The opinion
T.C. Memo. 2010-263
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
ERNESTINE FORREST, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 11513-08. Filed December 2, 2010.
After P failed to file a tax return for the 2004 tax
year, R filed a substitute for return and issued a notice of
deficiency determining a deficiency in P’s Federal income
tax and additions to tax under secs. 6651(a)(1) and (2) and
6654, I.R.C.
Held: P is liable for a portion of the deficiency to
the extent decided herein.
Held, further: P is liable for the applicable
additions to tax.
Ernestine Forrest, pro se.
Michael K. Park, for respondent.
- 2 -
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
WHERRY, Judge: This case is before the Court on a petition
for redetermination of petitioner’s liability for income tax and
additions to tax for 2004 as determined by respondent. After
concessions by petitioner and respondent of certain income items
and deductions,1 the issues left for decision are:
(1) Whether petitioner is entitled to a deduction on
Schedule A, Itemized Deductions, for meal expenses;
(2) whether petitioner is entitled to a Schedule A deduction
for vehicle mileage expenses;
(3) whether petitioner is entitled to a Schedule A deduction
for telephone expenses;
(4) whether petitioner is entitled to a Schedule A deduction
for an employment-related legal fee of $400;
(5) whether petitioner is entitled to a Schedule A deduction
for a casualty loss;
1
Responded conceded meal expense deductions of $29.24,
leaving $50.95 of meal expense deductions at issue. Petitioner
concedes that she received $7,005 of pension distributions, a
separate taxable distribution from her retirement account of
$3,328, interest income of $129, savings bond interest income of
$67, dividends of $1,084, unemployment compensation of $10,660,
and $61,771 of wage income, all in 2004. The parties have agreed
that petitioner is entitled to Schedule A deductions for 2004 as
follows: State income taxes of $3,847.22; real estate taxes of
$1,860.07; personal property tax of $166; mortgage interest of
$7,245; charitable contributions of $160, and miscellaneous
itemized deductions of $10,928.07 before any consideration of the
adjusted gross income limitation on miscellaneous itemized
deductions.
- 3 -
(6) whether petitioner is liable for the 10-percent
additional tax under section 72(t) on the distribution of $3,328
from her individual retirement plan;2
(7) whether petitioner is liable for the section 6651(a)(1)
addition to tax for the failure to file a timely return;3
(8) whether petitioner is liable for the section 6651(a)(2)
addition to tax for the failure to timely pay tax; and
(9) whether petitioner is liable for the section 6654
addition to tax for the failure to pay estimated income tax.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated, and the stipulation
of settled issues, the stipulated facts, and the accompanying
exhibits are hereby incorporated by this reference. At the time
she filed her petition, petitioner resided in California.
During January and the first 11 days of February 2004,
petitioner was a securities lawyer employed by the California
Department of Corporations. Although her employment was
terminated in February 2004, she continued receiving pay through
2
All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 (Code), as amended and in effect for the tax year at issue,
and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice
and Procedure.
3
The amounts of all the additions to tax will be determined
in the Rule 155 computations to be made in accordance with this
opinion.
- 4 -
June 2004.4 After petitioner’s employment was terminated, she
commenced a lawsuit for reinstatement and backpay. In connection
with that litigation, in April 2004 petitioner flew from her home
to Sacramento, and while in the Sacramento area consumed three
meals. At some time in 2004 petitioner was involved in an
automobile accident with an uninsured motorist. At the time of
the accident petitioner was insured by State Farm Insurance,
which has yet to resolve her claim.
Petitioner did not file a tax return for the 2004 tax year.
Respondent prepared a substitute for return for petitioner’s 2004
tax year which respondent filed on December 14, 2007. On
February 5, 2008, respondent issued petitioner a statutory notice
of deficiency determining an income tax deficiency for 2004 of
$16,260.80 and the following additions to tax: $1,438.83 under
section 6651(a)(1) for failure to file a tax return on time; an
amount to be determined under section 6651(a)(2) for failure to
pay tax on time; and $153.81 under section 6654(a) for failure to
pay estimated tax.
