Stewart v. Boone County Housing Authority

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Appellate Court Date: 2019.04.26

11:11:34 -05'00'

Stewart v. Boone County Housing Authority, 2018 IL App (2d) 180052

Appellate Court KIMBERLY STEWART, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE BOONE

Caption COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY and FELICIA DAVIS,

Defendants-Appellees.

District & No. Second District

Docket No. 2-18-0052

Filed September 28, 2018

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Boone County, No. 17-MR-44; the

Review Hon. John H. Young, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed and remanded with directions.

Counsel on Kira Devin and Emily Hardy, of Prairie State Legal Services, Inc., of

Appeal Rockford, for appellant.

Jeffrey R. Hoskins, Staci M. Holthus, and Joshua G. Vincent, of

Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, of Rockford, for appellees.

Panel JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Presiding Justice Hudson and Justice Schostok concurred in the

judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Plaintiff, Kimberly Stewart, appeals the decision of defendants, the Boone County

Housing Authority (BCHA) and Felicia Davis, a BCHA hearing officer, terminating her

housing choice voucher benefits. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court, vacate

defendants’ termination decision, and remand for BCHA to reconsider the evidence and enter

its findings, providing a rationale for any decision it makes on remand.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 Plaintiff receives federal housing-assistance benefits under a voucher program

administered by BCHA. Specifically, BCHA is a public housing authority (PHA) that receives

funding from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). HUD

provides rental subsidies (i.e., vouchers) to BCHA, and BCHA pays landlords on behalf of the

program’s recipients so they can afford decent, safe, and sanitary housing in the private

market. 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(1) (2015). The voucher program is governed by HUD’s

regulations, codified in 24 C.F.R. Part 982 (Part 982). In addition, Part 982 requires each PHA

to adopt a written administrative plan that establishes local policies for administering the

program in accordance with HUD’s requirements and that states the PHA’s policies on those

matters on which the PHA has been given discretion. 24 C.F.R. § 982.54(a) (2015).

¶4 In December 2015, plaintiff, who had no income, signed a statement of family obligations

that includes a requirement that “the family must supply any information requested by the

PHA or HUD for use in a regularly scheduled reexamination or interim reexamination of

family income and composition.” The statement of family obligations provides that the family

must promptly notify the PHA when absent from the unit. BCHA’s specific policy explains

that “notice is required under this provision only when all family members will be absent from

the unit for an extended period. An extended period is defined as any period greater than 30

calendar days. Written notice must be provided to the PHA at the start of the extended

absence.”

¶5 On February 1, 2017, BCHA sent plaintiff notice that, effective March 31, 2017, it would

terminate her housing-assistance benefits, stating:

“Your annual reexamination notice was sent on 1/4/17 scheduling your

appointment for 1/18/17 at 9:15. You did not call or attend the appointment. On

1/18/17 a final notice scheduling you for your annual reexamination was mailed out

scheduling your appointment for 2/1/17 [at] 10:00. You did not call or attend the

appointment.”

¶6 The notice identified legal grounds for the action. For context, we note that Part 982 lists

circumstances that require termination of assistance. 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(b) (2015). In

addition, Part 982 lists grounds on which a PHA has the authority to terminate assistance (24

C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1) (2015)) as well as circumstances that the PHA may consider when

determining whether to do so (24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(2) (2015)).

¶7 The notice of termination that BCHA sent to plaintiff referenced section 982.552(c), i.e.,

the “Other Authorized Reasons for Termination of Assistance,” as the legal grounds for the

termination. The notice explained that HUD permitted BCHA to terminate assistance under

“other” (i.e., not mandatory) circumstances and that it left to BCHA’s discretion “whether such

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circumstances in general warrant consideration for the termination of assistance.” (Emphasis

added.) The notice referenced BCHA’s policy that it “will terminate” assistance if “the family

has failed to comply with any family obligations,” including the obligation to supply any

information requested by the PHA or HUD for use in a regularly scheduled reexamination of

family income. 24 C.F.R. § 982.551 (2015). Further, citing regulations concerning

reexaminations generally (24 C.F.R. § 982.516 (2015)), the notice stated that a family is

generally required to participate in an annual reexamination interview and that “if a family

fails to attend two scheduled interviews without PHA approval *** a notice of termination will

be sent to the family’s address of record.” The notice concluded that, if plaintiff disagreed with

the decision, she had the right to request an informal hearing before an impartial hearing

officer. At the hearing, she would have the right to an attorney and to present evidence.

