Tate Family Found. v. Commissioner

T.C. Memo. 1999-165

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

TATE FAMILY FOUNDATION, Petitioner v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 23092-96X. Filed May 17, 1999.

William J. Tully (an officer), for petitioner.

Kirk M. Paxson, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LARO, Judge: Petitioner petitioned the Court to declare

whether petitioner qualifies for exempt status under section

501(c)(3). See sec. 7428. The parties dispute whether

petitioner meets the operational test of section 1.501(c)(3)-1,

Income Tax Regs. We hold it does not. Unless otherwise stated,

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section references are to the applicable versions of the Internal

Revenue Code. Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of

Practice and Procedure.

Background

We decide this case on the basis of the entire

administrative record, see Rule 217(b)(1), which is incorporated

herein by this reference. Petitioner's mailing address was in

Ontario, California, when its petition was filed.

William J. Tully is a promoter of tax-exempt entities.

Michael D. Tate and his wife, Sylvia A. Goesele Tate

(collectively, the Tates), attended a seminar presented by Mr.

Tully and retained him to organize a tax-exempt family foundation

for them. Mr. Tully organized a corporation named "Tate Family

Foundation" (petitioner herein). Petitioner's officers are Mr.

Tully (vice president), Mr. Tate (president and treasurer), Ms.

Goesele Tate (secretary), James O. Goethe (vice president), Karl

H. Goesele (chief financial adviser), and Ann Villanueva (vice

president). Karl H. Goesele is Ms. Goesele Tate's father, Ann

Villanueva is Mr. Tate's mother, and James O. Goethe is a cousin

of the Tates. Most, if not all, of petitioner's officers also

serve as directors on its board.

Mr. Tully filed articles of incorporation for petitioner

with the Nevada secretary of state, and he prepared bylaws for

petitioner. The articles state that petitioner's primary purpose

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is "TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE NEEDY"; petitioner's

submissions to the Commissioner indicate it intended to provide

this assistance through financial aid grants. The bylaws state

that petitioner's primary purpose is that set forth in the

articles. The bylaws further state that "Nothing herein

contained shall be construed to prevent any Director from

receiving compensation for services to the Corporation rendered

in a capacity other than Director."

On November 4, 1993, petitioner filed with the Commissioner

a Form 1023, Application for Recognition of Exemption Under

Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (application), in

which it sought recognition as a tax-exempt entity. The

application reported that petitioner's activities were:

(1) Supplying money, goods or services to the poor, (2) providing

services for the aged, and (3) providing aid to the handicapped.

The information that petitioner provided to the Commissioner on

and with the application was vague as to the specifics of these

activities. The application indicated that petitioner had not

currently begun any activity, except for organizational

activities. As to sources of financial support, the application

stated:

At the present time this organization does not have any

procedure for the generation of income other than * * *

* * * * * * *

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(a) Direct donations from the general

public at large,

(b) Larger sums from various fund

raising activities,

(c) A possible "thrift store" type

operation, and

(d) Donations of property (both

personal and real) which can be

turned into cash, and

(e) Various others as may be

recommended and implemented by the

organization.

On January 20, 1994, the Commissioner mailed petitioner a

letter seeking clarification of the information that it had

provided him on and with the application. The letter specified

the information that the Commissioner needed to rule on

petitioner's request for exempt status and listed the name and

phone number of a person at the Internal Revenue Service to

contact with any questions. The letter stated: "We can only

recognize you as exempt in advance of operations if you are able

to describe your proposed operations in sufficient detail to

enable us to determine that you will be organized and operated in

accordance with section 501(c)(3) of the Code."

On April 7, 1994, the Commissioner received a response to

his letter. The response, which was written by Mr. Tully in his

capacity as petitioner's vice president, gave vague answers to

the questions set forth in the Commissioner's letter and did not

explain in detail petitioner's proposed activities or operation.

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On August 2, 1994, the Commissioner mailed petitioner

another letter seeking specificity as to petitioner's

organization, activities, and operation. The letter explained

that the Commissioner needed specific information before he could

rule that petitioner was exempt from taxation under section

501(c)(3). The letter, citing and quoting Rev. Proc. 90-27, sec.

5.02, 1990-1 C.B. 514, 515, stated that

"Exempt status will be recognized in advance of

operations if proposed operations can be described in

sufficient detail to permit a conclusion that the

organization will clearly meet the particular

requirements of the section under which exemption is

claimed. A mere restatement of purposes or a statement

that proposed activities will be in furtherance of such

purposes will not satisfy this requirement. The

organization must fully describe the activities in

which it expects to engage, including the standards,

criteria, procedures or other means adopted or planned

for carrying out the activities, the anticipated

sources of receipts, and the nature of contemplated

expenditures. Where the organization cannot

demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Service that its

proposed activities will be exempt, a record of actual

operations may be required before a ruling or

determination letter will be issued. * * *" [Emphasis

added in the letter.]