Petitioner timely filed a petition with this Court on May
13, 2008. In the petition, petitioner disputed the deficiency
4
We note that petitioner had previously been terminated from
her employment with the California Department of Corporations in
2000 and was subsequently reinstated in March 2003 after filing
suit against the State of California in 2003, of which we take
judicial notice. See Forrest v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-
228.
- 5 -
and argued that “A tax of more than $16,000 has been proposed in
connection with the year 2004 with which the Taxpayer does not
agree” and that “the Taxpayer desires to preserve her rights and
position with regard to the year 2004. Relief from the proposed
tax is requested.” After concessions the issues left for
determination are those listed above. A trial was held in Los
Angeles, California, on July 1, 2009.5
OPINION
I. Burden of Proof
The Commissioner’s determination of a deficiency is presumed
correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the
determination is improper. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering,
290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). However, pursuant to section
7491(a)(1), the burden of proof as to a factual issue that
affects the taxpayer’s tax liability may be shifted to the
Commissioner. This occurs where the “taxpayer introduces
credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue”, and the
5
Petitioner has been given sufficient time to file a brief.
She has continually tested this Court’s patience with motions to
extend time to file and then ultimately failed to submit a brief.
Petitioner is a member of the California State Bar and, as such,
should be sensitive to any actual or perceived abuse of the
judicial process. The Court directs petitioner’s attention to
sec. 6673(a)(1), which allows the Court in its discretion to
require the taxpayer to pay to the United States a penalty not in
excess of $25,000 whenever it appears that “(A) proceedings
before it have been instituted or maintained by the taxpayer
primarily for delay, (B) the taxpayer’s position in such
proceeding is frivolous or groundless, or (C) the taxpayer
unreasonably failed to pursue available administrative remedies”.
- 6 -
taxpayer has, inter alia, complied with substantiation
requirements pursuant to the Code and “maintained all records
required under this title and has cooperated with reasonable
requests by the Secretary for witnesses, information, documents,
meetings, and interviews”. Sec. 7491(a). Petitioner did not
argue that the burden should shift, and she failed to maintain
required records or comply with the substantiation and
cooperation requirements. Accordingly, the burden of proof
remains on petitioner.
II. Expense Deductions
A. General Rules
Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and the
taxpayer must maintain adequate records to substantiate the
amounts of any deductions or credits claimed. Sec. 6001 (the
taxpayer “shall keep such records”); INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income
Tax Regs. Taxpayers must maintain records relating to their
income and expenses and must prove their entitlement to all
claimed deductions, credits, and expenses in controversy. See
sec. 6001.
Section 162(a) authorizes a deduction for “all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year
in carrying on any trade or business”. A trade or business
expense is ordinary for purposes of section 162 if it is normal
- 7 -
or customary within a particular trade, business, or industry,
and is necessary if it is appropriate and helpful for the
development of the business. Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S.
467, 471 (1943); Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940). In
contrast, “personal, living, or family expenses” are generally
nondeductible. Sec. 262(a).
In certain circumstances, the taxpayer must meet specific
substantiation requirements to be allowed a deduction under
section 162. See, e.g., sec. 274(d). The heightened
substantiation requirements of section 274(d) apply to: (1) Any
traveling expense, including meals and lodging away from home;
(2) any item with respect to an activity in the nature of
entertainment, amusement, or recreation; (3) an expense for
gifts; or (4) the use of “listed property”, as defined in section
280F(d)(4), including any passenger automobiles. To deduct such
expenses, the taxpayer must substantiate by adequate records or
sufficient evidence to corroborate the taxpayer’s own statement:
(1) The amount of the expense or other item; (2) the time and
place of the travel, entertainment, amusement, recreation, or use
of the property; (3) the business purpose of the expense or other
item; and, (4) the business relationship to the taxpayer of the
persons entertained or receiving the gift. Sec. 274(d).
To satisfy the adequate records requirement of section 274,
a taxpayer must maintain records and documentary evidence that in
- 8 -
combination are sufficient to establish each element of an
expenditure or use. Sec. 1.274-5T(c)(1) and (2), Temporary
Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46016, 46017 (Nov. 6, 1985).
