Opinion

L.A. Bonazza v. UCBR

Court
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
May 30, 2019
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Ceisler, J.
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 7.8%

The opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Larry A. Bonazza, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1545 C.D. 2018

: ARGUED: May 7, 2019

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE CEISLER FILED: May 30, 2019

Larry A. Bonazza (Claimant) petitions for review of the October 29, 2018 Order

of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) affirming a Referee’s

decision to deny Claimant unemployment compensation (UC) benefits. The Board

concluded that Claimant was ineligible for UC benefits under Section 402(e) of the

Unemployment Compensation Law (Law)1 because he was discharged from work for

willful misconduct. We affirm the Board’s Order.

Background

Claimant worked as a full-time police officer for Smith Township (Employer)

for 27 years until April 21, 2018. Bd.’s Finding of Fact (F.F.) No. 1; see Record (R.)

1

Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. § 802(e).

Section 402(e) of the Law states that an employee shall be ineligible for UC benefits for any week

“[i]n which his unemployment is due to his discharge . . . from work for willful misconduct connected

with his work.” 43 P.S. § 802(e).

Item No. 3.2 Employer has a written policy, of which Claimant was aware, that

prohibits its employees from sleeping while on duty. Bd.’s F.F. No. 2; see Notes of

Testimony (N.T.), 9/10/18, Ex. 5. In 2017, unbeknownst to its police officers,

Employer installed tracking devices in all of the officers’ vehicles. Bd.’s F.F. No. 3.

On March 7, 2017, Employer issued a written warning to Claimant for sleeping

during a training class on February 21, 2017. Id. No. 4.3 On March 9, 2017, Employer

also suspended Claimant for using a racial slur to refer to Chief of Police Winford

LaRue, who is African-American, on Facebook. Id. No. 5.4

In the early morning hours of April 21, 2018, Chief LaRue received a notification

from the tracking system that Claimant had parked his patrol vehicle at a strip mine for

at least two hours while on duty. Id. No. 6. Chief LaRue went to that location with a

Police Department Supervisor, Mr. Cassidy,5 and found Claimant sitting inside his

2

The record shows that Employer suspended Claimant from his position on April 21, 2018,

pending an internal investigation. Claimant was discharged on June 20, 2018. R. Item No. 3.

3

The March 7, 2017 warning letter stated:

This is to inform you of a written warning for your action of sleeping in class [on] 2-

21-2017. This was during our update training at the Slovan VFW. You had to be

push[ed] by the officers beside you to wake up . . . .

N.T., 9/10/18, Ex. 1.

4

The March 9, 2017 suspension letter stated:

This is to inform you that you are suspended on 3-9-17 . . . . This is for your action

[o]n Tues[day] 3-7-17 [w]hen you inbox[ed] me[,] the Chief [of Police,] on Facebook

“U ON NIGGA[.]” [T]his was at 5[:]34[p]m. I do not and will not take that kind[] of

talk from any of my officers. And I will not have my officers speak to the [p]ublic

this way.

N.T., 9/10/18, Ex. 2.

5

Mr. Cassidy’s first name does not appear in the record.

2

vehicle with his eyes closed and his head down. Id. No. 7; N.T., 9/10/18, at 8. Chief

LaRue roused Claimant by illuminating Claimant’s vehicle with a flashlight. Bd.’s

F.F. No. 8. Chief LaRue asked Claimant why he was sleeping, but Claimant denied

sleeping. Id. No. 9.

Claimant is a diabetic who experiences physical symptoms when his blood sugar

is low. Id. No. 11. Claimant did not request any accommodation for his medical

condition, nor did he notify Employer that drowsiness or sleepiness could be a

consequence of his condition. Id. No. 12. Employer terminated Claimant’s

employment for violating its policy prohibiting sleeping while on duty. Id. No. 10.

Claimant filed a claim for UC benefits, which the local Service Center denied.

The Service Center found that Claimant was discharged for poor performance, sleeping

on the job, and safety violations. Not. of Determ., 8/3/18, at 1. The Service Center

concluded that: (1) Claimant’s conduct demonstrated a disregard of the standards of

behavior that Employer had the right to expect of its employees; and (2) Claimant did

not establish good cause for his conduct. Id. Therefore, the Service Center determined

that Claimant was ineligible for UC benefits under Section 402(e) of the Law. Id.

