Norman Douglas Norwood Jr v. Mikael Jaquese Norwood

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

NORMAN DOUGLAS NORWOOD, JR., UNPUBLISHED

January 29, 2019

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 344707

Calhoun Circuit Court

MIKAEL JAQUESE NORWOOD, also known as LC No. 2012-003457-DM

MIKAEL WESTRY,

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: CAMERON, P.J., and BECKERING and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant-mother, Mikael Jaquese Norwood, also known as Mikael Westry, appeals the

trial court’s order granting plaintiff-father, Norman Douglas Norwood, Jr., sole legal custody and

primary physical custody of the parties’ minor child. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The parties were married in June 2010 in Battle Creek. Father filed for divorce when the

parties’ child was not quite three years old. Father immediately sought custody of the child, and

the trial court initially entered an ex parte order awarding father temporary custody of the child.

However, the trial court later dissolved that order, awarded the parties joint legal custody, and

awarded mother physical custody of the child. The trial court entered a consent judgment of

divorce in August 2013. The consent judgment of divorce awarded both parties joint legal

custody of the child, awarded mother physical custody, and awarded father parenting time.

Almost immediately, conflict arose regarding father’s attempts to exercise his court-

ordered parenting time. The trial court record is full of father’s complaints that mother failed or

refused to allow the child to visit him during his court-ordered parenting time. Father had moved

to Saginaw while mother continued living in Battle Creek. The parties’ scheduled pick-up and

drop-off location was a police department in Lansing. On several occasions, father would drive

from Saginaw to Lansing, and mother failed to show up with the child. The trial court held

mother in contempt of court on three separate occasions for failure to follow court orders

regarding father’s parenting time and other aspects of father’s rights to parent the child. For

instance, mother refused to keep father up to date on the child’s medical issues and education.

Mother went as far as to list her new husband as the father on the child’s academic paperwork,

and she did not tell father the pertinent details about a surgery that the child underwent.

Ultimately, father moved for change of custody. After hearing a considerable amount of

testimony, the trial court entered a written order in which it changed custody of the child,

awarding father sole legal and primary physical custody of the child and awarding mother

parenting time. The trial court found that (1) there was an established custodial environment

with mother, (2) there was clear and convincing evidence demonstrating proper cause to justify a

review of custody, and (3) it was in the child’s best interests that custody be changed from

mother to father. Mother now appeals the trial court’s order changing custody of the child.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A trial court’s order resolving a child custody dispute “shall be affirmed on appeal unless

the trial judge made findings of fact against the great weight of evidence or committed a palpable

abuse of discretion or a clear legal error on a major issue.” MCL 722.28. This Court reviews a

trial court’s determination regarding whether a party has demonstrated proper cause or a change

of circumstances under the great weight of the evidence standard. Corporan v Henton, 282 Mich

App 599, 605; 766 NW2d 903 (2009). A trial court’s factual findings are against the great

weight of the evidence when the evidence “clearly preponderate[s] in the opposite direction.” Id.

(quotation marks and citation omitted).

In Phillips v Jordan, 241 Mich App 17; 614 NW2d 183 (2000), this Court set forth the

three standards of review applicable in custody appeals:

We apply three standards of review in custody cases. The great weight of

the evidence standard applies to all findings of fact. A trial court’s findings

regarding the existence of an established custodial environment and regarding

each custody factor should be affirmed unless the evidence clearly preponderates

in the opposite direction. An abuse of discretion standard applies to the trial

court’s discretionary rulings such as custody decisions. Questions of law are

reviewed for clear legal error. A trial court commits clear legal error when it

incorrectly chooses, interprets, or applies the law. [Id. at 20 (citations omitted).]

Furthermore, as this Court stated in Mitchell v Mitchell, 296 Mich App 513, 517; 823 NW2d 153

(2012), “All custody orders must be affirmed on appeal unless the trial court committed a

palpable abuse of discretion, made findings against the great weight of the evidence, or made a

clear legal error.”

III. PROPER CAUSE OR CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES

Mother first argues that the trial court’s decision that there was proper cause to justify a

review of custody was against the great weight of the evidence. We disagree.

