Opinion

Franklin Am. Mortg. Co. v. Univ. Nat'l Bank of Lawrence

  • 910 F.3d 270
Court
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Filed
Dec 6, 2018
Status
Published
On the bench
Merritt, Cook, Larsen
Cited by
45 cases
Authority
More cited than 6.5%

affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment based upon failure to “directly address” 1 Johnson repeats similar, canned responses throughout Defendants’ statement of undisputed facts. (See Doc. No. 140 ¶¶ 7–8, 12, 17–18, 23, 26–29, 32, 39–43, 45–61, 64, 66–72, 74–77, 85– 88, 89–93, 98–99, 102–105, 108–114, 117–121, 127–131, 135–138, 140–41, 147–51, 154–57, 162–64, 167–79, 194–96, 198–99, 205–15, 217, 220, 222–25, 227, 313–14). factual assertions

How later courts described this case

  • affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment based upon failure to “directly address” 1 Johnson repeats similar, canned responses throughout Defendants’ statement of undisputed facts. (See Doc. No. 140 ¶¶ 7–8, 12, 17–18, 23, 26–29, 32, 39–43, 45–61, 64, 66–72, 74–77, 85– 88, 89–93, 98–99, 102–105, 108–114, 117–121, 127–131, 135–138, 140–41, 147–51, 154–57, 162–64, 167–79, 194–96, 198–99, 205–15, 217, 220, 222–25, 227, 313–14). factual assertions
  • observing that where the contract language is clear and unambiguous, the literal meaning controls the outcome of the dispute because it is the best indicator of the parties' intent under Tennessee law
  • “We review denials of motions to strike under an abuse of discretion standard.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 18a0263p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

FRANKLIN AMERICAN MORTGAGE COMPANY, ┐

Plaintiff-Appellee, │

│

> No. 18-5035

v. │

│

│

THE UNIVERSITY NATIONAL BANK OF LAWRENCE, │

Defendant-Appellant. │

┘

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.

No. 3:13-cv-01109—Bernard A. Friedman, District Judge.

Argued: October 18, 2018

Decided and Filed: December 6, 2018

Before: MERRITT, COOK, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Anthony V. Narula, AXS LAW GROUP, PLLC, Miami, Florida, for Appellant.

Charles M. Cain, II, CAIN LAW FIRM, Franklin, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:

Anthony V. Narula, AXS LAW GROUP, PLLC, Miami, Florida, for Appellant. Charles M.

Cain, II, CAIN LAW FIRM, Franklin, Tennessee, for Appellee.

LARSEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which COOK and MERRITT, JJ.,

joined. MERRITT, J. (pg. 17), delivered a separate concurring opinion.

No. 18-5035 Franklin Am. Mort. Co. v. Univ. Nat’l Bank Page 2

_________________

OPINION

_________________

LARSEN, Circuit Judge. Franklin American Mortgage Company (FAMC) purchased

two loans from the University National Bank of Lawrence (UNB) and promptly resold them to

Wells Fargo. Years later, Wells Fargo discovered defects in UNB’s underwriting and demanded

that FAMC repurchase the loans or indemnify Wells Fargo for its losses. FAMC similarly

demanded that UNB indemnify FAMC for its payments to Wells Fargo in accordance with their

agreement. UNB refused. The district court granted summary judgment to FAMC on its breach

of contract claims against UNB. We now AFFIRM that judgment.

I.

FAMC and UNB entered into a Correspondent Loan Purchase Agreement (Agreement) in

2005, by which FAMC agreed to purchase mortgage loans from UNB. In exchange, UNB made

certain representations and warranties about the loans it would sell, including that “[t]here

[would be] no fact or circumstance with respect to the Mortgage Loan that would entitle” a

subsequent purchaser “to demand repurchase of a Mortgage Loan” from FAMC. UNB also

agreed to repurchase any mortgage loans if one of its representations or warranties turned out to

be false or if a subsequent buyer required that FAMC repurchase the mortgage loan.

Additionally, UNB promised to indemnify FAMC for “any and all losses” that FAMC incurred

due to “[a]ny misrepresentation” or breach “of any of the . . . representations, warranties, or

obligations under this Agreement” by UNB.

The parties agreed that Tennessee law would govern the Agreement. FAMC and UNB

later modified the original Agreement with a Delegated Underwriting Agreement (Modification)

in which UNB agreed to perform the underwriting for loans it sold to FAMC.

