United States v. Raymont Wright

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 17-1972

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellant

v.

RAYMONT WRIGHT

______________

ON APPEAL FROM THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

(D.C. No. 2-14-cr-00292-001)

District Judge: Hon. Cathy Bissoon

______________

Argued May 24, 2018

______________

Before: MCKEE, SHWARTZ, and NYGAARD, Circuit

Judges.

(Opinion Filed: January 17, 2019)

______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

________________

Donovan J. Cocas, Esq. [ARGUED]

Jane M. Datttilo, Esq.

Laura S. Irwin, Esq.

Office of the United States Attorney

700 Grant Street

Suite 4000

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Attorney for Appellant

Renee Pietropaolo, Esq. [ARGUED]

Lisa B. Freeland, Esq.

Akin Adepoju, Esq.

Office of the Federal Public Defender

1001 Liberty Avenue

1500 Liberty Center

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Attorneys for Appellee Raymont Wright

Lawrence S. Lustberg, Esq. [ARGUED]

Gibbons, P.C.

One Gateway Center

Newark, NJ 07102

Attorney for Amicus Appellee National Association of

Criminal Defense Lawyers

2

SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.

The District Court barred a retrial of and dismissed the

indictment against Defendant Raymont Wright with prejudice

after two juries failed to reach a verdict. The Court did so

relying on its inherent authority, but without finding that any

misconduct had occurred or that Wright would suffer any

prejudice beyond the general anxiety and inconvenience of

facing a retrial. Under such circumstances, the Court lacked

the inherent authority to bar the retrial and dismiss the

indictment. Therefore, we will reverse the order dismissing the

indictment and remand for further proceedings.

I

In December 2014, Wright was charged with being a

felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1). He pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial in

May 2016. The jury was unable to reach a verdict. A second

trial was held in March 2017, and that jury was also unable to

reach a verdict.

During both trials, the jury heard evidence from police

officers about Wright’s actions on July 24, 2014. 1 That

evening, five Pittsburgh Police detectives were patrolling in

two unmarked cars. Detectives Kennedy, Henson, and Baker

were in the lead car, and Detectives Fallert and Goob were in

the second car. Around 8:30 p.m. (when it was still daylight),

Fallert and Goob saw a man, later identified as Wright, driving

1

The following facts are drawn largely from the

evidence presented at the first trial.

3

a car in the opposite direction well above the 25-mile-per-hour

speed limit. The detectives turned around to follow Wright,

and Wright sped up and turned onto a loop-shaped road. The

detectives pursued Wright, who fled at a high speed and ran at

least four stop signs. The lead car lost sight of Wright shortly

thereafter and discontinued pursuit.

Officers in the lead car then noticed skid marks

suggesting that a car had intended but failed to make a left turn

at the end of a street. Officers thereafter came upon Wright’s

car in a parking lot below. The car had gone through a fence,

over a hillside, and into the lot. The car hit two unoccupied

parked cars, its tires blew out, and its windows were down.

Detectives Baker and Henson exited the vehicle at the

top of the hill and remained where Wright’s car broke through

the fence, and Detective Kennedy drove his car down to the

parking lot’s entrance. Baker and Henson testified that they

saw Wright search around the rear passenger seat of the car,

back out of the vehicle with a black semi-automatic handgun

in his right hand, and try to “rack the slide,” which can insert

or remove a round from the chamber. App. 118-19. They had

their weapons drawn and told Wright to drop the gun. At first,

Wright merely stepped back, but he eventually tossed the gun

to the side, backed away, and lied on the ground. Pittsburgh

police officer Elliott and his partner, who heard of the crash on

the radio, were the first to reach Wright, and saw him lying on

the ground with a handgun next to him. Henson stated that

when he made it down to the parking lot, he heard Wright say

to him, “Hey, big guy. You won this time or you won this

round, something of that nature. He [Wright] said: You feel

me? You won this time,” which Henson understood to mean

that he had just avoided a shootout or that he caught Wright

4

after the pursuit. App. 125. Henson subsequently took custody

of the gun and noticed the slide lever was bent, and when he

straightened it, saw the gun was loaded with eight rounds, and

one in the chamber. 2

At the close of the Government’s case, Wright moved

for a directed verdict, arguing that no reasonable juror could

find beyond a reasonable doubt that Wright possessed the

firearm. The District Court denied the motion because “the

evidence does thus far demonstrate that a reasonable juror

could most certainly find the Defendant guilty of the charge in

this case.” App. 171. Wright did not present a case.

The jury deliberated for approximately five hours and

then reported to the Court that it was deadlocked. After polling

the jurors to confirm they were deadlocked and further

deliberations would not bring them closer to a unanimous

verdict, the District Court declared a mistrial.

At Wright’s March 2017 retrial, the Government

presented substantially the same evidence. The Government

also called Detective Kennedy and Lieutenant Palermo, who

were at the scene after Wright was arrested, as well as experts

who testified regarding the collection of DNA and fingerprint

evidence from firearms to respond to Wright’s argument at the

first trial that investigators chose not to test the gun for forensic

evidence in an effort to cover up that they had planted the gun

at the scene.

2

The parties stipulated Wright had been convicted of a

qualifying felony, and an ATF Special Agent testified about

the gun’s interstate nexus.

5

At the close of the Government’s case, Wright again

moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the Court denied

because “there is sufficient evidence in the record to establish

beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Wright possessed the

firearm in the case,” App. 650. Wright did not put on a case.

The second jury deliberated for approximately three

hours and then reported that it was hopelessly deadlocked. The

Court polled the jury to confirm the deadlock and then

dismissed the jury. 3

After the Government notified the Court that it intended

to retry the case, the Court required the parties to brief

“whether the Court, through an exercise of its inherent

authority, should prohibit or permit a second re-trial in this

case.” App. 26. After considering the parties’ arguments, the

District Court dismissed the indictment with prejudice, holding

that it “ha[d] the inherent authority, under some circumstances,

to dismiss an indictment following multiple mistrials.” United

States v. Wright, Crim. A. No. 14-292, 2017 WL 1179006, at

*4 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2017). It reasoned that: (1) principles

underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause also applied to a

defendant facing a retrial after multiple mistrials, id. at *1-2;

(2) other courts had dismissed indictments in similar

3

Wright asserted that in the first trial, jurors voted 8-4

for acquittal, and in the second trial, the jury was evenly split.

The Government asserted that in the first trial, jurors voted 7-

5 for acquittal, and in the second trial, voted 8-4 for conviction.

See United States v. Wright, Crim. A. No. 14-292, 2017 WL

1179006, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2017). While Wright does

not explain how he obtained these numbers, the Government

said it obtained them by speaking with the jurors.

6

circumstances, id. at *2-3 (citing United States v. Rossoff, 806

F. Supp. 200, 202-03 (C.D. Ill. 1992); United States v. Ingram,

412 F. Supp. 384, 385 (D.D.C. 1976); Sivels v. State, 741

N.E.2d 1197, 1201 (Ind. 2001); State v. Abbati, 493 A.2d 513,

517 (N.J. 1985); State v. Moriwake, 647 P.2d 705, 712-13

(Haw. 1982); State v. Witt, 572 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tenn.

1978)); (3) while Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(b)(3)

expressly allows the Government to retry a case after a mistrial,

nothing in the rule “limits a court’s inherent supervisory

authority to dismiss an indictment in the interests of

fundamental fairness,” id. at *4; and (4) if the Court were to

adopt the Government’s position that there are no limit to the

number of times the Government can retry a defendant, it

would be tantamount to a “type of jury shopping” that a court

should not permit, id. at *4. The District Court also considered

the factors set forth in Abbati, 493 A.2d at 521-22, and

concluded that most factors supported dismissal. 4

4

The Abbati factors are

(1) the number of prior mistrials and the

outcome of the juries’ deliberations, so far as is

known; (2) the character of prior trials in terms

of length, complexity, and similarity of evidence

presented; (3) the likelihood of any substantial

difference in a subsequent trial, if allowed;

(4) the trial court’s own evaluation of the relative

strength of each party’s case; and (5) the

professional conduct and diligence of respective

counsel, particularly of the prosecuting attorney.

