setting forth standard of review and grounds for relief under Rule 59(e)
How later courts described this case
- setting forth standard of review and grounds for relief under Rule 59(e)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 19 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARIO NOYOLA, No. 18-35350
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:16-cv-05041-EFS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
STEVEN HAMMOND, M.D., Chief
Medical Officer of the Washington
Department of Corrections; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Edward F. Shea, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 12, 2019**
Before: LEAVY, BEA, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Washington state prisoner Mario Noyola appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
§ 1291. We review de novo a district court’s summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity. Glenn v. Washington County, 673 F.3d 864, 870 (9th
Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Noyola’s Eighth
Amendment claim on the basis of qualified immunity because defendants’ conduct
did not violate clearly established law. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765,
778-79 (2014) (defendants sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity
unless they violated a right that was clearly established; “a defendant cannot be
said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right’s contours were
sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would
have understood that he was violating it”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Noyola’s motion to
alter or amend under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) because Noyola failed to demonstrate
any basis for relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5
F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds
for relief under Rule 59(e)). Contrary to Noyola’s contention, the district court
considered the proper factors and adequately articulated its reasoning.
AFFIRMED.
2 18-35350