“The first step toward modifying a custody award is to show proper cause or a change of

circumstances.” Id. at 517. The movant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the

evidence that either proper cause or a change in circumstances exists, before the trial court can

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(1) consider whether an established custodial environment exists and (2) conduct a review of the

best-interest factors. Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 511-512; 675 NW2d 847

(2003). Proper cause “means one or more appropriate grounds that have or could have a

significant effect on the child’s life to the extent that a reevaluation of the child’s custodial

situation should be undertaken.” Id. at 511. A trial court should rely on the 12 factors set forth

in the statutory best-interest test when deciding whether a particular fact raised by a party is a

proper or appropriate ground to revisit a custody order. Id. at 512. However, the Vodvarka

Court cautioned that “not just any fact relevant to the twelve factors will constitute sufficient

cause. Rather, the grounds presented must be ‘legally sufficient,’ i.e., they must be of a

magnitude to have a significant effect on the child’s well-being to the extent that revisiting the

custody order would be proper.” Id. Meanwhile, in order to establish a change in circumstances,

“a movant must prove that, since the entry of the last custody order, the conditions surrounding

custody of the child, which have or could have a significant effect on the child’s well-being, have

materially changed.” Id. at 513. This will necessarily involve “a determination made on the

basis of the facts of each case, with the relevance of the facts presented being gauged by the

statutory best interest factors.” Id. at 514. When considering a change of circumstances,

evidence of the circumstances existing at the time of and before entry of the prior

custody order will be relevant for comparison purposes, but the change of

circumstances must have occurred after entry of the last custody order. As a

result, the movant cannot rely on facts that existed before entry of the custody

order to establish a “change” of circumstances. [Id.]

Finally, “[o]nly after a moving party has established proper cause or a change of circumstances

may the trial court reevaluate the statutory best-interest factors.” Mitchell, 296 Mich App at 517-

518.

The trial court relied heavily on this Court’s decision in McRoberts v Ferguson, 322

Mich App 125; 910 NW2d 721 (2017), to support its decision that the deliberate and repeated

obstruction of parenting time constitutes proper cause and change of circumstances to revisit a

custody order. In McRoberts, the trial court held the plaintiff-mother in contempt of court on

three occasions for failing to allow the defendant-father his parenting time. Id. at 132. Noting

that “the test for proper cause examines whether there is an appropriate ground that ‘could have a

significant effect on the child’s life to the extent that a reevaluation of the child’s custodial

situation should be undertaken,’ ” the McRoberts Court held that the plaintiff-mother’s

“interference with the child’s and [father’s] relationship is plainly such a ground.” Id. at 132.

Therefore, the McRoberts Court concluded that the trial court’s finding that proper cause existed

was not against the great weight of the evidence.

In the present case, the trial court found that mother repeatedly failed to follow court

orders and failed to allow father his court-ordered parenting time. Applying the holding of

McRoberts to those findings of fact, the trial court determined that mother’s deliberate and

repeated obstruction of father’s parenting-time rights constituted proper cause to revisit custody

of the child. The trial court’s determination was not against the great weight of the evidence.

The record is full of father’s complaints that mother refused to allow him his court-ordered

parenting time with the child. Father submitted his complaints to the Friend of the Court (FOC).

The FOC, in turn, filed motions with the trial court seeking to hold mother in contempt of court.

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There is no dispute that the trial court held mother in contempt of court, on three separate

occasions, for failing to follow court orders. Mother’s only explanation was that she wanted to

keep the child for her birthday or activities that mother planned with her family members. The

trial court even specifically found, at one point in the proceedings, that mother was purposefully

scheduling activities for the child during father’s parenting time. Based on the facts of record in

this case, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s finding that proper cause existed was against

the great weight of the evidence. See Corporan, 282 Mich App at 605.

Mother does not focus her argument on proper cause, but only argues that there was no

change of circumstances that occurred after the last custody order. Although mother focuses on

the November 2016 parenting-time order as the last custody order, we do not agree that the

November 2016 order qualifies as such. That order did not change the custody provisions of the

August 2013 Consent Judgment of Divorce, only the details of the parties’ rights to parenting

time.1 However, even if we were to consider that order to be the last custody order in this case,

the trial court’s decision was still not against the great weight of the evidence. The record

indicates that mother has repeatedly and consistently interfered with father’s parenting time and

that mother emotionally manipulated the child in an attempt to alienate the child from father.

The trial court’s decision is not against the great weight of the evidence because the facts

apparent from the record do not clearly preponderate in the other direction. See Corporan, 282

Mich App at 605.

