements. Because the Academy did not carry its burden of

clearly showing that it is an “educational institution” entitled to

the property tax exemption, we reverse the final judgment. We also

reject the Academy’s alternative tipsy-coachman argument that

the doctrine of administrative finality precluded further review of

the tax-exemption issue the VAB addressed in 2008, and turn to

that issue next.

III. Procedure: Administrative Finality

The Academy’s alternative argument is that Property

Appraiser Crapo was barred from revisiting the tax exemption

issue after he lost the same issue before the VAB in 2008, and did

not raise the issue in a circuit court proceeding. This argument

requires us to pull together a complex constitutional, statutory,

regulatory, and factual framework to decide an important issue

that is deceptively simple to state: Does administrative finality

attach to VAB decisions that are not subsequently litigated in

circuit court? 2

2 We acknowledge with appreciation the amicus briefs on this

topic filed by the State of Florida Department of Revenue, the

Property Appraisers’ Association of Florida, and the Tax Section of

The Florida Bar. All three of these entities assert that

administrative finality does not attach to a VAB decision. We also

agree with the Department of Revenue’s observation in its amicus

brief that a ruling contrary to the one we reach “will adversely

impact the ability of taxpayers and property appraisers to access

Given the unique context of ad valorem taxation and

exemptions, we must agree with Property Appraiser Crapo that

administrative finality does not attach to VAB decisions. To

achieve preclusive finality of a tax ruling requires either going

directly to circuit court in the first instance, or filing suit in circuit

court for de novo review and disposition of an issue previously

presented to the VAB. The decision of a circuit court, if not

appealed, then has preclusive effect. If the circuit court’s decision

is appealed, the appellate court’s decision becomes the law of the

case (absent further review and disposition by the Florida

Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court). A VAB

decision alone does not have preclusive effect. 3

A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

This analysis requires an understanding of the laws and rules

establishing and governing the office of property appraiser and its

authority over tax exemptions, VABs and their authority and

processes, circuit court jurisdiction and standards for review of tax

questions, and the oft-repeated maxim in tax law that “each year

stands on its own.” We address these topics in turn.

the administrative and judicial remedies that have long been held

must function independently under a de novo standard of review,

each tax year.”

3 We respect our concurring colleague’s observation that the

record reveals some potential factual differences between the

Academy’s first exemption application and the later one at issue

here. However, we do not find that observation to require a

different analysis for two reasons. First, the circuit court did not

evaluate the legal effect of any factual differences, and we are not

at liberty to do so in the first instance on appeal, even if we thought

they might make a difference to the exemption question, which it

appears they do not. Second, although the concurrence would ask

first whether this case presents an exception to any doctrine of

finality that might attach to a VAB decision, we conclude that

administrative finality does not apply at all, so it is unnecessary to

evaluate whether any exception to it might exist.

(1) Property Appraisers and Exemptions

Each Florida county has a property appraiser, who is an

elected and independent constitutional officer charged with

determining whether real property situated within the county is

subject to ad valorem taxation; and if so, valuing the property and

assessing tax on it. Art. VIII, § 1(d), Fla. Const. 4 Each property

appraiser also has authority to determine whether property is

entitled to a tax exemption. § 196.011, Fla. Stat. (requiring tax-

exemption applications to be filed with property appraisers);

§ 196.193, Fla. Stat. (requiring property appraisers to review tax-

exemption applications and determine whether to grant or deny

them). This is an annually-repeating process, as discussed in

greater detail below.

A property appraiser denying an initial or renewal application

must notify the applicant, who then can choose any or all from

among three options to challenge the denial: request an informal

conference with the property appraiser under section 194.011(2),

Florida Statutes; petition the VAB for review under section

194.011(3); or file suit in circuit court under section 194.171, either

first among these options or after exercising one or both of the

others. Each of these statutes provides that the dispute-resolution

steps available before filing suit in circuit court are optional. It is

not necessary to confer informally before seeking a VAB hearing

or filing suit, and it is not necessary to go to a VAB hearing before

filing suit.

Property appraisers also have the statutory right to file suit

in circuit court after a VAB rules against them. § 194.036(1), Fla.

Stat. (authorizing property appraisers to initiate circuit court

proceedings (a) upon determining and asserting that the VAB

contravened a provision of constitution, statute, or rule; (b) if the

VAB arrives at an assessed value exceeding the property

appraiser’s assessed value by more than percentage amounts set

forth; and (c) if the property appraiser asserts that the VAB is

4 The State’s 67 property appraisers as a group make up a

class of constitutional or state officers within the Florida Supreme

Court’s review jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

consistently and continuously violating the law or rules, thus

triggering review by the Department of Revenue and potential

action against the VAB). 5 Property Appraiser Crapo sued in circuit

court under section 194.036(1)(a), asserting an erroneous

construction and application of the educational tax exemption

statute.

