James Mills v. City of Covina

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES MILLS, No. 17-56343

Plaintiff-Appellant,

D.C. No.

v. 2:16-cv-07127-

DOC-RAO

CITY OF COVINA, a California

municipal corporation; KIM RANEY,

in his official capacity as the Chief OPINION

of the City of Covina Police

Department; TERRANCE HANOU,

Officer; DOES, 1–100,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 8, 2019

Pasadena, California

Filed April 24, 2019

Before: Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Jacqueline H. Nguyen,

and Ryan D. Nelson, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge R. Nelson

2 MILLS V. CITY OF COVINA

SUMMARY *

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of

plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims as time-barred and

affirmed a judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendants

in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging

that plaintiff was stopped and searched by police officers

without probable cause, falsely arrested, and maliciously

prosecuted.

Plaintiff brought suit under § 1983 after a California

Court of Appeal overturned his convictions for possession of

a controlled substance and a smoking device on the grounds

that the Superior Court erred by denying plaintiff’s

suppression motion.

The panel held that plaintiff’s claims for unlawful stop

and detention, false arrest and false imprisonment were time-

barred because Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) did

not legally prevent plaintiff from commencing those claims

during his criminal appeal and thus tolling under California

Code of Civil Procedure § 356 was not triggered. The panel

noted that plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims accrued at

the time he was searched and arrested and that under

California law, the statute of limitations was tolled during

the criminal proceedings in Superior Court, but not during

the criminal appeal. The panel held that where, as in this

case, a § 1983 claim accrues pre-conviction, the possibility

that Heck may require dismissal of that “not-yet-filed, and

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

MILLS V. CITY OF COVINA 3

thus utterly indeterminate, § 1983 claim,” is not sufficient to

trigger tolling under California Code of Civil Procedure

§ 356.

Addressing the malicious prosecution and Monell

liability claims, the panel found that collateral estoppel did

not apply because a conviction or judgment that has been

reversed on appeal and vacated lacks preclusive effect and

cannot serve as collateral estoppel in a later proceeding. The

panel nevertheless affirmed the district court’s dismissal of

the claims on the alternative ground that the reversal of

plaintiff’s conviction on basis of the exclusionary rule was

not a favorable termination, for purposes of a malicious

prosecution claim, because the reversal did not address

plaintiff’s guilt or innocence.

COUNSEL

Joseph M. Adams (argued), Adams & Pham APC, Costa

Mesa, California; Thomas H. Schelly and Kevin A. Lipeles,

Lipeles Law Group APC, El Segundo, California; for

Plaintiff-Appellant.

Trisha E. Newman (argued), Tony M. Sain (argued), and

Andrea K. Kornblau, Manning & Kass Ellrod Ramirez

Trester LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Defendants-

Appellees.

4 MILLS V. CITY OF COVINA

OPINION

R. NELSON, Circuit Judge:

We consider whether the statute of limitations for a

criminal defendant’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is tolled under

California Code of Civil Procedure § 356 during the

pendency of an appeal from a conviction, in light of the

Supreme Court’s rule in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477

(1994). The district court held that § 356 does not toll

Appellant James Mills’s § 1983 claims and thus, all but two

of Mills’s claims are time-barred. Because Heck did not

legally prevent Mills from filing his § 1983 claims during his

criminal appeal, we agree with the district court. We also

find Mills’s remaining claims were properly dismissed, not

because those claims are barred by collateral estoppel, but

because reversal of Mills’s conviction was not a favorable

termination. We therefore affirm.

I

On April 14, 2013, Covina Police Department Officer

Terrance Hanou pulled Mills over for a traffic stop after

seeing Mills exit a hotel and drive to another hotel. Hanou

claimed he pulled Mills over because his vehicle registration

was expired. Mills alleges Hanou noticed Mills “for no

reason other than his physical appearance—large framed,

bald headed, Caucasian,” and that when Hanou checked

Mills’s vehicle license, the database showed the registration

was current.

Hanou acknowledged Mills’s registration was valid but

asked to search Mills’s car. Mills refused. Hanou then made

two calls to his supervisor and asked Mills if there were any

weapons in the vehicle. Mills informed Hanou of an

unloaded shotgun in the cargo compartment.