At issue here are two loans UNB sold to FAMC—one sold in 2006 (the “Salvino Loan”)

and one sold in 2007 (the “Turner Loan”). Per the parties’ arrangement, UNB underwrote both

loans. FAMC promptly resold both to Wells Fargo. In February and March 2010, Wells Fargo

notified FAMC that it had identified defects in the underwriting for both loans, including missing

No. 18-5035 Franklin Am. Mort. Co. v. Univ. Nat’l Bank Page 3

documents and income miscalculations. After internal appeals in which FAMC disputed some of

the defects and tried to resolve others, Wells Fargo demanded that FAMC repurchase the Salvino

Loan and indemnify Wells Fargo for its losses arising from the Turner Loan. 1 FAMC did so in

November 2010 (Salvino Loan) and August 2011 (Turner Loan), paying Wells Fargo a total of

$231,225.33 for the two loans.

After satisfying its repurchase and indemnification obligations to Wells Fargo, FAMC

invoked the Agreement to demand repurchase and indemnification from UNB. UNB refused to

repurchase the Salvino Loan or indemnify FAMC for either. To cut its losses, FAMC resold the

Salvino Loan to a third party for $42,278.48.

In 2013, FAMC filed a complaint alleging that UNB’s refusal to repurchase or indemnify

had breached their Agreement. FAMC moved for summary judgment on its claims; UNB made

a cross-motion for summary judgment on several affirmative defenses, including its claim that

the statute of limitations had run. The district court granted summary judgment to FAMC,

denied it to UNB, and awarded FAMC $188,858.71 in damages. UNB timely appealed.

II.

The primary issue in this appeal is whether the district court properly denied summary

judgment to UNB on its statute of limitations defense (and, relatedly, whether the district court

properly granted summary judgment to FAMC despite that defense). We review a district

court’s summary judgment decision de novo, applying the same standards the district court used.

Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 568 (6th Cir. 2013). In other words,

summary judgment is warranted only if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and

“the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Villegas, 709 F.3d

at 568. In evaluating the evidence presented by the parties, we “view[] the facts and all

inferences to be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom

summary judgment was entered.” Villegas, 709 F.3d at 568.

1Wells Fargo demanded indemnity, rather than repurchase, because the Turner Loan had already been

foreclosed or sold short by the time the demand was made.

No. 18-5035 Franklin Am. Mort. Co. v. Univ. Nat’l Bank Page 4

UNB argues that FAMC’s breach of contract claims are time-barred because they accrued

in 2006 and 2007, when FAMC purchased the loans from UNB. The claims accrued at this time,

says UNB, because UNB made the allegedly false representations and warranties at the time of

purchase. UNB further argues that the Agreement’s repurchase and indemnification provisions

did not create any independent obligations accruing after the purchase date; these provisions

instead simply provided alternative remedies for any breach of warranty. In support of its view,

UNB points to a body of cases addressing this precise issue—mortgage repurchase provisions—

under New York law. See, e.g., ACE Sec. Corp. v. DB Structured Prods., Inc., 36 N.E.3d 623,

626–31 (N.Y. 2015) (holding that claims for breach of contract accrued when the

misrepresentations were made—the original purchase date—rather than on the date the seller

refused to repurchase). UNB would have us apply the same reasoning under Tennessee law and

hold that the causes of action here accrued in 2006 and 2007, when FAMC purchased the

defective Salvino and Turner loans. This would mean that Kansas’ five-year statute of

limitations barred FAMC’s 2013 complaint.2

FAMC argues in response that the causes of action accrued in 2010 and 2011, rather than

in 2006 and 2007. FAMC reminds us that the New York cases are inapplicable to contracts

governed by Tennessee law, and points to cases resolving related issues differently under

Delaware, Missouri, and Minnesota law. See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. WMC Mortg., LLC,

50 Misc.3d 229, 235 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (noting that Delaware and Minnesota courts have

declined to follow New York’s approach to accrual-delaying provisions), aff’d as modified,

56 N.Y.S.3d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017); Citimortgage, Inc. v. Chi. Bancorp, Inc., No. 4:14-cv-

01278, 2016 WL 3346566, at *7–8 (E.D. Mo. June 16, 2016) (holding that the statute of

limitations runs from the date of the repurchase demand), vacated in part, 2016 WL 3958594

(E.D. Mo. July 22, 2016). FAMC concedes that Tennessee has not addressed this precise

2Although Tennessee law applies to the Agreement generally and has a longer six-year statute of

limitations, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-109(a), UNB argues that the Kansas statute of limitations, Kan. Stat. Ann.

§ 60-511, applies here because of Tennessee’s borrowing statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-112. Under the

borrowing statute, a second state’s statute of limitations applies (rather than Tennessee’s) if: (1) the defendant was a

resident of the second state when the cause of action accrued; (2) the cause of action is barred by the second state’s

limitations period; and (3) the cause of action accrued in the second state. Id.; see McNew v. People’s Bank of

Ewing, 999 F.2d 540, at *4 (6th Cir. 1993) (table). According to UNB, all three elements were satisfied here and

Kansas’ shorter statute of limitations applies.