The court must also give due weight to the

prosecutor’s decision to reprosecute, assessing

the reasons for that decision, such as the gravity

7

The Government appeals.

II 5

We review the District Court’s order dismissing the

indictment based on the Court’s inherent power for abuse of

discretion. 6 See United States v. Chapman, 524 F.3d 1073,

of the criminal charges and the public’s concern

in the effective and definitive conclusion of

criminal prosecutions. Conversely, the court

should accord careful consideration to the status

of the individual defendant and the impact of a

retrial upon the defendant in terms of untoward

hardship and unfairness.

Wright, 2017 WL 1179006, at *4 (quoting Abbati, 493 A.2d

at 521-22). For the reasons set forth herein, we would not

adopt Abbati, but even if we were to consider the Abbati

factors, we would conclude that they do not support dismissal

in this case.

5

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3731.

6

The phrases “inherent power,” “inherent authority,”

“supervisory power,” and “supervisory authority” are all used

to describe the basis for a court action seeking to maintain the

integrity of the proceedings that is not directly tethered to a

specific rule, statute, or constitutional provision. See, e.g.,

Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996) (inherent

power); United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 46 (1992)

(supervisory power); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,

43 (1991) (inherent power); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United

8

1084-88, 1090 (9th Cir. 2008) (reviewing dismissal of

indictment for abuse of discretion); cf. Chambers v. NASCO,

Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 55 (1991) (reviewing a court’s imposition of

sanctions under its inherent power for abuse of discretion);

Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Fahie, 419 F.3d 249, 258 (3d Cir.

2005) (“A trial court’s remedy for a discovery violation under

its supervisory powers is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”).

A district court abuses its discretion when it makes an errant

conclusion of law, an improper application of law to fact, or a

clearly erroneous finding of fact. McDowell v. Phila. Hous.

Auth., 423 F.3d 233, 238 (3d Cir. 2005).

A

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31 allows the

Government to retry a case if the court declares a mistrial after

a jury announces it is unable to reach a verdict. Specifically,

Rule 31(b)(3) provides: “[i]f the jury cannot agree on a verdict

on one or more counts, the court may declare a mistrial on

those counts. The government may retry any defendant on any

count on which the jury could not agree.” Fed. R. Crim. P.

31(b)(3). The word “may” means that the Government has the

States, 487 U.S. 250, 254-56, 263 (1988) (supervisory

authority); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983)

(supervisory power); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727,

733-36 (1980) (supervisory power); United States v. Nobles,

422 U.S. 225, 231 (1975) (inherent power).

Even if we accepted the distinctions our dissenting

colleague has drawn between inherent judicial powers,

legislatively granted judicial powers, and supervisory powers,

each category must operate within the constitutional

framework, including the separation of powers.

9

discretion to retry a case, and nothing in the rule or its

commentary provides or even suggests a limit on the number

of retrials it may conduct. See United States v. Wqas Khan,

No. 2:10-CR-0175 KJM, 2014 WL 1330681, at *2 (E.D. Cal.

Apr. 1, 2014) (“Nothing suggests that multiple mistrials take a

case out of the Rule’s operation.”), appeal dismissed, No. 14-

10218 (9th Cir. July 9, 2014). 7 Moreover, there is nothing in

7

While Rule 31 does not limit the Government’s

authority to retry a case, a handful of district courts have

dismissed indictments following a second hung jury, but those

decisions are not persuasive. In Ingram, the district court

dismissed the indictment sua sponte (without any initial

objection by the Government) after two mistrials—in which

jurors had voted 10-2 and 11-1 for acquittal, the defendant was

jailed during the pendency of the trials, and “[t]he Government

ha[d] no new proof; it simply want[ed] another chance.” 412

F. Supp. at 385. The court concluded that to permit a retrial

would be “to ignore the reasonable doubt standard,” and so

“[t]he Court’s intervention [was] required in the interest of

justice.” Id. at 386 (citing United States v. De Diego, 511 F.2d

818, 824 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1975); De Diego, 511 F.2d at 833 n.6

(McGowan, J., dissenting)). The Ingram court, however, relied

in part on the dissent in De Diego. Cases since Ingram have

applied the De Diego majority’s view concerning a court’s

limited authority to dismiss an indictment. See, e.g., United

States v. Hall, 559 F.2d 1160, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing

De Diego and reversing the district court’s dismissal of the

indictment where the district court found it would be

“unconscionable” to retry to the defendant); United States v.

Hudson, 545 F.2d 724, 724-26 (10th Cir. 1976) (discussing De

Diego and its dissent and holding a district court does not have

authority to sua sponte dismiss an indictment based on the

10

defendant’s poor health); United States v. Mussehl, 453 F.

Supp. 1235, 1236 (D.N.D. 1978) (denying defendants’ motion

to dismiss the indictment based on alleged errors at trial, and

citing De Diego for the proposition that “[t]he duty [to

administer justice] encompasses the concept of review of the

question whether the United States Attorney, in making his

decision to prosecute, complied with the law, but does not

allow the Court to question a United States Attorney’s

judgment decision to prosecute, when lawfully made”).

The District Court also relied on Rossoff, where the

court denied the Government’s motion to dismiss the

indictment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a),

but still dismissed the indictment with prejudice. 806 F. Supp.

at 202-03 (citing Ingram, 412 F. Supp. at 385-86). There had

been two trials, and the Government sought to dismiss the

indictment and refile the charges in a different judicial district.

Id. The court determined it had authority to dismiss an

indictment with prejudice if a retrial was “against the concept

of fundamental fairness,” id. at 202 (citing Ingram, 412 F.

Supp. 384), and did so because, among other reasons, the

defendant was in poor health, was under significant strain, and

a majority of jurors at both trials found him not guilty, id. at

203. Rossoff, however, is distinguishable from Wright’s case

because in Rossoff, the Government sought to dismiss the

indictment so that it could refile charges in a different judicial

district, which caused the court to question the Government’s

good faith. In Wright’s case, the District Court made no

finding that the Government’s desire to retry Wright was for

an improper purpose.

In addition, and significantly, neither Ingram nor

Rossoff addressed the doctrine of separation of powers.

Rather, each essentially relied on a general concept of fairness

11

the text that empowers a court to prohibit the Government from

retrying a case. 8

B

Apparently aware that Rule 31 did not provide it with a

basis to preclude a retrial in these circumstances, the District

Court concluded that it had the inherent authority to forbid the

retrial and dismiss the indictment. The District Court erred.

The exercise of inherent authority must satisfy two

requirements: (1) it “must be a reasonable response to the

to the defendant in deciding to dismiss an indictment. See

Rossoff, 806 F. Supp. at 202; Ingram, 412 F. Supp. at 385-86.

In this Circuit, however, “[t]he judiciary may not impose its

personal and private notions of ‘fairness’ on law enforcement

officials, but does have a limited authority to affect

prosecutorial actions when those actions are taken in violation

of the Constitution.” United States v. Santtini, 963 F.2d 585,

596 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).

8

Rule 31 differs from other Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure because it makes no mention of the court’s

authority. For instance, Rule 48(b) states that a court has

authority to dismiss an indictment “if unnecessary delay occurs

in: (1) presenting a charge to the grand jury; (2) filing an

information against a defendant; or (3) bringing a defendant to

trial.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(b). There are other Rule-based

grounds on which a district court could also dismiss an

indictment, but each would be triggered by a motion, such as a

motion to dismiss for failure to comply with Rule 16’s

discovery obligations if justice so requires, Fed. R. Crim. P.

16(d)(2)(D), or a motion asserting a defect in the indictment,

Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B).

12

problems and needs confronting the court’s fair administration

of justice,” and (2) it “cannot be contrary to any express grant

of or limitation on the district court’s power contained in a rule

or statute.” Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1892 (2016)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We will

examine each of these requirements in turn.

