Com. v. Schoen, R.

J-A26033-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

RACHEL LYNN SCHOEN,

Appellant No. 1773 WDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 30, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0006707-2016

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SHOGAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 07, 2019

Appellant, Rachel Lynn Schoen, appeals from the judgment of sentence

of court costs and a fine of $100, imposed after she was convicted, following

a non-jury trial, of public drunkenness and disorderly conduct. Appellant

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain her convictions, as well

as the trial court’s denial of her pretrial motion to suppress. After careful

review, we reverse.

The trial court summarized the facts of Appellant’s case, as follows:

On October 11, 2015, Sergeant Timothy Harvison (“Sgt.

Harvison”) and Officer Gregory Laepple (“Officer Laepple”) were

dispatched at approximately 2:30 a.m. to [Appellant’s] residence

in response to a neighbor’s complaint of a block party. Upon

arrival, both Sgt. Harvison and Officer Laepple heard music

playing while inside their running patrol vehicles. The party

included as many as fifteen people in the yard on the property.

Sgt. Harvison and Officer Laepple were met at the front of

[Appellant’s] house by Thomas Versharen (“Mr. Versharen”),

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[Appellant’s] boyfriend and co-defendant, where they asked him

to turn the music down. Sgt. Harvison noticed a strong odor of

alcohol coming from Mr. Versharen and that Mr. Versharen

appeared visibly intoxicated. The officers asked Mr. Versharen to

turn the music down multiple times, but Mr. Versharen was

argumentative and continued to debate the volume of the music

with the officers. The officers heard more noise coming from the

backyard, and Sgt. Harvison proceeded to walk towards the fence.

At that point, Mr. Versharen put his hand on Sgt. Harvison’s

shoulder to prevent Sgt. Harvison from going any further. After

Sgt. Harvison told Mr. Versharen not to touch him, they continued

to debate the music. Mr. Versharen then went into the gated area

and closed the gate behind him, refusing to comply with Sgt.

Harvison’s commands. At that point, Sgt. Harvison notified Mr.

Versharen that he was going to be placed under arrest.

Sgt. Harvison then opened the gate and proceeded to arrest

Mr. Versharen, but Mr. Versharen retreated into the middle of the

backyard. Sgt. Harvison followed Mr. Versharen into the yard,

and Officer Laepple followed behind. At that point, both officers

attempted to place Mr. Versharen in handcuffs, but Mr. Versharen

resisted. The officers told Mr. Versharen to stop resisting multiple

times, but Mr. Versharen continued not to comply with their

commands.

While continuing to place Mr. Versharen in custody, Officer

Laepple noticed [Appellant] coming from the right and toward Sgt.

Harvison. Sgt. Harvison testified that [Appellant] jumped on his

back three different times while attempting to place Mr. Versharen

under arrest. The third time occurred while Sgt. Harvison was

pointing his Taser at Mr. Versharen. At that point, Sgt. Harvison

took [Appellant] to the ground. Sgt. Harvison testified that there

was a strong odor of alcohol coming from [Appellant] as he and

Officer Laepple were escorting her to the patrol car. After being

placed in handcuffs, [Appellant] was yelling and screaming in a

place where neighboring houses were close together. [Appellant]

continued screaming even while inside the police station until she

passed out.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 3/9/18, at 2-4.

Appellant was charged with obstructing the administration of law or

other government functions, disorderly conduct, harassment, and public

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drunkenness. Prior to trial, she filed a motion to suppress, challenging the

legality of the officers’ entering her property and her subsequent arrest.

Following a hearing, the court denied that motion. Appellant’s case proceeded

to a non-jury trial, at the close of which the court convicted Appellant of

disorderly conduct and public drunkenness, but acquitted her of the other

charges. On October 30, 2017, the court sentenced Appellant to pay summary

court costs and a fine of $100.

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the court denied.

She then filed a timely notice of appeal, and she also timely complied with the

trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal. The court filed a responsive opinion on March 9,

2018. Herein, Appellant presents three questions for our review:

I. Whether the evidence was insufficient to support

[Appellant’s] conviction for public drunkenness where the

Commonwealth failed to prove (i) that she appeared in any

public place and (ii) that she was manifestly under the

influence of alcohol or a controlled substance to such a

degree that she might endanger herself or others or

property or annoy people nearby?