No. 18-5035 Franklin Am. Mort. Co. v. Univ. Nat’l Bank Page 5

question. Nevertheless, FAMC argues that under Tennessee law the repurchase and

indemnification provisions created independent contractual obligations. Therefore, FAMC

concludes, the causes of action for breach did not accrue until 2010 and 2011, when FAMC

incurred its losses, and the 2013 complaint is timely regardless of whether the Tennessee or

Kansas statute of limitations applies.

We are not convinced that Tennessee law would treat repurchase provisions any

differently than New York law. FAMC has not identified any substantive differences between

Tennessee and New York contract law that would lead to the conclusion that ACE Securities’

reasoning should not apply to the repurchase provisions of the contract. But we affirm the result

below nonetheless because FAMC also alleged breaches of the Agreement’s indemnification

provision, which falls squarely into ACE Securities’ exception for contractual agreements that

“undertake a separate obligation, the breach of which does not arise until some future date.”

36 N.E.3d at 628.

In ACE Securities, the buyer of numerous mortgage loans demanded that the seller

repurchase defective loans, as they had agreed. Id. at 626. When the seller refused, the buyer

sued for damages. Id. at 626–27. The New York Court of Appeals agreed with the seller’s

statute of limitations argument, holding that the breach of contract claims accrued when the

misrepresentations were made—the original purchase date. Id. at 627–30. The court observed

that “parties may contractually agree to undertake a separate obligation, the breach of which does

not arise until some future date,” but determined that the repurchase provision at issue there did

not create such an obligation. Id. at 628. Rather, the repurchase clause was only a remedial

provision. “The cure or repurchase obligation is an alternative remedy, or recourse, for the

[buyer], but the underlying act the [buyer] complains of is the same: the quality of the loans and

their conformity with the representations and warranties.” Id. at 630 (emphasis in original).

The repurchase provision in this Agreement is similar in all material respects to the one

analyzed in ACE Securities. Therefore, FAMC cannot assert a claim for breach of the

repurchase protocol separate from the alleged breaches of the representations and warranties, and

any such claim would have accrued on the date those representations and warranties were

made—at purchase, in 2006 and 2007. Id. at 629. That conclusion does not end our inquiry,

No. 18-5035 Franklin Am. Mort. Co. v. Univ. Nat’l Bank Page 6

however, because FAMC also alleged breaches of the Agreement’s indemnification provision.

Pursuant to the indemnification provision, UNB agreed that it would “indemnify [FAMC]

and . . . hold [FAMC], it[s] officers, directors, and shareholders harmless from and against any

and all losses, liabilities, penalties, damages, or other harm or injury” that FAMC might suffer

because of UNB’s error or misconduct. The Agreement also underscores the independent and

distinct nature of the indemnification obligation, stating the obligation exists “[i]n addition to the

repurchase obligation of [UNB] and all other rights and remedies available to [FAMC]” and

“shall survive any termination of the Agreement.” That distinguishes the indemnification

provision here from the repurchase provision in ACE Securities, which the court said “could not

reasonably be viewed as a distinct promise of future performance,” in part because “nothing in

the contract specified that the cure or repurchase obligation would continue for the life of the

loans.” Id. Here, by contrast, the Agreement on its face demonstrates that FAMC and UNB

intended to “shift[] the entire burden of loss or responsibility” to UNB, even after the rest of the

Agreement no longer had effect. Triangle Am. Homes v. Harrison, No. E2009-01954, 2011 WL

4863713, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2011) (quoting Winter v. Smith, 914 S.W.2d 527, 542

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)).

The common law of indemnification lends support to our determination that the

indemnification provision here created “a separate obligation, the breach of which does not arise

until some future date.” ACE Sec., 36 N.E.3d at 628. Under well-established common law

principles, “the liability of the indemnitor does not accrue until the indemnitee has actually paid

an obligation for which the indemnitee has been found liable.” Long v. McAllister-Long,

221 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006); Stiver Mktg., Inc. v. Performance Bus. Forms, Inc., No.

01-A-019108CH00276, 1991 WL 254564, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1991) (“Generally, the

right to sue for indemnity for damages . . . accrues only when payment has been legally made by

the indemnitee. Thus, the right does not arise until the indemnitee has actually sustained or

suffered loss; either through payment, settlement, or through the injured party’s obtaining an

enforceable judgment.” (quotation marks omitted)). That is true even when the indemnity

obligation arises from a contractual provision. Long, 221 S.W.3d at 11 (stating that the above

accrual rule applies “[i]n the context of an agreement to indemnify against loss”); Raleigh

Commons, Inc. v. SWH, LLC, No. W2011-01298, 2013 WL 3329016, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. June

No. 18-5035 Franklin Am. Mort. Co. v. Univ. Nat’l Bank Page 7

28, 2013) (stating that a payment to a third party “gave rise to an immediate right to

indemnification” under the contract at issue).3 We conclude that the text of this indemnification

provision indicates an intention to invoke the longstanding common law principles of

indemnification, including its accrual rules. It is true, as UNB argues, that there are “separate

substantive cause[s] of action” for indemnification. See Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc. v.