(2) VABs

Each Florida county has its own VAB, the members of which

are two members of the county’s governing body, one member of

the school board, and two citizen members—one homestead

property owner and one commercial business owner. § 194.015,

Fla. Stat. The members of the VAB are not elected by the public or

appointed by the Governor. The board of the governing body of the

county chooses two members of the governing body to serve on the

VAB, the school board elects one of its members to serve on the

VAB, and then the governing body and the school board each

appoint one of the other two VAB members. Id. Each VAB must

have private counsel, who must have more than five years’

experience practicing law. Id. To resolve factual issues in many

proceedings, the VAB appoints a special magistrate, who does not

have to be a lawyer, except in cases involving exemptions, in which

5 The Tax Section’s amicus brief, filed February 2, 2019, sets

forth a useful history of the development of what are now called

VABs, and provides context for why section 194.036(1)(c) allows

property appraisers to reject VAB decisions through de novo

lawsuits in circuit court. See also Crossings At Fleming Island

Cmty. Dev. Dist. v. Echeverri, 991 So. 2d 793, 800 (Fla. 2008)

(providing an historical synopsis). This provision of the statute

seeks to address situations in which VABs may have strayed from

their analytical and dispute-resolution roles under the influence of

their positions as local politicians answerable to residents seeking

to keep taxes low, or have over-corrected to the opposite result. The

Tax Section, while opining that problems may continue to exist

(which the Academy would deny), does not suggest that this

happened here; and nor do we—but the historical perspective is

helpful in understanding the evolution of the governing laws.

the special magistrate must be a lawyer admitted to the Florida

Bar for at least five years. § 194.035(1), Fla. Stat.

The VAB has specific authority to hear disputes involving

exemptions. § 194.032(1)(a)3., Fla. Stat. The VAB’s role in

exemption cases is to determine whether the taxpayer meets the

statutory criteria for the specific exemption at issue. See Fla.

Admin. Code R. 12D-9.027(4). The VAB must support all

conclusions of law with findings of fact supported by record

evidence, or the lack thereof. Fla. Admin. Code R. 12D-9.032(1)(a).

While it is tempting to try to analogize VAB decisions to a

variety of other non-judicial processes, it is important to respect

the differences between them. 6 The statutes expressly provide that

a VAB is not an administrative tribunal under chapter 120 of the

6 Even in a classic administrative-law context, the Florida

Supreme Court has cautioned against applying preclusive

doctrines. See Thomson v. Dep’t of Envtl. Regulation, 511 So. 2d

989, 991 (Fla.1987) (noting that unlike courts that apply the law

to past, static facts, administrative bodies often deal with “fluid

facts and shifting policies”) (internal references omitted); Peoples

Gas Sys., Inc. v. Mason, 187 So. 2d 335, 339 (Fla. 1966) (explaining

administrative bodies and “decid[e] issues according to a public

interest that often changes with shifting circumstances and

passage of time”); see also Delray Med. Ctr., Inc. v. State, Agency

for Health Care Admin., 5 So. 3d 26, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (noting

that preclusive doctrines do not “neatly fit” in administrative

proceedings and should be applied with “great caution,” and

allowing agencies to revisit earlier decisions upon a showing of a

significant change of circumstances, a demonstrated public

interest, or in the event of “new facts, changed conditions, or

additional submissions”). We find this reasoning persuasive in the

tax context presented here, but decline to map the outer

boundaries of administrative finality in other contexts. The

dissent’s extensive attempt to compare a VAB to many other local-

government or administrative bodies, and its attempt to advocate

for a different governing policy in this area, fails on the facts

because this board is unique, and fails on the law because of the

unique body of law already in existence that is foundational to tax

law and practice.

Florida Statutes. § 194.034(1)(i), Fla. Stat. (“Chapter 120 does not

apply to hearings of the value adjustment board.”). Whereas

appellate courts have jurisdiction to review the merits of orders

entered in chapter-120 proceedings, circuit courts review de novo

the issues presented to VABs, giving no precedential effect to VAB

decisions. § 194.036(3), Fla. Stat.

A VAB is also not a local governing body like a city or county

commission. It does not promulgate ordinances, determine and

regulate local land use, or otherwise govern a locale. See Broward

Cty. v. G.B.V. Int’l, Ltd., 787 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 2001) (illustrating

county commission function of regulating land use subject to

limited and deferential court review); Haines City Cmty. Dev. v.

Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1995) (recognizing right of judicial

review of local administrative action of evicting tenant from public

property, under increasingly narrow standards at each step of

review); City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d 624 (Fla.

1982) (noting right to review but explaining narrow scope of review

of civil service board decision on employee termination). A VAB

merely serves to informally resolve tax disputes or attempt to do

so, and because of the de novo standard that applies in circuit court

and the circuit court’s original, exclusive jurisdiction, VAB

decisions have no weight whatsoever in circuit court litigation. See

§ 194.036(3), Fla. Stat. 7

(3) Circuit Court Jurisdiction

Two important concepts apply to circuit court adjudication of

tax disputes: exclusivity and de novo review. The Florida

7 A VAB is also unlike the Public Service Commission, upon

which the original panel relied to derive its finality conclusion. See

Fla. Power Corp. v. Garcia, 780 So. 2d 34, 44 (Fla. 2001) (cited in

original panel opinion, but dealing only with an attempt to revisit

a previous determination of subject-matter jurisdiction over the

same parties and issues). The PSC is something of a hybrid, with

review of its decisions differing based on their content, but

deferentially. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Brown, 243 So. 3d 903 (Fla.

2018) (illustrating direct review in supreme court required by Art.

V, § 3(b)(2), Fla. Const. and deferential standard of review). We

could expend additional resources evaluating every dispute-

Constitution gives circuit courts “exclusive original jurisdiction . . .

in all cases involving legality of any tax assessment or toll” unless

the Legislature changes that by general law. Art. V, § 20(c)(3), Fla.

