Prawdzik v. Board of Trustees of the Homer Township Fire Protection District Pension Fund

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Appellate Court Date: 2019.07.02

14:22:58 -05'00'

Prawdzik v. Board of Trustees of the Homer Township Fire Protection District

Pension Fund, 2019 IL App (3d) 170024

Appellate Court GREGORY PRAWDZIK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF

Caption TRUSTEES OF THE HOMER TOWNSHIP FIRE PROTECTION

DISTRICT PENSION FUND, Defendant-Appellee.

District & No. Third District

Docket No. 3-17-0024

Opinion filed upon

denial of rehearing March 27, 2019

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, No. 16-MR-1067; the

Review Hon. John C. Anderson, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed; cause remanded.

Counsel on Thomas S. Radja Jr., of Collins & Radja, of Naperville, for appellant.

Appeal

Jeffrey A. Goodloe, of Puchalski Goodloe Marzullo, LLP, of

Northbrook, for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Justice McDade concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Presiding Justice Schmidt dissented, with opinion.

OPINION

¶1 The plaintiff, Gregory Prawdzik (Prawdzik), a former firefighter, brought an action for

administrative review to the circuit court of Will County appealing the decision of the

defendant, the Board of Trustees of the Homer Township Fire Protection District Pension Fund

(Board), denying Prawdzik a “line of duty” disability pension. The circuit court affirmed the

Board’s decision. This appeal followed.

¶2 FACTS

¶3 Prawdzik was employed as a firefighter for the Homer Township Fire Protection District

Fire Department (District) starting on May 8, 2006. He also served in the Air National Guard.

¶4 In 2008-09, during his employment as a firefighter, Prawdzik was deployed for military

duty in Afghanistan for a 10-month period. He was deployed to the eastern border of

Afghanistan, near the border with Pakistan, where he served as a combat medic and combat

advisor. The area where Prawdzik served was a thoroughfare for Taliban insurgents. Prawdzik

trained, mentored, and advised a medical platoon of a battalion-sized element of the Afghan

army. He accompanied his Afghan unit on combat missions approximately three to four times

per week. Missions could last anywhere from several hours to one week. Prawdzik provided

medical treatment to troops who later died.

¶5 Prawdzik testified that he encountered many life-threatening incidents while he was in

Afghanistan. While on combat missions, Prawdzik was shot at approximately 10 times.

Moreover, he testified that he experienced approximately 10 rocket attacks or improvised

explosive device (IED) attacks. On one occasion, insurgents fired rockets at the base where

Prawdzik was stationed. Prawdzik rolled out of his bunk and laid on the floor. As the rockets

kept coming, someone yelled for everyone to get to the bunkers. Prawdzik thought he was

going to die and was thinking about his wife and son and how they would get along without

him. The rockets hit another barracks approximately 100 meters from Prawdzik’s tent, killing

two contractors.

¶6 On another occasion, a rocket attack occurred while Prawdzik was in the “chow hall.”

Prawdzik testified that the door bowed in, all the lights shut off, the emergency power came on,

and the room was filled with dust. He felt that his life was in jeopardy. Prawdzik testified that,

on another occasion, he had to “go with Afghans and interpreters through the kill zone onto the

other side of the kill zone” to try to find his partner who had become separated from the rest of

the unit while the unit was on patrol. During that incident, Prawdzik was under

rocket-propelled grenade fire.

¶7 Prawdzik testified that he also experienced IED attacks. On one occasion, Prawdzik was

driving in a convoy of United States military mine resistant ambush proof (MRAP) vehicles

when the convoy was struck by an IED. Prawdzik heard a loud boom and “everything went

black.” He was thrown to the back of the vehicle and hit his head. The blow rendered him

unconscious. When he came to, his vehicle was flipped upside down in a crater. Prawdzik

testified that he was trapped upside down in the vehicle by a 400-pound door and he was

unable to get out for over an hour. During that time, Prawdzik was afraid for his life and in fear

of being attacked before he could be rescued. He suffered a head injury and was diagnosed

with a traumatic brain injury.

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¶8 Prawdzik testified that, while he was in Afghanistan, he felt as though his life was under

constant threat and that he was going to die there. He did not trust the Afghans he patrolled

with because he suspected that “half of them were Taliban,” and there were regular reports of

Afghan military or police “turning on their U.S. counterparts and shooting them.” While he

was getting haircuts in Afghanistan, he feared that the Afghan barber might kill him with a pair

of scissors.

¶9 Prawdzik returned from Afghanistan and resumed working as a firefighter for the District

on November 1, 2009. After he returned from Afghanistan, Prawdzik suffered from a variety

of symptoms that he did not have before his deployment. For example, Prawdzik suffered from

migraine headaches, panic attacks, tightness in his chest, shortness of breath, nausea, blurred

(or “tunnel”) vision, irritability, sadness, emotional numbness, poor concentration, insomnia,

and feelings of being detached from family and friends. Prawdzik acknowledged that these

were symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).1 He sought treatment through the

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). On February 9, 2010, Prawdzik showed signs of PTSD

during a mental health screen, and he reported the traumatic experiences he had experienced in

Afghanistan. On March 11, 2010, Dr. Thomas Benton of the VA diagnosed Prawdzik with

PTSD, adjustment disorder with anxiety, and depressed mood. Dr. Benton opined that

Prawdzik’s PTSD symptoms (such as mild depression, passive suicidal ideation, emotional

blunting, and irritability leading to verbal altercations and road rage) had increased in

frequency and intensity due to “the post-military stressors of unstructured time and frustration

over continuous Iraq and Afghanistan war news.”

¶ 10 On March 15, 2010, Prawdzik underwent a psychiatric assessment at the VA due to

“irritability with explosive outbursts.” He was receiving mental health treatment from a private

psychologist at that time. Prawdzik reported that he was concerned that his mental health

issues might jeopardize his career with the District. The following day, Prawdzik underwent a

neurological consultation during which he reported symptoms of PTSD, including sleep

disturbances. The examiner opined that Prawdzik’s sleep disturbances and current life

stressors “may be contributing to his current cognitive inefficiencies” and that these

impairments represented a “change” and a “relative reduction” in Prawdzik’s abilities. The

consult recommended mental health treatment.

¶ 11 The VA determined that Prawdzik’s PTSD was related to his military service and awarded

him VA disability benefits for PTSD, traumatic brain injury, and tinnitus. Prawdzik attended

group therapy for PTSD on June 1, 2010, but did not continue with the therapy in 2010.