Claimant appealed to the Referee, who held an evidentiary hearing on September

10, 2018. Both Claimant and Chief LaRue testified. Following the hearing, the Referee

concluded as follows:

Although [C]laimant asserts that he was not sleeping when confronted by

[Chief LaRue] on April 21, 2018, he asserts that drowsiness and sleepiness

are consequences of low blood sugar attacks that he suffers from time to

time. [C]laimant attempted to offer a document from a certified nurse

practitioner attesting to the symptoms. The document was excluded on

the basis of hearsay. Additionally, the document was not authored until

well over three months after [C]laimant’s separation from employment,

rendering it irrelevant.

3

[E]mployer would have been within its rights to discharge [C]laimant for

addressing [Chief LaRue] with a racial slur[,] and after receiving a

warning and being suspended for [other] infractions, it became

particularly important that [C]laimant strictly adhere to reasonable

employer expectations. . . .

Ref.’s Order, 9/11/18, at 2. Thus, the Referee affirmed the Service Center’s decision.

Claimant timely appealed to the Board, which affirmed the Referee’s decision.

The Board adopted the Referee’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and further

determined:

[W]hile the Referee did not make an express credibility determination in

his Decision, his findings of fact clearly reflect that he resolved any

credibility disputes in favor of [E]mployer. The Board discerns no basis

to disturb the Referee’s findings or his implicit credibility determinations.

Bd.’s Order, 10/29/18, at 1. Therefore, the Board concluded that Claimant was

ineligible for UC benefits under Section 402(e) of the Law. Bd.’s Order at 1. Claimant

now petitions for review of that decision.6

Analysis

Our Court has defined “willful misconduct” as a wanton or willful disregard of

the employer’s interests, a deliberate violation of the employer’s rules, a disregard of

the standards of behavior that the employer has a right to expect of its employees, or

negligence indicating an intentional disregard of the employer’s interests or of the

employee’s duties and obligations. Miller v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 83

A.3d 484, 486-87 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). An employer seeking to prove that a claimant

committed willful misconduct by violating a work policy “must demonstrate the

existence of the policy, its reasonableness, and its violation.” Klampfer v.

Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 182 A.3d 495, 500 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). If the

6

Our scope of review is limited to determining whether the necessary findings of fact are

supported by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed, or whether constitutional

rights were violated. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 704.

4

employer satisfies its burden of proving “the existence of a reasonable work rule and

its deliberate violation, [then] the burden shifts to the claimant to demonstrate good

cause for violating the rule.” Chester Cmty. Charter Sch. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd.

of Review, 138 A.3d 50, 54 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016).

Here, Employer has a written policy prohibiting its employees from sleeping

while on duty. Bd.’s F.F. No. 2; N.T., 9/10/18, Ex. 5. Claimant does not dispute the

existence of Employer’s policy, his knowledge of the policy, or its reasonableness.

Rather, Claimant challenges only the Board’s finding that he was asleep while on duty

on April 21, 2018.

We conclude that the Board’s finding is supported by the testimony of Chief

LaRue, which the Board expressly credited. Chief LaRue testified that on April 21,

2018, Claimant was working the midnight-to-8:00-a.m. shift. N.T., 9/10/18, at 8.

Around 4:00 a.m. on that date, Chief LaRue observed Claimant sitting inside his parked

vehicle with his eyes closed and his head down. Id. at 8, 11-12, 14. Chief LaRue

testified that, based on the information obtained from the tracking device, he believed

Claimant’s vehicle had been parked in that location for at least two hours. Id. at 8-9.

Chief LaRue observed Claimant sleeping inside the vehicle for 10 or 15 minutes, after

which Chief LaRue roused Claimant awake with a flashlight. Id. at 12. In contrast,

Claimant testified that when Chief LaRue approached his vehicle on the morning of

April 21, 2018, “I had the window down at the time. I was up. [Chief LaRue] said

what are you doing here? I said I’m eating my lunch.” Id. at 22. The Board, however,

discredited Claimant’s testimony.

It is well settled that the Board is the ultimate factfinder in UC cases and

empowered to determine the credibility of witnesses. Curran v. Unemployment Comp.

Bd. of Review, 752 A.2d 938, 940 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). Where the Board’s factual

findings are supported by substantial, credible evidence, those findings are conclusive

5

on appeal. Brandt v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 643 A.2d 78, 79 (Pa. 1994).