The letter asked for specific information that the Commissioner

needed to rule on petitioner's request for exemption and listed

the name and phone number of the person at the Internal Revenue

Service to contact with any questions.

By way of an undated letter to the Commissioner, petitioner

responded to the Commissioner's letter of August 2, 1994. This

response was no more informative than the prior response as to

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the specifics of petitioner's organization, activities, or

operation. The latest response repeated many of the statements

set forth on the prior response.

On December 13, 1994, the Commissioner issued to petitioner

a 30-day letter reflecting the Commissioner's determination that

petitioner did not qualify under section 501(c)(3) because it

failed the operational test of section 1.501(c)(3)-1(c), Income

Tax Regs. Approximately 1 month later, Mr. Tully, in his

capacity as petitioner's vice president, notified the

Commissioner that petitioner was appealing that determination,

and approximately 6 months after that, Mr. Tully met with one of

the Commissioner's Appeals officers to discuss petitioner's case.

Shortly after this meeting, petitioner filed with the

Commissioner an amended Form 1023. As amended, petitioner's Form

1023 stated that

the primary purpose of the foundation, as stated in its

oroginal [sic] application for exemption, * * * [was]

amended to read as follows:

"The primary purpose of the foundation will be to

raise funds for financially strap families living

within the immediate area of the foundation's base of

operation with all funds being administered by other

IRS approved 501(c)(3) charitable organizations such as

the Salvation Army, United Way and the Catholic

Church".

* * * the foundation will limit its currect [sic] fund

raising activities to raising funds directly from its

officers, directors and their immediate familites

[sic], friends and business associates.

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The amended Form 1023 did not list specifics as to petitioner's

operations, including the manner in which petitioner would effect

its amended primary purpose. The amended Form 1023 did not

address any safeguards against private inurement.

On April 9, 1996, the Commissioner mailed a letter to

Mr. Tully, in his capacity as petitioner's vice president,

explaining that petitioner had not yet described its operations

in sufficient detail. The letter set forth four items of

information that the Commissioner lacked as to petitioner

including a definition of the term "financially strap" as set

forth in the amended Form 1023.

By way of an undated letter, Mr. Tully responded to the

Commissioner's letter of April 9, 1996. The response was

generally vague as to the information sought. As to the

definition of the term "financially strap", the letter stated:

This organization defines the term "financially

strap" as a temporary condition wherein the person, or

family, under consideration is without "immediate funds

in sufficient amount to provide the very necessities of

life for the present day, or week, at most".

It is not to bail out any person or family from

their current financial psoition [sic]. Rather, it is

a temporary means of relief that is intended to assist

that person or family in their immediate need of foods

and or lodging for at least a day or two, perhaps a

week at the most until they can get on relief or find

other assistance, if that be the case.

It is to make sure that the person or persons in

question do not have to go hungry over night or not

have a safe place to stay.

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Included in this immediate need might be

considered a doctor appointment for life threatening

situations.

On September 25, 1996, the Commissioner issued to petitioner

a final adverse determination letter. The letter stated:

Our adverse determination was made for the following

reason(s):

You did not meet the operational test under

section 1.501(c)(3)-1 of the Income Tax

Regulations. In order to qualify under Code

section 501(c)(3), an organization must be

both organized and operated exclusively for

one or more purposes specified in that

section. You did not describe your proposed

activities in sufficient detail as required

by section 1.501(c)(3)-1 of the Regulations.

Discussion

Respondent has determined that petitioner does not meet the

requirements of section 501(c)(3). Petitioner must prove this

determination wrong. See Rule 217(c)(2)(A); Church By Mail, Inc.

v. Commissioner, 765 F.2d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir. 1985), affg. T.C.

Memo. 1984-349; Church of Scientology v. Commissioner, 83 T.C.

381, 491 (1984), affd. 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987). In order

for petitioner to do so, the administrative record upon which

this case is to be decided must contain enough evidence to

support a finding contrary to the grounds set forth in the notice

of determination, and petitioner must demonstrate the merits of

its claim by at least a preponderance of the evidence. See

Estate of Gilford v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 38, 51 (1987); see

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also Rule 217(c)(2)(A); Fed. R. Evid. 301. If petitioner fails

to carry its burden, respondent will prevail. See Rockwell v.

Commissioner, 512 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1975), affg. T.C. Memo.

1972-133; American Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d

125, 126 (9th Cir. 1957), affg. 25 T.C. 351 (1955); Estate of

Gilford v. Commissioner, supra at 51.

Section 501 provides in part:

SEC. 501(a). Exemption From Taxation.--An

organization described in subsection (c) * * * shall be

exempt from taxation under this subtitle unless such

exemption is denied under section 502 or 503.

