United States v. Maurice Collins

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 18‐2149

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

MAURICE COLLINS,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois.

No. 2:14‐cr‐20032‐CSB‐DGB‐1 — Colin S. Bruce, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 11, 2018 — DECIDED MAY 14, 2019

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and RIPPLE and BARRETT, Cir‐

cuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Maurice Collins pleaded guilty to

distributing cocaine and crack cocaine in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Because of a prior felony drug conviction,

he faced a statutory minimum of ten years in prison, unless

he qualified for the “safety valve” in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5).

The district court initially denied Mr. Collins the benefit of

the safety valve on a ground that we later determined to be

2 No. 18‐2149

erroneous. Consequently, we vacated his sentence and re‐

manded for further proceedings. See United States v. Collins,

877 F.3d 362, 368–69 (7th Cir. 2017).

On remand, the district court again determined that

Mr. Collins did not qualify for the safety valve. The court fo‐

cused on a statement in his proffer interview about what he

intended to do with the significant amount of cash found in

his car at the time of his arrest. Doubting the veracity of his

claims about the cash, the court concluded that Mr. Collins

had not established that he had “truthfully provided to the

Government all information and evidence the defendant has

concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same

course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(f)(5). Accordingly, the court did not give him the ben‐

efit of the safety valve and resentenced him to the statutory

mandatory minimum.

Mr. Collins again appeals his sentence. He contends that

the district court erred in assessing the relative burdens of

proof with respect to his eligibility for the safety valve. He

also submits that he provided a truthful and complete dis‐

closure to the Government before sentencing. For the rea‐

sons stated below, we affirm the judgment.

I

BACKGROUND

In the fall of 2013, a cooperating individual working for

the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) informed

agents that Mr. Collins was involved in cocaine distribution

in the Danville and Champaign, Illinois area. The informant

related that Mr. Collins had sold him ounce‐quantities of co‐

caine on multiple occasions. He also said that Mr. Collins

No. 18‐2149 3

and another individual had pooled their cash and that they

had paid $32,000 for a kilogram of cocaine. Following that

initial interview, the same informant participated, over a

five‐month period in 2013 and 2014, in four controlled buys

of ounce‐quantities of cocaine from Mr. Collins. On another

occasion, agents attempted to arrange a buy of

three‐quarters of a kilogram of cocaine, but Mr. Collins was

unable to acquire that amount.

In May 2014, agents arrested Mr. Collins outside Cham‐

paign, Illinois, while he was driving eastbound toward Dan‐

ville and away from Clinton. At the time of his arrest, DEA

agents seized from his vehicle about $40,000 in cash. Follow‐

ing the arrest, agents learned through a different source

working for a separate local law enforcement task force that

Mr. Collins had planned to use the cash to buy a kilogram of

cocaine in Danville.

The Government charged Mr. Collins with distributing

cocaine and crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §

841(a)(1). He subsequently pleaded guilty. Because of a prior

felony drug conviction, he faced a statutory minimum of ten

years in prison. See id. § 841(b)(1)(B). A few weeks before

sentencing, Mr. Collins met with the Government for a prof‐

fer interview; he hoped that he would earn entitlement to

sentencing under the “safety‐valve” exception to the statuto‐

ry minimum. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(5).

This exception requires a defendant to “truthfully provide[]

to the Government all information and evidence the defend‐

ant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of

the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan.”

18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5).

4 No. 18‐2149

During the proffer interview, Special Agent Joe Green

asked Mr. Collins what he intended to do with the $40,000

found in his vehicle at the time of his arrest, at least $15,000

of which, Mr. Collins admitted, were proceeds from cocaine

sales. Mr. Collins explained that he had planned to buy a

nice car at the Clinton Auto Auction and denied any intent

to purchase a kilogram of cocaine. Mr. Collins told the agent:

“I was going to Danville first … to the gym. Then I was go‐

ing to the auction during the evening.”1

At the original sentencing in May 2015, the district court

determined that Mr. Collins had played a supervisory role in

the offense, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c), which rendered him inel‐

igible for the safety‐valve reduction, see 18 U.S.C. §

3553(f)(4); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(4). The court therefore im‐

posed the statutory minimum sentence of 120 months’ im‐

prisonment but indicated that it would have chosen a lower

sentence had Mr. Collins been eligible for the safety valve.