Universal Am. Mortg. Co., LLC, 660 F. App’x 554, 567 (10th Cir. 2016). That is exactly why

the Agreement’s indemnification provisions created a distinct obligation—the Agreement

invoked those “separate substantive” principles to create a separate and independent contractual

obligation, which would accrue at the time that FAMC suffered a loss.

UNB argues that even if we characterize the claims as indemnification claims, the claims

still would have accrued on the date FAMC purchased the loans. But that takes ACE Securities

too far. Even under New York law, ACE Securities’ accrual rule would not apply to

indemnification provisions. The New York cases themselves do not discuss indemnification

claims; the plaintiffs there had not asserted any. Nor could they have done so. The New York

plaintiffs were trusts that had purchased and then pooled thousands of mortgage loans in order to

sell residential mortgage-backed securities. When the mortgage borrowers defaulted or the trusts

themselves discovered defects, the trusts sought repurchase to cut their losses. But since the

trusts had not re-sold the actual loans to any third parties, there would have been no viable

indemnification claims—just claims for breaches of the mortgages’ warranties and

representations. See, e.g., ACE Sec., 36 N.E.3d at 624–28 (no mention of indemnification);

Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Quicken Loans Inc., 810 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2015) (same); U.S.

Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Dexia Real Estate Capital Markets, 643 F. App’x 48 (2d Cir. 2016) (same);

3UNB supports its argument that any indemnification claims accrued immediately at purchase by pointing

to deposition testimony from FAMC’s corporate representative, admitting that the loans were defective at the time

of purchase. Therefore, UNB says, FAMC could have immediately sought indemnification from UNB and any

cause of action must have accrued at that time. But that is not true. Tennessee law dictates that a right to

contractual indemnification would arise only when FAMC “actually sustained or suffered loss; either through

payment, settlement, or through the injured party’s obtaining an enforceable judgment.” Stiver, 1991 WL 254564, at

*4 (quotation marks omitted). While the loans may have been defective at the time of purchase (and less valuable

generally), FAMC had not yet been required to make any payments to any third parties, and thus had not incurred

any “actual[] . . . loss,” id., that would trigger UNB’s contractual indemnification obligation. In fact, as the district

court noted, FAMC made a profit off the two loans when it bought and then immediately resold them to Wells

Fargo. So the deposition testimony does not alter our analysis.

No. 18-5035 Franklin Am. Mort. Co. v. Univ. Nat’l Bank Page 8

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 643 F. App’x 44 (2d Cir. 2016) (same);

Lehman XS Tr., Series 2006-4N v. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 643 F. App’x 14 (2d Cir.

2016) (same). Subsequent New York cases confirm our deduction.

For example, in Hometrust Mortgage Company v. Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., the

federal court distinguished ACE Securities, stating that “[i]t is black letter law in New York that

indemnification claims do not accrue until the liability to a third-party is fixed, or payment is

made—in this case when LBHI settled with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 2014.” Nos. 15-

CV-4060, 15-CV-4061, 2015 WL 5674899, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2015) (citing McDermott

v. City of N.Y., 406 N.E.2d 460, 462 (N.Y. 1980)). The district court rejected the argument that

ACE Securities applied to indemnification accrual, explaining that ACE Securities “involved

claims for the repurchase of loans, not indemnification for liability to third parties.” Id. at *3;

see also Lehman XS Tr. v. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., Nos. 12-cv-7935, 12-cv-7942, 12-

cv-7943, 2017 WL 1293773, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2017) (distinguishing between

repurchase claims and claims for indemnification arising from payments to a third party). ACE

Securities does not alter indemnification principles, even under New York law.

UNB also contends that we cannot apply the indemnification accrual rule because FAMC

pleaded breach of contract claims, not indemnification claims. UNB is right that FAMC’s

complaint titles its causes of action “Count One – Breach of Contract – Salvino Loan” and

“Count Two – Breach of Contract – Turner Loan.” But FAMC’s amended complaint also

alleges that the Agreement included a contractual indemnification obligation; that Wells Fargo

demanded payment from FAMC as a result of UNB’s errors; and that FAMC suffered losses

when it made those payments to Wells Fargo. The causes of action themselves plainly state that

“UNB has breached its contractual obligations to indemnify FAMC for its losses” arising from

the two loans. And “[i]n Tennessee, the applicable statute of limitations is determined by the

gravamen of the complaint rather than a plaintiff’s designation of a claim.” Nissan N. Am., Inc.

v. Schrader Elecs., Ltd., No. 3:13-CV-0180, 2013 WL 3778729, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. July 18,