1

PTSD is an anxiety disorder that occurs after an individual has experienced a traumatic event.

More specifically, it is a psychological response to an extreme traumatic stressor involving direct

personal experience of an event that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury or threat to

one’s physical integrity or witnessing an event that involves death, injury, or threat to the physical

integrity of another person. The person’s response to the event must involve intense fear, helplessness,

or horror. Characteristic symptoms resulting from the exposure to the trauma include persistent

re-experiencing of the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness and persistent increased

symptoms of arousal. Associated features include depressed mood; anxiety and irritability; sleep

disturbance; difficulty concentrating; hypervigilance; exaggerated startle response; efforts to avoid

activities, places, or people that arouse recollection of the trauma; feeling detached from others;

markedly diminished interest or participation in activities; and recurrent and intrusive distressing

recollection of the events.

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¶ 12 Prawdzik testified that he experienced panic attacks and related symptoms while on duty as

a firefighter in 2009 and 2010 but that he did not report them to the District because he was

hoping the situation would “resolve and take care of itself.” He also experienced panic attacks

when he was not on duty. While attempting to complete a driving program at work, Prawdzik

was “having issues with getting in the vehicles and driving the larger vehicles.” He testified

that the MRAP vehicles he drove in Afghanistan were built similarly to fire department trucks

in that they had the same chassis that a fire engine has, as well as the same steering column,

transmission, brake system, and an identical inside cab area.

¶ 13 On July 13, 2011, Prawdzik informed the district that he suffered from PTSD. He discussed

some of his experiences in Afghanistan and reported that one of the things that bothered him at

work was driving the fire engine and other trucks, noting the similarity between these trucks

and military vehicles. He attributed this problem to PTSD. Approximately one month later,

Prawdzik met with his supervisors and discussed traumatic events that had occurred during his

deployment. The District placed Prawdzik on administrative leave, ordered a fitness for duty

evaluation, and required Prawdzik to complete a driving program.

¶ 14 On August 23, 2011, Dr. Tracy Rogers performed a fitness for duty evaluation for

Prawdzik. Dr. Rogers noted that Prawdzik did not feel comfortable driving the fire engine or

trucks because of the similarity between those vehicles and the military vehicles he drove in

Afghanistan and that sitting in the cab of the fire trucks “triggers [his] PTSD symptoms.” Dr.

Rogers diagnosed Prawdzik with PTSD and found him conditionally fit for duty. Dr. Rogers

opined that, although Prawdzik had had PTSD for the past two years, his symptoms did not

appear to have affected his work performance or overall functioning. However, Dr. Rogers

acknowledged that certain thoughts about trauma caused Prawdzik stress and “exacerbated

[his] symptoms” and that Prawdzik was avoiding driving the fire engine and trucks because the

cabs of those vehicles reminded him of the military vehicles that he drove while deployed,

including the vehicle he was trapped in after receiving a head injury.

¶ 15 On August 6, 2013, Prawdzik sought mental health treatment form the VA and reported

increased PTSD symptoms, including anxiety, nightmares, recurrent thoughts of trauma,

feeling watchful and getting easily startled, and feelings of numbness and detachment. He

reported that his recent increase in anxiety symptoms was triggered mostly by a stressful work

environment. Specifically, he felt scrutinized at work because the District had a new chief who

was writing people up, demoting them, and firing them. He also stated that his PTSD

symptoms were exacerbated by driving the rigs at work, although he had passed the driving

program ordered by his supervisors. The social worker who evaluated Prawdzik opined that

PTSD symptoms may be perpetuated by the “trauma of war” and that Prawdzik’s symptoms

were impacted by “occupational stress” and “parenting stress.”

¶ 16 On September 3, 2013, Prawdzik began therapy for PTSD and marital issues. During a

September 11, 2013, session, he reported that he was “triggered at work when driving large

trucks or hearing loud noises” and that he tended to be hypervigilant and “extra worried about

safety issues.” He discussed the many combat traumas he had experienced. On September 27,

2013, Dr. Pradipkumar Desai examined Prawdzik at the VA for anxiety and depression. Dr.

Desai noted that Prawdzik’s reduction in alcohol consumption had “significantly” reduced his

PTSD symptoms, but also noted that Prawdzik’s mood was sad and anxious. Dr. Desai

diagnosed Prawdzik with PTSD exacerbated by physical stressors. Prawdzik testified that the

stress and anxiety he was treated for in 2013 were a continuation of the PTSD symptoms he

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had been experiencing since 2009, that his PTSD was “from Afghanistan,” and that his doctors

had told him that he would have these symptoms for the rest of his life.

¶ 17 On June 20 and September 20, 2014, Dr. Desai examined Prawdzik again for PTSD.

During both sessions, Prawdzik presented with depressed mood and reported that he was

suffering from “nightmares and flashbacks.” During his August 18, 2014, District physical,

Prawdzik reported that he had experienced weakness and fatigue, as well as persistent anxiety,

lack of concentration, and insomnia during the past few months. He later testified that the

effects of the war were taking a toll on his mental health in 2013 and 2014.

¶ 18 On November 7, 2014, Prawdzik was working full duties as a firefighter when he was

dispatched to an emergency call. On the way back from the call, the fire truck Prawdzik was

driving was shifting roughly between gears. As Prawdzik tried to check the pump shift lever to

fix the problem, he inadvertently hit the power switch, shutting off all the power in the vehicle

while the vehicle was traveling at approximately 45 miles per hour. This reminded Prawdzik of

his experience in Afghanistan when his vehicle was hit by an IED, and it gave Prawdzik the

feeling that he was going to die. Prawdzik testified that he had an anxiety attack after the

November 7, 2014, incident and that his PTSD symptoms of anxiety got progressively worse

thereafter. For example, Prawdzik stated that, over the next few days, he began to feel tightness

in his chest, blurred vision, shortness of breath, and was having trouble concentrating.

However, Prawdzik admitted that he may have been having increasing anxiety prior to the

November 7, 2014, incident. Prawdzik did not report having a panic attack on November 7,

2014.

¶ 19 On November 16, 2014 (two duty shift days after the November 7, 2014, incident),

Prawdzik reported the issues he was having with PTSD and asked to go home. He was placed

on modified duty and never returned to full, unrestricted duty thereafter. During the three years

prior to the November 7, 2014, incident, Prawdzik had been able to perform his full,

unrestricted firefighter duties despite his PTSD.