Const. (emphasis added). Far from having been changed by

general law, this requirement remains codified at section

194.171(1) of the Florida Statutes (“The circuit courts have

original jurisdiction at law of all matters relating to property

taxation.”), and at section 26.012(2)(e) (“[Circuit courts] shall have

exclusive original jurisdiction: . . . In all cases involving legality of

any tax assessment or toll or denial of refund.”) (emphasis added).

Thus, as already noted, it is not necessary for a taxpayer to seek

informal resolution with the property appraiser or the VAB before

filing suit in court. § 194.011(2), (3), Fla. Stat. Both the property

appraiser and the taxpayer can go straight to circuit court to

litigate an assessment or exemption issue, and skip the VAB

altogether. § 194.171, Fla. Stat.

Regardless of the prior history of a dispute, review in circuit

court is de novo: “The circuit court proceeding shall be de novo, and

the burden of proof shall be upon the party initiating the action.”

§ 194.036(3), Fla. Stat. In circuit court proceedings, there is no

presumption of correctness as to exemptions. § 194.301(2)(d), Fla.

Stat. (“If the challenge is to the classification or exemption status

of the property, there is no presumption of correctness, and the

party initiating the challenge has the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that the classification or exempt

status assigned to the property is incorrect.”).

Thus, although proceedings in circuit court after earlier

informal attempts at dispute resolution are sometimes called

“appeals,” a VAB decision is not “appealable” in the formal sense

of an appeal as a review proceeding. Crossings, 991 So. 2d at 801

n.6 (“While this process is referred to as an ‘appeal’ of the board’s

decision, actions brought in the circuit court pursuant to section

194.032, now section 194.036, are original actions, not appeals.”

(quoting Williams v. Law, 368 So. 2d 1285, 1286 (Fla. 1979))). In

circuit court proceedings, the VAB resolution has no precedential

resolution and decision-making body in the state for comparison to

VABs, but to no practical avail, as the law enables us to resolve the

issue before us without such an academic exercise.

value and is owed no deference; the property appraiser’s decision

is reviewed de novo. § 194.036(3), Fla. Stat.

(4) “Each year stands on its own.”

The general maxim of “each year stands on its own” is

foundational to the understanding of tax law, and has been

extended to the context of tax exemptions and not merely

valuations. Page v. City of Fernandina Beach, 714 So. 2d 1070,

1072 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (“The taxable status of property is

determined on January 1 of each year. See Section 192.042, Florida

Statutes (1973). This is the date on which the tax assessor

determines whether a particular parcel of property is entitled to

exemption from taxation for the tax year.”) (emphasis added)

(citing Overstreet v. Ty–Tan, Inc., 48 So. 2d 158 (Fla.1950));

Southlake Cmty. Found. v. Havill, 707 So. 2d 361, 363 (Fla. 5th

DCA 1998) (reaching merits of tax exemption denial following

earlier memorandum from property appraiser that property was

exempt); S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Broward Cty., 665 So. 2d 272,

274-75 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (accepting the rule that every tax year

stands alone and finding on the facts presented that the rule was

not violated); Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 74-98 (1974) (“[T]he very nature

of a tax exemption and the laws establishing the same preclude

the application of this [preclusive] doctrine in tax exemption cases.

. . . Each years . . . exemption must stand or fall on its own validity,

unconnected with . . . any prior or subsequent year . . . .”); see also

Container Corp. of Am. v. Long, 274 So. 2d 571, 573 (Fla. 1st DCA

1973) (“Ad valorem taxes assessed against property in this state

for any given tax year must stand or fall on its own validity,

unconnected with the assessment made against that land during

any prior or subsequent year.”), superseded by statute in certain

agricultural-exemption cases Tilton v. Gardner, 52 So. 3d 771, 778

& n.5 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).

This year-standing-alone concept reflects the nature of

taxation and the annual taxation process established in the

Florida Statutes. Property owners seeking tax exemptions must

apply annually, and failure to file “shall constitute a waiver of the

exemption privilege for that year.” § 196.011(1)(a), Fla. Stat. After

initially granting a tax exemption, the property appraiser in

subsequent years mails the taxpayer a renewal application, but

the property appraiser retains the discretion to deny even a

renewal application. § 196.011(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (“Such renewal

application shall be accepted as evidence of exemption by the

property appraiser unless he or she denies the application.”)

(emphasis added). The property appraiser also can request the

county’s governing body to waive the requirement of annual

application for exemption as to properties not excluded from such

waiver by statute, which then shifts to the property owner the

burden of notifying the property appraiser proactively of any

changes that may affect the exempt status of the property, subject

to penalties for failure to do so. § 196.011(9)(a), Fla. Stat. Even in

that context, which was the process followed in this case, the

statute contemplates the property appraiser’s discretion to deny

an exemption. § 196.011(9)(e), Fla. Stat. (“If an exemption for

which the annual application is waived pursuant to this subsection

will be denied by the property appraiser in the absence of the

refiling of the application, notification of an intent to deny the

exemption shall be mailed to the owner of the property prior to

February 1.”) (emphasis added). 8

The corollary to the maxim that “each tax year stands on its

own” is that no taxpayer has a vested right to a tax exemption.