2013) (citing Pera v. Kroger, 674 S.W.2d 715, 719 (Tenn. 1984)). Because we conclude that the

indemnification provision created “a separate obligation,” we also conclude that the parties

agreed that the breach of this obligation would “not arise until some future date.” ACE Sec.,

No. 18-5035 Franklin Am. Mort. Co. v. Univ. Nat’l Bank Page 9

36 N.E.3d at 628. This conclusion necessarily follows from the Agreement itself; UNB agreed

to indemnify FAMC for “any and all losses, liabilities, penalties, damages, or other harm or

injury that [FAMC] may incur.” This would be meaningless unless the parties also agreed that

the claim for breach would arise only at the future date when FAMC actually suffered those

losses.

The Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. v. Universal American

Mortgage Company, LLC does not change our conclusion. There, the court declined to

characterize causes of action labeled “breach of contract” as indemnification claims. Lehman

Bros., 660 F. App’x at 566–68. But the point in Lehman Brothers was not that the plaintiffs had

labeled their causes of action “breach of contract.” The insurmountable issue there was that

despite filing five amended complaints, the Lehman Brothers plaintiffs never alleged “any

payment by Lehman Holdings to a third party,” which is an essential part of an indemnification

claim. Id. at 567–68. The Tenth Circuit saw that the plaintiffs were not pursuing

indemnification—reimbursement for payments to third parties—but rather were seeking run-of-

the-mill contract damages for injuries the defendants’ breaches had caused them. Id. at 567–68.4

Here, on the other hand, FAMC’s complaint on its face shows that FAMC is pursuing

reimbursement for the damages it suffered when it paid Wells Fargo for the defective loans. It

4The Tenth Circuit also based its conclusion in part on what seems to us to be a mistaken reading of New

York law. Lehman Brothers quotes a New York Appellate Division case, City of New York v. Lead Industries

Association, Inc., 644 N.Y.S.2d 919 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (per curiam), for the proposition that an indemnity claim

is only viable when “the plaintiff alleges that the defendant owed a duty to a third party rather than to the plaintiff

itself.” 660 F. App’x at 568 (citing Lead Indus. Ass’n, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 923–24). But indemnity obligations may be

either express (i.e., contractual) or implied for equitable reasons. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Torts:

Apportionment Liab. § 22 (Am. Law Inst. 2000); Med. Protective Co. v. Bolick, No. 2:15-CV-322, 2016 WL

5172282, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 19, 2016) (“Under Tennessee law, an obligation to indemnify may arise expressly

by contract between the parties or impliedly from the parties’ relationship.” (citing Houseboating Corp. of Am. v.

Marshall, 553 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tenn. 1977))); Peoples’ Democratic Republic of Yemen v. Goodpasture, Inc., 782

F.2d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 1986) (discussing the circumstances under which New York law implies indemnification

obligations in the absence of an express agreement).

Lead Industries Association discussed duties to third parties in the context of deciding whether the court should

imply an equitable indemnification obligation—specifically, whether lead manufacturers should reimburse New

York City for the costs incurred in removing lead paint from public buildings. The reasoning in Yemen on which

Lehman Brothers relies is inapplicable to contractual indemnification for the same reasons; Yemen discussed

whether an implied right to indemnification was appropriate where “there is no express agreement creating a right to

indemnification.” 782 F.2d at 351. We do not read these cases to alter the longstanding principle that “[a] party is

entitled to contractual indemnification when the intention to indemnify” is clear from an agreement. Centennial

Contractors Enters. v. E. N.Y. Renovation Corp., 79 A.D.3d 690, 692 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (quotation omitted).

No. 18-5035 Franklin Am. Mort. Co. v. Univ. Nat’l Bank Page 10

argued indemnification to the district court; indeed, the district court’s summary judgment order

relied on FAMC’s evidence that UNB had failed to fulfill its express indemnity obligation. We

therefore conclude that FAMC properly pleaded contractual indemnity claims for statute of

limitations (and accrual) purposes.

As its last line of defense, UNB asserts that FAMC has no indemnification claims

because the Modification executed by the parties (in which UNB agreed to underwrite loans it

sold to FAMC) limited the remedies available to FAMC. UNB points to language in the

Modification stating that “[UNB] shall repurchase any loan purchased by [FAMC] hereunder,

subject to the terms of” the Agreement’s repurchase provision. UNB would have us believe that

this language amended the original Agreement to eliminate all remedies except repurchase

because otherwise the language would merely restate a preexisting obligation and would be

superfluous.

We disagree. For one thing, we concluded above that the indemnification provision is

not a mere remedial provision; it creates a separate, distinct obligation. Even so, the

Modification did not abrogate the Agreement’s indemnification provision. The Modification

stated that it would “supplement and[,] to the extent inconsistent, modify” the original

Agreement. It made clear that the original Agreement “shall remain in full force and effect as

supplemented and modified hereby.” Nothing in the Modification, including the provision

highlighted by UNB, indicates any intention to limit FAMC’s remedies to repurchase alone.