Mr. Collins appealed. We held that the district court had

erred in applying the supervisory‐role enhancement. We

therefore remanded for resentencing. See Collins, 877 F.3d at

368–69.

At the resentencing hearing in May 2018, the Govern‐

ment maintained that Mr. Collins still was ineligible for the

safety valve because he had not been fully truthful in his in‐

terview. In particular, the Government asserted that he had

made three false statements. The first two statements con‐

cerned his working relationship with another drug trafficker

and the nature of his involvement in a particular transaction

1 See R.31 (12:05–12:25 in the proffer video).

No. 18‐2149 5

involving crack cocaine instead of powder cocaine. The dis‐

trict court disagreed with the Government and concluded

that Mr. Collins had not been untruthful with respect to

these matters.

The third falsehood, according to the Government, con‐

cerned Mr. Collins’s statements about what he planned to do

with the $40,000 in cash he was carrying when arrested. On

this issue, the district court took evidence and heard argu‐

ment. Testifying for the Government, Special Agent Green

pointed out that Mr. Collins was arrested on a Tuesday, but

Clinton Auto Auction held auctions on Wednesdays and

Saturdays only. He also testified that $40,000 would have

been a “reasonable price” for a kilogram of cocaine at the

time of Mr. Collins’s arrest, and “every once in a while,”

drug traffickers found with large amounts of cash say that

they are “on their way to purchase a vehicle.”2 On

cross‐examination, Special Agent Green agreed that, during

the investigation, the largest amount of cocaine that

Mr. Collins had sold at any one time was an ounce and one‐

half. Indeed, when Special Agent Green’s confidential in‐

formant had attempted to purchase three‐quarters of a kilo‐

gram from Mr. Collins, Mr. Collins could not acquire that

amount. Special Agent Green also admitted that the invento‐

ry at the Clinton Auto Auction might include some “decent”

cars by high‐end makers.3 After the agent testified, the court

recessed the hearing so that it could watch the videotape of

2 R.59 at 29, 31.

3 Id. at 35–36.

6 No. 18‐2149

Mr. Collins’s safety‐valve interview. Mr. Collins did not testi‐

fy.

When the hearing reconvened, the district court stated

that it had reviewed the disputed section of the video “mul‐

tiple times” and had “watched and heard the tones” in an

effort to understand Mr. Collins’s “true intentions.”4 The

court then set forth six undisputed facts that informed its

ruling: (1) Mr. Collins was “dealing in, more or less, ounce

quantities of cocaine”; (2) “$40,000 was an approximate price

for a kilogram of powder cocaine”; (3) drug dealers typically

“buy large quantities of cocaine with cash”; (4) a confidential

source “indicated [that Mr. Collins] intended to purchase a

kilo of cocaine … during the operative time frame”; (5)

“there was no Clinton Auto Auction the day [Mr. Collins]

was arrested”; and (6) “he was driving away from Clinton—

not towards it—with the money.”5 The court was “skeptical

that [Mr. Collins] was being 100 percent truthful as to his in‐

tention with the $40,000” because his explanation did not

“seem to be reasonable.”6

The district court acknowledged that, “[i]n a lot of ways,

this is just … a ‘he said/she said’ sort of thing,” but stressed

that Mr. Collins had the burden of proving that his explana‐

tion was truthful.7 Although the court was “troubled,” it

concluded that Mr. Collins had not satisfied his burden, and

4 R.60 at 3–4, 7–8.

5 Id. at 6–7.

6 Id. at 8, 9.

7 Id. at 7–8.

No. 18‐2149 7

thus, he did not qualify for safety‐valve relief.8 After sentenc‐

ing Mr. Collins to 120 months in prison, the court “actively

encourag[ed]” him to appeal because the court “want[ed] to

make sure [it had] interpreted the law correctly as to the

burden of proof.”9

If Mr. Collins had been eligible for the safety valve, his

guideline range would have been 37 to 46 months.