MILLS V. CITY OF COVINA 5

Hanou requested that Mills exit the vehicle and Mills

complied. Hanou immediately handcuffed Mills, conducted

a pat down search, and found $10,000 cash on Mills’s

person. Hanou then searched Mills’s vehicle and found the

shotgun and an additional $7,000 cash. After the search,

Hanou arrested Mills claiming he found illegal drugs and “a

smoking device” in Mills’s vehicle.

Prior to Mills’s criminal trial, Mills moved to suppress

evidence of the alleged drugs, arguing Hanou’s search

violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The California

Superior Court denied the motion. At trial, Hanou testified

he found drugs during the search. Mills testified “there were

no drugs in his vehicle,” “there was evidence that the drugs

were planted,” and Mills’s counsel closed by stating, “Mr.

Mills did not have drugs in his car. Those drugs were

planted, and he’s not guilty.” On June 6, 2014, Mills was

convicted of one count of possession of a controlled

substance (methamphetamine) and one count of possession

of a smoking device and was sentenced to eighteen months’

probation.

On March 3, 2016, the California Court of Appeal

overturned Mills’s conviction. The Court of Appeal held, in

an unpublished opinion, that Hanou violated Mills’s Fourth

Amendment rights by searching the vehicle without

probable cause and therefore, the Superior Court erred by

denying Mills’s suppression motion. Because “[t]he

methamphetamine Hanou recovered from the center console

and the methamphetamine and methamphetamine pipe he

recovered from the luggage formed the evidentiary basis for

[Mills’s] convictions in th[e] case,” the Court of Appeal held

that further proceedings below would be an “idle gesture,”

and remanded for dismissal.

6 MILLS V. CITY OF COVINA

On September 22, 2016, Mills filed this suit against the

City of Covina, Covina Police Chief Kim Raney, and Hanou,

alleging, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claims for: (1) unlawful

stop and detention, (2) false arrest, (3) false imprisonment,

(4) malicious prosecution, (5) failure to screen and hire

properly, (6) failure to train properly, (7) failure to supervise

and discipline, and (8) Monell municipal liability against the

City of Covina. The district court dismissed all but Mills’s

§ 1983 claim for malicious prosecution and the related

Monell claim as time-barred. The district court held that

Heck “did not bar [Mills] from filing his claims while he was

subject to a criminal prosecution,” and thus, California Code

of Civil Procedure § 356 did not toll his claims during the

pendency of his criminal appeal.

Mills filed two amended complaints against only the City

of Covina and Hanou (collectively “Appellees”) alleging,

under § 1983, claims for: (1) malicious prosecution and

(2) Monell municipal liability. On August 4, 2017,

Appellees moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing

that Mills’s amended claims were barred by collateral

estoppel or, in the alternative, that Mills failed to establish a

favorable termination of his criminal proceedings. The

district court held that collateral estoppel barred Mills from

relitigating the issue of whether he possessed drugs, and

thus, probable cause was conclusively established. The

district court did not reach Appellees’ favorable termination

argument. Mills now appeals.

II

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review de novo the district court’s dismissal based on the

statute of limitations. Johnson v. Lucent Techs., Inc.,

653 F.3d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 2011). We also review de

novo the district court’s judgment on the pleadings based on

MILLS V. CITY OF COVINA 7

collateral estoppel. Clark v. Bear Stearns & Co., 966 F.2d

1318, 1320 (9th Cir. 1992).

III

A

We begin by determining whether Mills’s § 1983 claims

for unlawful stop and detention, false arrest, false

imprisonment, failure to screen and hire properly, failure to

train properly, and failure to supervise and discipline are

time-barred. The parties and the district court agree that

those claims accrued on April 14, 2013, when the search was

conducted and Mills was arrested. That is correct. “[T]he

accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of

federal law . . . .” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388

(2007). “[A]ccrual occurs when the plaintiff has a complete

and present cause of action, . . . that is, when the plaintiff can

file suit and obtain relief.” Id. (internal citations, quotation

marks and brackets omitted). 1 Mills had complete and

1

Prior to Wallace, the rule in this circuit was that a § 1983 action

like this one “alleging illegal search and seizure of evidence upon which

criminal charges are based does not accrue until the criminal charges

have been dismissed or the conviction has been overturned.” Harvey v.

Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2000). District courts have

expressed confusion over whether this deferred accrual rule survived the

Supreme Court’s decision in Wallace. See, e.g., Choma v. Arnold,

No. CV 11-5906, 2012 WL 1340387, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2012)

(“The Ninth Circuit has not yet addressed explicitly whether Harvey’s

accrual rule has survived the Supreme Court’s decision in Wallace

. . . .”); Hawkins v. Suisun City Police Dep’t, No. 2:08cv0529, 2008 WL

3974388, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2008) (relying on Harvey’s

proposition that “Heck has been interpreted to apply to pending

charges”); Kamar v. Krolczyk, No. 1:07-CV-0340, 2008 WL 2880414,

at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 22, 2008) (finding Wallace “has effectively

overruled Harvey”). The deferred accrual rule we announced in Harvey

8 MILLS V. CITY OF COVINA

present causes of action for all but his malicious prosecution

and Monell liability claims when he was subjected to a

search in violation of the Fourth Amendment and was

arrested; therefore, those claims accrued at that time.

Next, to determine whether the statute of limitations ran

on Mills’s claims, we “apply [California’s] statute of

limitations for personal injury actions, along with

[California’s] law regarding tolling, including equitable

tolling, except to the extent any of these laws is inconsistent

with federal law.” Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d

1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks

omitted). California’s two-year statute of limitations for

personal injury actions thus applies to Mills’s claims. See

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1; Canatella, 486 F.3d at 1132–

33.

Mills filed his claims on September 22, 2016, roughly

three years and five months after the search and arrest. His

claims would therefore be time-barred absent tolling. The

parties agree that California Government Code § 945.3

tolled the statute of limitations during Mills’s criminal

proceedings in the Superior Court, but not during his

criminal appeal. The parties also agree that, but for

for Fourth Amendment claims was based on our more general holding

“that Heck applies to pending criminal charges, and that a claim, that if

successful would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction in a

pending criminal prosecution, does not accrue so long as the potential

for a conviction in the pending criminal prosecution continues to exist.”

Harvey, 210 F.3d. at 1014. That general holding is “clearly

irreconcilable” with Wallace’s holding that “the Heck rule for deferred

accrual is called into play only when there exists a conviction or sentence

that has not been . . . invalidated.” 549 U.S. at 393 (internal quotation

marks omitted). Thus, Harvey’s deferred accrual rule has been

“effectively overruled” and is no longer good law. See Miller v.

Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

MILLS V. CITY OF COVINA 9

additional tolling, the statute of limitations elapsed during

Mills’s criminal appeal. Mills, however, argues that

California Code of Civil Procedure § 356 tolled the statute

of limitations during the pendency of his criminal appeal

because he was legally prevented from bringing those claims

during that period by the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck.

We disagree.

Under § 356, “[w]hen the commencement of an action is

stayed by injunction or statutory prohibition, the time of the

continuance of the injunction or prohibition is not part of the

time limited for the commencement of the action.” As

Appellees argue, a judicially created bar to commencing an

action appears to fall outside § 356 based on its plain

language. The California Supreme Court, however, has

explained that § 356 “has been applied in situations where

the action is legally prohibited by other means than

injunctions or statutory prohibition.” Hoover v. Galbraith,

7 Cal. 3d 519, 526 (1972) (collecting cases). Indeed, while

the California Supreme Court has not specifically addressed

the impact of a judicially created bar on § 356, it has held

“that the running of the statute of limitations is suspended

during any period in which the plaintiff is legally prevented

from taking action to protect his rights.” Dillon v. Bd. of

Pension Comm’rs of City of Los Angeles, 18 Cal. 2d 427,

431 (1941); see also Hoover, 7 Cal. 3d at 526 (confirming

that “[t]he limitation period has been tolled during the period

in which a plaintiff is legally prevented from taking action

to protect his rights”). We are bound by this interpretation.

See Lewis v. Tel. Emps. Credit Union, 87 F.3d 1537, 1545

(9th Cir. 1996) (“When interpreting state law, federal courts

are bound by decisions of the state’s highest court.”)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

10 MILLS V. CITY OF COVINA

Notably, however, in Hoover and each case it discussed,

a definitive bar to commencing an action was required to

trigger tolling under § 356, regardless whether the

prohibition was by statute, injunction, or otherwise. See

Hoover, 7 Cal. 3d at 526 (plaintiff precluded by statute from

commencing action against directors of corporation until

appeal from judgment on his claim against debtor

corporation became final); Dillon, 18 Cal. 2d at 430–31

(plaintiff precluded by city charter from commencing action

until decision from pension board became final); Skaggs v.