And the “shall repurchase” language is not inconsistent with the Agreement’s indemnification

obligations, which were explicitly “[i]n addition to the repurchase obligation . . . and any and all

other rights and remedies available.” We acknowledge that this Modification language thus

merely restates UNB’s preexisting repurchase obligation. But there is no general prohibition

against redundant contract language. See TMW Enters., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 619 F.3d 574, 577–

78 (6th Cir. 2010). “[T]he rule that courts should interpret contracts to avoid superfluous words

is a tool for dealing with ambiguity, not a tool for creating ambiguity in the first place.” Gallo v.

Moen Inc., 813 F.3d 265, 273 (6th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original) (quotation marks omitted).

The Modification’s “shall repurchase” language is not ambiguous, and we decline to create an

No. 18-5035 Franklin Am. Mort. Co. v. Univ. Nat’l Bank Page 11

ambiguity. We conclude, therefore, that the Modification did not eliminate the Agreement’s

indemnification obligations.

The district court correctly concluded that FAMC’s claims as to the Salvino and Turner

Loans accrued in 2010 and 2011, respectively. The 2013 complaint was, therefore, filed well

within the limitations period, regardless of whether Kansas’s five-year or Tennessee’s six-year

limitations period applies. Accordingly, we need not address UNB’s arguments regarding

repurchase provisions or decide whether Tennessee law recognizes a discovery rule that would

toll the limitations period for breach of contract actions.

III.

Having resolved UNB’s most compelling argument in FAMC’s favor, we can now easily

resolve the rest.

A.

UNB first asserts that FAMC produced insufficient evidence of breach and causation for

summary judgment. We disagree. In Tennessee, a “plaintiff alleging breach of contract must

prove: (1) the existence of an enforceable contract, (2) non-performance amounting to a breach

of the contract, and (3) damages caused by the breached contract.” Nw. Tenn. Motorsports Park,

LLC v. Tenn. Asphalt Co., 410 S.W.3d 810, 816–17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (quotation marks

omitted). A party moving for summary judgment must marshal the evidence in the record to

“show[] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [party] is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Both sides admitted the existence of an enforceable contract. FAMC pointed to evidence

in the record sufficient to show it suffered losses as a result of misrepresentations and

miscalculations made by UNB in its underwriting. FAMC’s evidence demonstrated that based

on these defects, Wells Fargo demanded and received payment from FAMC. Finally, FAMC

showed that UNB breached the Agreement by failing to indemnify FAMC for its losses and

presented evidence of the exact amount of the damages caused.

No. 18-5035 Franklin Am. Mort. Co. v. Univ. Nat’l Bank Page 12

With this evidence, FAMC “met its burden of raising sufficient facts to entitle its motion

to be granted as a matter of law under Rule 56(c).” Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d

985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007). It then fell to UNB “to direct the court’s attention to those specific

portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact.” Id.

(quoting In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 665 (6th Cir. 2001)). But UNB’s response to FAMC’s

motion for summary judgment did not directly address the evidence presented in FAMC’s

motion. Rather, UNB focused mainly on the same affirmative defenses and other ultimately

unpersuasive arguments on which its appellate brief focused. Therefore, the district court

correctly granted summary judgment to FAMC on the first and second elements of both causes

of action (the existence of an enforceable contract, and breach). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (“If a

party . . . fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the

court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.”).

UNB next argues that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether there

actually were “material misrepresentations” in the loan documents, saying that “the parties

dispute whether the Salvinos and the Turners made material misrepresentations on their loan

applications.” UNB speculates that both loans might have been approved by the loan

underwriting program anyway, even if there were no misrepresentations, so any breach was not

material. According to UNB, to prove the misrepresentations, FAMC needed to

“present . . . evidence to contradict the borrowers’ certifications under penalty of perjury that the

information in their loan applications were true and correct.” But this argument misses the mark

entirely.

The relevant issue is not whether the Salvinos and Turners committed fraud, but whether

the underwriting measured up to the standard required by the parties’ agreements. FAMC

presented more than enough evidence to show that the underwriting performed by UNB was

deficient; the incomes had been miscalculated, and documents required to verify the

homeowners’ incomes were missing. This evidence directly contradicts UNB’s contractual

representation that “no fact or circumstance with respect to the Mortgage Loan” existed “that

would entitle” a subsequent purchaser “to demand repurchase of a Mortgage Loan.” And

whether or not the loans at issue “would still . . . have qualified for approval” absent these

No. 18-5035 Franklin Am. Mort. Co. v. Univ. Nat’l Bank Page 13

defects is beside the point. There were defects, and those defects entitled Wells Fargo to demand

payment from FAMC. Pursuant to the Agreement, UNB had an obligation to indemnify FAMC

for these payments. Furthermore, FAMC presented evidence (never addressed by UNB) to show

that the Turner Loan’s mortgage insurance had been rescinded, in breach of UNB’s warranty that

it had (and would continue to have) such insurance.