II

DISCUSSION

As part of the Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Reform

Act of 1994 (“MMSRA”), Congress created the so‐called

“safety‐valve” provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), which abro‐

gates mandated minimum sentences for some first‐time,

low‐level offenders in federal drug cases. Before the

MMSRA’s enactment, a district court could impose a sen‐

tence below the statutory minimum only upon the Govern‐

ment’s motion, based on the defendant’s substantial assis‐

tance to authorities. See id. § 3553(e); U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. Be‐

cause these motions primarily benefited offenders with

greater criminal involvement — and thus, more information

— lower‐level offenders often received longer sentences than

their more culpable counterparts. See United States v. Arring‐

ton, 73 F.3d 144, 147 (7th Cir. 1996). To remedy this inequity,

Congress enacted the safety‐valve provision. See H.R. Rep.

No. 103‐460, at 4–5 (1994).

8 Id. at 8, 10.

9 Id. at 19.

8 No. 18‐2149

The safety‐valve provision requires a district court to

waive the imposition of a statutory minimum sentence if it

finds that the defendant meets the following five criteria:

(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 crim‐

inal history point, as determined under the

sentencing guidelines …;

(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible

threats of violence or possess a firearm or other

dangerous weapon (or induce another partici‐

pant to do so) in connection with the offense;

(3) the offense did not result in death or serious

bodily injury to any person;

(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader,

manager, or supervisor of others in the offense,

as determined under the sentencing guidelines

and was not engaged in a continuing criminal

enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 848; and

(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hear‐

ing, the defendant has truthfully provided to

the Government all information and evidence

the defendant has concerning the offense or of‐

fenses that were part of the same course of

conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but

the fact that the defendant has no relevant or

useful other information to provide or that the

Government is already aware of the infor‐

mation shall not preclude a determination by

the court that the defendant has complied with

this requirement.

No. 18‐2149 9

U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). This appeal

focuses on the fifth criterion. We review the district court’s

interpretation of the safety‐valve provision under the statute

and the sentencing guidelines de novo. United States v. Mon‐

tes, 381 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v.

Ramirez, 94 F.3d 1095, 1099 (7th Cir. 1996)). We review the

district court’s factual findings about a defendant’s eligibility

for the safety valve, as well as its ultimate conclusion, for

clear error. Montes, 381 F.3d at 634; United States v. Aceve‐

do‐Fitz, 739 F.3d 967, 970 (7th Cir. 2014).

A.

At this late date, there can be no question that the de‐

fendant must carry the burden of establishing eligibility for

the safety‐valve exemption from a mandatory minimum sen‐

tence. Thirteen years ago, in United States v. Ramirez, 94 F.3d

1095 (7th Cir. 1996), we reviewed the denial of safety‐valve

relief to a defendant who had provided only the “basic de‐

tails” of his offense but had not responded to specific ques‐

tions posed by the Government. Id. at 1103. In that case, the

defendant had argued that once a defendant offers infor‐

mation to the Government and states that he has fully pro‐

vided all that he knows, “the burden must shift to the gov‐

ernment to proffer evidence that the defendant has not pro‐

vided his information completely or truthfully.” Id. at 1100.

We rejected the defendant’s “shifting‐burden theory” and

affirmed the district court’s denial of the safety valve. Id. We

analogized the safety valve to a departure under the sentenc‐

ing guidelines and reasoned that because the party seeking

the departure bears the burden of proving that he meets the

criteria, it “logically follows … that a defendant moving for a

§ 5.C1.2 reduction would be responsible to prove his enti‐

10 No. 18‐2149

tlement to it.” Id. at 1101. We therefore held that application

of the safety valve requires that “the defendant, not the gov‐

ernment, prove the defendant’s entitlement to that sentence

reduction,” and emphasized that, throughout the proceed‐

ings, “the burden remains on the defendant to prove his enti‐

tlement.” Id. at 1101, 1102 (emphasis in original) (quoting

United States v. Montanez, 82 F.3d 520, 523 (1st Cir. 1996)). We

noted, moreover, that our approach was “compatible with

the view taken in other circuits.” Id. at 1100–01 (citing cases).