We conclude that Chief LaRue’s credible testimony provides substantial evidence to

support the Board’s finding that Claimant was sleeping while on duty on April 21,

2018.

Next, Claimant argues that, even if he had been asleep while on duty on April

21, 2018, a single infraction was insufficient to justify his discharge under Employer’s

policy. At the hearing, Chief LaRue testified that one instance of sleeping on duty

would be insufficient to result in an employee’s discharge and that “at least two”

instances would be required for a discharge. N.T., 9/10/18, at 12. Claimant contends

that only one sleeping infraction occurred on April 21, 2018. According to Claimant,

the prior sleeping incident in March 2017 occurred during a training session and not

while he was “out ‘on duty.’” Claimant’s Br. at 8. Thus, Claimant argues that he

should not have been discharged pursuant to Employer’s policy.7

Although Claimant raised this issue in his appeal to the Board, the Board did not

address it. We conclude, however, that this oversight does not necessitate a remand to

the Board.

Even in the absence of Employer’s policy, we conclude that Claimant committed

willful misconduct in this case. It is well settled that “sleeping on the job is prima facie

an act of willful misconduct, for it falls within either ‘wanton and wil[l]ful disregard

7

Although Claimant asserts that he was not “on duty” during the March 2017 sleeping

incident, the record shows that the incident occurred during an Employer-sanctioned training session.

Chief LaRue credibly testified that the session was “a yearly update[] training for municipal police

officers that [Employer] hosted at [the] Slovan VFW for at least 40 to 50 officers[,] including my

whole department.” N.T., 9/10/18, at 6. Furthermore, Employer disciplined Claimant for sleeping

during the training session, Bd.’s F.F. No. 4; N.T., 9/10/18, Ex.1, further indicating that Claimant was

“on duty” when the March 2017 incident occurred. Contrary to Claimant’s assertion on appeal, Chief

LaRue did not indicate that an officer was required to be “out” on patrol for a sleeping incident to

qualify as a violation of Employer’s policy, nor did Claimant present any evidence to support such

an interpretation.

6

of the employer’s interest,’ or ‘disregard of standards of behavior which an employer

can rightfully expect [of its employees].’” Ragland v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of

Review, 428 A.2d 1019, 1020 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981) (citation omitted); see Biggs v.

Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 443 A.2d 1204, 1205 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982); Tundel

v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 404 A.2d 434, 435-36 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979). An

employer need only establish that the claimant was sleeping at work to satisfy its

burden. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review v. Simone, 355 A.2d 614, 616 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1976). As discussed above, the record contains substantial evidence to

support the Board’s finding that Claimant fell asleep during his shift on April 21, 2018.

Because Employer met its burden of proving that Claimant committed willful

misconduct, the burden shifted to Claimant to establish good cause for sleeping on the

job. Biggs, 443 A.2d at 1205. Claimant testified that, on the morning of April 21,

2018, he pulled over during his shift because his blood sugar level had dropped and he

felt “jittery.” N.T., 9/10/18, at 23-25. Claimant testified that he stopped to buy lunch

and then parked his vehicle at the strip mine because he did not believe it was safe to

drive. Id. at 26. He stated that he ate lunch and began to feel better “right before”

Chief LaRue approached his vehicle. Id. The Board, however, discredited Claimant’s

testimony. Bd.’s Order, 10/29/18, at 1. The Board also found that although Claimant

has diabetes, Bd.’s F.F. No. 11, he never notified Employer that drowsiness or

sleepiness could be a consequence of his condition or otherwise affect his employment,

id. No. 12. Therefore, we conclude that Claimant failed to establish that his sleeping

on the job was justified by his medical condition.8

8

At the hearing, Claimant attempted to introduce into evidence an August 1, 2018 letter from

a nurse practitioner to Employer concerning Claimant’s medical condition and resulting symptoms.

N.T., 9/10/18, at 22. The Referee precluded the letter on both hearsay and relevancy grounds. Id.;

see Ref.’s Order, 9/11/18, at 2. Claimant does not challenge that evidentiary ruling on appeal.

7

Conclusion

Based on the credible evidence of record, we conclude that Claimant was

discharged for willful misconduct under Section 402(e) of the Law and is, therefore,

ineligible for UC benefits. Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s Order.

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

8

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Larry A. Bonazza, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1545 C.D. 2018

:

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 30th day of May, 2019, the Order of the Unemployment

Compensation Board of Review, dated October 29, 2018, is hereby AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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