¶ 20 Prawdzik underwent another fitness for duty evaluation on November 21, 2014. At that

time, Prawdzik reported experiencing anxiety symptoms (including a panic attack that

occurred during the November 7, 2014, work incident), but he denied experiencing any

symptoms of PTSD aside from generalized anxiety. The evaluator (Dr. Wasyliw) noted that

Prawdzik did not associate his anxiety symptoms with his “service-connected” experiences,

and that Prawdzik had problems on the job only when driving trucks reminiscent of those he

drove in Afghanistan. Dr. Wasyliw concluded that Prawdzik was unable to drive fire trucks

due to his anxiety issues. Because it is a necessary requirement of Prawdzik’s employment that

he be able to drive all Department vehicles at any time, Dr. Wasyliw found Prawdzik unfit for

duty. Dr. Wasyliw opined that the claimant was unfit for duty due to “generalized anxiety

disorder with residual PTSD symptoms and a major depressive episode.” Dr. Wasyliw noted

that Prawdzik had been experiencing increasing “generalized” anxiety for a few days in early

November, which “became worse” after the November 7, 2014, work incident, when the

power went out in the truck the claimant was driving. Dr. Wasyliw opined that Prawdzik’s

anxiety disorder was “more widespread” at the time of his November 21, 2014, evaluation than

it had been when the claimant underwent a previous fitness for duty evaluation in 2011.

Although Dr. Wasyliw “could not uncover any specific precipitants or stressors” that triggered

Prawdzik’s increased anxiety during the week prior to the November 7, 2014, incident, Dr.

Wasyliw noted that (1) Prawdzik had “report[ed] a number of long standing physical

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symptoms that may have a medical basis” and (2) Prawdzik had recently begun taking a new

medication for a urinary condition and it “needs to be assessed” whether the new medication

was contributing to Prawdzik’s anxiety and depression.

¶ 21 Thereafter, Prawdzik continued to undergo mental health treatment for PTSD. His mental

health records indicate that he continued to experience PTSD symptoms, including panic

attacks while driving and during other situations. A May 2015 fitness for duty evaluation

concluded that Prawdzik’s panic attacks could occur at any time and were not related to any

specific situation. On April 17, 2015, Prawdzik reported increased panic attacks and was

placed on administrative leave. A June 3, 2015, PTSD assessment at the VA concluded that

(1) Prawdzik’s job duties as a firefighter resembled his service-related traumas, which have

“contributed to his PTSD symptoms relapse,” and (2) it is more likely than not that Prawdzik’s

“current level of social and occupational impairment due to his PTSD symptoms remains

similar to that reported on his last PTSD evaluation dated March 11, 2010.”

¶ 22 On June 18, 2015, Prawdzik filed an application for disability benefits with the Board.

Pursuant to section 4-112 of the Illinois Pension Code (Code) (40 ILCS 5/4-112 (West 2014)),

the Board had Prawdzik evaluated by three physicians of its choosing: Dr. Robert Reff, Dr.

Stevan Weine, and Dr. Cathy Frank.

¶ 23 Dr. Reff opined that Prawdzik suffers from generalized anxiety disorder with residual

post-traumatic symptoms. Dr. Reff concluded that this condition prevented Prawdzik from

functioning as a firefighter because it limits his ability to drive large vehicles, including fire

trucks and engines. Although Dr. Reff acknowledged that Prawdzik’s preexisting PTSD and

anxiety disorder was caused by his combat experiences in Afghanistan, he opined that

Prawdzik’s disability from PTSD was, at least in part, the result of his firefighter duties. Dr.

Reff explained:

“It is my opinion that Mr. Prawdzik suffers from a disability resulting from an act of

duty. After completing the sixth month Corrective Plan established by Dr. Rogers in

September 2011, it appears as if Mr. Prawdzik was able to perform adequately as a

firefighter/paramedic, including driving as required. It was not until [the November 7,

2014, incident] that Mr. Prawdzik experienced performance limiting anxiety again. ***

Mr. Prawdzik’s current episode would be considered an aggravation of his pre-existing

psychiatric condition, more likely than not, caused by the incident that occurred on

November 7, 2014.”

Dr. Reff further opined that Prawdzik’s current disability was “permanent” based upon the

length of time that Prawdzik had suffered some degree of symptoms and “the significance of

symptoms he suffered following the [November 7, 2014] incident.”

¶ 24 Dr. Weine opined that Prawdzik was disabled and suffered from chronic PTSD, recurrent

major depression, and isolated traumatic stress symptoms. Dr. Weine concluded that, over

time, Prawdzik’s PTSD symptoms had diminished to the point where he no longer meets the

formal diagnostic criteria for PTSD, but he continues to suffer from generalized anxiety

disorder and major depressive disorder. Dr. Weine opined that (1) “the persistence and

worsening” of Prawdzik’s disorders was due to his “exposure to stress as a firefighter/EMS”

and (2) “[Prawdzik’s] conditions were initially caused by his combat exposure in Afghanistan

but were exacerbated by the stress of firefighter work.”

¶ 25 Dr. Frank opined that Prawdzik’s PTSD prevented him from driving firefighting vehicles,

which was an essential part of his job. She concluded that Prawdzik’s exposure to trauma on

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the job “continues to aggravate his PTSD causing anxiety, hypervigilance, insomnia, and panic

attacks,” and “as long as [Prawdzik] continues to drive the fire fighting/paramedic vehicles

required for his employment, he will continue to have aggravation of his PTSD.” However, Dr.

Frank opined that it was Prawdzik’s combat exposure, and not any incident or trauma in his

employment, that caused his PTSD and major depressive disorder. According to Dr. Frank,

“[c]ues” from Prawdzik’s employment (such as accidentally turning off the power while

driving a fire engine on November 7, 2014, or driving work-related vehicles generally) “may

aggravate his PTSD at times, but are not the cause of this disorder.”

¶ 26 The Board issued a written order granting Prawdzik a “non-duty” disability pension

pursuant to section 4-111 of the Code but denying him a “line of duty” disability pension

pursuant to section 4-110. The Board found that Prawdzik was entitled to a “non-duty”

disability pension because he was “mentally permanently disabled for service in the fire

service” as a result of the “sickness” of PTSD.