¶8 A. BCHA Hearing Decision

¶9 On February 8, 2017, only one week after she missed the February 1, 2017, appointment,

plaintiff, on her own initiative, called BCHA to discuss a separate matter. She then learned that

her benefits were being terminated. Plaintiff requested a hearing and explained that she was

unable to reply to the notices of reexamination because she was unable to receive her mail for a

period.

¶ 10 The hearing was held before Davis on March 1, 2017. Plaintiff represented herself. Kristin

Andrews appeared on BCHA’s behalf. The hearing was not recorded.

¶ 11 On March 14, 2017, in a written order, Davis upheld the termination. The order stated that,

“having fully considered the entire record, the undersigned Hearing Officer enters the

following findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision.” The findings of fact stated:

“1. Ms. Andrews presented:

01/04/17 Annual Recertification letter scheduling a 01/18/17 appointment with a

written note ‘01/18/17 No Call, No Show KA’

01/18/17 Final Notice, Annual Recertification letter scheduling a 02/01/17

appointment with a written note ‘No Call, No Show KA’

12/09/15—State of Family Obligations (signed by [plaintiff])

02/01/17—Tenant Notification of Termination of Program Assistance and Housing

Assistance Payment Contract (Tenant Noncompliance)

Ms. Andrews explained that notices are sent out 120 days prior to annual

recertification to allow time to get verifications back and calculate rent properly.

Failure to timely recertify participants, [sic] affects funding and possibly loss of

monies.

2. [Plaintiff] said she was out of town in January. She had a cousin that was ill and

passed away. [Plaintiff] said the ride she usually has (her mother), [sic] car was towed

and all her belongings were in the car and she was unable to retrieve them. The items in

the car were her identification and keys. [Plaintiff] presented:

01/01/17—Illinois Traffic Crash Report

01/05/17—City of Elgin System tow receipt

01/08/17—Obituary for Linda Kaye Johnson

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3. [Plaintiff] stated she called 02/08/17 to inquire about porting and found out about

the termination. [Plaintiff] said she was unable to get her mail for an extended period of

time due to her not having identification.

4. Ms. Andrews asked how long [plaintiff] was without her keys. Also asked why

she did not contact someone to get her entry into her unit and possibly get her mail.

[Plaintiff] said she did not have her landlord[’]s number and did not think to call the

Housing Authority. Therefore entry to her unit and retrieving mail did not occur in a

timely fashion.”

¶ 12 The order provided “conclusions of law,” stating, in their entirety:

“1.The Housing Authority’s decision to terminate was in accordance with the law,

HUD regulations and the Housing Authority’s policies.”

Accordingly, Davis upheld BCHA’s decision to terminate plaintiff’s housing benefits.

¶ 13 B. Trial Court Decision

¶ 14 Plaintiff filed a complaint requesting that the trial court review the order approving the

termination of her benefits. The parties presented a bystander’s report of the BCHA hearing,

slightly elaborating on the evidence that had been presented. The bystander’s report reflects:

“5. Kristin Andrews also explained that notices are sent out approximately 120

days prior to annual recertification effective date to allow time to get verifications back

and calculate rent properly. Ms. Andrews also explained that, pursuant to the tenant’s

Lease Agreement and Statement of Family Obligations, tenants are responsible for

timely supplying any information requested by the housing authority for use in

regularly scheduled re-examinations, including information regarding family income

and composition and that tenants are obligated to cooperate with housing authority in

conducting said re-examinations. Failure to timely recertify participants, affects

funding and possibly loss of monies and a tenant’s failure to cooperate with a housing

authority in the re-examination process is a breach of the Lease Agreement and

Statement of Family Obligations.