IV. STATUTORY BEST-INTEREST FACTORS

Mother next argues that the trial court’s factual findings regarding the statutory best-

interest factors were against the great weight of the evidence and that the trial court erred in

finding that awarding custody of the child to father was in the child’s best interest. We disagree.

“[W]hen a modification of custody would change the established custodial environment

of a child, the moving party must show by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the child’s

best interest.” Phillips, 241 Mich App at 25. In this case, the trial court found that an

established custodial environment existed with mother. Therefore, it was father’s burden to

show, by clear and convincing evidence, that a change of custody was in the child’s best interest.

“[C]ustody disputes are to be resolved in the child’s best interests,” and “[g]enerally, a trial court

determines the best interests of the child by weighing the twelve statutory factors outlined in

MCL 722.23.” Eldred v Ziny, 246 Mich App 142, 150; 631 NW2d 748 (2001). Those factors

are:

(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the

parties involved and the child.

1

See Shade v Wright, 291 Mich App 17, 26-28; 805 NW2d 1 (2010) (holding that the definitions

of proper cause and change of circumstances as articulated in Vodvarka apply to custody

determinations but not to parenting-time determinations).

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(b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child

love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the

child in his or her religion or creed, if any.

(c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the

child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and

permitted under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material

needs.

(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory

environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity.

(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial

home or homes.

(f) The moral fitness of the parties involved.

(g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved.

(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.

(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the child

to be of sufficient age to express preference.

(j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and

encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and

the other parent or the child and the parents. . . .

(k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed

against or witnessed by the child.

(l) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular

child custody dispute. [MCL 722.23(a)-(l).]

Mother challenges the trial court’s findings regarding best-interest Factors (c) (capacity

and disposition to provide material needs); (d) (length of time in a stable, satisfactory

environment); (f) (moral fitness); (h) (home, school, and community record); (j) (facilitation of a

relationship with the other parent); and (k) (domestic violence).

The great weight of the evidence standard applies to all findings of fact in a custody case.

Phillips, 241 Mich App at 20. A trial court’s findings regarding each custody factor should be

affirmed unless the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction. Id. “An abuse of

discretion standard applies to the trial court’s discretionary rulings such as custody decisions.”

Id. The trial court’s factual findings as to any of the statutory factors is not against the great

weight of the evidence, and the decision to change custody does not constitute an abuse of

discretion.

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A. FACTOR C (CAPACITY AND DISPOSITION TO PROVIDE MATERIAL NEEDS)

Factor (c) is the “capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with

food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of

this state in place of medical care, and other material needs.” MCL 222.23(c).

Mother argues that Factor (c) concerns both a parent’s capacity and disposition to provide

for the child’s material needs, including the child’s medical care. Mother acknowledges that the

trial court found that Factor (c) favored father because he was working, attending school, and

buying his own house, while mother was working part-time and was renting her home.

However, mother argues that there was no evidence that mother was unable to provide for the

child’s material needs because her employment was part-time.

Furthermore, mother argues that the trial court’s focus should have been entirely on the

child’s medical needs and the parties’ disposition, rather than their capacity, to provide for those

medical needs. Mother argues that the child had experienced serious medical issues since she

was two years old, that she took two medications for bladder and urinary tract issues, and that

she underwent surgery to remove a cyst from her temple. Mother argues that she has been the

primary parent who has attended to the child’s medical needs throughout her life. Mother argues

that she took the child to her regular doctor’s appointments and that she scheduled the surgery to

remove the cyst. Mother argues, in contrast, that father only attended one medical

appointment—the surgery to remove the cyst. Mother also argues that she is the person who

provided the child with health insurance through Medicaid. Mother claims that father let the

child drop from his health insurance without consulting mother, causing health insurance issues

when the child required surgery. Mother further argues that, during the child’s eight-week visit

with father over summer break, the child’s urinary tract issues made her uncomfortable, yet

father never took the child to the doctor. While mother admits that her “communication issues”

with father caused her not to share information about the child’s medications with father, she

claims that this is no excuse for father to have failed to independently investigate and figure out

the child’s medical issues on his own. Mother argues that these facts demonstrate that father is

not disposed to provide for the child’s medical care the way that mother is. Mother, therefore,

argues that the trial court’s decision that Factor (c) favored father was against the great weight of

the evidence and that this factor should have favored mother.