1

As to the first Dietz requirement, “[g]uided by

considerations of justice, and in the exercise of supervisory

powers, federal courts may, within limits, formulate procedural

rules not specifically required by the Constitution or the

Congress.” United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Such rules

must be imposed (1) “to implement a remedy for violation of

recognized rights,” (2) “to preserve judicial integrity by

ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate considerations

validly before the jury,” and (3) “as a remedy designed to deter

illegal conduct.” Id. (citations omitted). Thus, a court may

exercise its inherent authority only when it is necessary to

address improper conduct and ensure respect for the

proceedings.

Under these principles, a court may dismiss an

indictment based upon its inherent authority only if the

Government engaged in misconduct, the defendant was

prejudiced, and no less severe remedy was available to address

the prejudice. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487

U.S. 250, 254-56, 263 (1988); Chapman, 524 F.3d at 1087

(stating that “[a] court may dismiss an indictment under its

supervisory powers only when the defendant suffers

substantial prejudice and where no lesser remedial action is

13

available” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted));

United States v. Goodson, 204 F.3d 508, 514 (4th Cir. 2000)

(observing that “a district court may not, in the management of

its docket, exercise its discretion to dismiss an indictment with

prejudice, either under Rule 48(b) or under its supervisory

power, unless the violation caused prejudice to the defendant

or posed a substantial threat thereof” (emphasis omitted));

United States v. Derrick, 163 F.3d 799, 808 (4th Cir. 1998)

(holding that an indictment may not be dismissed for

prosecutorial misconduct absent a showing that the misconduct

prejudiced the defendants, and stating that “virtually every

other circuit to consider the issue post-Hasting and Nova Scotia

has also held that an indictment may not be dismissed based on

prosecutorial misconduct, absent a showing of prejudice to the

defendant”); United States v. Van Engel, 15 F.3d 623, 631-32

(7th Cir. 1993) (“A federal judge is not authorized to punish

the misconduct of a prosecutor by letting the defendant walk,

unless the misconduct not only violated the defendant’s rights

but also prejudiced his defense . . . .”); United States v. Tucker,

8 F.3d 673, 674 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[A] federal court may not

exercise its supervisory authority to reverse a conviction or

dismiss an indictment absent prejudice to the defendant.”);

United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[T]aken

together, [United States v. ]Payner, [447 U.S. 727, 735 (1980),]

Hasting, and Bank of Nova Scotia form a trilogy admonishing

federal courts to refrain from using the supervisory power to

conform executive conduct to judicially preferred norms by

dismissing charges, absent cognizable prejudice to a particular

defendant.”); United States v. Isgro, 974 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th

Cir. 1992) (“Before it may invoke this [supervisory] power [to

dismiss an indictment], a court must first find that the

defendant is actually prejudiced . . . .”), amended by 43 F.3d

1480 (9th Cir. 1994).

14

In this case, there has been no misconduct. Indeed, the

District Court noted that the Government performed diligently

and professionally in both trials, Wright, 2017 WL 1179006,

at *4, and found that the evidence was sufficient to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that Wright possessed the gun. The

District Court nonetheless applied its own predictions about

what another jury may do when presented with the same

evidence, emphasized the need for finality, and opined that the

effect of prosecution on the defendant precluded a proper

prosecution from proceeding. See id. at *5-6. Invoking its own

notions about the unfairness of requiring a defendant to face a

retrial where the Government did not obtain a majority of the

jurors’ votes is an improper exercise of a court’s supervisory

power. United States v. Miller, 4 F.3d 792, 795 (9th Cir. 1993).

Moreover, there is no prejudice to a defendant simply because

he faces the anxiety and the normal stress of undergoing a trial.

See United States v. Shepherd, 511 F.2d 119, 123 (5th Cir.

1975) (“[A]nxiety is present to some degree in virtually every

case. Something more than the normal anxiety that

accompanies a trial is necessary to show a degree of

prejudice.”); United States v. Clyburn, Crim. No. 89-0154

(JHG), 1991 WL 45749, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 1991) (“The

only real harm alleged is the general unfairness to these

defendants in having to go forward yet again with a lengthy

trial, in their being ‘ground down’ by the several months’ drain

on their mental, emotional, and financial resources. A lack of

such fairness, however, does not alone violate due process.”).

Rather, prejudice sufficient for the District Court to intervene

in a proper prosecution based upon its inherent authority occurs

only where the Government engages in actions that place a

defendant at a disadvantage in addressing the charges. That

sort of prejudice is absent in this case.

15

Unless there is some constitutional basis, such as a due

process violation, it makes sense to limit a court’s authority to

bar retrial to instances of prosecutorial misconduct and

prejudice. First, it ensures that a judge’s personal preferences

about a case do not influence whether the case proceeds. See

United States v. Santtini, 963 F.2d 585, 596 (3d Cir. 1992)

(“The judiciary may not impose its personal and private

notions of ‘fairness’ on law enforcement officials, but does

have a limited authority to affect prosecutorial actions when

those actions are taken in violation of the Constitution.”).

Second, as more fully discussed below, it guarantees that a

court limits the Executive’s decision to prosecute only where

there is a constitutionally sound reason to do so. 9 This brings

us to the second Dietz requirement.

9

For these reasons, we find unpersuasive our dissenting

colleague’s reliance on Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757

F.2d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc), and particularly its

observation that a court has the inherent power to resolve a

case, as authority for allowing a court dismiss an indictment

after successive hung juries. As a general matter, there is no

doubt that a court has the authority to dismiss a case, but it may

not simply end a case because it decides that it should not be

tried again. Rather, as Bank of Nova Scotia, Chapman, and

their progeny make clear, the court must point to evidentiary

deficiency, prejudicial misconduct, or a constitutional basis,

such as double jeopardy or due process, to justify precluding a

prosecution. If a court believed that the evidence was deficient,

the prosecutor engaged in prejudicial misconduct, or a retrial

would violate the constitution, then it has a basis to preclude a

retrial. Requiring such reasons for barring a retrial ensures that

16

2

The second Dietz requirement reminds a court that the

exercise of its powers must be in accordance with the

Constitution, statutes, and rules. 136 S. Ct. at 1892. Beginning

with the Constitution, a court must be mindful of its role in our

tripartite form of government and the doctrine of separation of

powers. Separation-of-powers principles limit a court’s

inherent authority. “Regardless of whether the supervisory

power stems from the federal courts’ inherent power to check

intrusions by other branches of government or whether it is a

form of specialized federal common law, the separation-of-

powers principle imposes significant limits on it,” and

“[p]roper regard for judicial integrity does not justify a

‘chancellor’s foot veto’ over activities of coequal branches of

government.” United States v. Gatto, 763 F.2d 1040, 1046 (9th

Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United

States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973)).

In the criminal context, the Executive Branch has

“broad discretion as to whom to prosecute,” and this discretion

“rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute

is particularly ill-suited to judicial review.” Wayte v. United

States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). A court is not equipped to evaluate

[s]uch factors as . . . the prosecution’s general

deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement

priorities, and the case’s relationship to the

the ruling is not based on a court’s own personal sense of

whether a case is worthy of prosecution.

17

Government’s overall enforcement plan . . . .

Judicial supervision in this area, moreover,

entails systemic costs of particular concern.

Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the

criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law

enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor’s

motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry,

and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness

by revealing the Government’s enforcement

policy. All of these are substantial concerns that

make the courts properly hesitant to examine the

decision whether to prosecute.

Id.; see also In re Richards, 213 F.3d 773, 786 (3d Cir. 2000)

(echoing similar sentiments with respect to Rule 48(a)

dismissals). Thus, absent constitutional concerns, the decision

to try or retry a case is at the discretion of the prosecutor.

United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d 125, 129,

137-38 (2d Cir. 2017) (stating that the court’s “role is not to act

as superprosecutors, second-guessing the legitimate exercise of

core elements of prosecutorial discretion, but rather as neutral

arbiters of the law” (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted)); United States v. Raineri, 42 F.3d 36, 43 (1st Cir.