Sowell, 192 So. 3d at 30-31 (relying in part on the statutory

procedures for tax exemptions as evidencing the absence of a

vested right to an exemption); see also City of Largo v. AHF-Bay

Fund, LLC, 215 So. 3d 10, 14-15 (Fla. 2017) (noting nonprofit

exemption statute requires taxpayer to take affirmative steps to

request exemption on an annual basis; the exemption is not

automatic and can be waived); Spencer Estates of Fla., LLC v.

Havill, 125 So. 3d 795, 796 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (affirming circuit

court’s refusal to entertain taxpayer’s attempt to punish property

appraiser for failing to grant exemption in 2009 and 2010, where

pending case determining taxpayer’s entitlement to exemption

involved only tax year 2008; “[e]ach [tax] year stands on its own”);

Davis v. Macedonia Housing Auth., 641 So. 2d 131, 132 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1994) (expressly rejecting trial court’s ruling that taxpayer

8 The Department of Revenue’s administrative rules also

contemplate property appraisers’ right to change their minds,

excluding from “correction” procedures “changes in the judgment

of the property appraiser.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 12D-8.021(2)(d)7.

was to be granted charitable tax exemption for future years

“absent a material change in applicable law or a material change

in Plaintiff’s status or operation,” because exemption can be

waived and entitlement to exemption must be affirmatively

demonstrated annually).

B. Analysis

This unique and detailed legal framework brings us to agree

with Property Appraiser Crapo: administrative finality does not

attach to a VAB decision that is not subsequently adjudicated in

circuit court. Chief among the legal principles driving this result

are the status of Florida’s property appraisers as elected,

independent constitutional officers; the exclusive original

jurisdiction of circuit court in tax assessment matters under the

constitution and sections 26.012(2)(e) and 194.171(1); the de-novo

standard of review required by section 194.036(3); and the one-

year-at-a-time concept embedded in rules, regulations, and

longstanding tax law practice and procedure. These foundational

principles permeate the processes set forth in the governing

statutes, establishing an annual process subject to annual renewal

or revisitation, embodying the concept that “each tax year stands

on its own.” The statutory scheme makes it clear that, while VAB

proceedings may often be useful in informal dispute resolution,

they are not to be accorded preclusive effect.

The dissent seems to argue that the Legislature’s creation and

regulation of VABs, and the role given them, at least does not

preclude the possibility that VAB decisions have administrative

finality effect. See Fla. Export Tobacco Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 510

So. 2d 936, 955 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 519 So. 2d 986 (Fla.

1987). In Export Tobacco, this Court held that the statutory

authorization of tax refund remedies before the Comptroller or in

Chapter-120 proceedings did not divest the circuit courts of

original exclusive jurisdiction in tax assessment matters and did

not confer res judicata effect upon such proceedings, and that only

the Legislature can specify the extent of an administrative

agency’s quasi-judicial functions. 510 So. 2d at 955. If the

Legislature had intended for VAB decisions to have administrative

finality, it surely would not be difficult to pinpoint the statute so

providing—but there is none. To the contrary, the Legislature has

expressly retained a statutory structure under which VAB

decisions have no legal significance whatsoever in subsequent

circuit-court litigation.

The dissent also argues that it is unfair not to give

administrative-finality effect to VAB decisions because it forces

taxpayers to defend their requests for exemptions year after year

even if they think their property and its ownership and use have

not changed from previous years when exemptions were granted.

This argument is misplaced for several reasons. First, as a

threshold factor, this argument overlooks that the statutory and

regulatory framework mandates a year-at-a-time process. Even if

an exemption is granted, and re-application waived in favor of an

automatic renewal, it is only subject to the appraiser’s statutory

right to require a new or updated application. No one goes into this

with an absolute “right” to avoid interacting with the property

appraiser for more than a year.

Second, the nature of the dispute here was, and is, a threshold

legal question—the proper interpretation of the educational

exemption statute. Even if a tax-exemption statute does not

change, there remains the possibility of differing interpretations of

it over time as a body of law develops on it. This is especially true

for a narrowly-applicable tax-exemption statute such as the one at

issue here. One would not expect hordes of lawsuits generating

reams of precedent on every arcane tax exemption, and indeed

judicial precedent can be entirely lacking. A property appraiser’s

initial interpretation of an exemption statute may lie alone and

untested until some precedent is created on the issue, or until a

change of professional judgment—or a change of property

appraiser—occurs. In either event, the property appraiser has not

only the right but the duty to advance and apply the interpretation

deemed legally correct at the time. A new office-holder should not

be bound by erroneous positions taken by a predecessor and not

adopted by an Article-V court. Our disposition of the Academy’s

licensing issue is a perfect example: it turns out Property

Appraiser Crapo’s professional judgment to deny this exemption

was correct.

Third, the Academy’s argument is one-sided, claiming a right

to revisit VAB decisions upon a change in taxpayer facts but not

upon a change in circumstances on the property appraiser side.

But a change on the taxpayer side of the equation cannot be the

only route into circuit court. We can envision several

circumstances under which a property appraiser may choose to

litigate an issue that was not previously taken into circuit court.