We conclude that the trial court’s factual finding that Factor (c) favored father was not

against the great weight of the evidence. The trial court properly considered the fact that (1)

mother only worked part-time and that she did not work in the summer; (2) mother was renting

her home, which led to frequent moves and housing instability; (3) father was working, attending

school, and buying a home rather than renting; and (4) father had lived in the same home for four

years, during which time mother lived in three different rental dwellings. Furthermore, the trial

court did focus on the child’s medical issues, despite mother’s argument that the court failed to

do so. The trial court expressly noted that mother refused to tell father critical information about

the child’s medical needs, providers, and appointments. The trial court also expressed great

concern with mother’s practice of refusing to send the child’s medication to father in the original

prescription bottles, noting that mother repackaged the medication in plastic bags with sticky

notes for instructions. The trial court noted that, because the child had visited the hospital

multiple times for her medical issues, mother’s refusal to tell father pertinent information about

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her prescription medication was dangerous. The trial court’s decision regarding Factor (c) was

not against the great weight of the evidence.

B. FACTOR D (LENGTH OF TIME IN A STABLE, SATISFACTORY ENVIRONMENT)

Factor (d) is “[t]he length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment,

and the desirability of maintaining continuity.” MCL 222.23(d). “Factor (d) is properly

addressed by considering the environments in which the child has lived in the past and the

desirability of maintaining the continuity of those environments.” Demski v Petlick, 309 Mich

App 404, 448-449; 873 NW2d 596 (2015).

Mother argues that, when the trial court rendered its decision changing custody, the child

was eight years old; had always lived in Battle Creek; had attended the same elementary school

for one year; had friends in Battle Creek; had relatives (of mother) in Battle Creek; and had

activities, such as dance classes, in Battle Creek. Mother argued that these facts established a

strong desirability of maintaining continuity for the child by continuing her in mother’s custody

in Battle Creek.

Mother concedes that the trial court considered the fact that the child had “tons of

friends” at her school and church in Battle Creek, and that the trial court acknowledged that the

child was “thriving” in Battle Creek. Mother argues that, despite those acknowledgements, the

trial court failed to consider the impact of a drastic change in the child’s life, daily routines,

ability to spend time with her friends, and overall comfort level and feeling of stability. Mother

admits that, “due to a school closing,” the child attended three different schools over the course

of three years while in mother’s care. However, mother complains that the change of custody

“uproots” the child by forcing her to “change schools once again.” Mother argues that the trial

court’s decision that Factor (d) favored father was against the great weight of the evidence, and

that this factor should have favored mother.

Mother also argues that, when analyzing Factor (d), the trial court improperly focused on

the appropriateness of the future environment for the child in father’s home. Instead, mother

argues that the trial court was required to address the desirability of maintaining the child’s

continuity with mother, with whom the child had lived her entire life. Mother argues that the

trial court erred in evaluating Factor (d) because it failed to abide by this Court’s instruction in

Demski. In that case, the trial court found that Factor (d) weighed equally in favor of both

parents. On appeal, this Court held that the trial court failed to address the desirability of

maintaining the child’s continuity in her mother’s custody, but only addressed the

appropriateness of her father’s future environment for the child. Accordingly, this Court held

that the trial court’s finding was based on clear legal error and should have favored the mother.

Demski, 309 Mich App at 448-449.

We conclude that the trial court’s finding that Factor (d) favored father was not against

the great weight of the evidence. The trial court relied on the fact that mother moved several

times during the three years preceding the trial court’s decision to change custody. It is

undisputed that mother did so and that mother also enrolled the child in three different schools

over the course of three successive school years, showing a lack of stability in the child’s life.

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We cannot conclude that the trial court’s decision regarding Factor (d) was against the great

weight of the evidence.

C. FACTOR F (MORAL FITNESS)

Factor (f) is “[t]he moral fitness of the parties involved.” MCL 222.23(f). Mother argues

that the trial court’s factual finding regarding Factor (f) was unfair to her, that the trial court’s

decision was against the great weight of the evidence, and that this factor should have favored

mother.