II. Whether the evidence was insufficient to support

[Appellant’s] conviction for disorderly conduct where the

Commonwealth failed to prove (i) that she created a

hazardous or physically offensive condition and (ii) that she

took any action with the intent to cause public

inconvenience, annoyance or alarm or recklessly created the

risk of the same?

III. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Appellant’s]

omnibus pre-trial motion seeking the suppression of

evidence and dismissal of charges where law enforcement

entered her property in violation of her rights secured by

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

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States Constitution, and/or Article I, Section 8 of the

Pennsylvania Constitution?

Appellant’s Brief at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

In Appellant’s first two issues, she challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence to sustain her convictions.

In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must

determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light

most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all

elements of the offense. Commonwealth v. Moreno, 14 A.3d

133 (Pa. Super. 2011). Additionally, we may not reweigh the

evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact

finder. Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 988 A.2d 141 (Pa. Super.

2009). The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it

links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Moreno, supra at 136.

Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2011).

First, we address Appellant’s public drunkenness conviction. That

offense is defined, in pertinent part, as follows:

A person is guilty of a summary offense if he appears in any public

place manifestly under the influence of alcohol or a controlled

substance, as defined in the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No.

64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and

Cosmetic Act, except those taken pursuant to the lawful order of

a practitioner, as defined in The Controlled Substance, Drug,

Device and Cosmetic Act, to the degree that he may endanger

himself or other persons or property, or annoy persons in his

vicinity.

18 Pa.C.S. § 5505 (footnote omitted).

Here, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth’s evidence failed to

demonstrate that she appeared in a public place, as she was in her privately-

owned backyard, and she only exited the yard when forced to do so by the

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police. Notably, the Commonwealth concedes that the cases relied upon by

Appellant - discussed infra - “support her argument that a fenced backyard

does not qualify as a ‘public place’ under the circumstances of this case.”

Commonwealth’s Brief at 12. We agree.

As Appellant recognizes, section 5505 does not define ‘public place.’

However, this Court has observed that the term has been defined in two other

provisions of the Crimes Code. See Commonwealth v. Meyer, 431 A.2d

287, 289 (Pa. Super. 1981). First, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5902 (Prostitution and related

offenses) defines “public place” as “[a]ny place to which the public or any

substantial group thereof has access.” Second, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503 (Disorderly

conduct) states:

As used in this section the word ‘public’ means affecting or likely

to affect persons in a place to which the public or a substantial

group has access; among the places included are highways,

transport facilities, schools, prisons, apartment houses, places of

business or amusement, any neighborhood, or any premises

which are open to the public.

18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(c).

In support of her argument that she did not ‘appear in a public place,’

Appellant relies on several cases, including Commonwealth v. Biagini, 655

A.2d 492 (Pa. 1995). There, our Supreme Court determined that there was

no probable cause to arrest Biagini for public drunkenness where he “was

allegedly intoxicated in his home and on his porch….” Biagini, 655 A.2d at

495. Despite that Biagini was screaming loudly enough in the rear of his home

for a patrolling officer out front to hear him, the Court concluded that because

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Biagini was on his own private property, he “had not ‘appeared in any public

place manifestly under the influence of alcohol….’” Biagini, 655 A.2d at 495

(citation omitted; emphasis added).

In Meyer — another case on which Appellant relies — Meyer was

escorted by police from a private club and arrested outside for public

drunkenness. Meyer, 431 A.2d at 288. This Court concluded that the club

was not a ‘public place’ as contemplated by the public drunkenness statute,

as “the public at large” did not have the right to enter the club or use its

facilities. Id. at 289. We also held that, “to be found guilty of public

drunkenness, the accused must be in the ‘public place’ voluntarily.” Id. at

290. Thus, although Meyer had been arrested outside the club, his conviction

for public drunkenness could not stand because he had been escorted outside

by police. Id.

Like the facts of Biagini, Appellant was present on her own private

property when police responded to the noise complaint. The altercation

between Appellant and Sergeant Harvison also occurred in her backyard.