In addition to a change in interpretation of the law or the election

of a new property appraiser, a property appraiser might choose not

to fight an adverse VAB decision in any given tax year for a variety

of reasons: lacking the budget or personnel or both to litigate; a

cost/benefit analysis making the issue not worth fighting in any

particular year; or changes in tax rates, an increase in the number

and value of exemptions claimed, and economic conditions. When

a significant issue arises that in a property appraiser’s estimation

of the balance of factors merits litigation, the property appraiser

must be free to litigate in the first instance without being bound

by prior VAB decisions; otherwise, the express statutory

requirement of a de-novo standard of review in a circuit court

denominated in the constitution as having original and exclusive

jurisdiction is meaningless. The alternative would force property

appraisers to preemptively litigate all significant tax exemptions

annually lest they be penned in by their own equitable or

economic-reality forbearance of a prior year. They simply do not

have the resources to do that, and if they had to do it, the result

would be to impose significant additional costs and delays on

taxpayers who otherwise would get a bye for one or more years.

Finally, even putting aside the practical point that it is highly

unlikely any elected property appraiser would “force” the same

taxpayer to dispute an exemption ruling year after year, the

statutes even-handedly provide taxpayers as well as property

appraisers the means to obtain finality: file suit in circuit court.

Taxpayers are free to try for a favorable ruling informally and then

go to court if necessary, but also can go directly to circuit court. In

either approach, taxpayers have available and within their control

a clear path for obtaining finality.

In the unique context of ad valorem taxation, which by

constitution, statute, and rule operates on a year-at-a-time cycle

and mandates de-novo review in a circuit court having original and

exclusive jurisdiction, we reject the Academy’s administrative-

finality argument, and reverse the circuit court’s judgment.

REVERSED.

RAY, C.J., and WOLF, LEWIS, ROBERTS, ROWE, BILBREY, KELSEY,

WINOKUR, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

OSTERHAUS, J., concurs in part in an opinion in which B.L.

THOMAS, J., joins.

MAKAR, J., dissents in an opinion in which WETHERELL and JAY,

JJ., join.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or

9.331.

_____________________________

OSTERHAUS, J., concurring in part.

I concur in the Court’s per curiam opinion, except for the part

about administrative finality. I don’t see the need to decide in

broad strokes whether Value Adjustment Board decisions merit

decisional finality because, regardless of the answer to this issue,

the Academy’s tipsy-coachman argument loses. See Palm Beach

Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship v. Nantucket Enters., 211 So.

3d 42, 45 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (avoiding adjudication of a first

impression issue where the underlying evidence failed to support

the argument). Administrative finality doesn’t apply where the

facts have materially changed. Here, even if administrative

finality applies to VAB exemption decisions, the 2008 decision did

not fit the new facts and changed conditions relied upon by the

Academy to prove its case for the 2014 and 2015 tax-year

exemptions. For this reason, the circuit court and VAB did not err

by declining to apply decisional finality.

The Florida Supreme Court has warned courts and

administrative agencies to apply the doctrine of res judicata “with

‘great caution’ in administrative cases.” Thomson v. Dep’t of Envtl.

Regulation, 511 So. 2d 989, 991 (Fla. 1987). The Court in Thomson

set forth a “proper rule” that res judicata will apply in

administrative cases only if the subsequent case “is not supported

by new facts, changed conditions, or additional submissions by the

applicant.” Id. (citing Doheny v. Grove Isle, Ltd., 442 So. 2d 966,

976 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)); see also Fla. Power Corp. v. Garcia, 780

So. 2d 34, 44 (Fla. 2001).

This case involved new facts, new circumstances, and

additional submissions, as well as an uber-equivocal exemption

decision in 2008. Even the VAB itself refused to follow its own 2008

decision in this case. And it’s not hard to see why.

“Redetermination of issues is warranted if there is reason to doubt

the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of procedures followed in

prior litigation.” B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135

S.Ct. 1293, 1309 (2015) (quoting Montana v. United States, 440

U.S. 147, 164 n.11 (1979)). In the 2008 case, the VAB relied

completely upon the Special Magistrate’s recommendation, which

barely reached a conclusion on the Academy’s exemption after

reviewing the law and evidence. The Special Magistrate granted

the exemption because it considered the statute “ambiguous and

very difficult to comprehend”:

2. The undersigned has read this statute again and again

to try to understand its meaning. The statute appears to

be unclear. There is no case law or other information

which the undersigned could find which clarifies the

statute or provides any assistance with its interpretation.

....

6. The Commission for Independent Education issued the

Petitioner an annual license. . . .

7. This certification appears to allow the Petitioner to

come within the meaning of “educational institution” as

set forth in the statute. This would allow it to obtain an

educational tax exemption.

8. This issue needs to be addressed by the Legislature to

provide clarity. Reviewing this issue by reading all the

statutes which are involved would seem to suggest that

the Petitioner should be qualified as an educational

institution and receive the appropriate tax

exemption. . . . Taking all the above into consideration

the undersigned is going to recommend that the petition

be granted because the statute is ambiguous and very

difficult to comprehend.

(Emphasis added.) This result is exactly the opposite of how tax

exemption issues are supposed to be decided. See Nat’l Ctr. for

Construction Educ. & Research Ltd., Corp. v. Crapo, 248 So. 3d

1256, 1257-58 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (citing Sowell, 192 So. 3d at 30)

(requiring tax exemptions to be strictly construed, with

ambiguities resolved against the claimed exemption). The 2008

VAB, in turn, checked a box on the 2008 “Final Decision” form

indicating that it “considered and adopts all the special

magistrate’s findings of fact and conclusions of law (attached).”