1994) (“[T]he choice to forego permanently a prosecution is

ordinarily made by the executive branch.”); Tucker, 8 F.3d at

676 (“In maintaining order in our own house, we should not

needlessly trample on the interest of the prosecutor and of the

public in securing proper, lasting convictions.”); Isgro, 974

F.2d at 1097 (stating that the doctrine of separation of powers

“mandates judicial respect for the independence of the

prosecutor,” and “[d]ismissal of an indictment with prejudice

18

is the most severe sanction possible”). 10 Accordingly,

separation-of-powers principles preclude a court from

terminating a prosecution absent misconduct and prejudice to

the defendant. See Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 254-56,

263; Goodson, 204 F.3d at 514; Tucker, 8 F.3d at 674; Isgro,

974 F.2d at 1094.

In short, a court’s power to preclude a prosecution is

limited by the separation of powers and, specifically, the

Executive’s law-enforcement and prosecutorial prerogative.

See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607-08; HSBC, 863 F.3d at 137; In re

Richards, 213 F.3d at 786; Raineri, 42 F.3d at 43; Tucker, 8

F.3d at 676; Isgro, 974 F.2d at 1095-97; Santtini, 963 F.2d at

596; Gatto, 763 F.2d at 1046. Exercising inherent authority

here to dismiss an indictment in the absence of misconduct and

prejudice and based only on the fact that two juries could not

reach a verdict intrudes on the Executive’s domain and thereby

violates the separation of powers. See, e.g., HSBC, 863 F.3d

at 138; Isgro, 974 F.2d 1091.

10

Several state courts have also refused to recognize

any inherent authority to dismiss an indictment to prevent a

retrial. See People v. Sierb, 581 N.W.2d 219, 225 (Mich.

1998); State v. Johnson, 821 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1991) (en banc); State v. Sherrod, 383 So.2d 752, 753

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Other states, however, have

recognized a court’s authority to dismiss an indictment sua

sponte. See State v. Sauve, 666 A.2d 1164, 1167-68, 1167 n.1

(Vt. 1995); Abbati, 493 A.2d at 521; Moriwake, 647 P.2d at

712; Witt, 572 S.W.2d at 917. These latter cases are

unpersuasive because they give too little weight to the

separation of powers, a crucial constitutional principle in the

federal system.

19

Finally, there is no statute or procedural rule that

permits a court to bar a retrial in the absence of misconduct and

prejudice. First, a court may not dismiss an indictment as a

method to manage its own affairs. 11 See Hasting, 461 U.S. at

505. Second, a court’s inherent power does not “include the

power to develop rules that circumvent or conflict with the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” Carlisle v. United

States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996). Barring a retrial through the

exercise of inherent authority circumvents the absence of

power of the district court to dismiss an indictment in Rule

31(b). As stated above, courts have inherent authority to

dismiss indictments, including, for instance, for prosecutorial

misconduct if the defendant was prejudiced, Bank of Nova

Scotia, 487 U.S. at 254-56, 263, but neither the Supreme Court

nor our Court has extended a court’s inherent authority to allow

11

In Chambers, for example, the Supreme Court

recognized a court’s authority to impose silence, respect, and

decorum based on its authority to manage its own affairs. 501

U.S. at 43. This authority has been exercised by controlling

admission to the bar and disciplining its members; punishing

for contempt, which penalizes disruption to proceedings and

disobedience to court orders; disallowing fraud on the courts;

ensuring the proceedings move forward; and curtailing

litigation abuses. Id. at 43-45; see also Link v. Wabash R.R.

Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-31 (1962) (noting a court can dismiss a

civil case for failure to prosecute to prevent delays and court

congestion as part of a court’s inherent power to manage its

own affairs). Chambers and Link address how a court may

manage its own proceedings, but they do not address how the

court must also account for issues of separation of powers in

the context of a criminal case.

20

the sua sponte dismissal of an indictment solely to preclude

multiple mistrials following hung juries, see Chambers, 501

U.S. at 47; HSBC, 863 F.3d at 136. 12

12

Most cases concerning a court’s inherent authority

have arisen in the civil context. See Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1893

(noting a court’s inherent powers to rescind a jury discharge

order and recall a jury); Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44, 55-58

(recognizing a court’s authority to vacate a judgment upon

proof that a fraud was perpetrated on the court, and, in

particular, to assess as a sanction the entire amount of the

opposing party’s attorney’s fees); Link, 370 U.S. at 629-31

(authority to dismiss a civil case sua sponte for failure to

prosecute); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-08

(1947) (dismissing an action based on the doctrine of forum

non conveniens). See generally Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1892-93

(citing cases involving the scope of a district court’s inherent

power); Eash, 757 F.2d at 561-64 (same).

There are other circumstances in which district courts

lack the inherent authority to act, and most of those situations

arise in the criminal context. See, e.g., Carlisle, 517 U.S. at

433 (holding that a court does not have authority to grant a

post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal, filed one day

outside the time limit under Rule 29(e)); Williams, 504 U.S. at

45-50, 55 (holding that a district court does not have inherent

authority to dismiss an indictment because the Government

failed to disclose to the grand jury substantial exculpatory

evidence; “[b]ecause the grand jury is an institution separate

from the courts, over whose functioning the courts do not

preside, we think it clear that, as a general matter at least, no

such ‘supervisory’ judicial authority exists”); HSBC, 863 F.3d

at 129, 135-37 (holding that the district court violated

separation-of-powers principles by sua sponte invoking its

21

Thus, the District Court abused its discretion in barring

a retrial and dismissing the indictment. 13

III

For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse and remand

for further proceedings.

supervisory power to oversee the government’s entry into and

implementation of a deferred prosecution agreement).

13

Our dissenting colleague says that our approach

deprives the court from taking action “when warranted to

protect the institutional integrity of the judiciary.” Dissent at

3. We disagree. This approach recognizes a court’s role in our

tripartite system of government and ensures that a court

intercedes when proceeding would violate the Constitution.

Furthermore, our approach does not preclude a court from

ending a case where the evidence is insufficient or the conduct

of the prosecution is improper.

22

No. 17-1972, United States of America v. Raymont Wright

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, dissenting

This appeal presents us with two issues: First, does a

district court possess the inherent power to dismiss an

indictment after serial hung juries, and second, did the

District Court here abuse its discretion by dismissing this

indictment after two of them. I answer yes to the first and no

to the second. Because I view this to be a matter of

substantial importance, I must respectfully dissent. 1

As the majority notes, twice now, the Government has

tried Raymont Wright for a violation of federal law: being a

felon in possession of a firearm. 2 Twice now, the

Government has done so on the basis of essentially the same

evidence at trials presided over by the same District Court.

And twice now, two different juries could not reach a verdict.

Thus, when the Government announced its intention to put

Wright on trial for the third time, the District Court was

skeptical. It asked for briefing on whether it possessed the

inherent power to prohibit the Government from taking a

1

Whether the District Court had the inherent power to

dismiss the indictment is a legal question. We employ a

plenary standard of review to that issue. See United States v.

Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 161 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing United States

v. Scott, 223 F.3d 208, 210 (3d Cir. 2000)). Whether the

District Court appropriately exercised this power is reviewed

for an abuse of discretion. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S.

626, 633 (1962).

2

See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

third turn, and if it did, whether the court should use that

power. 3 After hearing from both sides, the District Court

concluded that its inherent power applied to this

circumstance. It then exercised its discretion to dismiss the

indictment.

Neither the Government nor the majority disputes that

district courts have the inherent authority to dismiss

indictments under at least some circumstances. Citing to

United States v. Hasting, 4 however, the majority cabins that

authority to those instances in which there is evidence of

prosecutorial misconduct. In my view, in so doing, the

majority conflates and confuses the various powers of the

court. And it also hobbles the court’s discretion to probe the

impact on the fair administration of justice of those

prosecutorial decisions that sit outside the definition of bad

conduct but still pose—or threaten to pose—real institutional

harm.

The executive office inheres prosecutors with the

power to bring a case to trial. The judicial office, on the other

hand, inheres the court with the power to end a case. 5 Both

3

The District Court ordered the parties to “file cross briefs

stating their position regarding whether the Court, through an

exercise of its inherent authority, should prohibit or permit a

second re-trial in this case.” United States v. Wright, No. 14-

cr-292, 2017 WL 1179006, at *1 (W.D. Pa. 2017).

4

461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983).

5

See Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787,

816 (1987)(Scalia, J. concurring)(“The judicial power is the

power to decide, in accordance with law, who should prevail

in a case or controversy. See Art. III, § 2. . . . [S]ince the

2

offices share a responsibility to safeguard the overall integrity

of the judicial process. But when a prosecutor decides to

proceed with another trial in the aftermath of multiple

mistrials, who but the court is empowered to question the

impact of the prosecutor’s discretion on the fair

administration of justice, particularly when the court has

concerns that the proceedings—and the institution—will be

tainted by the abuse of jury shopping? It could be argued that

two mistrials may not in some instances be enough to inflict

serious institutional damage. But, the majority’s combined

reliance on Dietz v. Bouldin 6 and Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(b)(3) to

allow the prosecutor to bring an unlimited number of retrials,

so long as she or he does not stray into the realm of “illegal

conduct,” provides the prosecutor with an unchecked power.

This poses a threat to the integrity of the judiciary and

contradicts the inherent responsibility and authority vested in

the judiciary by the framers of the Constitution. Thus, it is

the majority’s decision—and not the District Court’s exercise

of its inherent authority—that violates the separation of

power principles on which the majority relies. We must

affirm that our trial court judges have the discretion,

originating in the court’s inherent power, to take proper

action when warranted to protect the institutional integrity of

the judiciary.

Here, the District Court mindfully struck the balance

that is necessary anytime the power of the court and the

prosecution of law violators is part of the implementation of

the laws, it is—at least to the extent that it is publicly

exercised—executive power, vested by the Constitution in the

President.”) (footnote omitted)).

6

136 S. Ct. 1885, 1892 (2016).

3

power of the prosecutor intersect. Drawing from factors set

out in State v. Abbati, 7 the District Court identified and

investigated a circumstance that it identified as harmful to the

institution and to the defendant: jury shopping. It also took

note of the impact of serial retrials on the defendant. It then

properly dismissed the indictment. Its use of the court’s

inherent discretion did not violate the separation of powers

doctrine. To the contrary, it gave definition and substance to

it.

I.

Some review is appropriate to illuminate how and

possibly why I believe the majority confuses the court’s

various powers.

A.

Federal courts operate within a constitutional system

that enumerates the powers of each branch of government, as

set forth in the founding document. Article I restrains

congressional power to those “legislative Powers granted

herein.” 8 By comparison, Article II vests the President with

“the executive Power” without further description, limitation,

or restriction. 9 Analogous to Article II, Article III conveys

without restriction or limitation the “judicial Power” to

federal courts. 10 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has—since

at least 1812—recognized that “[c]ertain implied powers must

7

493 A.2d 513, 521-22 (N.J. 1985).

8

U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.

9

U.S. Const. art. II, § 1.

10

U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.

4

necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of

their institution.” 11 “The moment the courts of the United

States were called into existence and invested with

jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of”

inherent authority. 12

Moreover, two bedrock purposes of the Constitution—

checking the actions of the states and ensuring that Congress

and the Executive do not overstep their boundaries—require a

federal judiciary that exercises its own independent judicial

power. That is, it would be impossible for federal courts to

discharge these vital duties if they lacked some inherent

power beyond the reach of the Executive or the legislature. I

think of it this way: the elaborate measures set out in the

Constitution to protect the independence of the judiciary (life

tenure, removal from office only through impeachment, no

decrease in salary during a judge’s tenure, for example)

would be meaningless if there were not some inherent,

unimpeachable power vested solely in the federal courts.

In Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 13 we defined inherent

power as vesting in federal courts upon their creation and as

not deriving from any statute. In this sense, the “judicial

power” given to the federal courts by Article III of the

Constitution is the “power to decide, in accordance with law,

who should prevail in a case or controversy.” 14 No matter the

description, this power is intrinsic to the judicial office and

11

United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).

12

Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1873) (speaking of

the inherent contempt power).

13

757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc).

14

Young, 481 U.S. at 816 (Scalia, J., concurring).

5

cannot be inhibited by any rule or act of Congress. As we

have recognized, the boundaries of this power are often

“nebulous” and “shadowy,” 15 and “it is not always possible to

categorize inherent power.” 16 Yet, we have an outline.

In Eash, we identified three main classes or categories

of inherent power: 1) inherent powers based in Article III,

that is, the power of a lower federal court to decide a case

over which it has jurisdiction; 2) those powers “necessary to

the exercise of all others,” 17 and 3) powers that include those

reasonably useful to achieve justice, which are “necessary

only in the practical sense of being useful.” 18 Focusing on the

first category, the inherent power to decide a case is “so

fundamental to the essence of a court as a constitutional

tribunal that to divest the court of absolute command within

this sphere is really to render practically meaningless the

terms ‘court’ and ‘judicial power.’” 19 In other words, powers

15

Eash, 757 F.2d at 561 (citation omitted).

16

Id. at 562.

17

Id. (quoting Roadway Express, Inc., v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752,

764 (1980)).

18

Id. at 563; see also Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Holder,

673 F.3d 245, 255-56 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying Eash factors);

In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 901-02 (5th Cir. 1993) (per

curiam) (adopting Eash factors). In Chambers v. NASCO

Inc., the Supreme Court was urged to adopt our approach to

inherent powers. But the Court held that it “ha[d] never so

classified the inherent powers and . . . ha[d] no need to do so

now.” 501 U.S. 32, 47 n.12 (1991).

19

Eash, 757 F.2d at 562. The third aspect of a court’s

inherent power is its authority to employ persons or

instruments not connected with the court, such as experts and

6

in this category make a court a court; they are encoded into

the judiciary’s DNA. Courts have referred to this power as a

court’s “irreducible inherent authority” 20 and “the core

Article III power.” 21 It is nothing less than our ability to

decide a case over which we have jurisdiction, without

interference by Congress or the Executive. 22

Drawing from this, when I refer to a district court’s

inherent power, I mean a ‘“[c]ertain implied power[] [that]

must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the

nature of their institution,’ [a] power[] ‘which cannot be

dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the

exercise of all others.’” 23 It is “grounded in the separation of

powers concept,” since to deny it and yet maintain an

independent judiciary “is a self-contradiction.” 24

However, that is not to say that the court operates

solely outside the realm of legislatively granted judicial

auditors, to assist in its decision-making function. This facet

of inherent power is not in play here.

20

Id.

21

Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Holder, 673 F.3d at 256.

22

United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871),

Eash, 757 F.2d at 562 (noting that courts may exercise this

type of inherent power despite legislation to the contrary); see

also Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. &

O. Ry. Co., 266 U.S. 42, 64 (1924) (acknowledging that the

Constitution vests courts with some powers unalterable by

legislation).

23

Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43 (quoting Hudson, 11 U.S. (7

Cranch) at 34.).

24

Eash, 757 F.2d at 562.

7

powers. 25 In fact, the categorization scheme in Eash was

intended largely as a means of explaining the relationship

between inherent judicial powers and legislatively granted

judicial powers. 26 It is here that I believe the majority’s

analysis strays.

B.

The majority, the briefs, and the discussion at oral

argument reveal what has become a commonplace but

imprecise conflation of the terms “inherent power” and

“supervisory power.” 27 The Government, while referencing

the District Court’s “inherent power,” also referred to the

court’s “supervisory power,” and its “inherent supervisory

judicial authority.” 28 The Appellee covers the entire panoply,

citing the District Court’s “supervisory authority,” its

25

See Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 33.

26

See In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 120 F.3d 368,

384 n.14 (3d Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by

Cunningham v. Hamilton County, Ohio, 527 U.S. 198 (1999).

27

In Eash, we noted that “[t]he conceptual and definitional

problems regarding inherent power . . . have bedeviled

commentators for years,” 757 F.2d at 561, and that “those

cases that have employed inherent power appear to use that

generic term to describe several distinguishable court

powers,” id. at 562. We also noted that “this lack of

specificity [has been compounded by courts] rel[ying] . . . on

precedents involving one form of power to support the court’s

use of another.” Id.

28

E.g., Appellant’s Br. at 13, 16; Appellant’s Reply Br. at 2,

14.

8

“supervisory power,” and its “inherent power.” 29 At times,

we too have been guilty of adding to the confusion. 30 The

erroneous interchangeability of these terms clouds an

important distinction that is crucial to this appeal: the

difference between inherent judicial powers and legislatively

granted judicial powers. 31 As noted supra, inherent “judicial

power” is given to the federal courts by Article III of the

Constitution. 32 Through this grant, federal courts receive the

“power to decide, in accordance with law, who should prevail

in a case or controversy.” 33 The merging of the terms

“inherent” and “supervisory” likely has its genesis in the fact

that some inherent powers are supervisory in function, such

as a federal court’s inherent power “to supervise the

administration of criminal justice.” 34

29

E.g., Appellee’s Br. at 22, 26.

30

See, e.g., United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382, 396 (3d

Cir. 1986) (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (speaking of our “inherent

supervisory power”); see also United States v. Watkins, 339

F.3d 167, 180 (3d Cir. 2003) (Nygaard, J., concurring)

(referring to both a court’s supervisory power and inherent

power to dismiss a case under Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(b)).

31

In re Tutu Wells Litig., 120 F.3d at 384 n. 14.

32

See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.

33

Young, 481 U.S. at 816 (Scalia, J., concurring).

34

United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n.7 (1980)

(quotation marks omitted); see also Sara Sun Beale,

Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases;

Constitutional and Statutory Limits of the Federal Courts, 84

Colum. L. Rev. 1433, 1433-34, 1465, 1470 (1984)

(identification of Article III “judicial power,” not

congressional acts, as the source of the Supreme Court’s

supervisory authority).

9

However, unlike inherent powers, a court’s

supervisory authority may come from, and can be limited by,

acts of Congress or a court’s own rules. 35 Supervisory power

often speaks to the power “to mandate ‘procedures deemed

desirable from the viewpoint of sound judicial practice.’” 36 A

court’s use of supervisory power can usually be classified in

one of three ways. First, supervisory power can refer to an

appellate court’s supervision of a district court, through the

imposition of procedures in addition to those already imposed

by federal statute or constitutional provision. 37 We have, for

example, relied on our supervisory power over district courts

to review the application of local rules of practice and

procedure. 38 We have also used our supervisory power to

35

See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-41

(1943); Hasting, 461 U.S. at 505.

36

United States v. Moreno, 809 F.3d 766, 780 (3d Cir. 2016)

(quoting Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 146-47 (1985)).

37

See, e.g., Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 384 (2003)

(instructing district courts to notify pro se litigants about

consequences of re-characterizing motions as ones seeking

relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255); Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S.

217, 225 (1946) (announcing a new rule for the composition

of federal juries); Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co.,

816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1987) (prescribing procedures for

motions to dismiss based on the conduct of a litigant’s

counsel); United States v. Bazzano, 570 F.2d 1120, 1137-38

(3d Cir. 1977) (requiring district courts to state reasons for a

criminal sentence).

38

See United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 204-05 (3d Cir.

2007).

10

prohibit certain jury instructions in the district courts 39 and to

review attorney-client fee arrangements. 40 Second, Courts—

both trial and appellate—also refer to their “supervisory

power” when meaning their power to supervise pending

litigation. 41 They can, for example, seal and unseal records, 42

reassign a case to a different judge on remand, 43 or disqualify

an attorney on ethical grounds. 44 Lastly, the power of a

federal court to supervise law enforcement officials can also

be what a court intends when it speaks of its “supervisory

39

See United States v. E. Med. Billing Inc., 230 F.3d 600,

607-12 (3d Cir. 2000).

40

See Ryan v. Butera, Beausang, Cohen & Brennan, 193 F.3d

210, 214 (3d Cir. 1999).

41

See, e.g., Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 425-26

(1996) (acknowledging “supervisory power” of district courts

over litigation before them).

42

See, e.g., Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th

Cir. 1995).

43

See Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Walker, 261 F.3d 370,

376 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that, “[a]lthough it is the standard

practice in the district courts and in this circuit that a case on

remand is assigned to the judge who originally heard it, we

can, in the exercise of our supervisory power, reassign this

case to a different judge upon remand.”) (quotation marks

omitted).

44

In re Grand Jury Investigation, 447 F. Supp. 2d 453, 456-

57 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (collecting cases); see also United States

v. Moreno, 809 F.3d at 780 (summarizing supervisory

authority).

11

power.” 45 These powers broadly ensure that pending cases

are managed uniformly and efficiently.

I concede that the boundary between supervisory

authority that is inherent to the court and that which is granted

by the legislature can, at times, be difficult to identify.

However, these difficulties are irrelevant to this case because

I conclude that the District Court here acted pursuant to its

inherent power and not to any authority conferred by any

statute or rule. The District Court’s action was not

undertaken in supervision of pending litigation—two trials

were already concluded and a potential third trial had not yet

begun. Nor was it exercised according to a rule of procedure

or practice newly announced by an appellate tribunal.

Moreover, its action was not a response to any prosecutorial

misconduct or request from Wright to dismiss the indictment.

There is simply no basis to conclude that the inherent power

that the District Court exercised in this case derived from any

legislative grant.

To the contrary, the specific power under review here

is the power to dismiss an indictment after two mistrials

because of deadlocked juries in each instance. This power

falls within Eash’s first category of power because it is an

inherent power to resolve a case. A court, by its nature, must

be able to dismiss with prejudice actions brought before it,

just as it must have the power to decide cases and enter

45

See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 772 F.3d 752, 763 (3d

Cir. 2014). For a comprehensive discussion of the origins

and uses of supervisory power, see Amy Coney Barrett, The

Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 Colum. L. Rev.

324, 330 (2006).

12

judgments. 46 Such exercises of power are fundamental to the

essence of a court. Were they not, the judicial system simply

could not function. 47

The inherent power to dismiss is “of ancient origin,

having its roots in judgments of nonsuit and non prosequitur

entered at common law,” and so is a power that is part of the

very nature of the judicial institution. 48 It is incidental and

necessary to the fair and efficient operation of the courts. 49

Indeed, “the power to dismiss exists in many situations. For

example, a district court has the inherent power to dismiss sua

sponte for lack of jurisdiction, or under the doctrine of forum

non conveniens.” 50 Because the power to resolve a case by

dismissing an indictment (in a criminal action) or a complaint

(in a civil action) is fundamental to the essence of a court of

justice, it cannot be interfered with. Indeed, as two

commentators have explained, “McNabb, other Supreme

46

We have also noted that our power to remand is a subset of

the inherent power to dismiss a case. See Bradgate Assocs.,

Inc. v. Fellows, Read & Assocs., Inc., 999 F.2d. 745, 750 n.4

(3d Cir. 1993).

47

See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp.,

221 F.3d 362, 363-364 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding a district court

has the inherent power to dismiss a case, sua sponte, if it

determines that the action is frivolous or the court lacks

jurisdiction over the matter).

48

Link, 370 U.S. at 630.

49

See, e.g., Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 564 F.

Supp. 2d 322, 333 (D.N.J. 2008) (citing Derzack v. County of

Allegheny, 173 F.R.D. 400, 411 (W.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d

without op., 118 F.3d 1575 (3d Cir. 1997)).

50

In re Prevot, 59 F.3d 556, 565-66 (6th Cir. 1995).

13

Court cases, and an analysis of several lower court opinions

addressing this precise issue should sufficiently dispel any

notion that the federal courts lack the power to bar repeated

attempts to obtain a conviction” following serial mistrials.51

Thus, the District Court’s action here was well within the

boundaries of its inherent power.