City of Los Angeles, 43 Cal. 2d 497, 500 (1954) (same).

Because we hold the Heck bar did not operate as such a

definitive bar to the commencement of Mills’s action, we

need not decide whether a judicially created bar can trigger

tolling under § 356.

In Heck, the Supreme Court announced that “in order to

recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose

unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,

a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence

has been [set aside]. A claim for damages bearing that

relationship to a conviction or sentence . . . is not cognizable

under § 1983.” 512 U.S. at 486–87 (internal citations

omitted).

In Wallace, the Supreme Court recognized a

“complication” in applying the Heck bar to claims like

Mills’s that “arises from the fact that § 1983 actions, unlike

the tort of malicious prosecution which Heck took as its

model . . . sometimes accrue before the setting aside of—

indeed, even before the existence of—the related criminal

conviction.” 549 U.S. at 394 (internal citation omitted). As

the Court explained, application of Heck to such claims

“raises the question whether, assuming that the Heck bar

MILLS V. CITY OF COVINA 11

takes effect when the later conviction is obtained, the statute

of limitations on the once valid cause of action is tolled as

long as the Heck bar subsists.” Id. There, like here, “[i]f

petitioner’s conviction . . . caused the statute of limitations

on his (possibly) impugning but yet-to-be-filed cause of

action to be tolled until that conviction was set aside, his

filing [] would have been timely.” Id.

Finding no basis for tolling under Illinois state law, the

Court declined to adopt a federal equitable tolling rule in

such circumstances. Id. The Court reasoned:

Under such a regime, it would not be known

whether tolling is appropriate by reason of

the Heck bar until it is established that the

newly entered conviction would be impugned

by the not-yet-filed, and thus utterly

indeterminate, § 1983 claim. It would hardly

be desirable to place the question of tolling

vel non in this jurisprudential limbo, leaving

it to be determined by those later events, and

then pronouncing it retroactively.

Id. at 394–95 (internal footnote omitted).

For these same reasons, we find that where, as here, a

§ 1983 claim accrues pre-conviction, the possibility that

Heck may require dismissal of that “not-yet-filed, and thus

utterly indeterminate, § 1983 claim,” is not sufficient to

trigger tolling under California Code of Civil Procedure

§ 356. In such circumstances, it is not known whether the

claim is barred by Heck until the claim is filed and the district

court determines that it will impugn an extant conviction.

Until that determination is made, a plaintiff is not “legally

prevented from taking action to protect his rights.” Hoover,

7 Cal. 3d at 526.

12 MILLS V. CITY OF COVINA

Mills nevertheless implores us to adopt a rule allowing

California plaintiffs to wait until the resolution of their

criminal appeals to file their § 1983 claims, leaving district

courts to retroactively pronounce the applicability of the

Heck bar and, in turn, tolling under § 356. As discussed

above, however, the Supreme Court rejected the petitioner’s

invitation to adopt a similar rule in Wallace in part because

“[d]efendants need to be on notice to preserve beyond the

normal limitations period evidence that will be needed for

their defense; and a statute that becomes retroactively

extended, by the action of the plaintiff in crafting a

conviction-impugning cause of action, is hardly a statute of

repose.” 549 U.S. at 395. We likewise decline to adopt such

a rule.

Ultimately, nothing prevented Mills from commencing

his suit during his criminal appeal. Had he done so, the

district court could have determined whether his claims

impugned his conviction. If so, the district court could have

dismissed those claims without prejudice, and Mills could

have refiled the claims once his conviction was reversed.

See id. at 395 n.4 (“If under those circumstances he were not

allowed to refile his suit, Heck would produce immunity

from § 1983 liability, a result surely not intended.”). If

Mills’s claims did not impugn his conviction, the suit could

have proceeded. Because Mills was not legally precluded

from commencing his § 1983 claims during the pendency of

his criminal appeal, he was not “legally prevented from

taking action to protect his rights” and tolling under § 356

was not triggered. See Hoover, 7 Cal. 3d at 526. We

therefore affirm the district court’s holding that all but

Mills’s claims for malicious prosecution and Monell liability

are time-barred.

MILLS V. CITY OF COVINA 13

B

1

We next consider whether the district court properly

dismissed Mills’s § 1983 malicious prosecution claim under

the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Federal courts rely on

state common law for elements of malicious prosecution.

Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir.

