explaining that a complaint must set forth simple, concise, and direct averments indicating “which defendants are liable to plaintiffs for which wrongs”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that a complaint must set forth simple, concise, and direct averments indicating “which defendants are liable to plaintiffs for which wrongs”
- explaining that a “credible threat” of future harm may confer Article III standing if it is “both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
- setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 14 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ERIC CHARLES RODNEY K’NAPP, AKA No. 18-16959
Eric C.R. K’napp,
D.C. No. 2:17-cv-00742-KJM-
Plaintiff-Appellant, CMK
v.
MEMORANDUM*
EDMUND G. BROWN, Jr.; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Kimberly J. Mueller, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 11, 2019**
Before: CANBY, GRABER, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Eric Charles Rodney K’napp, aka Eric C.R. K’napp, appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal
claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo
questions of constitutional standing. Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
(9th Cir. 2011). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Kwan v.
SanMedica Int’l, 854 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed K’napp’s action on the ground that
K’napp lacked constitutional standing because K’napp failed to allege facts
sufficient to show that the threat to terminate K’napp’s single-cell accommodation
resulted in a concrete and particularized injury to K’napp. See Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (setting forth elements of Article III
standing); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010)
(explaining that a “credible threat” of future harm may confer Article III standing
if it is “both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
To the extent that K’napp attempted to state claims for damages under the
Americans with Disabilities Act or the Rehabilitation Act on the basis of past
events, the dismissal of these claims was proper because K’napp’s complaint did
not comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2) (requiring that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d
1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that a complaint must set forth simple,
concise, and direct averments indicating “which defendants are liable to plaintiffs
for which wrongs”).
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The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying K’napp’s motion for
reconsideration because K’napp failed to set forth any basis for relief. See Sch.
Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir.
1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b)).
AFFIRMED.
3 18-16959