Ramirez confirmed the existing law of the circuit and, in

turn, we have confirmed the holding in Ramirez in many

cases. See, e.g., Montes, 381 F.3d at 637; United States v. Gal‐

braith, 200 F.3d 1006, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v.

Martinez, 301 F.3d 860, 866 (7th Cir. 2002). If, after evaluating

the defendant’s submission, the district court finds the

statements in the proffer interview to be “inconsistent,”

“suspicious,” or “implausible,” the court is entitled to deny

safety‐valve relief. United States v. Rebolledo‐Delgadillo, 820

F.3d 870, 880 (7th Cir. 2016). Our more recent cases testify to

the durability of this principle. See, e.g., United States v. Sand‐

oval, 747 F.3d 464, 469 (7th Cir. 2014). To prevail, a defendant

must meet the district court’s misgivings even when those

misgivings are based on a relatively weak rebuttal by the

Government, or when those misgivings are grounded in fac‐

tual assertions not admissible under the Rules of Evidence.10

10 See United States v. Alvarado‐Tizoc, 656 F.3d 740, 746 (7th Cir. 2011)

(“The government’s evidence was not strong, but it didn’t have to be, as

there was nothing on the other side but the defendant’s say‐so … .”);

United States v. Ponce, 358 F.3d 466, 468 (7th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the de‐

fendant’s argument that such non‐evidentiary presentations are categor‐

(continued … )

No. 18‐2149 11

Most of the decisions of our sister circuits are consonant

with our approach. Certainly, every circuit to have consid‐

ered the matter has held, as we have, that the initial burden

of proof for safety‐valve eligibility lies with the defendant.11

Some also specifically have rejected, as we have, any form of

burden shifting. See, e.g., United States v. Aidoo, 670 F.3d 600,

607 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that “[t]he defendant’s burden

under the safety valve is a true burden of proof that rests, at

all times, on the defendant”). These circuits accept that “the

government has no obligation to present evidence of the de‐

fendant’s failure to satisfy the requirements of the safety

valve.” Id. at 606; see also United States v. Alvarado‐Rivera, 412

F.3d 942, 947 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (rejecting defendants’

argument that the Government has the burden to present

additional evidence if it finds a defendant’s proffer inade‐

quate).

( … continued)

ically insufficient “to call into question the veracity of [the defendant’s]

testimony” because “the government does not bear the burden of

proof”).

11 See United States v. Bolton, 858 F.3d 905, 913 (4th Cir. 2017); United

States v. Carillo‐Ayala, 713 F.3d 82, 90 (11th Cir. 2013); United States v.

Jimenez, 451 F.3d 97, 101–03 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Mathis, 216

F.3d 18, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2000); United States v. Morones, 181 F.3d 888, 890

(8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Vasquez, 161 F.3d 909, 912 (5th Cir. 1998);

United States v. Sabir, 117 F.3d 750, 754 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v.

Verners, 103 F.3d 108, 110 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Miran‐

da‐Santiago, 96 F.3d 517, 529 & n.25 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v.

Ramirez, 94 F.3d 1095, 1101 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Ajugwo, 82

F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Adu, 82 F.3d 119, 123 (6th

Cir. 1996).

12 No. 18‐2149

Other circuits seemingly have indicated that the burden

shifts to the Government after the defendant’s initial eviden‐

tiary showing. The First Circuit initially took this view in

United States v. Miranda‐Santiago, 96 F.3d 517 (1st Cir. 1996),

where it rejected as inadequate the Government’s statement

that it did not “believe” the defendant in her proffer. Id. at

529. That court required that the Government must at least

come forward with “some sound reason to suggest” that the

defendant could not be credited. Id. n.25. This language in

Miranda‐Santiago suggesting that the Government had a

formal obligation to meet the defendant’s case caused the

First Circuit to delineate the true import of its holding in

subsequent cases. In United States v. Marquez, 280 F.3d 19 (1st

Cir. 2002), the court explicitly described several scenarios

that belied a sweeping interpretation of the problematic lan‐

guage in the earlier case. First, the court reiterated its earlier

holding in United States v. White, 119 F.3d 70 (1st Cir. 1997),

that a “court may reject a safety valve proffer based on its

reasoned assessment of the defendant’s credibility in light of

the facts—and that the court may do so without the benefit

of independent rebuttal evidence.” Marquez, 280 F.3d at 24.