Calling the alleged defects “insignificant technicalities,” UNB asserts that the Agreement

“does not impose strict liability on UNB,” but “rather a defect must be material to rise to the

level of triggering an actionable claim.” But we search in vain for any contractual language that

would support UNB’s position. In some portions of the Agreement, the parties did use the word

“material” to qualify their obligations. For example, the Agreement required repurchase if “[a]

post-closing quality control review” revealed “any material fraud or misrepresentation.” There

was no such limitation in the indemnification provision. Rather, UNB broadly agreed to

indemnify FAMC for “any and all losses . . . arising out of . . . [a]ny misrepresentation” by UNB

or “[a]ny breach” of UNB’s “representations, warranties, or obligations under this Agreement.”

We cannot infer a materiality requirement at odds with the indemnification provision’s text. See

Dick Broad. Co., Inc. of Tenn. v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc., 395 S.W.3d 653, 659 (Tenn. 2013) (“The

literal meaning of the contract language controls if the language is clear and unambiguous.”).

Finally, UNB failed to present evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact about

whether Wells Fargo demanded repurchase because of the defects. UNB pointed to testimony

from FAMC’s corporate representative, for example, that because of the economic climate of the

time, “not every instance of a default or delinquency with regard to these loans necessarily

flowed from some poor quality underwriting.” But that evidence does not show that something

besides the loan defects caused Wells Fargo’s repurchase and indemnification demands, and is

insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. See, e.g., Wilson v. Cleveland Clinic

Found., 579 F. App’x 392, 403 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Evidence that is merely colorable or not

significantly probative is not sufficient . . . .”). Similarly, UNB claims that the

misrepresentations did not actually cause any damages or trigger the indemnity obligations

because FAMC simply complied with Wells Fargo’s demands, ostensibly in order to preserve

goodwill with its largest purchaser. But UNB failed to point to any concrete evidence to show

No. 18-5035 Franklin Am. Mort. Co. v. Univ. Nat’l Bank Page 14

that this is true generally, and likewise has not shown that this case’s particular repurchase and

indemnity demands were paid merely out of obeisance to Wells Fargo. To the contrary, FAMC

presented evidence showing that it appealed the demands within Wells Fargo’s internal appeals

process. In sum, summary judgment on both the breach and causation issues was appropriate.5

B.

Next, UNB argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact over whether FAMC

properly mitigated its damages when, following UNB’s refusal to repurchase the Salvino Loan,

FAMC resold the loan at a significant discount.6 The problem for UNB is that failure to mitigate

damages is an affirmative defense. Aqua-Chem, Inc. v. D&H Mach. Serv., Inc., No. E2015-

01818-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 6078566, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2016). UNB thus bears

the burden of presenting evidence sufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether FAMC’s mitigation efforts were reasonable. See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. E.L. Bailey

& Co., Inc., 841 F.3d 439, 445 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[A]s an affirmative defense, [Defendants] bore

the burden of pleading and substantiating the issue to place it in dispute.” (quotation marks

5UNB also argues that it cannot be required to indemnify FAMC for Salvino Loan losses because Wells

Fargo, after purchasing the Salvino Loan from FAMC, executed a “Loan Modification Agreement” with the

borrowers. According to UNB, this created a new loan not subject to the original Agreement between UNB and

FAMC. Not so. The document calls itself a “Loan Modification Agreement,” and explicitly states that “except as

otherwise specifically stated in this Agreement, the original Note and Mortgage”—the Salvino Loan—“will remain

unchanged.” UNB points out that FAMC’s corporate representative called the as-modified Salvino Loan a “new,

different loan,” but that is irrelevant to our analysis. Where the contract language “is clear and unambiguous, the

literal meaning controls the outcome of the dispute” because it is the best indicator of the parties’ intent. Maggart v.

Almany Realtors, Inc., 259 S.W.3d 700, 703–04 (Tenn. 2008). FAMC was not a party to the “Loan Modification

Agreement” between Wells Fargo and the Salvinos, and so the FAMC corporate representative’s opinion is

immaterial. See Riverside Surgery Ctr., LLC v. Methodist Health Sys., Inc., 182 S.W.3d 805, 811 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2005) (stating that contract interpretation seeks to “determin[e] the intent of the contracting parties”). We conclude,

based on the contractual language, that the Salvino Loan remained in effect and subject to the original Agreement.