2004). California law requires a plaintiff claiming malicious

prosecution to establish “that the prior action (1) was

commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was

pursued to a legal termination in his, plaintiff’s, favor;

(2) was brought without probable cause; and (3) was

initiated with malice.” Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert &

Oliker, 47 Cal. 3d 863, 871 (1989) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Additionally, to maintain a § 1983 action for

malicious prosecution, “a plaintiff ‘must show that the

defendants prosecuted [him] . . . for the purpose of denying

[him] equal protection or another specific constitutional

right.’” Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1066 (quoting Freeman v. City

of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995)).

State law also governs the application of collateral

estoppel to a state court judgment in a federal civil rights

action. Ayers v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 1267, 1270 (9th

Cir. 1990). Under California law, collateral estoppel bars

the relitigation of an issue in a subsequent proceeding when

certain threshold requirements are fulfilled:

[1] the issue sought to be precluded from

relitigation must be identical to that decided

in a former proceeding[; 2] this issue must

have been actually litigated in the former

proceeding[; 3] it must have been necessarily

decided in the former proceeding[; 4] the

14 MILLS V. CITY OF COVINA

decision in the former proceeding must be

final and on the merits[; 5] the party against

whom preclusion is sought must be the same

as, or in privity with, the party to the former

proceeding.

Gikas v. Zolin, 6 Cal. 4th 841, 849 (1993).

In holding collateral estoppel applied, the district court

reasoned that “[w]hether Hanou actually discovered drugs

and thus had probable cause to arrest [Mills], as opposed to

planting or fabricating the drugs, appear[ed] to be identical

to an issue already decided in the prior criminal proceeding.”

That was because “[t]he jury necessarily had to determine

whether [Mills] actually possessed drugs in order to convict

him of possession of a controlled substance in violation of

California Health & Safety Code § 11377(a).” In the district

court’s view, “that factual finding ha[d] not been

overturned” by the Court of Appeal because Mills sought

reversal of his conviction only on Fourth Amendment

grounds and because “[t]he Court of Appeal’s analysis

assume[d] that [Hanou] did find methamphetamine in

[Mills’s] vehicle.”

Mills argues he is not collaterally estopped from

litigating the issue of probable cause here because his

reversed conviction was not final. We agree. Under

California law, “[f]or purposes of issue preclusion, final

judgment includes any prior adjudication of an issue in

another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be

accorded conclusive effect.” People v. Cooper, 149 Cal.

App. 4th 500, 520 (2007) (quoting Border Bus. Park, Inc. v.

City of San Diego, 142 Cal. App. 4th 1538, 1564 (2006))

(internal quotation marks omitted). “A final judgment is

defined as one that is free from direct attack. Stated

MILLS V. CITY OF COVINA 15

differently, [t]o be final for purposes of collateral estoppel

the decision need only be immune, as a practical matter, to

reversal or amendment.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). It follows from this that a conviction or judgment

that has been reversed on appeal and vacated cannot serve as

collateral estoppel in a later proceeding. 2 Accordingly,

Mills’s reversed conviction and the factual determinations

underlying that conviction lack conclusive effect here.

That Mills challenged his conviction on Fourth

Amendment grounds rather than attacking the jury’s

underlying factual determinations does not change this

result. As the Sixth Circuit explained considering nearly

identical facts: where a criminal defendant successfully

appealed his conviction on constitutional grounds, “he was

not acquiescing in adverse factual determinations made at

his trial.” Dodrill v. Ludt, 764 F.2d 442, 444 (6th Cir. 1985).

Thus, “[w]hen he won his appeal and the judgment was

vacated, all such factual determinations were vacated with it,

and their preclusive effect surrendered.” Id. at 444–45.

Nor does the Court of Appeal’s reference to Mills

possessing methamphetamine change the fact that the jury’s

underlying factual determinations to that effect were vacated

with Mills’s conviction. The Court of Appeal had no

occasion to reassess the jury’s underlying findings of fact.

Instead, the Court of Appeal was tasked with determining

whether violation of Mills’s Fourth Amendment rights

warranted overturning his conviction. The Court of Appeal

concluded that it did and reversed. That “reversal . . .

2

This is also the federal rule. See, e.g., Ornellas v. Oakley, 618 F.2d

1351, 1356 (9th Cir. 1980) (“A reversed or dismissed judgment cannot

serve as the basis for a disposition on the ground of res judicata or

collateral estoppel.”).