While Appellant yelled and screamed after the police removed her from her

property and took her to the police station, she was clearly not in those public

places voluntarily.

The trial court erroneously relies on Commonwealth v. Whritenour,

751 A.2d 687 (Pa. Super. 2000), to support its conclusion that Appellant’s

public drunkenness conviction can stand. In Whritenour, we held that a road

in a gated neighborhood was ‘public’ because the road “was traversed by

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members of the community and their invitees or licensees.” Id. at 688. Here,

however, Appellant convincingly argues that her “backyard is not akin to a

community-owned road. It is her private property, which belongs absolutely

to her and is closed to the community.” Appellant’s Brief at 18. Therefore,

Whritenour is distinguishable. We also conclude that the court’s reliance on

Commonwealth v. Fedorek, 946 A.2d 93 (Pa. 2008), is unconvincing, as

that case addressed only the requirements for sustaining a conviction for

disorderly conduct graded as a misdemeanor of the third-degree, not the

elements of the offense of public drunkenness.

In sum, we agree with Appellant that her conviction for public

drunkenness cannot stand, as the evidence failed to demonstrate that she

‘appeared in a public place’ while intoxicated. Therefore, we reverse her

conviction for that offense.1

In Appellant’s second issue, she challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence to support her disorderly conduct conviction under section

5503(a)(4):

(a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if,

with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or

recklessly creating a risk thereof, he:

***

____________________________________________

1 Given this disposition, we need not address Appellant’s argument that she

was not intoxicated to the degree required to sustain her public drunkenness

conviction.

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(4) creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by

any act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor.

18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a)(4).2

“We have defined the relevant terms of subsection(a)(4) as follows: A

‘hazardous condition’ is a condition that involves danger or risk, particularly

of injuries resulting from public disorders.” Commonwealth v. N.M.C., 172

A.3d 1146, 1150 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation, quotation marks, and brackets

omitted). “Although a precise definition of ‘physically offensive condition’ is

elusive, this term encompasses direct assaults on the physical senses of

members of the public.” Id. (citation omitted).

In this case, the Commonwealth contends that Appellant’s act of

jumping on Sergeant Harvison’s back created a hazardous or physically

offensive condition constituting disorderly conduct under section 5503(a)(4).

Appellant, however, argues that her conviction cannot stand because,

____________________________________________

2 The Commonwealth notes that it is unclear under “exactly which subsection

of 18 Pa.C.S.[] §[]5503 [A]ppellant was convicted….” Commonwealth’s Brief

at 17. Appellant was charged with violating section 5503(a)(1), but the

sentencing order stated that she was convicted of violating section

5503(a)(4). The Commonwealth acknowledges that, “the signed sentencing

order takes precedence over oral statements of the sentencing court not

incorporated into that order.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 20 (quoting

Commonwealth v. Kubiac, 550 A.2d 219, 229 (Pa. Super. 1988). Thus, the

Commonwealth “assumes that [A]ppellant was convicted of violating

subsection (a)(4).” Id. at 20. However, in the trial court’s opinion, it suggests

that Appellant was convicted of disorderly conduct under subsection (a)(2).

In her reply brief, Appellant objects to the court’s analysis, stressing that she

was not charged with an offense under that provision. Appellant’s Reply Brief

at 7. Therefore, Appellant offers argument only pertaining to subpart (a)(4).

Given the parties’ positions, and the record in this case, we will only analyze

the sufficiency of the evidence under subpart (a)(4).

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the evidence does not reveal that [she] possessed the necessary

mens rea for disorderly conduct. “The mens rea requirement of

this statute demands proof that [a defendant] by his actions

intentionally or recklessly created a risk or caused a public

inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm.” Commonwealth v.

Gilbert, 674 A.2d 284, 286 (Pa. Super. [] 1996). Recklessness

under the statute denotes a “conscious disregard of a substantial

and unjustifiable risk that public annoyance or alarm would result

from her conduct, or a gross deviation from the standard of

conduct that a reasonable person would observe in her situation.”

Commonwealth v. Weiss, 490 A.2d 853, 857 (Pa. Super. []

1985).

Appellant’s Brief at 23-24.