6On the issue of damages, UNB makes a preliminary assertion that the district court should not even have

considered FAMC’s damages argument because its memorandum exceeded the page limit established by previous

order. We review denials of motions to strike under an abuse of discretion standard. Cf. Operating Eng’rs Local

324 Health Care Plan v. G&W Const. Co., 783 F.3d 1045, 1050 (6th Cir. 2015); Rodgers v. La. Bd. of Nursing, 665

F. App’x 326, 328 (5th Cir. 2017). But besides saying that the district court should have stricken FAMC’s damages

discussion, UNB presents no argument or evidence to indicate that this decision was an abuse of discretion. UNB

does not even dispute the district court’s explicit determination that the motion was moot. Therefore, this issue has

been inadequately briefed, and we do not consider it. See United States v. Wright, 747 F.3d 399, 415–16 (6th Cir.

2014); Benge v. Johnson, 474 F.3d 236, 245 (6th Cir. 2007).

No. 18-5035 Franklin Am. Mort. Co. v. Univ. Nat’l Bank Page 15

omitted)). And UNB failed to produce or point to any concrete evidence showing that FAMC’s

mitigation efforts were unreasonable.

Rather, in both its response to FAMC’s summary judgment motion and its brief on

appeal, UNB merely described FAMC’s resale process and then asked a series of questions about

that process. For example, UNB asked why FAMC did not get an appraisal of the Salvino Loan;

whether the amount of FAMC’s payment to Wells Fargo was reasonable; whether FAMC

requested supporting documents or clarification of vague or non-descriptive line items in Wells

Fargo’s expense statement; and why FAMC never “pursued the borrowers for deficiency

judgments.” UNB points to deposition testimony where FAMC’s representative stated that

FAMC had not taken such steps. But that, without more, is simply insufficient to create a

genuine issue of material fact.

To avoid summary judgment, UNB needed to do more than suggest possible problems

with FAMC’s mitigation. UNB needed to present and point to evidence that affirmatively

demonstrated FAMC’s mitigation efforts were not reasonable. For example, expert testimony on

what the appraisal value of the property would have been might have been sufficient to create a

genuine issue of material fact; simply asking why no appraisal was done is certainly not enough.

Expert testimony that industry custom dictates certain mitigation steps perhaps could create a

genuine issue of material fact; simply pointing out that FAMC had not taken certain steps cannot.

Under Rule 56(e), UNB needed to “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986). The district court here correctly observed that UNB failed to present evidence

showing that FAMC’s process was unreasonable, and so there was no genuine issue of material

fact. Summary judgment on the issue of damages was appropriate.

C.

Finally, UNB contends that summary judgment for FAMC was improper because

FAMC’s original motion for summary judgment failed to directly address the twenty-four

affirmative defenses that UNB raised in its answer. We find no merit to this argument. Rather,

as the party asserting the affirmative defenses, UNB bore the burden of proof on all twenty-four.

No. 18-5035 Franklin Am. Mort. Co. v. Univ. Nat’l Bank Page 16

Beck-Wilson v. Principi, 441 F.3d 353, 361 (6th Cir. 2006); Byrne v. CSX Transp., Inc., 541 F.

App’x 672, 675 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The burden of proof will not shift to the plaintiff on an

affirmative defense absent the defendant first discharging the initial burden.” (citing Adickes v.

S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970))). This means that FAMC was not required to

preemptively address all of UNB’s pleaded affirmative defenses.

***

For the above reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order granting summary judgment

to FAMC and denying summary judgment to UNB.

No. 18-5035 Franklin Am. Mort. Co. v. Univ. Nat’l Bank Page 17

_________________

CONCURRENCE

_________________

MERRITT, Circuit Judge, concurring. I concur in the panel’s approach to the indemnity

aspect of this case. We conclude that “[t]he 2013 complaint was, therefore, filed well within the

limitations period, regardless of whether Kansas’s five-year or Tennessee’s six-year limitations

period applies.” But we do not address whether Tennessee law recognizes a discovery rule that

would toll the statute of limitations for breach of contract. The discovery rule is another basis for

the same result — the one used by the District Court.

The District Court concluded that plaintiff Franklin American’s claims accrued in

Tennessee and that Tennessee’s statute of limitations applied. Franklin Am. Mortg. Co. v. Univ.

Nat’l Bank of Lawrence, No. 3:13-CV-01109, 2017 WL 6405595, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 14,

2017). The District Court proceeded to reason that even if we cannot treat plaintiff’s claims

under different sections of the contract separately, then Tennessee law still tolled the statute of

limitation because the breach was inherently undiscoverable by Franklin American. Id. at *6

(citing Goot v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., No. M200302013COAR3CV, 2005

WL 3031638, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2005) (“[I]t would be unjust to hold that a

plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract accrues before the plaintiff knew or should have known

that the contract had been breached.”)).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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