* * * * * * *

(c) List of Exempt Organizations.--The following

organizations are referred to in subsection (a):

* * * * * * *

(3) Corporations, and any community

chest, fund, or foundation, organized and

operated exclusively for religious,

charitable, scientific, testing for public

safety, literary, or educational purposes,

* * * no part of the net earnings of which

inures to the benefit of any private

shareholder or individual, no substantial

part of the activities of which is carrying

on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to

influence legislation, * * * and which does

not participate in, or intervene in * * * any

political campaign on behalf of (or in

opposition to) any candidate for public

office.

From this text, we understand that an organization is entitled to

exempt status if it is organized and operated exclusively for

charitable purposes. See also sec. 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1), Income

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Tax Regs. We also understand that an organization that fails

this test does not qualify for exempt status under section

501(c)(3). See also id.

Respondent focuses entirely on petitioner's failure to

satisfy its burden as to the operational test. So do we.

Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(c), Income Tax Regs., provides as follows

as to the operational test:

(c) Operational test.--(1) Primary activities. An

organization will be regarded as "operated exclusively"

for one or more exempt purposes only if it engages

primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of

such exempt purposes specified in section 501(c)(3).

An organization will not be so regarded if more than an

insubstantial part of its activities is not in

furtherance of an exempt purpose.

(2) Distribution of earnings. An organization is

not operated exclusively for one or more exempt

purposes if its net earnings inure in whole or in part

to the benefit of private shareholders or individuals.

* * *

From the text of these regulations, we understand that an

organization is not operated exclusively for one or more exempt

purposes if its net earnings inure in whole or in part to the

benefit of private shareholders or individuals. See sec.

1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2), Income Tax Regs. The concept of private

inurement as expressed therein ensures that the organization

serves public rather than private interests. See Church of

Scientology v. Commissioner, supra at 491. Tax exemption is a

matter of legislative grace; it is not a matter of right. See

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Christian Echoes Natl. Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d

849, 857 (10th Cir. 1972).

We have previously observed that the opportunity for abuse

is present when the affairs of an organization are controlled by

its creators who belong to the same family. See Bubbling Well

Church of Universal Love, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 531, 535

(1980), affd. 670 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1981). In such a situation,

therefore, we require an open and candid disclosure of all facts

bearing upon the organization, its operations, and its finances

so that we may be assured that we are not sanctioning an abuse of

the revenue laws by granting a claimed exemption. See id.; see

also United Libertarian Fellowship, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 1993-116. Where such a disclosure is not made, the logical

inference is that the facts, if disclosed, would show that the

taxpayer fails to meet the requirements of section 501(c)(3).

See Bubbling Well Church of Universal Love, Inc. v. Commissioner,

supra at 535.

Petitioner leaves us no choice but to draw such an inference

here. The record is devoid of sufficient documentation or other

substantive information regarding petitioner's organization,

activities, or operations. What little information petitioner

did provide, pursuant to respondent's requests, was extremely

vague and, in our view, simply an attempt by petitioner to avoid

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disclosing the requested information. Petitioner has completely

failed to establish its entitlement to tax-exempt status.

We also note that petitioner has failed to prosecute its

case properly.1 Petitioner failed to file a brief, as ordered by

the Court and required by Rule 151, and it has failed to explain

its failure to do so. We have previously treated such inaction

by a party as an abandonment of those issues not addressed. See

Calcutt v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 716, 721 (1985). We also have

held that the failure to file a brief may justify the dismissal

of all issues as to which a taxpayer has the burden of proof.

See Stringer v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 693, 708 (1985), affd.

without published opinion 789 F.2d 917 (4th Cir. 1986).

We sustain respondent's determination. See also Larry D.

Bowen Family Found. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-149, wherein

we reached the same result based on an administrative record that

was virtually identical to the administrative record at hand; as

1

Petitioner's representative, Mr. Tully, is no stranger to

litigation. He has filed cases in this Court on at least three

prior occasions, see Tully v. Commissioner, an Order of this

Court dated Jan. 8, 1998 (dismissing the case for failure to

prosecute), vacated and remanded without published opinion

164 F.3d 631 (9th Cir. 1998) (with instructions to dismiss

petition for lack of jurisdiction); Tully v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 1997-310, on appeal (9th Cir., July 29, 1997);

Oliver Family Found. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-220, he has

prosecuted or is prosecuting the appeal of two of these cases

before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and he

prosecuted one case before a Federal District Court, see Tully v.

Kaply, 81 AFTR 2d 98-2125 (C.D. Cal. 1998).

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is true with the case here, Mr. Tully also organized the

corporation in Larry D. Bowen Family Found. and was its

representative before this Court. Accordingly,

Decision will be entered

for respondent.