With such a vacillating 2008 order, it is not surprising that in

2014, the VAB put no stock in its own prior order. It declined the

Academy’s invitation to decide the 2014 and 2015 tax-year issues

based on the 2008 decision, giving “no weight to the recommended

decision of the VAB special magistrate from 2008, nor to the fact

that the exemption was granted in that instance.” It chose instead

to make the exemption decision for tax years 2014 and 2015 based

on the current evidence. And the circuit court made the same

decision to let the 2014 and 2015 tax years stand on their own

validity. Because of the doubtful quality of the 2008 decision and

process, I see no error in the VAB and circuit court decisions

against applying administrative finality and would not tipsy-

coachman affirm this case. See Powell v. State, 120 So. 3d 577, 591

(Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (remarking that the tipsy coachman doctrine

“does not compel [appellate courts] to overlook deficient records

and blaze new trails”).

In addition to the decisional deficiencies in the 2008 order, the

case record in this case for tax years 2014 and 2015 contained new

and different evidence. To begin with, the 2014-15 evidence

included a new parcel that was not part of the 2008 case. According

to the Academy’s summary judgment evidence, it purchased an

adjacent property in late 2014, that it claimed to be mostly used

for educational purposes (part was leased to a third party for

purposes not identified in the record). The Academy sought for an

educational exemption to be applied to this property too, according

to the ratio of its educational use for the first time in this litigation.

The question of whether this property qualified for the educational

exemption was not part of the 2008 case. And administrative

finality does not apply where there are new facts and changed

conditions. Thomson, 511 So. 2d at 991. Each case must stand on

its own.

The Academy also offered new exhibits and affidavits

attesting to its ongoing educational work on the properties.

Whereas the Special Magistrate’s 2008 decision hinged on the

Academy possessing a “certification appear[ing] to allow the

Petitioner to come within the meaning of ‘educational institution,’”

the Academy put “voluminous” evidence into the 2014-2015 record

of this case, as the Special Magistrate recognized. An affidavit

from the Academy’s Executive Director gave up-to-date

information regarding educational programs offered on-site,

numbers of students, descriptions of faculty and property, etc.,

with supporting exhibits. The Executive Director’s affidavit also

addressed state approval for the Academy’s new bachelor’s degree

program: “On January 8, 2014, the Florida Department of

Education Commission for Independent Education approved the

Academy’s request for a bachelor’s degree program in Health

Science.“ And it submitted other post-2008 exhibits, including: an

application and documentation submitted to the Commission in

2014; its Renewal of Accreditation from ACAOM (2011); an

approval letter from the United States Department of Education

(2015); and a state Department of Revenue Consumer’s Certificate

of Exemption (2013). This evidence was key to bolstering the

Academy’s case for the 2014 and 2015 exemptions because of the

statutory importance of showing that it conducted “regular classes

and courses.” § 196.012(5), Fla. Stat.

For his part, Property Appraiser Crapo disputed the efficacy

of this evidence in the circuit court:

It is the Defendant’s burden to establish that they

conduct regular classes and courses of study “required for

eligibility to certification by . . . the State Department of

Education of Florida . . .”. (DOE) § 196.012(5), Fla. Stat.

Davis v. Macedonia Hous. Auth., 641 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1994). The Defendant has never tendered any

evidence or rule of the DOE establishing the required

regular classes or courses. . . .

And contrary to the dissent’s view, I don’t see a stipulation from

the Property Appraiser in the record below or read the briefs to say

that everything material remained static from 2008 to 2014. Nor

did the circuit court make such a finding. The record shows that

the parties contested this case based upon the current evidence.

Thus, under administrative finality principles, because of the new

and contested evidence, it was well within the discretion of the

VAB and circuit court to resolve the case based on the current

evidence instead of deferring to the 2008 decision. See Delray Med.

Ctr., Inc. v. State Agency for Health Care Admin., 5 So. 3d 26, 29

(Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (determining whether a significant change in

circumstances has occurred for administrative finality purposes

lies primarily within the discretion of the agency).

For these reasons, because of the equivocal 2008 decision and

the existence of new facts, changed conditions, and post-2008

evidentiary submissions, and especially in view of the Florida

Supreme Court’s admonition to exercise “great caution” in

applying decisional finality in administrative cases, I see no error

in the decisions of the circuit court and VAB on this issue. Thus, I

would not tipsy-coachman affirm this case.

_____________________________

MAKAR, J., dissenting.

Florida’s sixty-seven value adjustment boards, which issue

formal written rulings in hundreds of property tax disputes

annually after notice, evidentiary hearings, and many other due

process protections, are quasi-judicial tribunals to which

principles of finality and preclusion apply. For this reason, a

property appraiser who fails to challenge a tax exemption

previously granted by a value adjustment board may not relitigate

the exemption absent a showing of changed circumstances, which

admittedly do not exist in this case. Affirmance is thereby

required.

The Academy for Five Element Acupuncture, Inc., was

founded in 1995 as a not-for-profit private postsecondary school to

provide academic instruction and clinical training in acupuncture,

which is a regulated medical profession in Florida. See Chapter

457, Florida Statutes. The Academy held an educational tax

exemption under 196.012(5), Florida Statutes, on its real and

personal property in Broward County for over a decade.

In 2008, the Academy moved to Gainesville, Florida, where it

purchased property in the southeastern quadrant of historic

downtown and applied for the same tax exemption. Edward A.

Crapo, Alachua County’s property appraiser since his election in

1980, denied the exemption, asserting the Academy was not an

“educational institution” for exemption purposes. Crapo and the

Academy litigated the exemption in the Alachua County Value

Adjustment Board (VAB), which ruled that the Academy was

entitled to the educational exemption, a decision Crapo could have

appealed, but did not.

Despite admitting that nothing had changed, Crapo denied

the Academy’s exemption in 2014 and has done so for each

subsequent tax year, spawning this litigation in which the

Academy again prevailed. A question on appeal is whether a

property appraiser, who admits no change in circumstances, is

barred by principles of res judicata from re-litigating a property

tax exemption previously granted in a final order of a value

adjustment board after an adjudicatory hearing where the

property appraiser failed to appeal the prior decision. The question

is answered by reviewing whether principles of res judicata apply

to value adjustment boards, and, if so, whether any countervailing

reasons exist to judicially exclude value adjustment boards from

their application.

II.

Our Nation’s judicial systems have long recognized that

principles of finality and preclusion apply not only to courts but to

federal and state administrative bodies acting in a quasi-judicial

capacity as well.

We have long favored application of the common-law

doctrines of collateral estoppel (as to issues) and res

judicata (as to claims) to those determinations of

administrative bodies that have attained finality. “When

an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity

and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it

which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to

litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res

judicata to enforce repose.” . . . The principle holds true

when a court has resolved an issue, and should do so

equally when the issue has been decided by an

administrative agency, be it state or federal, . . . which

acts in a judicial capacity.

Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107-08

(1991) (citations omitted). The justification for preclusion is the

“sound and obvious principle of judicial policy that a losing litigant

deserves no rematch after a defeat fairly suffered, in adversarial

proceedings, on an issue identical in substance to the one he

subsequently seeks to raise.” Id. at 107. Allowing re-litigation of

matters previously resolved would “impose unjustifiably upon

those who have already shouldered their burdens, and drain the

resources of an adjudicatory system with disputes resisting

resolution.” Id. at 107-08 (citation omitted).

Florida is no different, where it is well-established that the

decisions of governmental bodies acting in a quasi-judicial capacity

are subject to principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel. See

Thomson v. Dep’t of Envtl. Regulation, 511 So. 2d 989, 991 (Fla.

1987) (“It is now well settled that res judicata may be applied in

administrative proceedings.”); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. City of

Jacksonville, 678 So. 2d 528, 529 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (“Res

judicata (and collateral estoppel) ‘is applicable to rulings or

decisions of administrative bodies[.]’”) (citation omitted); Jet Air

Freight v. Jet Air Freight Delivery, Inc., 264 So. 2d 35, 40 (Fla. 3d

DCA 1972) (same); Metro. Dade Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v.

Rockmatt Corp., 231 So. 2d 41, 44 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970) (same);

Rubin v. Sanford, 168 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964) (“There

is little question that administrative proceedings are subject to the

doctrine of res judicata, 9 and the courts of this state have similarly

so concluded.”) (footnote omitted). These principles of decisional

finality apply unless a showing is made that a substantial change

of circumstances has occurred that justifies a different result, as

discussed in more detail later in this opinion. See generally

Thomson, 511 So. 2d at 991 (proper rule “is that res judicata will

apply only if the second application is not supported by new facts,

changed conditions, or additional submissions by the applicant.”);

Holiday Inns, Inc., 678 So. 2d at 528 (same).

A governmental body acts in a quasi-judicial manner when,

after notice and a hearing, it enters a judgment based on the

evidence presented. See, e.g., Broward Cty. v. La Rosa, 505 So. 2d

422, 423 (Fla. 1987) (“An administrative agency conducts a quasi-

judicial proceeding in order to investigate and ascertain the

existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from those

hearings as a basis for their official actions.”); Anoll v. Pomerance,

363 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla. 1978) (“a judgment becomes judicial or

quasi-judicial, as distinguished from executive, when notice and

hearing are required and the judgment of the board is contingent

on the showing made at the hearing.”); De Groot v. Sheffield, 95

So. 2d 912, 915 (Fla. 1957) (“. . . when notice and a hearing are

required and the judgment of the board is contingent on the

showing made at the hearing, then its judgment becomes judicial

9 See Fla. Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n v. Wakulla

Fishermen’s Ass’n, Inc., 141 So. 3d 723, 726 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)

(“’The doctrine of res judicata applies when four identities are

present: (1) identity of the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause

of action; (3) identity of persons and parties to the action; and (4)

identity of the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim

is made.’ Topps v. State, 865 So.2d 1253, 1255 (Fla.2004).”).

“Administrative finality” is a phrase sometimes used to describe

res judicata in the administrative context. Delray Med. Ctr., Inc. v.

State Ag. for Health Care Admin., 5 So. 3d 26, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA

2009) (“In the field of administrative law, the counterpart to res

judicata is administrative finality.”). See also Coral Reef Nurseries,

Inc. v. Babcock Co., 410 So. 2d 648, 651 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (“The

doctrine of administrative res judicata is firmly entrenched as part

of the decisional law of the State of Florida in relation to zoning

cases.”).

or quasi-judicial as distinguished from being purely executive.”);

cf. Teston v. City of Tampa, 143 So. 2d 473, 476 (Fla. 1962) (holding

that order of board of police and fireman’s pensions fund not quasi-

judicial because “it was a purely administrative determination

without hearing or adversary evidence,” noting that “the statute

under which the [board] operates makes no requirement whatever

for a notice and hearing preliminary to decision.”).

[T]he test of the quasi judicial function . . . [is] whether or

not the statutory tribunal had exercised a statutory

power given it to make a decision having a judicial

character or attribute and consequent upon some notice

or hearing provided to be had before it as a condition for

the rendition of the particular decision made.

W. Flagler Amusement Co. v. State Racing Comm’n, 165 So. 64, 65

(Fla. 1935) (“A judicial or quasi judicial act determines the rules of

law applicable, and the rights affected by them, in relation to past

transactions.”). Similarly,

[i]f the affected party is entitled by law to the essentially

judicial procedures of notice and hearing, and to have the

action taken based upon the showing made at the

hearing, the activity is judicial in nature. If such activity

occurs other than in a court of law, we refer to it as quasi-

judicial.

Modlin v. City of Miami Beach, 201 So. 2d 70, 74 (Fla. 1967); see

generally Robert Lincoln & Sidney F. Ansbacher, What’s A Local

Government Got to Do to Get Reviewed Around Here? Review of

Local Administrative Actions by Common Law Certiorari After

Pleasures II v. City of Sarasota, 77 FLA. B.J. 50, 51 (2003)

(discussing four minimum requirements for quasi-judicial

hearings as notice, an informal hearing, a written decision based

on the record, and fairness protections including an unbiased

decisionmaker protected from ex parte contacts and political

influence).

Value adjustment boards in Florida easily meet the test for

whether they act in a quasi-judicial manner in tax disputes: they

are statutorily created tribunals specifically empowered to

adjudicate and render binding decisions after notice, a hearing and

broad due process protections. They are perfect examples of the

type of statutorily created administrative bodies that the state

constitution says may be given quasi-judicial powers. Art. V, § 1,

Fla. Const. (“Commissions established by law, or administrative

officers or bodies may be granted quasi-judicial power in matters

connected with the functions of their offices.”); see, e.g., Verdi v.

Metro. Dade County, 684 So. 2d 870, 874 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)

(county code enforcement proceedings that involve hearing officer

rulings appealable to the circuit court “fall squarely within the

parameters of a constitutionally authorized quasi-judicial

proceeding.”).

Value adjustment boards are among the most structured and

regulated administrative tribunals in the State of Florida. They

operate within a highly detailed statutory and regulatory

framework, the sole purpose of which is to facilitate the full and

fair adjudication of disputes as to property tax assessments,

exemptions, classifications, deferrals, and related matters. Their

raison d’être is to adjudge property tax disputes. An entire chapter

of the Florida Statutes—Chapter 194, entitled “Administrative

and Judicial Review of Property Taxes”—is devoted to value

adjustment boards and their role in the adjudication of property

tax disputes. See §§ 194.011-194.3015, Fla. Stat. (2019).

Supplementing this 30+ pages/9000+ words of statutory language

are voluminous regulations, adopted by the Department of

Revenue, to implement this statutory structure, consisting of

thirty-seven rules—all with multiple subparts, sub-subparts and

sub-sub-subparts—whose word counts far exceed that of their

implementing statutes (approximately 20,000+ words). See Fla.

Admin. Code R. 12D-9.001 to 12D-9.038 (2019).

Value adjustment board hearings are not subject to the

general administrative process statute, Chapter 120, for good

reason: they have their own hyper-detailed statutory framework.

§ 194.034(1)(i), Fla. Stat. (2019). (“Chapter 120 does not apply to

hearings of the value adjustment board.”); see also Kent Wetherell,

The New Burdens of Proof in Ad Valorem Tax Valuation Cases, 25

FLA. ST. U. L. Rev. 185, 193–94 (1998) (“The hearings on the

petitions, whether conducted by the value adjustment board or a

special master, are quasi-judicial in nature and must be conducted

in accordance with the rules adopted by DOR.”).

Value Adjustment Board Composition & Independence. Value

adjustment boards are designed to provide for collegial and ethical

decision-making, insulated from improper influences, political and

otherwise. Each county has a value adjustment board consisting of

five members: two county commissioners, one school board

member, and two citizens. 10 All value adjustment board members

are subject to ethical restrictions including recusal standards and

prohibitions on conflicts of interest. 11 Each value adjustment board

is required to have its own legal counsel, who must be a private

practitioner with at least five years of experience. 12 Legal counsel

has broad responsibilities to both the board itself as well as the

fairness of the process. 13 Like board members, legal counsel are

10One citizen member, who is appointed by the county, must

own homestead property in that county; the other, who is

appointed by the school district, must own a business occupying

commercial space in that district. § 194.015, Fla. Stat. (2019).

11See Fla. Admin. Code R. 12D-9.022 (2019). Disqualification

or Recusal of Special Magistrates or Board Members.

12 Id. R. 12D-9.008(1)-(2) (2019) (“Each value adjustment

board must appoint private legal counsel to assist the board . . .

This legal counsel must be an attorney in private practice . . . [and]

must have practiced law for over five years” prior to appointment.);