“Miranda–Santiago stands,” the First Circuit continued,

“merely for the proposition that when the record, taken as a

whole, will not support a finding that the defendant has

failed to provide a truthful and complete proffer, the gov‐

ernment’s lack of confidence in the proffer is insufficient, in

and of itself, to justify a denial of access to the safety valve.”

Id.; see also United States v. Padilla‐Colón, 578 F.3d 23, 31 (1st

Cir. 2009) (reaffirming the Marquez court’s understanding of

Miranda‐Santiago); United States v. Bravo, 489 F.3d 1, 12 (1st

Cir. 2007) (“The district court’s finding on eligibility must be

‘an independent determination,’ resting on more than ‘bare

No. 18‐2149 13

conclusions.’” (citation omitted) (quoting White, 119 F.3d at

73, and Miranda‐Santiago, 96 F.3d at 528)). Notably, both Pa‐

dilla‐Colón and Bravo also stress that, in the end, it is the dis‐

trict court’s “reasoned determination, in light of the facts on

record” that must determine the propriety of granting the

safety‐valve reduction. Padilla‐Colón, 578 F.3d at 31; see also

Bravo, 498 F.3d at 12.

In United States v. Miller, 179 F.3d 961 (5th Cir. 1999), the

Fifth Circuit found support in Miranda‐Santiago and its prog‐

eny for the unexceptional proposition that, in evaluating a

defendant’s safety‐valve proffer, a district court cannot de‐

termine that the defendant has not rendered a truthful and

complete statement based solely on speculation, devoid of

any factual support, suggested by the Government. The

court concluded that the district court had erred in failing to

apply the safety valve based only on the Government’s un‐

supported assertion that the defendant had “surely lied”

when he told authorities that he had only recently learned

how to dry cocaine. Id. at 967. The Government had argued

that because the defendant previously had trafficked co‐

caine, the court could “glean[]” from the record that he also

was familiar with the process of drying cocaine. Id. at 968.

After discussing Miranda‐Santiago, the Fifth Circuit rejected

the Government’s assertion as “merely speculative,” and

thus, an insufficient basis on which to deny safety‐valve re‐

lief. Id. at 968–69.

Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that once a de‐

fendant meets his “initial burden” of demonstrating his eli‐

gibility for the safety‐valve reduction, “it falls to the Gov‐

ernment to show that the information he has supplied is un‐

true or incomplete.” United States v. Shrestha, 86 F.3d 935, 940

14 No. 18‐2149

(9th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Diaz‐Cardenas, 351 F.3d

404, 409 (9th Cir. 2003).12 Read in context, however, these

cases stand for the proposition that, once a defendant makes

a significant case, it is incumbent upon the Government to

rebut that case if it does not want the defendant to prevail.

This so‐called “shifting” of the burden to the Government

simply means that, if the Government is to prevail in the face

of a fact‐based submission by the defendant, it must produce

a fact‐based rebuttal, not rank speculation.13

There is no doctrinal disagreement among the circuits. A

close examination of these cases makes very clear that the

authorities are compatible. No court of appeals questions the

fundamental proposition that the defendant bears the ulti‐

mate burden of proof in establishing eligibility for the safe‐

ty‐valve reduction. No circuit disputes that a defendant can

fail to carry the burden by producing a story so riddled with

12 The District of Columbia Circuit has articulated, albeit in dicta, a simi‐

lar understanding of Miranda‐Santiago and United States v. Shrestha, 86

F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 1996), respectively. See United States v. Tate, 630

F.3d 194, 203 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Miranda‐Santiago favorably and

quoting it at length); see also United States v. Gales, 603 F.3d 49, 54–55

(D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that neither Miranda‐Santiago nor Shrestha sup‐

port altering the burden of proof for the defendant).