Although a contemporaneous log is not required, corroborative
evidence to support a taxpayer’s reconstruction “of the elements
* * * of the expenditure or use must have a high degree of
probative value to elevate such statement” to the level of
credibility of a contemporaneous record. Sec. 1.274-5T(c)(1),
Temporary Income Tax Regs., supra.
Where the heightened requirements discussed above do not
apply, however, the Court may allow the deduction of a claimed
expense even where the taxpayer is unable to fully substantiate
it, provided the Court has an evidentiary basis for doing so.
Williams v. United States, 245 F.2d 559, 560 (5th Cir. 1957);
Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930);
Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 742-743 (1985). But see
sec. 1.274-5T(a), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46014
(Nov. 6, 1985). In these instances, the Court is permitted to
approximate the allowable expense, bearing heavily against the
taxpayer whose inexactitude is of his or her own making. Cohan
v. Commissioner, supra at 544.
B. Schedule A Deduction for Meal Expenses
The heightened or strict substantiation requirements of
section 274(d), discussed above, apply to meal expenses. To
- 9 -
satisfy section 274(d) petitioner must present sufficient
evidence in addition to her testimony to satisfy the three
aspects of this requirement. The taxpayer must prove: (1) The
amount, (2) the time and place, and (3) the business purpose of
each expenditure. Sec. 1.274-5T(b), Temporary Income Tax Regs.,
50 Fed. Reg. 46014 (Nov. 6, 1985).
After respondent’s concessions, $50.95 of petitioner’s meal
expense deductions remains at issue. This amount stems from
three meals petitioner consumed during a trip she made to
Sacramento in April 2004 in connection with her employment
litigation. Petitioner claims that she is entitled to deductions
for meals purchased including: $10.45 at Denny’s, Inc., on April
24, 2004, $29.97 at the Bootlegger Restaurant on April 25, 2004,
and $10.53 at Awful Annies #1 on April 25, 2004, all in the
Sacramento and Auburn, California, area.
Petitioner presented a credit card statement showing the
above amounts and an airline receipt showing that she had
purchased a round-trip ticket from Los Angeles to Sacramento on
April 24, 2004, and returning on April 26, 2004. We find that
petitioner has produced enough evidence in conjunction with her
testimony to meet the first two parts of the heightened section
274 burden. She has shown both the amount of the expenditure and
the time and place of the travel. Remaining is the third,
required business purpose, showing.
- 10 -
Petitioner testified that she incurred these expenses during
a trip to Sacramento to confer with the attorney working on her
reinstatement litigation. This litigation can be characterized
as an attempt to reestablish petitioner’s business of earning her
pay and, therefore, a business expense. See Kenton v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-13. Therefore, petitioner has met
the three requirements under the heightened burden of
substantiation with respect to the three meal expense deductions
and is entitled to a Schedule A deduction of $50.95.6
C. Schedule A Deduction for Vehicle Mileage Expenses
The strict substantiation requirements of section 274(d)
also apply to away-from-home business mileage expenses. Smith v.
Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1165, 1172 (1983). The taxpayer must prove
the amount, time, place, and business purpose of each
expenditure. Sec. 1.274-5T(b), Temporary Income Tax Regs.,
supra. The amount of the business travel may be substantiated by
the use of a contemporaneous log or by any reasonable means
establishing the number of miles traveled, the date, the place,
6
We note that under sec. 62(a)(20) as amended, effective
Oct. 22, 2004, “attorney fees and court costs” paid by the
taxpayer in connection with discrimination lawsuits “paid after
Oct. 22, 2004, with respect to any judgment or settlement
occurring after that date are allowed as a deduction in computing
adjusted gross income, with the result that they are not subject
to the AMT, and are not subject to the 2-percent floor.” Kenton
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-13. However, as petitioner is
deducting meal expenses here, not attorney’s fees and court
costs, these expenses do not fall within the favorable treatment
of sec. 62(a)(20) and are subject to the AMT and the 2-percent
floor. See secs. 56(b)(1)(A)(i), 67(a).
- 11 -
and the business purpose of such miles. Smith v. Commissioner,
supra at 1172. “Congress has chosen to impose a rigorous test of
deductibility in the area of travel expenses. Each of the
foregoing elements must be proved for each separate expenditure.
General vague proof, whether offered by testimony or documentary
evidence, will not suffice.” Id. at 1171-1172.
Although petitioner claimed to have regularly used her
personal vehicle in connection with her reinstatement litigation,
the record is practically devoid of any evidence related to her
claimed mileage deduction. Evidence which is vague or
significantly incomplete is not credible. Harris v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-248; Weaver v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2004-108. Petitioner asserted that she has always
maintained a log of her vehicle travels, but “could not locate
it” and the only evidence accepted at trial was an exhibit
consisting of photocopies of parking receipts.7 Although we
7
At trial petitioner attempted to introduce a typed list of
expenses and places that did not include miles traveled. She
explained that this exhibit
describes taxpayer’s activities in relation to some of
the expenses that are being questioned, written
transcripts, * * * parking fees * * * in connection
with trying to get the back pay awarded to her * * *
similarly there is another chart referring to the
copies and other things that are incurred related to
travel to accomplish these things * * * to go to the
airport * * * to do a variety of business activities.
Respondent objects to the exhibit as “clearly prepared in
anticipation of [this] litigation”. We agreed with respondent
(continued...)
- 12 -
agree with petitioner that she “had to drive to someplace to
park”, she did not even attempt to explain at trial where she had
driven when she received the parking receipts or that the miles
driven to the parking lots were in fact deductible. Petitioner
was unable to provide any substantiation for her claimed mileage
deduction, let alone meet the heightened requirements under
section 274. Therefore she is not entitled to a Schedule A
deduction for her claimed vehicle mileage expenses for the 2004
tax year.
D. Schedule A Deduction for Telephone Expenses
As discussed above, a taxpayer is generally permitted to
deduct ordinary and necessary business expenses, but is required
to keep sufficient records to substantiate the amount of any
deduction. Secs. 162(a), 6001. Under the Cohan doctrine, the
Court is permitted to estimate expenses; however, there must be
sufficient evidence that the expense was in fact incurred.
Williams v. United States, 245 F.2d at 560.
7
(...continued)
and refused to admit the evidence. This exhibit does not
constitute the kind of evidence contemplated by sec. 274(d) and
required to satisfy the higher burden of substantiation.
We also note that generally taxpayers may not “deduct the
daily cost of commuting to and from work, as such expense is
considered to be personal and nondeductible.” Brockman v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-3 (citing Commissioner v. Flowers,
326 U.S. 465, 473-474 (1946)). Petitioner’s offered exhibit
listed under mileage included entries such as “kinko”, “mail”,
“copy”, and “buy supplies” that denote local and possibly
personal errands.
- 13 -
At trial petitioner testified that she had more than one
telephone to support a dial-up modem and fax machine. She did
not present any evidence, testimonial or otherwise, regarding the
percentage of business use of the telephone. We note that “in
the case of an individual, any charge (including taxes thereon)
for basic local telephone service with respect to the 1st
telephone line provided to any residence of the taxpayer shall be
treated as a personal expense.” Sec. 262(b). Petitioner also
did not produce any telephone bills to substantiate a deduction.
Petitioner clearly has not met her burden and is not entitled to
a Schedule A deduction for her claimed telephone expenses for the
2004 tax year.
E. Schedule A Deduction for $400 Legal Fee
Petitioner claims to have made a $400 payment to her
attorney “for filing a writ petition to try to get the employer
to pay three years of back pay.” As we decided above,
petitioner’s litigation fees are ordinary and necessary business
expenses. See Kenton v. Commissioner, supra. However,
petitioner is still required to maintain adequate records to
substantiate those expenses under section 6001. Petitioner did
not present either a receipt for the $400 or a canceled check
evidencing such payment even though the Court allowed her time
after the trial, with numerous extensions, to gather evidence of
this payment. Petitioner has not met her burden and is therefore
- 14 -
not entitled to a Schedule A deduction for a claimed employment-
related legal fee of $400 for the 2004 tax year.
F. Schedule A Deduction for Casualty Loss
Section 165(a) allows “as a deduction any loss sustained
during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or
otherwise.” See also sec. 165(c)(3) (casualty loss deductions
for individual taxpayers). A taxpayer may deduct a casualty loss
resulting from damage to his or her automobile whether used for a
business or personal purpose. Sec. 1.165-7(a)(3), Income Tax
Regs. The amount of the deduction, in the case of property not
used for business or held for the production of income, is the
lesser of either (i) the fair market value of the property before
the casualty minus the fair market value after the casualty; or
(ii) the adjusted basis of the property. Sec. 1.165-7(b)(1),
Income Tax Regs.
Petitioner explained that her 1978 BMW was “totaled” while
she was stalled on the Pasadena Freeway at some time during 2004.
While petitioner might qualify for a casualty loss deduction, we
conclude that she failed to establish her adjusted tax basis in
the car and that she claimed this deduction prematurely.
Petitioner admitted that her claim for damages with her
automobile insurance company has yet to be resolved. She
acknowledged there still exists a claim for reimbursement with a
reasonable prospect for recovery although she was unsure whether
- 15 -
the insurance company would pay her at all. As we have
previously held, a taxpayer must establish the amount of the loss
before she may claim a casualty loss deduction. Clem v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1991-414 (citing Towers v. Commissioner,
24 T.C. 199, 239 (1955), affd. 247 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1957), affd.
sub nom. Bonney v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1957));
see also sec. 1.165-1(d)(2)(i), Income Tax Regs.
This is especially true in a case involving insurance.
Section 165(a) prohibits a taxpayer from deducting any amount
compensated by insurance. Since petitioner did not know, by the
close of the year in issue, how much, if anything, she would
receive from her insurance company as reimbursement for the
damages to her car, she cannot ascertain the amount of her
casualty loss. Petitioner is not entitled to a casualty loss
deduction.
G. Ten Percent Additional Tax Under Section 72(t) on the
Distribution From Petitioner’s Retirement Plan
In general, section 4974(c) defines qualified retirement
plans as including individual retirement accounts (IRA). Section
408 governs the treatment of IRAs. Specifically, section 408(d)
provides that distributions from an IRA are generally taxable in
the manner directed in section 72. Section 72(t) provides for an
additional tax on premature distributions.
Petitioner concedes that when she withdrew $3,328 from her
IRA at the Washington Mutual Bank in 2004 she was 55 years old.
- 16 -
She testified that the reason she withdrew the money was that she
needed it for “some major expense or something it required.” At
no time has petitioner contended that any of the exceptions set
forth in section 72(t)(2) are applicable to her circumstance, nor
has she explained why she believed the section 72(t) additional
tax did not apply. Petitioner is liable for the 10-percent
additional tax under section 72(t) on the distribution of $3,328
from her retirement plan for the 2004 tax year.
III. Additions to Tax
Respondent determined that petitioner is liable for
additions to tax under sections 6651(a)(1) and (2) and 6654 for
the 2004 tax year. Pursuant to section 7491(c), respondent has
the burden of production with respect to these additions to tax
and is therefore required to “come forward with sufficient
evidence indicating that it is appropriate to impose the relevant
penalty.” See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001).
However, “once the Commissioner meets his burden of production,
the taxpayer must come forward with evidence sufficient to
persuade a court that the Commissioner’s determination is
incorrect.” Id. at 447.
A. Section 6651(a)(1) Addition to Tax
Section 6651(a)(1) imposes an addition to tax for failure to
file a timely return unless the taxpayer proves that such failure
is due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect. See United
- 17 -
States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 245 (1985). Petitioner concedes
that she did not file a Federal income tax return for her 2004
tax year. She has not argued, or introduced any evidence
suggesting, that her failure to file was due to reasonable cause
and not willful neglect. Accordingly, we sustain respondent’s
imposition of the addition to tax under section 6651(a)(1).
B. Section 6651(a)(2) Addition to Tax
Section 6651(a)(2) imposes an addition to tax for failure to
timely pay the amount of tax shown on a return. This Court has
stated:
The Commissioner’s burden of production with
respect to the section 6651(a)(2) addition to tax
requires that the Commissioner introduce evidence that
a return showing the taxpayer’s tax liability was filed
for the year in question. In a case such as this where
the taxpayer did not file a return, the Commissioner
must introduce evidence that an SFR [substitute for
return] satisfying the requirements of section 6020(b)
was made. See Cabirac v. Commissioner, * * * [120 T.C.
163 (2003)]. * * *
Wheeler v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 200, 210 (2006), affd. 521
F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 2008). The section 6651(a)(2) addition to
tax is not imposed if the taxpayer proves that the failure to pay
is due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect.
Under section 6651(g)(2), a return prepared by the Secretary
pursuant to section 6020(b) is treated as a return filed by the
taxpayer for the purpose of determining the amount of an addition
to tax under section 6651(a)(2). To constitute a section 6020(b)
return, “the return must be subscribed, it must contain
- 18 -
sufficient information from which to compute the taxpayer’s tax
liability, and the return form and any attachments must purport
to be a ‘return’.” Spurlock v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-
124.
Petitioner concedes that respondent prepared a substitute
for return for her 2004 tax year under section 6020(b). Because
petitioner did not pay the tax liability as shown on the section
6020(b) return, respondent has met the burden of production with
respect to the section 6651(a)(2) addition to tax. Petitioner
has not argued or introduced any evidence suggesting that her
failure to pay was due to reasonable cause and not willful
neglect. We therefore sustain respondent’s imposition of the
addition to tax under section 6651(a)(2).
C. Section 6654 Addition to Tax
Section 6654(a) imposes an addition to tax for underpayment
of estimated income tax by an individual taxpayer. The addition
to tax is computed by reference to the four required installment
payments of the taxpayer’s estimated tax liability, each
constituting 25 percent of the “required annual payment.” Sec.
6654(d)(1)(A). For taxpayers whose adjusted gross income for the
preceding year was $150,000 or less, the “required annual
payment” is equal to the lesser of (1) 90 percent of the tax
shown on the individual's return for the year or, if no return is
filed, 90 percent of his or her tax for such year, or (2) if the
- 19 -
individual filed a return for the immediately preceding taxable
year, 100 percent of the tax shown on that return. Sec.
6654(d)(1)(A) and (B).
Petitioner failed to file a 2004 Federal income tax return
and made no estimated tax payments for 2004. Petitioner did have
a tax liability for her 2003 taxable year.8 Consequently,
petitioner was required to make a payment of estimated tax. See
sec. 6654(d)(1)(B)(ii). Respondent has met his burden of
producing evidence that petitioner had a required annual payment
of estimated tax for 2004. The Court also concludes that
petitioner does not qualify for any of the exceptions to a
section 6654(a) addition to tax provided in section 6654(e).
Under section 6654(e), a section 6654(a) addition to tax
does not apply if the tax shown on the taxpayer’s return for the
year in question (or, if no return is filed, the taxpayer’s tax
for that year), reduced by the credit allowable by section 31, is
less than $1,000. The addition to tax will also not apply if the
taxpayer’s tax for a full immediately preceding 12-month taxable
year was zero and the taxpayer was, for the entire taxable year,
a citizen or resident of the United States. The Court has
8
Respondent was unable to present petitioner’s 2003 tax
liability at trial because it was the subject of another Tax
Court case that has since been decided. In Forrest v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-228, we sustained respondent’s
determination that in addition to the $9,666 of tax shown on her
2003 tax return, petitioner had a Federal income tax deficiency
of $1,882.
- 20 -
determined that petitioner had a liability for income tax for
2004 that exceeded $1,000, net of any section 31 credit, and has
taken judicial notice of the fact that petitioner had a tax
liability in 2003. Therefore, the Court sustains respondent’s
determination of the addition to tax pursuant to section 6654(a).
The Court has considered all of petitioner’s contentions,
arguments, requests, and statements. To the extent not discussed
herein, we conclude that they are meritless, moot, or irrelevant.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.