6. Kristin Andrews asked how long [plaintiff] was without keys and why she didn’t

contact the landlord or someone to get entry to her unit and get her mail. Kristin

Andrews also stated that the BCHA would have provided landlord telephone number to

[plaintiff] in order for [plaintiff] to access unit and mailbox. The January 4, 2017[,] and

January 8, 2017[,] annual recertification letters include the telephone and fax number

for the BCHA, as well as the telephone numbers of Kristin Andrews and Christine

Coon.

7. Kristin Andrews said her biggest concern is that it doesn’t seem like [plaintiff]

lives at her house based upon [plaintiff] not having access for approximately 1 month.

8. [Plaintiff] [p]resented the following information:

a. 1-5-17- Illinois Traffic Crash report

b. 1-5-17- City of Elgin System Tow Receipt

c. 1-8-17- Obituary for Linda Kaye Johnson

9. [Plaintiff] told the housing authority the following information:

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a. She was out of town when the recertification letters were sent because her cousin

passed away from lupus, she had to go to the funeral because it’s her family.

b. She was trying to be there for her family, she was in Elgin at her mother’s house,

her car got towed, and she didn’t have a ride. She doesn’t have a car and relies on her

mom for a ride.

c. Her purse with her ID, house keys, and mail keys were in her mom’s car. Her

mom’s car was then in an accident with someone else driving and was towed after she

got to Elgin.

d. The police were investigating the accident and wouldn’t let her mom get

anything out of the car.

e. She couldn’t get back home from Elgin without a ride from her mother.

f. She didn’t have keys for her unit or mailbox to get her mail at the time the

housing authority sent the letters.

g. She only found out about her [S]ection 8 termination because she called the

housing authority to ask about porting out on February 8, 2017[,] and was told by the

housing authority, via Ms. Andrews, that she was in the process of losing her Section 8.

When [plaintiff] spoke with Ms. Andrews, she was told by Ms. Andrews about the

termination notice being sent out and Ms. Andrews also informed [plaintiff] of the

process to request a hearing.

h. She came back home in early February around February 4th. She went to the post

office around that time to ask about getting her mail out of the post office box. She

didn’t think the post office would give her the mail since she didn’t have her ID.

i. She stated she did not have her landlord’s phone number and couldn’t contact the

landlord.

j. She said the housing authority is only open once a week and she didn’t have the

chance to call. Ms. Andrews informed [plaintiff] that the BCHA has voicemail and all

calls are forwarded to other housing authority offices every day of the week except

Wednesdays.”

¶ 15 Plaintiff’s exhibits appear in the record. The obituary for Linda Kaye Johnson reflects that

the service was held in Elgin on Sunday, January 8, 2017. The crash report lists the name of the

vehicle owner as Patricia Stewart and the driver as Keyon Stewart.

¶ 16 Plaintiff also moved to stay BCHA’s termination decision, attesting that she has no income

and stating, “if I am evicted, and do not receive continuing benefits through BCHA I do not

have anywhere else to live and will likely become homeless.” On April 11, 2017, in an agreed

order, the trial court granted the stay and ordered BCHA to immediately reinstate plaintiff’s

benefits, pending final resolution of the case.

¶ 17 On December 21, 2017, the trial court denied plaintiff’s complaint and affirmed BCHA’s

decision. Plaintiff appeals.

¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 19 On appeal, plaintiff argues that defendants failed to consider her individual circumstances

in the discretionary termination of her benefits, instead improperly treating the termination as

mandatory. She notes that the order failed to state the reasons for the decision, gave no

indication that her circumstances and explanation for the violation were considered, and did

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not reflect that Davis even knew that BCHA had discretion as to whether to terminate her

benefits. Plaintiff argues that, “[w]ith no indication that [Davis] considered [plaintiff’s

extenuating circumstances], the distinction between mandatory and discretionary terminations

is rendered meaningless.” Further, plaintiff argues that the termination was overly harsh and

arbitrary, where the evidence showed that she did not receive the two reexamination notices

and that, as soon as she became aware of the need for information, she apologized and offered

to supply it. Plaintiff asserts that there was only a one-week delay between the second hearing

date and the date that she contacted BCHA, which, she notes, is open only one day each week.

As such, plaintiff requests that we reverse BCHA’s decision and direct BCHA to restore her

benefits.

¶ 20 Defendants, in turn, assert that the termination was mandatory under BCHA’s

administrative plan. Alternatively, defendants argue that, even if the termination were

discretionary, the factual findings contained in the hearing decision reflect that all relevant

circumstances were considered “despite the fact that plaintiff’s failure to comply with family

obligations under the [program] was a mandatory termination.” For the following reasons, we

reverse the trial court, vacate the termination decision, and remand for BCHA to reconsider the

evidence and enter its findings.

¶ 21 A. Standard of Review

¶ 22 The appeal of a trial court’s ruling on a petition for certiorari seeking review of an

administrative decision is treated the same as any other appeal for administrative review.

Lipscomb v. Housing Authority, 2015 IL App (1st) 142793, ¶¶ 11-16. Specifically, we review

the decision of the administrative agency, not the decision of the trial court, and the record only

of the administrative proceedings. Id. ¶ 11. “The applicable standard of review, which

determines the degree of deference given to the agency’s decision, depends upon whether the

question presented is one of fact, one of law, or a mixed question of law and fact.” AFM

Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 390 (2001).

Factual findings are reviewed under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard, whereas a

purely legal question demands de novo review. Lipscomb, 2015 IL App (1st) 142793, ¶ 16.

However, where an agency’s decision involves a mixed question of law and fact, we will not

reverse unless the decision is clearly erroneous, i.e., when we are left with a definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed. Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers

Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 211 (2008). “Mixed questions of fact and law are questions in

which the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the

issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or to put it another way, whether the

rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id.

¶ 23 Plaintiff’s arguments require us to answer two primary questions: (1) whether the

termination of her benefits was mandatory or discretionary and, (2) if discretionary, whether

Davis considered relevant circumstances prior to terminating plaintiff’s benefits. The first

issue is a purely legal question, which we review de novo, whereas the second issue involves

the legal effect of a given set of facts and the “clearly erroneous” standard of review.

Lipscomb, 2015 IL App (1st) 142793, ¶ 16.

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¶ 24 B. Termination of Benefits: Mandatory or Discretionary

¶ 25 Defendants assert that the termination was mandatory. In our view, however, the

termination was clearly discretionary.

¶ 26 As previously noted, mandatory terminations are described in section 552(b) of Part 982

(24 C.F.R. § 982.552(b) (2015)). This is not the section under which BCHA pursued the

termination of plaintiff’s benefits. Rather, BCHA explicitly stated in its notice of termination

that the legal grounds for the termination fell under section 552(c) of Part 982 (24 C.F.R.

§ 982.552(c) (2015)), which, it further explained, gave BCHA the authority to terminate, in its

discretion. Indeed, section 552(c)(1)(i) provides that a PHA has the authority and “may”

terminate benefits if any family obligations are violated. 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1)(i) (2015).

Thus, Part 982 clearly did not mandate the termination of plaintiff’s benefits.

¶ 27 BCHA nevertheless contends that the termination was mandated by its own administrative

plan. Noting that Part 982 authorizes a PHA to establish local policies to administer those

matters for which the PHA has discretion, BCHA asserts that it exercised its discretion within

the plan by deciding that a failure to meet family obligations mandates termination.

Specifically, BCHA points to the plan’s language providing that “[t]he PHA will terminate a

family’s assistance” (emphasis added) if certain circumstances occur (listing 10), including

“[t]he family has failed to comply with any family obligations under the program.”

¶ 28 A broader review of BCHA’s administrative plan, however, requires us to reject this

argument. Sections of the plan must be read as a whole, so no part is rendered meaningless or

superfluous. See Gaston v. Chac, Inc., 375 Ill. App. 3d 16, 24 (2007). We initially note that,

like Part 982, the plan separates mandatory and discretionary terminations into different

sections. The plan lists, in section 12-I.D., “Mandatory Termination of Assistance.” Again, this

is not where the grounds for the termination of plaintiff’s benefits allegedly fell. Rather,

plaintiff’s benefits were terminated under section 12-I.E., “Mandatory Polices and Other

Authorized Terminations.” Section 12-I.E. is further divided, with the grounds for plaintiff’s

termination falling under the subsection concerning “Other Authorized Terminations.” After

an introductory paragraph again explaining that HUD permits BCHA to consider, in its

discretion, whether circumstances warrant “consideration for the termination of assistance”

(emphasis added), the policy does state that termination “will” occur for 10 enumerated

infractions. Critically, however, this statement is then qualified, with the following language

appearing at the end of the subsection:

“In making its decision to terminate assistance, the PHA will consider alternatives as

described in Section 12-II.C and other factors described in Sections 12-II.D and

12-II.E. Upon consideration of such alternatives and factors, the PHA may, on a

case-by-case basis, choose not to terminate assistance.” (Emphases added.)

¶ 29 In turn, section 12-II.D. lists “criteria for deciding to terminate assistance.” Each

subsection provides first the relevant citation to Part 982 and then the specific policy that

BCHA has adopted in relation thereto. The subsection relevant here references section

552(c)(2)(i) of Part 982, which provides that a PHA may consider all relevant circumstances,

such as the seriousness of the case. BCHA’s administrative plan does insert a limitation,

stating: “The PHA is permitted, but not required, to consider all relevant circumstances when

determining whether a family’s assistance should be terminated.” (Emphasis added.)

Nevertheless, the plan next provides, as “PHA Policy,” that “[t]he PHA will consider the

following factors when making its decision to terminate assistance” (emphasis added),

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including the seriousness of the case (as well as factors such as “the length of time since the

violation occurred, the family’s recent history and the likelihood of favorable conduct in the

future, if the family reported to the PHA within 10 business days of arrest or conviction”).

¶ 30 As previously noted, a PHA must adopt a written administrative plan that establishes local

policies for matters within the PHA’s discretion, but those polices must be in accordance with

HUD’s regulations and requirements. 24 C.F.R. § 982.54(a) (2015). The administrative plan

here, as described above, conforms with Part 982, as it provides that alternatives and factors

“will” be considered before a discretionary termination decision is rendered. Indeed, as further

described below, this interpretation is also consistent with the decisions in Gaston and

Lipscomb, both of which considered discretionary terminations and held that relevant

circumstances must first be considered or the distinction between mandatory and discretionary

terminations is meaningless. See Lipscomb, 2015 IL App (1st) 142793, ¶ 28; Gaston, 375 Ill.

App. 3d at 24. Accordingly, although defendants repeatedly contend that BCHA’s

administrative plan mandated termination here, this interpretation is contrary to the plain

language of the plan, when read as a whole. Gaston, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 24. The notice of

termination, Part 982, and the administrative plan clearly reflect that plaintiff’s termination did

not fall under the mandatory termination provisions but, rather, fell into the category of an

“authorized termination,” requiring the application of discretion and the consideration of

relevant circumstances.

¶ 31 C. Application of Discretion

¶ 32 Having determined that the termination of plaintiff’s benefits was not mandatory under

Part 982 or BCHA’s administrative plan, we consider whether the record reflects that the

termination decision was the result of an exercise of discretion.

¶ 33 We note first that, in its provisions addressing hearing procedures, Part 982 requires that

“[t]he person who conducts the hearing must issue a written decision, stating briefly the

reasons for the decision.” (Emphasis added.) 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(6) (2015). Here, the order

reflects that, after considering the record, Davis made findings of fact, but they amount only to

a recitation of the evidence presented. The conclusion of law cursorily upheld the termination,

without providing any reasons for the decision, in light of the evidence that was presented.

Based on the evidence presented, there is no dispute that there was a technical violation of the

family obligations (assuming that knowledge and intent are irrelevant to finding this type of

violation), but the issue here was the appropriate consequence, if any, for that violation, in light

of all relevant circumstances and given that a termination was discretionary. In that regard,

there is nothing in the order reflecting that Davis knew or appreciated that she had discretion

not to terminate, or that her decision to terminate resulted from consideration and application

of the factors prescribed within BCHA’s administrative plan.

¶ 34 Our decision is consistent with the decisions in Lipscomb and Gaston. There,

distinguishing between mandatory and discretionary terminations under Part 982, the courts

held that “a discretionary termination of benefits under subsection (c) [(24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)

(2015))] requires the agency to consider these ‘relevant circumstances’ [(24 C.F.R.

§ 982.552(c)(2)(i) (2015))] before making its determination.” (Emphasis added.) Lipscomb,

2015 IL App (1st) 142793, ¶ 25 (citing Gaston, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 24). The courts noted that

failing to consider relevant circumstances before making a termination decision renders

meaningless any distinction between mandatory and discretionary terminations and that it is

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not sufficient, in a discretionary termination, for the hearing officer to simply summarize the

evidence and announce a decision without providing any reasons for exercising his or her

discretion in favor of termination. See Id. ¶ 28; Gaston, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 24.

¶ 35 We reject defendants’ attempts to distinguish Gaston and Lipscomb on factual bases. Their

relevance here concerns the importance of distinguishing between mandatory and

discretionary terminations and, in the latter instance, providing reasons for the decision and an

indication that relevant circumstances were considered. Further, although defendants note that

it is not clear in Gaston or Lipscomb whether the administrative plan would have classified the

termination as mandatory, we have rejected defendants’ contention that the termination here

was mandatory, and therefore, this argument is irrelevant.

¶ 36 We further disagree with defendants’ argument that, because the hearing decision

referenced “plaintiff’s purported basis for failing to reschedule and appear,” as well as

evidence presented by BCHA, the basis for the termination is clearly evident for our review.

The decision lacked any rationale connecting the recited evidence to the ultimate conclusion,

nor did it even state with which “law, HUD regulations and the Housing Authority’s policies”

the decision complied. Part 982 and case law clearly require reasons for the decision. 24

C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(6) (2015); Lipscomb, 2015 IL App (1st) 142793, ¶ 28; Gaston, 375 Ill.

App. 3d at 24. To make judicial review meaningful, an administrative decisionmaker must

articulate the rationale for the decision made, based on the facts found. See, e.g., Medina

Nursing Center, Inc. v. Health Facilities & Services Review Board, 2013 IL App (4th) 120554,

¶¶ 23-27 (noting that a conclusion reflecting a “robotic declaration” of compliance with

applicable standards “is worthless for purposes of judicial review”). Where findings are

lacking, the case must be remanded for further proceedings and to allow the administrative

body to enter its findings. See, e.g., Lipscomb, 2015 IL App (1st) 142793, ¶ 28.

¶ 37 Defendants also contend that the inclusion of the evidence in the hearing decision reflects

that Davis considered it. We do not agree that we can infer from the order’s summary of the

evidence that Davis applied the relevant factors in a discretionary manner. In other words,

where defendants’ primary position is that the termination was mandatory, there is no basis for

us to simply assume that Davis knew otherwise when issuing the decision. Again, the order

summarized the evidence presented but included no explanation for how that evidence was

considered or why, despite plaintiff’s explanation and evidence in support thereof for the

technical violation, Davis rejected any alternative to the termination. Thus, we cannot ascertain

that Davis even knew or appreciated that termination was not mandatory.

¶ 38 To be clear, Part 982 requires only that the hearing officer state “briefly” the reasons for the

decision (24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(6) (2015)), and we are not holding that an elaborate decision

must be issued. However, where a termination is mandatory, the decision should so state.

Where a termination is discretionary, the decision should reflect the hearing officer’s rationale

for choosing termination over any alternative, based on the relevant circumstances. In contrast,

here, we have no rationale for the decision to terminate. This absence, combined with the

faulty position that the termination was mandatory, requires us to remand for the entry of a

decision, based on the relevant circumstances, that explains what consequence is chosen and

why.

¶ 39 In sum, as no reasons for the termination decision were provided, the termination of

benefits here does not reflect that it resulted from an exercise of discretion, rendered after a

consideration of the relevant circumstances; therefore, the decision was clearly erroneous. See,

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e.g., Lipscomb, 2015 IL App (1st) 142793, ¶ 16. We reverse the trial court, vacate BCHA’s

termination decision, and remand for BCHA to reconsider the evidence and enter its findings,

providing a rationale for any decision it makes on remand.

¶ 40 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 41 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Boone County is reversed, and

the cause is remanded with directions.

¶ 42 Reversed and remanded with directions.

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