Therefore, the majority’s conclusion that “inherent

authority,” “supervisory power,” and “supervisory authority”

all refer to the same thing (while understandable given the

rampant muddled references that persist) ultimately misses

the point. The power at issue here is the inherent power of

the court to decide a case: a power that is limited by the

boundaries of reason and discretion and is subject to appellate

review for abuse. It is not subject to the power of Congress

or the Executive.

II.

There is no dispute that district courts have the

inherent power to dismiss indictments in at least some

circumstance. The majority nevertheless concludes that the

District Court lacked the power to do so in this case. The

majority reaches that conclusion for three principal reasons,

but none withstands scrutiny.

A.

51

Michael A. Berch & Rebecca White Berch, The Power of

the Judiciary to Dismiss Criminal Charges After Several

Hung Juries: A Proposed Rule to Control Judicial Discretion,

30 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 535, 543 & nn. 42-43 (1997) (collecting

cases).

14

First, the majority agrees with the Government’s

argument that the District Court’s dismissal violated the

Separation of Powers Doctrine. I agree that the District

Court’s dismissal implicates the separation of powers. But its

actions were in furtherance—not in violation—of the

doctrine. The separation of powers doctrine refers to the

balance among the branches of Government which prevents

one branch from disrupting the constitutional functions of

another. 52

Here, the majority concludes that, in dismissing the

indictment after two hung juries, the District Court

encroached on the independence of the Executive because it

prohibited the prosecution from exercising its constitutional

duty to enforce the laws of the United States. Certainly, the

United States Attorney, as a member of the Executive Branch,

has such a responsibility. 53 And, just as certainly, the

decision to prosecute “is soundly within the discretion of the

prosecutor, not the courts.” 54 The Government’s authority

not to prosecute a case is clear as well. 55 But we see no sign

that the District Court did anything to prevent the

Government from fulfilling its duty. To the contrary, the

Government was twice given a full and fair opportunity to

52

See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 699-700 (1997);

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988); Nixon v. Adm’r

of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 442-43 (1977); Baraka v.

McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 201 (3d Cir. 2007).

53

See, e.g., In re Grand Jury, 286 F.3d 153, 163 (3d Cir.

2002).

54

United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 997 (6th Cir. 1999).

55

See, e.g., United States v. Quinn, 728 F.3d 243, 255-56 (3d

Cir. 2013).

15

present its case and makes no claim that the District Court

ever prevented it from doing so. Having had those

opportunities, the Government had no absolute right as a

matter of separation of powers or otherwise to try again. As

two commentators have explained, a district court’s use of its

inherent power to dismiss an indictment after serial mistrials

does not raise “significant separation of powers concerns”

because the nature of that inherent power means that federal

courts “need not automatically defer to a prosecutor’s

decision to retry a defendant” in this situation. 56

The majority nevertheless concludes that prosecutors

have the unimpeded right to try persons for violating federal

law based on an indictment as many times as they wish and

that the separation of powers doctrine prohibits a federal court

from interfering. This position is untenable because it is not a

true reflection of the separation of powers. It is axiomatic

that no one branch of government is completely divorced

from the other two. In reality, “our constitutional system

imposes on the Branches a degree of overlapping

responsibility, a duty of interdependence as well as

independence.” 57 This overlap becomes problematic, of

course, when it results in an encroachment (when an action of

one branch might undermine the independence of another

branch) or an aggrandizement (where one branch seeks

“powers more appropriately diffused among separate

Branches”). 58

56

Berch & Berch, supra note 51, at 544.

57

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989).

58

Id. at 381; see also In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272,

285 (3d Cir. 2015) (Ambro, J., concurring).

16

But recognizing a district court’s right to prohibit a

retrial following serial mistrials does not implicate these

concerns. To the contrary, and putting the shoe on the other

foot, the Government’s position that nothing limits its

opportunity to try and retry a defendant as many times as it

chooses violates the judicial branch’s constitutional mandate

to exercise its judicial power. Just as the filing of an

indictment is an exercise of executive power, the dismissal of

one is an exercise of judicial power. The unlimited serial

prosecutions that the Government advocates for, and that the

majority permits, would limit a court’s authority to dismiss an

indictment to only those instances in which the prosecutor

steps outside the bounds of professional conduct. But our

independence as an institution of government must include an

ability to adjudicate, and thus dismiss with prejudice,

individual cases when a district court, in its discretion, has

concerns about the impact of serial retrials on the institution

and the defendant. We view the prosecution of a defendant

after deadlocked juries as a tipping point in balancing the

separation of powers. As the repeated prosecutions increase,

so too does the judiciary’s power to limit them. As we stated

in Eash, and as we said supra, a court’s exercise of its

inherent power to dismiss an indictment after retrials does not

violate the separation of powers but is grounded in it. 59

B.

Second, and relatedly, the majority concludes that the

District Court’s dismissal was in violation of Fed. R. Crim. P.

31(b)(3), which the majority claims confers on prosecutors

the unlimited discretion to retry defendants following serial

59

See Eash, 757 F.2d at 562.

17

mistrials. Rule 31 does nothing of the kind. Rule 31 provides

in relevant part that “if a jury cannot agree on a verdict on one

or more counts, the court may declare a mistrial on those

counts. The government may retry any defendant on any

counts on which the jury could not agree.” 60 The Supreme

Court adopted this rule in its original form in 1944 as a

“restatement of existing law.” 61 The Supreme Court itself

appears never to have cited Rule 31(b)(3), and neither the few

Courts of Appeals to have done so 62 nor its Advisory

Committee Notes have discussed its history or purpose in any

detail. Arguably, the rule’s reference to the prosecutor’s

general ability to retry a defendant following a mistrial may

be nothing more than a recognition of the longstanding

principle that retrials following mistrials are not prohibited by

the Double Jeopardy Clause, 63 which is not at issue here.

In any event, this rule does not by its terms prohibit

district courts from dismissing indictments following serial

mistrials. District courts have the inherent power to do so as

explained above. A district court’s exercise of that power

could be contrary to Rule 31(b)(3) only if the rule contained

an “express grant of or limitation on” that power. 64 It does

not. The rule does not mandate a retrial after a mistrial. Nor

60

Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(b)(3).

61

Id. advisory committee’s note to 1944 adoption.

62

See United States v. Melendez, 775 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir.

2014); United States v. Warren, 593 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir.

2010); United States v. Fort, 472 F.3d 1106, 1111 n.3 (9th

Cir. 2007); United States v. Gotti, 451 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir.

2006).

63

See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824).

64

Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1892.

18

does it contain any other limitation on the district court’s

power to prohibit one. In fact, the rule does not even mention

that issue. 65 Thus, as the Supreme Court has noted in

addressing other rules of court, “[i]t would require a much

clearer expression of purpose than [this rule] provides for us

to assume that it was intended to abrogate” the district courts’

inherent power. 66 Put simply, when there have been multiple

mistrials and the prosecutor seeks to try the case again, Rule

31(b)(3) does not purport to reduce the role of the district

courts to that of a rubber stamp.

C.

Finally, the majority claims that a district court can

exercise its inherent power to dismiss an indictment only if

there is evidence of willful bad faith or prosecutorial

misconduct on the part of the government and resultant

prejudice to the defendant. It cites to numerous decisions that

it says supports this position. 67 But none of these cases deals

65

The majority claims that Rule 31(b)(3)’s silence on this

issue supports the proposition that district courts lack the

authority to dismiss an indictment following serial mistrials.

But because district courts have the inherent power to do so

as explained above, the question is not whether Rule 31(b)(3)

permits district courts to dismiss an indictment in that

circumstance. The question instead is whether Rule 31(b)(3)

prohibits them from doing so. It does not.

66

Link, 370 U.S. at 631-32.

67

See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250,

254-56, 263 (1988); United States v. Chapman, 524 F.3d

1073, 1087 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Goodson, 204

F.3d 508, 514 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Derrick, 163

19

with the particular circumstance we face here: the decision to

retry a defendant after serial mistrials. 68 In fact, many are

dismissals due to prosecutorial misconduct. The majority’s

reliance on such decisions is misplaced because it ignores the

fact that the dismissal in this case was not punitive in nature;

it was not a sanction for misconduct. 69 As two commentators

have explained, “[a]lthough the inherent power principle has

usually involved cases of misconduct by the parties or a

vindication of statutory principles, the doctrine is not so

limited.” 70 To the contrary, courts may use their inherent

authority to dismiss indictments whenever necessary to

vindicate “principles of fairness to the defendant and the

interests of the public in the effective administration of

justice.” 71

That is just what the District Court did here. The

Government asked the District Court to dismiss without

prejudice “[e]ven if this court were inclined to dismiss the

case.” 72 Yet the Government proffered no additional

F.3d 799, 808 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Tucker, 8 F.3d

673, 674 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc); United States v. Van

Engel, 15 F.3d 623, 631-32 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v.

Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Isgro,

974 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 1992).

68

Derrick does deal with a dismissal of the indictment after

an initial grant of a retrial, but the circumstance differs from

this case because the mistrials were not due to deadlocked

verdicts. See 163 F.3d at 803

69

Cf., e.g., Isgro, 974 F.2d at 1097.

70

Berch & Berch, supra note 51, at 548.

71

Id.

72

Wright, 2017 WL 1179006, at *7.

20

evidence it would present if Wright was re-indicted. It asked

to try the same case again before a third jury, merely hoping

for a different result. The District Court’s dismissal of the

indictment with prejudice was based on the merits, or lack

thereof, of the Government’s request, no more and no less.

Moreover, the dismissal was not, as the majority

contends, a general declaration of unfairness simply because

the government failed to obtain a conviction. 73 Nor was it

merely an attempt to shield the defendant from the anxiety of

a retrial. 74 Reference to Miller and Shepherd misconstrues

not only the circumstance of this case, but also the gravity of

the District Court’s concern. As I discuss next, the District

Court weighed many factors, mindful of the importance of

each, before making its decision. From all of this—even

taking into account the separation of powers and Rule

31(b)(3)—it is evident to me that the District Court correctly

concluded it had the inherent authority to act upon the

prosecutor’s decision to retry this case in the wake of two

mistrials. 75

73

See United States v. Miller, 4 F.3d 792, 795 (9th Cir. 1993).

74

See United States v. Shepherd, 511 F.2d 119, 123 (5th Cir.

1975); see also Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503-04

(1978).

75

Although we conclude that the District Court appropriately

exercised its inherent power as a court of law to dismiss an

indictment, thus placing its actions within Eash’s first

category, the District Court appeared at one point to tether its

dismissal to its “inherent authority to effectuate . . . the

speedy and orderly administration of justice and to ensure

fundamental fairness.” Wright, 2017 WL 1179006, at *2.

These actions are typically associated with the second

21

III.

Before moving to the actual merits of the District

Court’s decision, a word of caution is in order. Just because a

court has inherent power to dismiss an indictment after a

retrial does not mean it should always be exercised. 76 My

dissenting opinion today should not be interpreted as an

endorsement of unchecked and ungrounded judicial power.

Nor should it be interpreted as permitting district courts in

this Circuit to dismiss indictments without a significant basis

for doing so. Moreover, nothing in this opinion should be

read as limiting reprosecution to two trials. Cases no doubt

exist where a third or fourth trial on the same indictment may

be appropriate where the evidence so indicates. It is simply

my conclusion that, in some cases, and in the proper exercise

of its discretion, a district court has the inherent power to

prohibit continued re-prosecution by dismissing an

indictment.

IV.

This is such a case. The District Court here rightly

proceeded with the Government’s request for another trial

with deliberate caution. Recognizing the lack of guidance

classification of Eash’s powers. See Eash, 757 F.2d at 562-

563. Nonetheless, it invoked the inherent power of the court

and dismissed the case and it is on this basis that I conclude

the District Court did not reach the boundaries of its power.

76

See Lopez v. United States 373 U.S. 427, 440 (1963); see

also Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44 (“Because of their very

potency and discretion, inherent powers must be exercised

with restraint and discretion.”).

22

from this Court, the District Court turned to a decision of the

Supreme Court of New Jersey. In State v. Abbati, 77 that court

listed several factors a trial court should consider before

dismissing an indictment after several hung juries. These

factors are valid inquiries and include

• the number of previous mistrials and the

outcome of the juries’ deliberations, as far as

can be determined;

• the character or nature of the previous trials,

considering their length, complexity of issues,

and similarities in evidence;

• the probability that any subsequent trial will be

much different from the previous ones;

• the relative strength of the party’s case, as

determined by the trial court;

• the conduct of counsel during the previous

trials. 78

In considering these factors, a district court must also accord

appropriate weight to the Government’s decision to continue

prosecution, giving deliberate consideration to the reasons for

that choice. 79

Other considerations might include the seriousness of

the crimes charged, the public’s interest in the effective

resolution of criminal charges, and the criminal defendant’s

circumstances, including the impact that continued

prosecution might have on him or her and the potential for

77

493 A.2d 513.

78

Id. at 521-22.

79

See id.

23

unfairness or unnecessary hardship. 80 The factors just

outlined are not an exhaustive list and district courts could

consider other things that are reasonably useful in answering

whether further prosecutions after deadlocked juries should

be permitted. Moreover, all of these elements of inquiry

enable the court to assess the impact that a serial retrial has on

the integrity of the judiciary as an institution.

These avenues of inquiry make sense to me. Take

differences in evidence, for example. If the evidence would

be different at a retrial, then there seems little chance that

continued prosecution should be curtailed. If, on the other

hand, there would be no substantial difference in evidence,

concern about re-prosecution is appropriate. So too the

number of deadlocked juries is an important consideration.

Continued prosecution after two, three, or even four

deadlocked juries could unbalance the scale. By inquiring

into the seriousness of the charges, a district court could

compare the crime being prosecuted to other cases when a

court dismissed an indictment after deadlocked juries. In

other words, a district court must make sufficient findings and

establish a sufficient record supporting its decision, thus

enabling a court of appeals to accurately assess whether the

district court abused its discretion or not. That is what the

District Court did here.

I see no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s

exercise of its inherent powers. The District Court’s ruling

was not arbitrary and instead was based on a thorough,

careful, and balanced consideration of the above factors. The

District Court first acknowledged the weight of its actions

80

See id.

24

within our constitutional scheme. It then found that the

evidence suggested that the deadlock was not the result of a

lone holdout. As to the character of the preceding trials, the

District Court noted the Government’s position that this was a

“simple” case. It also stated that both previous trials were

“virtual duplicates” and that counsel on both sides was the

same for both prosecutions. The District Court further

observed the lack of any allegation of jury nullification or

bias. Instead, it found that “there is every indication that the

two juries engaged in deliberations in good faith, and, despite

their best efforts, were unable to reach a verdict.”

The District Court also considered the strength of the

parties’ respective cases and determined that its opinion on

this factor was irrelevant, given that two separate juries had

concluded that the Government failed to meet its burden of

proof. It commended the professionalism and hence the

effectiveness of counsel on all sides, which it weighted as

favoring disallowing any further prosecution. The District

Court specifically considered the seriousness of the crime

charged, and it noted that other courts had dismissed

indictments when the charges were far graver. 81 Lastly, the

District Court thoroughly balanced the Government’s

authority to prosecute against the effect of continued

prosecution on Wright. Recognizing that Wright has been on

bond since July of 2014, and on home detention for nearly

two years, the District Court concluded that this inquiry

tipped in his favor.

81

Wright, 2017 WL 1179006, at *6 (citing United States v.

Ingram, 412 F. Supp. 384, 385 (D.D.C. 1976); State v.

Moriwake, 647 P.2d 705, 708 (Haw. 1982); Abbati, 493 A.2d

at 517; and State v. Witt, 572 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1978)).

25

V.

In conclusion, I see no abuse of discretion in the

District Court’s careful and thorough balancing of relevant

factors, a balancing which led it to invoke its inherent power

and to dismiss the Government’s indictment of Wright. For

all of these reasons, I respectfully dissent from my esteemed

colleagues in the majority. I would affirm.

26