¶ 27 However, the Board denied Prawdzik a “line of duty” disability pension because it found

that the disabling sickness (i.e., Prawdzik’s PTSD) was not “incurred in and did not result from

the performance of an act of duty or the cumulative effects acts of duty.” In support of this

finding, the Board relied upon Dr. Frank’s opinion and other evidence purportedly suggesting

that Prawdzik’s PTSD was not “caused by” the November 7, 2014, work incident or by

Prawdzik’s general firefighting duties. The Board noted that several doctors had diagnosed

Prawdzik with PTSD years before the November 2014 incident and had linked the etiology of

Prawdzik’s PTSD with the traumatic experiences he suffered in Afghanistan. The Board

further noted that the claimant had experienced symptoms of PTSD, including panic attacks,

both before and after the November 2014, incident, and that Dr. Wasyliw opined in 2015 that

the claimant’s panic attacks “could occur at any time” and “were not related to any specific

situation.”2 Moreover, the Board stressed that Prawdzik “was already experiencing increased

anxiety in the weeks leading up to the November 7, 2014, incident,” and it cited Dr. Wasyliw’s

inability to “uncover any specific precipitants or stressors” associated with that increased

anxiety. Relying on Dr. Frank’s opinion, the Board found that the November 7, 2014, incident

had merely triggered symptoms of Prawdzik’s preexisting PTSD but did not cause his PTSD.

¶ 28 The Board also found that there was no evidence to support Prawdzik’s claim that his

disabling PTSD was caused by his performance of “general firefighting/EMS duties.” The

Board noted that Prawdzik was always able to perform general firefighting and EMS duties

(including fire rescue, fire suppression, and EMS duties), “albeit with driving restrictions,”

both before and after the November 7, 2014, incident. The Board also rejected any such claim

as a matter of law. Relying upon our appellate court’s decision in Graves v. Pontiac

Firefighters’ Pension Board, 281 Ill. App. 3d 508, 515 (1996), the Board ruled that, even if

there were evidence to support Prawdzik’s claim that general firefighting and EMS duties

caused his PTSD, the claim would fail because “stress or depression resulting from general

employment functions inherent in the occupation and common to all firefighters is not the

equivalent of the specific acts of duty contemplated by section 4-110” of the Code.

2

The Board acknowledged that, during his November 2014 fitness for duty evaluation, Prawdzik

denied almost all symptoms of PTSD. However, the Board found these denials to be “false in light of

the record.”

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¶ 29 The Board concluded that the “underlying cause” of the claimant’s disabling PTSD was

“external to, and independent of, any specific act of duty or to the cumulative effects of acts of

duty.” It denied Prawdzik’s claim for a “line of duty” pension on that basis.

¶ 30 Prawdzik filed a complaint for administrative review of the Board’s decision in the circuit

court of Will County. The circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision. In its written order, the

circuit court stated that, “[h]ad the [court] been a member of the administrative board, the

[court] might have reached a different conclusion.” However, the circuit court found that,

“regardless of which standard of review is applied, the Court must find that the record does not

justify reversal.”

¶ 31 This appeal followed.

¶ 32 ANALYSIS

¶ 33 Prawdzik appeals the Board’s denial of a line of duty disability pension. Before addressing

the issues raised by Prawdzik, we note that Prawdzik’s brief on appeal does not comply with

the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 342(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2005). That rule provides,

in relevant part, that

“[t]he appellant’s brief shall include, as an appendix, *** a copy of the judgment

appealed from, [and] any opinion, memorandum, or findings of fact filed or entered by

the trial judge or by any administrative agency or its officers. (Emphasis added.) Ill. S.

Ct. R. 342(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2005).

Although Prawdzik included a copy of the circuit court’s order in his appendix, he failed to

include a copy of the Board’s decision, in violation of Rule 342(a). Moreover, the table of

contents to the record on appeal included in Prawdzik’s appendix does not state the names of

all witnesses and the pages on which their testimony begins, as required by Rule 342(a).

¶ 34 When a brief or appendix fails to follow the requirements set forth in Rule 342(a), we may

dismiss the appeal. Perez v. Chicago Park District, 2016 IL App (1st) 153101, ¶ 8. We

admonish Prawdzik’s counsel that our supreme court’s rules are not advisory suggestions but

mandatory rules that must be followed. In re Marriage of Hluska, 2011 IL App (1st) 092636,

¶ 57. Because the parties included citations to the relevant record materials in their briefs on

appeal, Prawdzik’s violation of Rule 342(a) has not precluded meaningful review of the

Board’s decision in this case. Accordingly, although we have the discretion to dismiss this

appeal, we elect to address the issues Prawdzik raises on their merit. However, we admonish

Prawdzik’s counsel, and all appellants, to ensure that their briefs on appeal are in full

compliance with Rule 342(a).

¶ 35 Turning to the merits, we begin by identifying the standards of review governing our

analysis. We review the Board’s decision, not the circuit court’s determination. Village of Oak

Park v. Village of Oak Park Firefighters Pension Board, 362 Ill. App. 3d 357, 365 (2005). The

factual findings of an administrative agency are deemed prima facie true and correct (735

ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2016)) and may be reversed only if they are against the manifest weight of

the evidence (Hammond v. Firefighters’ Pension Fund, 369 Ill. App. 3d 294, 307 (2006)).

Accordingly, we review the Board’s findings of fact regarding the nature of the plaintiff’s

emotional condition and its cause deferentially and will overturn such findings only if they are

against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id.

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¶ 36 An agency’s decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite

conclusion is clearly evident. Carrillo v. Park Ridge Firefighters’ Pension Fund, 2014 IL App

(1st) 130656, ¶ 21. The mere fact that an opposite conclusion is reasonable or that the

reviewing court might have ruled differently will not justify reversal of the Board’s decision.

Robbins v. Board of Trustees of the Carbondale Police Pension Fund, 177 Ill. 2d 533, 538

(1997); Carrillo, 2014 IL App (1st) 130656, ¶ 21. If the record contains evidence supporting

the agency’s decision, the decision should generally be affirmed. Marconi v. Chicago Heights

Police Pension Board, 225 Ill. 2d 497, 534 (2006); Robbins, 177 Ill. 2d at 538. It is particularly

within the Board’s province to accord weight to the evidence, resolve conflicts presented by

the evidence, and determine the credibility of witnesses. Peterson v. Board of Trustees of the

Firemen’s Pension Fund, 54 Ill. 2d 260, 263 (1973); Evert v. Board of Trustees of the Fire

Fighters’ Pension Fund, 180 Ill. App. 3d 656, 660 (1989). A reviewing court may not reweigh

the evidence or make an independent determination of the facts. Hoffman v. Orland

Firefighters’ Pension Board, 2012 IL App (1st) 112120981, ¶ 18.