13 As one commentator has remarked, shifting the burden to the Gov‐

ernment in this regard can help “ensur[e] that any challenges to [a de‐

fendant’s safety‐valve] eligibility stem from actual untruthfulness on

their part, rather than simple government speculation or the govern‐

ment’s dissatisfaction with the information it received.” Natasha Bronn,

“Unlucky Enough to Be Innocent”: Burden‐Shifting and the Fate of the Modern

Drug Mule Under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) Statutory Safety Valve, 46 Colum.

J.L. & Soc. Probs. 469, 500 (2013).

No. 18‐2149 15

inconsistencies and implausibility that the district court can‐

not accept it. See, e.g., Montes, 381 F.3d at 637. In such cases,

the Government’s silence is immaterial. Some circuits simply

have taken the time to emphasize that when the defendant

makes an initial submission that appears credible and com‐

plete, the Government cannot carry the day by simply telling

the district court that it does not believe the defendant or by

inviting the district court to indulge in speculation. The

Government can hope to rebut the defendant’s credible

showing only by giving the district court a concrete,

fact‐based rationale for rejecting the defendant’s case. It can

do this by impeaching, to the district court’s satisfaction, the

quality of the defendant’s submission or by introducing evi‐

dence to the contrary. It cannot prevail, however, simply by

asserting its disbelief or its lack of satisfaction. In the end, it

is the district court’s estimation of the defendant’s submis‐

sion, not the Government’s, that counts.

B.

Confident that our approach to the burden of proof re‐

sides comfortably among the articulations of our sister cir‐

cuits and that there is no substantive disagreement among

the circuits, we proceed to consider its application in the

present case.

The Government does not dispute that Mr. Collins pro‐

vided abundant truthful information about his offense, in‐

cluding his drug source and other potential distributors.14

14 Appellant’s Br. 16–17; Appellee’s Br. 14. This court has had little diffi‐

culty affirming the denial of safety‐valve relief when the opposite is

true—i.e., when a defendant provided only limited information to the

Government or lied about or even denied his involvement in the offense.

(continued … )

16 No. 18‐2149

Rather, it argued that Mr. Collins’s ineligibility for the safety

valve turned solely on whether he was truthful with respect

to his intentions for the $40,000 in cash he possessed when

he was arrested. In the Government’s view, the evidence

suggested that he lied when he told the officers that he

planned to buy a car, not cocaine.

The district court struggled with the issue, but concluded

that Mr. Collins had not carried his burden. The court cited

six facts that it considered in reaching its conclusion that

Mr. Collins’s explanation did not “seem to be reasonable.”15

The court noted that Mr. Collins generally dealt in

ounce‐quantities of cocaine throughout the term of the in‐

vestigation, but that he had an amount of cash approximate‐

ly equal to the cost of one kilogram and that drug dealers

use cash. It also discounted his explanation that he would be

buying a car, because he was heading in the wrong direction

and there was no auction scheduled to be held in Clinton on

the day of his arrest.

Applying the approach employed throughout the United

States, we must conclude that Mr. Collins’s sentence must be

affirmed. The district court understood that the defendant

( … continued)

Cf. United States v. Ortiz, 775 F.3d 964, 967–68 (7th Cir. 2015) (defendant

gave limited information in a post‐arrest statement, leaving “many facts

[about his offense] unknown”); United States v. Marin, 144 F.3d 1085, 1095

(7th Cir. 1998) (defendant “kept altering his version of events”); United

States v. Thompson, 106 F.3d 794, 801 (7th Cir. 1997) (defendants “contin‐

ued to cling to a false version of events and dispute their own culpabil‐

ity”).

15 R.60 at 9.

No. 18‐2149 17

had the burden of establishing eligibility for the safety valve.

It weighed the record and statements before it and conclud‐

ed that Mr. Collins had not established his eligibility because

his explanations were not credible. This conclusion was not

clearly erroneous. It was a difficult decision on disputed

facts. The district court made the hard call and decided the

case according to established law.

Conclusion

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED