The opinion
T.C. Memo. 2001-114
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
JOHN & CHRISTINA WADE, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 11521-99. Filed May 14, 2001.
Erwin A. Rubenstein, for petitioners.
Gregory C. Okwuosah, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GOLDBERG, Special Trial Judge: Respondent determined a
deficiency in petitioners’ Federal income tax of $1,120 for the
taxable year 1996. Unless otherwise indicated, section
references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the
year in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules
of Practice and Procedure.
- 2 -
The sole issue for decision is whether petitioners are
entitled to deduct $4,000 for contributions to their individual
retirement accounts (IRA’s) in 1996.
This case was submitted fully stipulated pursuant to Rule
122. The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are
incorporated herein by this reference. At the time the petition
was filed, petitioners resided in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
Petitioners are husband and wife. References to petitioner in
the singular are to Christina Wade.
Petitioner was a part-time employee of Washtenaw Community
College (WCC) of the Michigan public school system during taxable
year 1996. As a part-time employee of WCC during 1996,
petitioner was required to become a member of the Michigan Public
School Employees Retirement System (MPSERS). The MPSERS’ Member
Investment Plan (plan) is a statewide employer-sponsored
qualified defined benefit plan. Participation in the MPSERS is
mandatory under the Public School Employees Retirement Act of
1979 (the Act), as amended, Mich. Comp. Laws, sec. 38.1301-
38.1408 (1997), for all public school full-time, part-time,
teaching and nonteaching, employees, including short-term and
interim employees except for a few specific groups exempt by law.
Because petitioner’s position with WCC was not exempt by law, she
was automatically enrolled in the plan as a part-time employee in
1996.
- 3 -
Section 108 of the Act, Mich. Comp. Laws sec. 38.1408,
provides the following: “This state intends that the retirement
system be a qualified pension plan created in trust under section
401 of the internal revenue code and that the trust be an exempt
organization under section 501 of the internal revenue
code. * * *”
Upon automatic enrollment in the plan, petitioner was
required to contribute 3 percent of the first $5,000 of
compensation. Consequently, $84.89 was automatically contributed
to the plan by WCC from petitioner’s total compensation in 1996
of $2,830.
In order to qualify to receive benefits under the plan,
petitioner must earn at least 10 years of credited service and be
at least 60 years old. A single credit year is earned upon
performing Michigan public school work for 170 days at 6 or more
hours per day within the school fiscal year of July 1 through
June 30. No more than 1 year of credit may be earned within 1
school fiscal year, and proportionate service credit is granted
for less than full-time employment. If petitioner is unable to
reach the 10-year minimum amount of service credit, then she will
not receive any retirement benefits. During calendar year 1996
petitioner worked 169.50 hours. Based upon the MPSERS
calculation, which is part of the stipulation of facts,
petitioner earned 0.083 years of service credit during 1996,
- 4 -
which did not entitle her to receive any regular plan benefits.
At no time did petitioner receive benefits under the plan.
In 1996, petitioners contributed $2,000 each to their
respective IRA’s. On their 1996 joint Federal income tax return,
they claimed an IRA deduction of $4,000 and reported adjusted
gross income of $77,142. Respondent determined that petitioners
were not entitled to their IRA deduction pursuant to section
219(g).
In general, a taxpayer is entitled to deduct amounts
contributed to an IRA. See sec. 219(a); sec. 1.219-1(a), Income
Tax Regs. The deduction in any taxable year, however, may not
exceed the lesser of $2,000 or an amount equal to the
compensation includable in an individual taxpayer’s gross income
for such taxable year. See sec. 219(b)(1). The maximum amount
that may be deducted is further limited where the taxpayer or
spouse of the taxpayer is an “active participant” in certain
retirement plans. Sec. 219(g)(1). An “active participant” is
defined by section 219(g)(5) as an individual--
(A) who is an active participant in--
(i) a plan described in section 401(a) which
includes a trust exempt from tax under section 501(a),
(ii) an annuity plan described in section 403(a),
(iii) a plan established for its employees by the
United States, by a State or political subdivision
thereof, or by an agency or instrumentality of any of
the foregoing,
- 5 -
(iv) an annuity contract described in section
403(b),
(v) a simplified employee pension (within the
meaning of section 408(k)), or
(vi) any simple retirement account (within the
meaning of section 408(p)), or
(B) who makes deductible contributions to a trust
described in section 501(c)(18).
The determination of whether an individual is an active
participant shall be made without regard to whether or
not such individual’s rights under a plan, trust, or
contract are nonforfeitable. An eligible deferred
compensation plan (within the meaning of section
457(b)) shall not be treated as a plan described in
subparagraph (A)(iii).
In the case of a taxpayer who is an active participant and
who files a joint return, the $2,000 limitation of section
219(b)(1)(A) is reduced using a ratio determined by dividing the
excess of the taxpayers’ modified adjusted gross income (modified
AGI)1 over $40,000, by $10,000. See sec. 219(g)(2) and (3). The
defined benefit plan provided by MPSERS was a plan described in
section 219(g)(5)(A)(i). See Neumeister v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2000-41, affd. without published opinion 2001-1 USTC par.
50,235, 87 AFTR 2d 2001-819 (6th Cir. 2001). The formula set
forth in section 219(g)(2) and (3) results in a total
disallowance of the IRA deduction where the total modified AGI
reported on a joint return exceeds $50,000. See id. Because
1
As relevant herein, modified adjusted gross income means
adjusted gross income computed without regard to any deduction
for an IRA.
- 6 -
petitioners reported a modified AGI of $77,809 on their 1996
Federal income tax return, they are not entitled to any IRA
deduction if petitioner was an active participant in a plan
during 1996.
Petitioners contend that petitioner was not an active
participant in the plan because she earned only 0.083 years of
service credit during 1996, and, at that rate, they further argue
that it would take “over 120 years to accumulate the minimum 10.0
years of credited service” to receive any regular retirement
benefits. We disagree.
This Court has previously held that a person can be an
active participant even though she had only forfeitable rights to
plan benefits and those rights were, in fact, forfeited prior to
becoming vested. See Eanes v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 168, 170
(1985) (citing Hildebrand v. Commissioner, 683 F.2d 57, 58 (3d
Cir. 1982), affg. T.C. Memo. 1980-532); Wartes v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1993-84. Although Eanes involved an earlier version
of section 219,2 we apply its reasoning to the facts of the
instant case. Eanes involved a taxpayer who forfeited all rights
under an employer’s retirement plan when he left after only 3
2
Sec. 219, as applicable to 1981, the year in issue in Eanes
v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 168, 170 (1985) (citing Hildebrand v.
Commissioner, 683 F.2d 57, 58 (3d Cir. 1982), affg. T.C. Memo.
1980-532), did not include a definition of “active participant”.
The flush language currently contained in sec. 219(g)(5),
referring to whether the individual’s rights under the plan are
forfeitable, was then only found in the legislative history.
- 7 -
months. Despite the short time the taxpayer worked, we held that
he was an active participant in his employer’s plan and was not
entitled to a deduction under section 219. We stated: “While
the result to petitioner seems harsh, we cannot ignore the plain
language of the statute, and, in effect, rewrite this statute to
achieve what would appear to be an equitable result.” Eanes v.
Commissioner, supra at 171 (citing Hildebrand v. Commissioner,
supra at 59). In the instant case, petitioner’s position is
weaker than that of the taxpayer in Eanes because there is no
showing that petitioner, through retirement, discharge or
otherwise, has forfeited her service credit with the MPSERS.
Moreover, under section 1.219-2(e), Income Tax Regs., “If an
employee makes a voluntary or mandatory contribution to a
[defined benefit] plan * * * such employee is an active
participant in the plan for the taxable year in which such
contribution is made.” (Emphasis added.) As required under the
Act, petitioner personally contributed $84.89, or 3 percent of
the first $5,000 of compensation, to the plan during 1996.
Petitioners further contend that under their interpretation
of section 1.219-2(b), Income Tax Regs., petitioner was not an
active participant in the plan. The pertinent part of section
1.219-2(b), Income Tax Regs., provides the following:
An individual whose compensation for the plan year
ending with or within his taxable year is less than the
amount necessary under the plan to accrue a benefit is
not an active participant in such plan.
- 8 -
Petitioners’ reliance on the above regulation is misplaced. A
plain reading of the regulation indicates that the regulation
refers to a plan which utilizes compensation levels to
distinguish who is eligible to accrue benefits under the plan.
The record lacks any evidence that MSPERS utilized an eligibility
scheme based on compensation. The plan clearly indicates that
petitioner’s eligibility was mandatory and automatic; whereas,
actual receipt of any benefits turned on petitioner’s ability to
meet the minimum service credits and age requirement. Section
1.219-2(b), Income Tax Regs., does not address petitioner’s
eligibility to receive benefits under the MPSERS plan.
At the heart of petitioners’ argument is an equitable plea
which this Court has addressed on previous occasions. It is
sufficient to say that petitioners, in effect, are asking us to
legislate changes in the statute as enacted by Congress. The
power to legislate is exclusively the power of Congress and not
of this Court. See Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 250
(1926).
Upon the basis of the record, we find that petitioner was an
“active participant” in a qualified plan during 1996.
Accordingly, petitioners are not entitled to deduct their IRA
contributions. See sec. 219(g)(1) and (2). We have considered
all arguments by the parties, and, to the extent not discussed
above, conclude they are irrelevant or without merit.
- 9 -
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
for respondent.