¶ 37 However, the deference we afford the Board’s decision is “not boundless.” Wade v. City of

North Chicago Police Pension Board, 226 Ill. 2d 485, 507 (2007); see also Scepurek v. Board

of Trustees of the Northbrook Firefighters’ Pension Fund, 2014 IL App (1st) 131066, ¶ 26;

Bowlin v. Murphysboro Firefighters Pension Board of Trustees, 368 Ill. App. 3d 205, 210-12,

(2006) (“our review cannot amount to a rubber stamp of the proceedings below”). “ ‘Even

when the decision is supported by some evidence, which if undisputed would sustain the

administrative finding, it is not sufficient if upon consideration of all the evidence the finding

is against the manifest weight.’ ” Scepurek, 2014 IL App (1st) 131066, ¶ 26 (quoting Bowlin,

368 Ill. App. 3d at 211-12).

¶ 38 “[W]hether the facts, as found by the Board, satisfy the standard for awarding a

line-of-duty disability pension” is a mixed question of law and fact subject to the clearly

erroneous standard of review. Hammond, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 307. This is a less deferential

standard than the manifest weight of the evidence standard, yet still “significantly deferential.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carrillo, 2014 IL App (1st) 130656, ¶ 21. Under this

standard, we should affirm the Board’s decision unless, after reviewing the entire record, we

are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Hammond, 369

Ill. App. 3d at 307; Carrillo, 2014 IL App (1st) 130656, ¶ 21. Pure questions of law (such as

the proper interpretation of a statute) are reviewed de novo. Robbins, 177 Ill. 2d at 538; Village

of Oak Park, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 365.

¶ 39 The section of the Code addressing line of duty disability pensions provides, in relevant

part:

“If a firefighter, as the result of sickness, accident or injury incurred in or resulting

from the performance of an act of duty or from the cumulative effects of acts of duty, is

found, pursuant to Section 4-112, to be physically or mentally permanently disabled for

service in the fire department, so as to render necessary his or her being placed on

disability pension, the firefighter shall be entitled to a [line of duty] disability pension

***.” (Emphasis added.) 40 ILCS 5/4-110 (West 2014).

Section 6-110 of the Code (40 ILCS 5/6-110 (West 2014)) defines “act of duty” as:

“Any act imposed on an active fireman by the ordinances of a city, or by the rules or

regulations of its fire department, or any act performed by an active fireman while on

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duty, having for its direct purpose the saving of the life or property of another person.”

40 ILCS 5/6-110 (West 2014).3

¶ 40 To recover a line of duty disability pension, a claimant need not prove that his job duties

were the “sole or even the primary cause” of his disability”; rather, it is sufficient that an act of

duty was an “aggravating, contributing or exacerbating factor” in the ensuing disability.

Edwards v. Addison Fire Protection District Firefighters’ Pension Fund, 2013 IL App (2d)

121262, ¶ 32; see also Village of Oak Park, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 371. The claimant must only

prove that the duty-related injury is a “causative factor contributing to the claimant’s

disability.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Scepurek, 2014 IL App (1st) 131066, ¶ 27; see

also Carrillo, 2014 IL App (1st) 130656, ¶ 23. “There is no requirement that the duty-related

incident be the originating or primary cause of injury, although a sufficient nexus between the

injury and the performance of the duty must exist.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Scepurek, 2014 IL App (1st) 131066, ¶ 27. Accordingly, “ ‘[a] disability pension may be based

upon the line-of-duty aggravation of a preexisting condition.’ ” Id. (quoting Wade, 226 Ill. 2d

at 505); see also Carrillo, 2014 IL App (1st) 130656, ¶ 23.

¶ 41 In this case, two of the three physicians chosen by the Board (Drs. Reff and Weine)

expressly opined that Prawdzik’s work duties, including the November 7, 2014, work incident,

aggravated or exacerbated Prawdzik’s preexisting psychological conditions, resulting in

Prawdzik’s disability (i.e., his inability to continue working as a firefighter). Dr. Reff opined

that Prawdzik’s disability was caused by an “act of duty” (specifically, the November 7, 2014,

work incident). Similarly, although Dr. Weine acknowledged that Prawdzik’s PTSD was

initially caused by his combat exposure, he opined that “the persistence and worsening” of

Prawdzik’s disabling psychological disorders was due to his “exposure to stress as a

firefighter/EMS.”4

¶ 42 Although the third physician chosen by the Board, Dr. Frank, did not explicitly opine that

Prawdzik’s disability was caused in whole or in part by the November 7, 2014, incident, she

acknowledged that driving fire trucks “aggravated” Prawdzik’s PTSD, which was the cause of

his disability. Dr. Frank’s opinion focuses primarily on the “cause” of Prawdzik’s PTSD. She

concludes that Prawdzik’s “combat exposure, and not any incident or trauma in his

employment with [the District] is the cause of his PTSD.” However, this means only that, in

Dr. Frank’s opinion, Prawdzik’s PTSD originated from his combat exposure. Dr. Frank did not

deny that certain acts of duty connected to Prawdzik’s employment aggravated or exacerbated

Prawdzik’s PTSD in a manner that contributed to Prawdzik’s current disability. To the

3

This provision appears in the Code section governing municipalities of 500,000 people or more.

There is no definition of “act of duty” in the section of the Code applying to firefighters in

municipalities with populations of 500,000 and under. However, our appellate court has held that

section 6-110’s definition “applies equally to all firefighters” in Illinois. Mabie v. Village of

Schaumburg, 364 Ill. App. 3d 756, 759 (2006); Jensen v. East Dundee Fire Protection District

Firefighters’ Pension Fund Board of Trustees, 362 Ill. App. 3d 197, 204 (2005).

4

Dr. Weine opined that Prawdzik had previously suffered from PTSD but “no longer me[t] the

formal diagnostic criteria for PTSD” at the time Dr. Weine issued his IME report in November 2015.

However, Dr. Weine opined that (1) Prawdzik continued to suffer from generalized anxiety disorder,

major depressive disorder, and “isolate traumatic stress symptoms,” all of which were initially caused

by Prawdzik’s combat exposure in Afghanistan but “were exacerbated by the stress of firefighter

work,” and (2) these conditions were the cause of Prawdzik’s disability.

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contrary, Dr. Frank acknowledged that the exposure to trauma on the job “continue[d] to

aggravate [Prawdzik’s] PTSD causing anxiety, hypervigilance, insomnia, and panic attacks”

and that Prawdzik “will continue to have aggravation of his PTSD” as long as he continues to

drive the firefighting vehicles required for his employment. Accordingly, Dr. Frank did not

deny (and, in fact, appeared to admit) that the aggravated PTSD symptoms that disabled

Prawdzik from working were triggered by the performance Prawdzik’s essential job duties.5

¶ 43 Further, Prawdzik testified that his PTSD symptoms became more severe after the

November 7, 2014, incident, and the record shows that he was able to perform his job duties as

a firefighter until shortly after the November 7, 2014, incident. Only after that incident was he

permanently disabled from performing the essential functions of his job.

¶ 44 Thus, the manifest weight of the evidence establishes that Prawdzik’s psychological

disability was caused, at least in part, by his work duties. Prawdzik’s work duties causally

contributed to his disability by aggravating the symptoms of his underlying PTSD and/or

generalized anxiety disorder to the point where these disorders became permanently disabling.

¶ 45 The Board raises two main arguments in defense of its decision. First, the Board argues that

Prawdzik’s claim is governed by a stricter causation standard because Prawdzik alleges a

mental or psychological injury rather than a physical injury. As noted, Prawdzik maintains that

he is entitled to a line of duty disability pension if he can show that his employment duties were

a causal factor (i.e., a contributing cause, but not necessarily the sole or original cause) in his

disability. The Board concedes that this standard applies in line of duty disability cases

involving physical injuries. However, the Board argues that the Illinois Supreme Court has

rejected the “causal factor” standard for line of duty disability cases involving mental or

psychological disabilities. Specifically, the Board maintains that in Robbins, 177 Ill. 2d 533,

our supreme court held that in cases involving mental disabilities, the claimant must prove that

an act of duty was the sole cause of his disabling injury, not merely a contributing cause.

¶ 46 The Board reads Robbins too broadly. As an initial matter, Robbins involved a line of duty

disability pension application filed by a police officer, not a firefighter. The Code defines “act

of duty” very differently for police officers than for firefighters. See Jensen, 362 Ill. App. 3d at

203. For police officers, the Code defines “act of duty” as any act of police duty “inherently

involving special risk, not ordinarily assumed by a citizen in the ordinary walks of life” that is

imposed on a policeman by statutes, ordinances, or regulations, or “any act of heroism ***

having for its direct purpose the saving of a life or property of a person other than the

policeman.” 40 ILCS 5/5-113 (West 2014). For firefighters, by contrast, the Code defines “act

of duty” far more broadly to include “[a]ny act imposed on an active fireman by the ordinances

of a city, or by the rules or regulations of its fire department, or any act performed by an active

fireman while on duty, having for its direct purpose the saving of the life or property of another

person.” 40 ILCS 5/6-110 (West 2014). These divergent statutory definitions of “act of duty”

entail different standards for awarding “line of duty” disability pensions to police officers as

compared to firefighters. See Jensen, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 203 (reversing Board’s denial of a line

Nor did Dr. Wasyliw deny that Prawdzik’s work duties aggravated or exacerbated his symptoms in

5

a way that contributed to his disability. To the contrary, Dr. Wasyliw acknowledged that the increasing

“generalized” anxiety that Prawdzik had been experiencing for a few days in early November “became

worse” after the November 7, 2014, work incident, and he opined that Prawdzik’s anxiety disorder was

“more widespread” at the time of his November 21, 2014, evaluation than it had been in 2011.

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of duty disability pension to a firefighter where the Board erroneously applied the definition of

“act of duty” applicable to police officers). To establish eligibility for a line of duty pension

under the stricter standard prescribed for police officers, a police officer must establish that his

disability is “the result of a specific, identifiable act of duty unique to police work.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Robbins, 177 Ill. 2d at 542. Accordingly, when a police officer

alleges a psychological or mental disability caused by job-related stress, he may obtain a line

of duty pension only if he proves that “the causes of the stress are *** unique to police work.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see also id. (“to be eligible for a line-of-duty disability

pension based on stress, a police officer’s psychological disability must result from a special

risk, not ordinarily assumed by a citizen in the ordinary walks of life” (internal quotation marks

omitted)). In other words, the stress alleged to be disabling must result entirely from a specific,

identifiable act of duty that is unique to police work and that involves a special risk not

confronted by members of the general public. This rule flows directly from the definition of

“act of duty” for police officers prescribed by section 5-113 of the Code. Id. (noting that the

requirement that the causes of stress be unique to police work is “an outgrowth of judicial

attempts to define and apply [section 5-113’s] term ‘act of duty’ to cases involving claimed

psychological disabilities” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

¶ 47 Applying this standard, our supreme court upheld the Board’s denial of a line of duty

pension to the claimant police officer in Robbins because the “record contain[ed] ample

evidence that [Officer] Robbins’ stress was the result of his anxiety over his job performance,

which civilians regularly suffer, and not the performance of a specific act of duty” unique to

police work. Id. at 544. Each of the psychologists who testified in the case opined that, while

Officer Robbins’s disabling stress was related to his police work, it “was not connected to any

specific act of Robbins as a police officer”; rather, the stress was triggered by general features

of his employment, such as the pace of his job duties. Id.6 Our supreme court held that this type

of generalized job stress did not entitle Officer Robbins to a line of duty pension given the

Code’s strict definition of “act of duty” for police officers. See id. at 542 (applying section

5-113’s definition of “act of duty” and ruling that, where the alleged psychological disability is

“traceable only to the general nature of being a police officer and not to a specific act of police

service,” and the causes of stress are not unique to police work, “line-of-duty disability

pensions are *** denied” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

¶ 48 In so holding, our supreme court reversed our appellate court’s judgment in Robbins,

which had reversed the Board’s denial of benefits based on common-law tort conceptions of

causation. Id. at 543-44. The appellate court did not address section 5-113’s definition of “act

of duty” for police officers or the limitations on line of duty pensions that that definition

entails. Id. at 543. Rather, the appellate court focused its analysis upon the Code’s phrase

“incurred in or resulting from the performance of an act of duty.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id. The appellate court reasoned that the words “incur” and “resulting from” were

equivalent to the word “cause.” Id. It then reasoned that the tort concept of proximate cause

allows for more than one cause of an injury. Id. Thus, the appellate court concluded that a

disabled police officer should not be deprived of a line of duty disability pension as long as one

6

Although Officer Robbins argued that his disabling stress was caused, at least in part, by a

work-related incident during which he saw a man commit suicide with a shotgun, none of the medical

opinions supported this argument. Robbins, 177 Ill. 2d at 544.

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of the causes of the disability resulted from an act of duty. Id. The appellate court awarded

Officer Robbins a line of duty disability pension based on “generalized police stress of

multiple origins” because it concluded that “Robbins’ debilitating mental condition was

caused, at least in part, by his on-duty functions as a police officer.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id. Our supreme court rejected the appellate court’s reasoning and its conclusion.

Noting that the case before it was “a statutory action with explicit requirements and not a

common law negligence action,” the supreme court ruled that the appellate court had erred by

basing its conclusion on the common law concepts of negligence and proximate cause rather

than on the plain and unambiguous language of the Code, which required that the disability

result from an “act of duty” as defined by section 5-113. Id. at 543-44.

¶ 49 The Board argues that Robbins’s rejection of a tort-based standard of causation should not

be limited to pension disability claims brought by police officers but should also apply to a

firefighter’s claim for a line of duty pension based on psychological disabilities. In its petition

for rehearing, the Board assumes that our supreme court’s holding in Robbins was based

entirely upon the supreme court’s construction of the statutory phrase “incurred in or resulting

from” the performance of an act of duty (which applies to line of duty disability claims filed by

firefighters as well as police officers) and had nothing to do with section 5-113’s definition of

“act of duty” (which applies only to police officers). Based on this assumption, the Board

contends that our original order in this case “incorrectly focused on the different ***

definitions of the phrase ‘act of duty’ in the line of duty disability statutes whereas the Court

should have focused on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the phrase ‘incurred in or

resulting from’ found in both line of duty disability statutes.” The Board maintains that “there

is no compelling reason, statutory or otherwise, why police officers and firefighters should

have a different causation standard for line of duty mental disability pensions when the

operable [causation] language in the [two] statutes” (i.e., the phrase “incurred in or resulting

from”) “is identical.”

¶ 50 We disagree. Contrary to the Board’s assertion, the “operable causation language” in the

two statutes is not identical. Although both statutes contain the phrase “incurred in or resulting

from an act of duty,” they define “act of duty” very differently. Because each statute authorizes

a line of duty disability pension only for disabling injuries resulting from an “act of duty,” the

causation standard prescribed by each statute is linked to that statute’s definition of “act of

duty.” Because each statute defines “act of duty” differently, the corresponding causation

standards must differ accordingly. Our supreme court recognized this fact in Robbins. The

supreme court’s rejection of the tort-based standard of causation in Robbins was based entirely

on section 5-113’s narrow definition of “act of duty,” which requires that the disabling stress

be caused entirely by an identifiable act of duty unique to police work and involving a special

risk not ordinarily assumed by civilians (thereby precluding any common law, tort-based

conception of contributing cause). The definition of “act of duty” applicable to line of duty

claims filed by firefighters includes no comparable restriction. See 40 ILCS 5/6-110 (West

2014). Accordingly, unlike a police officer, a firefighter seeking a line of duty disability

pension may establish that his disability is caused by an “act of duty” even if work-related

stress was a contributing cause, rather than the sole cause, of his disabling psychological

condition. See, e.g., Edwards, 2013 IL App (2d) 121262, ¶ 32 (a firefighter may recover a line

of duty disability pension by showing that an act of duty was an “aggravating, contributing or

exacerbating factor” in the ensuing disability without having to prove that his job duties were

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the “sole or even the primary cause” of his disability); see also Wade, 226 Ill. 2d at 505;

Carrillo, 2014 IL App (1st) 130656, ¶ 23; Scepurek, 2014 IL App (1st) 131066, ¶ 27; Village

of Oak Park, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 371.7

¶ 51 In its petition for rehearing, the Board accuses us of making the “same error as the appellate

court in Robbins.” To the contrary, it is the Board that employs the same flawed reasoning

applied by the appellate court in Robbins, which our supreme court explicitly rejected. Like the

appellate court in Robbins, the Board focuses its causation analysis entirely on the phrase

“incurred in or resulting from” rather than on section 5-113’s definition of “act of duty.” It is

the latter, not the former, that our supreme court treated as dispositive.

¶ 52 In sum, the Board misconstrues Robbins. Robbins did not impose a different causation

standard for firefighters alleging psychological disabilities. Nor did Robbins eliminate or limit

the traditional causal factor standard in a way that would apply in this case. Although the

Robbins court rejected the appellate court’s reliance on tort-based standards of causation

(including the principle that any act of duty that contributes to the disability is a “cause” of the

disability), it did so because the appellate court had failed to apply the governing statutory

definition of “act of duty” for police officers. Robbins does not hold or imply that the “causal

factor” test should not apply to mental disability claims brought by firefighters seeking line of

duty disability pensions. See generally Jensen, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 203. Nor does Robbins hold

or imply that, to obtain a line of duty disability pension, a firefighter must prove that some act

of duty was the “sole” or “original” cause of his mental or psychological disability. If a

firefighter can show that some “act of duty” (as defined by section 6-110, which applies to

firefighters rather than policemen) causally contributed to his disabling mental condition, he

may recover a line of duty pension. As noted above, Prawdzik has made that showing.

¶ 53 The Board also argues that the evidence does not support Prawdzik’s claim that the

November 7, 2014, incident (or any other act of duty) caused or aggravated his PTSD

symptoms to the point that they became disabling. The Board stresses that each of the

evaluating doctors (plus many of Prawdzik’s treaters as well as Prawdzik himself) opined that

Prawdzik’s PTSD was caused by his combat trauma in Afghanistan, and it argues that

Prawdzik’s job duties merely “triggered symptoms” of his PTSD. Moreover, the Board notes

that the medical records show that Prawdzik’s PTSD symptoms were worsening in 2013 and

2014, prior to the November 7, 2014, incident. Further, Prawdzik admitted that he may have

been having increasing anxiety prior to the November 7, 2014, incident, and the medical

records show that to be the case.

¶ 54 We do not find these arguments persuasive. Although there is some evidence in the record

suggesting that Prawdzik’s PTSD and anxiety symptoms were worsening shortly before the

November 7, 2014, incident, it is undisputed that Prawdzik was able to work full duty without

significant restrictions until shortly after the November 7, 2014, incident. It was not until after

7

Each of these cases involved claims for physical disabilities. The Board argues that Robbins’s

stricter causation standard should apply to firefighter pension disability claims based on psychological

disabilities. However, to paraphrase a statement made by the Board in another context, “there is no

compelling reason, statutory or otherwise” why firefighter pension disability claims predicated on

psychological disabilities should be governed by a different causation standard than similar claims

predicated on physical disabilities. The Board’s only argument for this proposition is its contention that

Robbins requires it. As shown above, that is not the case.

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that incident that Prawdzik’s symptoms became permanently disabling. Prawdzik testified that

his PTSD symptoms became more severe after the November 7, 2014, incident. The medical

opinions of Drs. Reff, Weine, Wasyliw, and Frank either support this testimony or, at a

minimum, do not contradict it. Moreover, the medical records and some of the medical

opinions suggest that the aggravation of Prawdzik’s symptoms in 2013 and 2014 (prior to the

November 7, 2014, incident) was itself due, at least in part, to acts of duty such as driving fire

trucks, which reminded Prawdzik of his combat exposure.

¶ 55 The Board relies extensively upon our appellate court’s decisions in Hammond, 369 Ill.

App. 3d 294, and Graves, 281 Ill. App. 3d 508. Neither decision supports the Board’s

argument in this case. In Hammond, our appellate court affirmed the denial of a line of duty

disability pension to a firefighter where there was evidence suggesting that certain acts of duty

had merely triggered symptoms of an underlying psychological condition that was causally

unrelated to the firefighter’s job. Here, by contrast, the evidence established that certain acts of

duty (including a traumatic work incident on November 7, 2014), causally contributed to

Prawdzik’s disability by aggravating the symptoms of his underlying psychological disorder

and rendering it disabling.8

¶ 56 The Board’s reliance on Graves is also unavailing. As an initial matter, Graves appears to

apply an erroneous causation standard. The Graves court held that a firefighter’s “general job

dissatisfaction or job stress arising from the inability to handle general duties does not give rise

to a duty-related disability pension.” Graves, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 515. The court further ruled

that, even where general aspects of a firefighter’s duties cause or contribute to a psychological

disability, “stress or depression resulting from general employment functions inherent in the

occupation and common to all firefighters [is] not the equivalent of the specific acts of duty

contemplated by the statute.” Id. In crafting this definition of “act of duty,” Graves relied on

cases involving the definition of “act of duty” applicable to police officers. However, our

appellate court subsequently held that that definition does not apply in pension cases involving

firefighters. Jensen, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 203-04. Thus, “it is not entirely clear *** whether

Graves is still good law.” Hammond, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 307.

¶ 57 In any event, the instant case is distinguishable from Graves. Here, Prawdzik presented

evidence of a specific, work-related traumatic incident (the November 7, 2014, incident) that

aggravated his preexisting symptoms and rendered his preexisting psychological condition

permanently disabling. Unlike the claimant in Graves, Prawdzik did not base his claim entirely

upon allegations of stress or depression resulting from general employment functions.

8

Contrary to the Board’s assertion in its petition for rehearing, the Hammond court did not hold that

an act of duty (or the cumulative effects of any acts of duty) aggravated the symptoms of the plaintiff’s

underlying psychological condition, rendering it disabling. To the contrary, the court upheld the

Board’s finding that the plaintiff’s disability “stemmed from interpersonal difficulties” rather than the

plaintiff’s job duties. Hammond, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 307. The Board’s finding in Hammond was based,

in part, on the opinion of Dr. Harris, an independent psychiatrist who evaluated the plaintiff. According

to Dr. Harris, the plaintiff was disabled due to several preexisting psychological problems that were

unrelated to the plaintiff’s work duties, and the claimant’s disability “was not duty related.” Id. at 301.

This refutes the Board’s assertion in its petition for rehearing that “every doctor in Hammond found that

an ‘act of duty’ or the ‘cumulative effects of acts of duty’ as a firefighter in some way caused or

contributed to the worsening of the plaintiff’s mental condition such that he became disabled.”

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¶ 58 The manifest weight of the evidence in this case establishes that Prawdzik’s psychological

disability was caused, at least in part, by his work duties. Even when all reasonable inferences

are drawn in the Board’s favor, a conclusion opposite of that reached by the Board is clearly

apparent.

¶ 59 CONCLUSION

¶ 60 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is reversed. The cause is remanded to the

Board with instructions to award Prawdzik a line of duty disability pension.

¶ 61 Reversed; cause remanded.

¶ 62 JUSTICE SCHMIDT, dissenting:

¶ 63 I respectfully dissent. Plaintiff’s service to this country, which undeniably came at a great

personal loss, demands the respect of this court. However, I disagree with the majority’s

finding that a conclusion opposite that reached by the Board is clearly apparent. For that

reason, I would affirm the Board’s decision and find plaintiff is not entitled to a line of duty

fireman’s disability.

¶ 64 The record contains sufficient evidence to support the Board’s finding that neither

plaintiff’s general firefighting/EMS duties nor the November 7, 2014, incident were

“ ‘causative factor[s] contributing to the claimant’s disability.’ ” Supra ¶ 40 (quoting

Scepurek, 2014 IL App (1st) 131066, ¶ 27). In fact, the record shows that plaintiff’s PTSD

symptoms waxed and waned since he returned from combat. For example, in 2010 and 2011,

plaintiff expressed concerns that his PTSD symptoms were causing problems with coworkers.

In 2013, plaintiff’s PTSD symptoms increased to the extent that he sought mental health

treatment. As late as September 2014, plaintiff continued to complain of a depressed mood,

nightmares, and flashbacks. In the weeks leading up to the November 7, 2014, incident,

plaintiff reported experiencing increased anxiety. After the incident, claimant worked two

more shifts without issue. He reported experiencing a “normal amount” of anxiety following

the incident that slowly increased until he realized, on November 16, 2014, he could no longer

focus on his job. Dr. Wasyliw attributed plaintiff’s increased anxiety leading up to the incident

to plaintiff’s longstanding physical problems, new medications—which plaintiff stopped

taking following the incident—and alcohol use. In January 2015, plaintiff reported having

increased anxiety and panic attacks. In February 2015, he had a panic attack while driving his

personal vehicle, and in July 2015, he had a panic attack while riding on a duck boat. Because

there is sufficient evidence to support the Board’s decision, I would defer to its finding that the

November 7, 2014, incident, like others before and after, merely triggered symptoms of

plaintiff’s preexisting PTSD but that the incident did not causally contribute to his disability.

¶ 65 In closing, I note that the majority’s analysis in this case could have far reaching

detrimental consequences for our combat veterans. Specifically, the majority’s decision may

deter employers—at least police and fire departments—from hiring combat veterans if their

general job duties might trigger some preexisting PTSD, which would entitle them to receive a

line of duty disability pension.

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