16 MILLS V. CITY OF COVINA

vacate[d] the judgment entirely, technically leaving nothing

to which we may accord preclusive effect.” Dodrill,

764 F.2d at 444.

Finally, Appellees’ reliance on the California common

law rule, that probable cause in a malicious prosecution

action may be conclusively established by a conviction or

judgment despite reversal, does not support their collateral

estoppel argument. As the California Supreme Court has

made clear, that common law rule, sometimes referred to as

the “interim adverse judgment rule,” is not part of the

doctrine of collateral estoppel as it “does not operate, like

collateral estoppel, to preclude relitigation of an issue of

fact.” Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester, 28 Cal. 4th

811, 825 (2002); see also L.G. v. M.B., 25 Cal. App. 5th 211,

230 n.15 (2018) (“Our Supreme Court has explained that the

interim adverse judgment rule is not part of the doctrine of

res judicata or any of its branches, but is derived from the

definition of probable cause.”) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Because the district court did not make any

findings as to the applicability of the interim adverse

judgment rule, and because we affirm the district court’s

dismissal on alternative grounds, we do not decide whether

the interim adverse judgment rule applies here. It is enough

to find that collateral estoppel does not bar Mills from

pursuing his malicious prosecution claim.

2

Appellees argue that we can affirm the district court’s

dismissal of Mills’s malicious prosecution claim on the

alternative ground that Mills’s reversed conviction did not

constitute a legal termination in Mills’s favor. We agree.

Under California law, the favorable termination element

of a malicious prosecution claim “requires a termination

MILLS V. CITY OF COVINA 17

reflecting the merits of the action and plaintiff’s innocence

of the misconduct.” Pattiz v. Minye, 61 Cal. App. 4th 822,

827 (1998). “If . . . the dismissal is on technical grounds, for

procedural reasons, or for any other reason not inconsistent

with his guilt, it does not constitute a favorable termination.”

Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal. 2d 146, 150 (1941). Put differently,

“[i]f the resolution of the underlying action leaves some

doubt concerning plaintiff’s innocence or liability, it is not a

favorable termination sufficient to allow a cause of action

for malicious prosecution.” Pattiz, 61 Cal. App. 4th at 827.

The California Court of Appeal reversed Mills’s

conviction because it held that the government’s evidence

that Mills possessed drugs should have been excluded on

Fourth Amendment grounds. We have never considered

whether reversal of a conviction under the exclusionary rule

qualifies as a favorable termination. District courts in this

circuit have held categorically that it does not. See, e.g.,

Willis v. Mullins, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1241 (E.D. Cal.

2011) (stating that “a conviction overturned due to the

exclusionary rule does not qualify as a favorable termination

for the purposes of malicious prosecution”). At least in

circumstances such as these, we agree.

The exclusionary rule excludes relevant and probative

evidence not because of a person’s innocence, but rather to

prevent violations of the Fourth Amendment. See Lego v.

Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488–89 (1972). As the Supreme

Court has explained, applying the exclusionary rule diverts

“from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should

be the central concern in a criminal proceeding.” Stone v.

Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976). Indeed, “the physical

evidence sought to be excluded is typically reliable and often

the most probative information bearing on the guilt or

innocence of the defendant.” Id.

18 MILLS V. CITY OF COVINA

In reversing Mills’s conviction based on the

exclusionary rule, the Court of Appeal did not find that Mills

actually possessed drugs or that those drugs were planted.

The Court of Appeal held only that the drug evidence should

have been excluded. Absent more, the Court of Appeal’s

ruling does not speak to Mills’s “innocence of the

misconduct.” Pattiz, 61 Cal. App. 4th at 827. Certainly, the

Court of Appeal’s decision leaves at minimum “some doubt”

as to Mills’s innocence. Id. That is sufficient under

California law to find that there was no favorable

termination. Id. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s

dismissal of Mills’s malicious prosecution and Monell

liability claims on this alternative ground.

IV

All but Mills’s § 1983 malicious prosecution and Monell

liability claims are time-barred because the Heck bar did not

legally prevent Mills from commencing those claims during

his criminal appeal and thus, tolling under California Code

of Civil Procedure § 356 was not triggered. Mills’s

malicious prosecution and Monell actions are also barred,

not because of collateral estoppel, but because reversal of

Mills’s conviction was not a favorable termination.

Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is

AFFIRMED.