Mother argues that the trial court relied unfairly on an incident that occurred during the

parties’ parenting-time exchange scheduled to occur on April 13, 2017, to conclude that mother

caused the child emotional harm. According to mother, the trial court questioned why she

continued driving to Lansing on that day for the scheduled parenting-time exchange even after

father told her that he was not going to meet her there. Mother argues that the trial court found

that this act indicated a lack of moral fitness. Mother argues that she was simply confused about

which parent had visitation that weekend, and she did not realize her mistake until she arrived at

the exchange point. Mother argues that she was already on the road driving to the exchange

point when father texted her that he was not coming because he would not have enough time to

make it to work after he picked the child up. Mother argues that she was in the right to continue

to the exchange point, despite the fact that she knew father would not be there. Mother argues

that she was “rightfully wary” of not showing up at the exchange point, given the tumultuous

relationship between the parties and the number of contempt motions that father had filed against

her. Mother argues that it was understandable that she would want to ensure that she was at the

scheduled parenting-time exchange point on time. Because the location for the exchange of the

child was in Lansing, one hour or more away from both parties, mother argues that she had to

plan ahead and leave early if she was going to be able to arrive on time.

Mother also argues that the trial court completely ignored father’s actions that were more

morally questionable than mother’s. Mother argues that, in addition to being late or failing to

show up to parenting-time exchanges, father made the child miss the dress rehearsal for her

dance recital. Mother argues that she presented text messages regarding this incident that

demonstrated without a doubt that father promised to bring the child to the rehearsal, and then

father later stated that he would not do so. Father’s excuse was that he did not believe that the

child actually had a dress rehearsal. Mother argues that father’s act was “unacceptable” and was

far worse than mother driving to Lansing with the child to be on time for a parenting-time

exchange so that she would not get in trouble with the court.

The trial court’s finding as to Factor (f) was not against the great weight of the evidence.

The trial court reviewed video recordings of the parties’ parenting-time exchanges and found that

mother was emotionally manipulating the child in an attempt to alienate the child from father.

The trial court also considered multiple different occasions—not just the single occasion

addressed by mother in her appellate brief when mother drove the child from Battle Creek to

Lansing even though she knew in advance that no parenting-time exchange would occur. We

cannot conclude that the trial court’s decision was against the great weight of the evidence.

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D. FACTOR H (HOME, SCHOOL, AND COMMUNITY RECORD)

Mother argues that the trial court’s decision regarding Factor (h) was against the great

weight of the evidence and that this factor should have favored mother. Factor (h) involves

“[t]he home, school, and community record of the child.” MCL 222.23(h). Mother maintains

that “the child has tons of friends at school and church and is thriving in Battle Creek.”

However, mother asserts that father only attended one school event, and he had not met the

child’s teacher until December 2017.

Mother argues that the trial court’s decision regarding Factor (h) seemed to be entirely

based on mother’s alleged exclusion of father from involvement in the child’s education. Mother

takes issue with the trial court’s statement that it was “appalled” that mother listed her new

husband as the child’s father on her school paperwork. Mother claims that her new husband was

never truly represented to be the child’s father. Mother protests that she simply listed her

husband as the child’s emergency contact and clearly noted that he was a stepparent, not a

parent. Mother argues that the only reason that she listed her new husband on the first page of

the school paperwork in the “father” contact spot was because mother did not have father’s

telephone number when she filled out that paperwork. Mother highlights the fact that the child’s

teacher testified that mother’s new husband was never represented to her as the child’s father,

and the child did not call him “dad.” Mother also argues that she corrected the school paperwork

once she acquired father’s telephone number. Mother insists that the manner in which she filled

out the child’s school paperwork “has nothing to do with the child’s home, school, and

community record.” Mother contends that the trial court should have considered the fact that the

child was doing extremely well in school, was very involved in the community and in church,

and that the child was involved in other activities such as dance. Mother argues that the trial

court changed custody of the child to a parent who lives in a different city, uprooting the child

from the community in which she had been growing up and in which she had been thriving.

We conclude that the trial court’s finding that Factor (h) favored father was not against

the great weight of the evidence. Although the record indicates that the child was progressing

socially and academically, the evidence was equally clear that the child had no stability while in

mother’s physical custody, as mother lived in three different rental homes and enrolled the child

in three different schools over three successive school years. Furthermore, the trial court’s focus

on mother’s intentional exclusion of father from the child’s schooling was appropriate. The

evidence was clear that mother changed the child’s school several times without consulting

father, refused to tell father where the child attended school, and intentionally prevented father

from being able to participate in the child’s school activities. In fact, mother listed her new

husband as the child’s father on the school paperwork, and the school’s administration would not

initially allow father pick the child up as ordered by the court. We cannot conclude that the trial

court’s decision regarding Factor (h) was against the great weight of the evidence.