Appellant relies on this Court’s decision in Weiss, arguing that it is

analogous to her case. There, the evidence demonstrated that Weiss was

inside her home at 11:00 p.m. when a police officer broke open her locked

door, entered the home, and arrested Weiss’s husband. Weiss, 490 A.2d at

853-54. During the one-minute-long incident, Weiss “started to yell and use

various obscenities, telling the officer to get out of her house and off her

property.” Id. at 854. In reversing Weiss’s conviction for disorderly conduct

based on these facts, we concluded that her conduct did not demonstrate an

intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm. Id. at 857. We

stressed that, “[a]ll of [the] appellant’s complaints … involved the breaking

and entering of her home[,]” and “[a]t all relevant times, [the] appellant was

inside her home in the vicinity of the doorway through which [the] [o]fficer …

had entered.” Id. (emphasis in original).

Appellant contends that here, as in Weiss, her conduct occurred on her

private property and “[n]othing in the record suggests that [she] intended to

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cause public annoyance or alarm or recklessly created a risk of such

annoyance or alarm.” Appellant’s Brief at 25 (emphasis in original). We

agree. While Appellant was not inside her home, she was inside her fenced-

in backyard when she jumped on Sergeant Harvison’s back. As in Weiss,

nothing in the record demonstrates that Appellant intended to cause alarm or

annoyance to the public; rather, the evidence established that she jumped on

Sergeant Harvison in order to impede the officer’s arrest of her boyfriend.

Moreover, Appellant cannot be said to have recklessly created a risk of public

alarm where nothing in the record demonstrates that the public could see into

her yard to observe her conduct toward the sergeant.

We also find Commonwealth v. Mauz, 122 A.3d 1039, 1041 (Pa.

Super. 2015), to be instructive in this case. There, the

[a]ppellant was in his yard when he shouted … obscene remarks

to [the victim], who was in her yard at the time with her boyfriend

and several other people. A five or six foot high fence separated

the two properties. The record does not reflect that anyone other

than [the victim] heard [the] [a]ppellant’s remarks, nor does the

record reflect that [the] [a]ppellant’s remarks could have reached

anyone not present in the yard of [the victim] or [the] [a]ppellant.

Id. at 1042 (internal citations to the record omitted). Based on these facts,

our Court held that,

[s]ince both the speaker and the recipient of the offensive remarks

were present in respective yards, we believe the evidence is

insufficient to establish that [the] [a]ppellant acted with the intent

to cause public annoyance, inconvenience or alarm. We cannot

conclude [the] [a]ppellant acted with the intent to create public

annoyance when he made his offensive remarks in a private

setting and the remarks apparently were discernible only to [the

victim].

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Id. 1042-43. We stressed that,

“[t]he offense of disorderly conduct is not intended as a catchall

for every act which annoys or disturbs people; it is not to be used

as a dragnet for all the irritations which breed in the ferment of a

community.” Commonwealth v. Maerz, 879 A.2d 1267, 1269

(Pa.Super.2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hock, 556 Pa.

409, 728 A.2d 943, 947 (1999)). “It has a specific purpose; it has

a definite objective, it is intended to preserve the public peace.”

Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, our courts have repeatedly

emphasized that the goal of § 5503 is to protect the public.

Commonwealth v. Fedorek, 596 Pa. 475, 946 A.2d 93, 100

(2008) (“Certainly, Section 5503 is aimed at protecting the public

from certain enumerated acts.”); Hock, 728 A.2d at 946 (“The

cardinal feature of the crime of disorderly conduct is public

unruliness which can or does lead to tumult and disorder.”).

Id. at 1041.

Here, as in Mauz, Appellant was in her private, fenced-in backyard when

she jumped on Sergeant Harvison. There was no evidence that she intended

the public to even see this act, let alone be inconvenienced, annoyed, or

alarmed by it. Therefore, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to

sustain Appellant’s conviction of disorderly conduct under section 5503(a)(4).

Accordingly, we reverse her judgment of sentence for that offense, as well as

for public drunkenness. Given this disposition, we need not address

Appellant’s third issue challenging the court’s denial of her pretrial motion to

suppress.

Judgment of sentence reversed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

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Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/7/2019

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