E. FACTOR J (FACILITATION OF A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OTHER PARENT)

Factor (j) is “[t]he willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and

encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent

or the child and the parents.” MCL 222.23(j).

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The trial court found that father had proven by clear and convincing evidence that mother

“does not keep him in the loop” and that mother failed to follow court orders. Mother contends

that the trial court erred with regard to both of these findings. Mother argues that, while she “is

not perfect,” father “violates orders as often as she does,” and most of father’s complaints about

her were due to “unintentional, reasonable tardiness or a misunderstanding.” Mother argues that

father repeatedly sought to hold her in contempt of court with no legitimate basis and that

father’s frequent complaints about mother and his attempts to send her to jail “over minor issues”

is evidence that father failed to facilitate and encourage a strong relationship between the child

and the other parent.

Although mother concedes that there were three occasions when the trial court held her in

contempt of court, she objects that (1) the first contempt citation, for denial of parenting time,

occurred before the November 2016 parenting-time order and, therefore, cannot be counted

against her; (2) the second contempt citation was issued because mother denied father parenting

time over the 2016 Christmas break, but that was issued simply because mother could not prove

that it was really father’s fault; and (3) the third contempt citation was for mother’s failure to

inform father of the child’s surgery, and the trial court unreasonably refused to let mother prove

that father already knew the date of the surgery from other sources and, therefore, it was

irrelevant that she tell him about the surgery. Mother also argues that, in addition to finding that

she violated court orders, the trial court found that mother failed to keep father informed about

the child’s life. Mother argues that (1) she proved at two different hearings that the parties’

communication issues were father’s fault because he refused to give mother a telephone number;

(2) mother did not have a telephone number at which to contact father until December 11, 2017;

and (3) father’s complaints about information were from before December 11, 2017.

We conclude that the trial court’s finding that Factor (j) favored father was not against

the great weight of the evidence. The trial court made clear that it weighed Factor (j) much more

heavily than the other best-interest factors. It is undisputed that the trial court held mother in

contempt of court, on three separate occasions, for her failure to follow court orders in this case.

The record is also clear that mother repeatedly and intentionally excluded father from the child’s

life in multiple respects, including her attempts to exclude father from both education and

medical decisions regarding the child, in addition to mother’s attempts to emotionally manipulate

the child so as to alienate her from father. For instance, mother would tell the child, before

father’s parenting time, that the child would miss out on all of the fun activities that would take

place while she was gone. We cannot conclude that the trial court’s decision regarding Factor (j)

was against the great weight of the evidence.

F. FACTOR K (DOMESTIC VIOLENCE)

Factor (k) is “[d]omestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed

against or witnessed by the child.”

With respect to Factor (k), mother argues that the trial court relied on a personal

protection order (PPO) between mother and father’s wife that was granted in 2014 and expired in

2015. Mother argues that the PPO was granted two years before the November 2016 custody

order that reaffirmed mother’s primary physical custody of the child. Mother argues that,

“[b]ecause the incident was so long ago, to find this factor favored Plaintiff-Father was against

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the great weight of the evidence. At the very least, it should not have been weighed

significantly.” Notably, mother does not deny that she attacked father’s wife, or that a circuit

court issued father’s wife a PPO to protect her from the conduct of mother and her family

members. Mother simply argues that her domestic violence assault against father’s wife was “so

long ago” that it is unfair to consider it when weighing Factor (k).

We conclude that the trial court’s factual finding that Factor (k) favored father was not

against the great weight of the evidence. There is no evidence in the record that father ever

engaged in any type of domestic violence. Yet, it is uncontroverted that the circuit court issued

both father and his wife PPOs because of the assaultive conduct of mother and her family. We

cannot conclude that the trial court’s decision regarding Factor (k) was against the great weight

of the evidence.

Thus, we find no error in the trial court’s decision to grant sole legal custody and primary

physical custody of the child to father.

Affirmed.

/s/ Thomas C. Cameron

/s/ Jane M. Beckering

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause

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