“[Notwithstanding the conversion of decedent’s partnership items to nonpartnership items ... Mrs. Callaway was at all times treated as a Mountain View partner who was fully entitled to participate in partnership level proceedings.”
How later courts described this case
- “[Notwithstanding the conversion of decedent’s partnership items to nonpartnership items ... Mrs. Callaway was at all times treated as a Mountain View partner who was fully entitled to participate in partnership level proceedings.”
- relying on Crowell v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 683, 691-92, 1994 WL 151303 (1994)
- relying on Crowell v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 683, 691-92 (1994)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
T.C. Memo. 1998-99
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
ESTATE OF JAMES T. CALLAWAY, DECEASED, ELIZABETH N.
CALLAWAY, EXECUTRIX, and ELIZABETH N. CALLAWAY, Petitioners
v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 20048-96. Filed March 10, 1998.
Frank Agostino, for petitioners.
Susan G. Lewis and Guy A. Bracuti, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PANUTHOS, Chief Special Trial Judge: This case is before
the Court on petitioners' Motion for Summary Judgment. In
addition, the Court, sua sponte, raised certain jurisdictional
issues concerning the validity of the notices of deficiency at
issue.1
1
Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, as
(continued...)
- 2 -
The primary issue for consideration is whether the affected
items notices of deficiency are valid. In this connection, we
must consider whether the partnership items of each petitioner
converted to nonpartnership items. If the partnership items of
either petitioner remain as partnership items, we must further
decide whether the period of limitations has expired for issuance
of that affected items notice of deficiency.
Background
Petitioners are the estate of James T. Callaway and
Elizabeth N. Callaway (Mrs. Callaway), James T. Callaway's
surviving spouse. James T. Callaway (decedent) died on December
8, 1990. Mrs. Callaway is the duly appointed executrix of
decedent's estate.
During the taxable years 1986, 1987, and 1988, decedent was
a limited partner in a partnership known as Mountain View Mall
Associates (Mountain View or the partnership). Decedent and Mrs.
Callaway filed joint Federal income tax returns reporting
decedent's distributive share of losses reported on Mountain
View's partnership returns for the taxable years 1986, 1987, and
1988.
On February 5, 1991, respondent mailed to decedent a notice
of the beginning of an administrative proceeding (NBAP)
1
(...continued)
amended. Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice
and Procedure.
- 3 -
respecting the partnership's 1988 taxable year. Respondent has
been unable to provide the Court with copies of the NBAP's
purportedly mailed to decedent on the same date with respect to
the partnership's 1986 and 1987 taxable years.
On December 23, 1991, Mrs. Callaway forwarded several
letters to respondent, including a request for prompt assessment
of income tax submitted on behalf of decedent's estate for the
taxable years 1983 through 1990. See sec. 6501(d). In addition,
Mrs. Callaway remitted three checks to respondent in the amounts
of $90,635, $48,846, and $8,439 designated as deposits in the
nature of a cash bond respecting petitioners' tax liabilities for
1986, 1987, and 1988, respectively. At the same time, Mrs.
Callaway filed a Form 872-T with respondent, covering the taxable
years 1983 through 1990, along with a letter dated December 23,
1991, stating:
please accept this form as a statement disclaiming and
denying the Tax Matters Partners' settlement authority,
a statement denying the Tax Matters Partner's authority
to extend any statutes of limitation, and an election
to have any items which would be classified as
partnership items classified as non-partnership items
subject to the deficiency procedures of Internal
Revenue Code section 6213. * * *
There is no indication that respondent replied to Mrs. Callaway's
letters. However, the record indicates that respondent initially
concluded that Mrs. Callaway's request for prompt assessment of
income tax filed on behalf of decedent's estate was invalid.
- 4 -
On October 5, 1992, respondent issued notices of final
partnership administrative adjustment (FPAA) to the tax matters
partner (TMP) for Mountain View determining adjustments to the
partnership's tax returns for 1986, 1987, and 1988. On the same
date, respondent mailed to petitioners copies of the above-
described FPAA's.
On or about March 17, 1993, a Mountain View partner, other
than the TMP, filed a petition for readjustment with the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims contesting the FPAA's described above.
In August and September 1993, respondent entered what
respondent terms "precautionary" assessments against petitioners
for additional taxes in the amounts of $77,384, $41,981, and
$6,541 for 1986, 1987, and 1988, respectively, reflecting the
disallowance of decedent's distributive share of Mountain View's
partnership items for those years. At the same time, respondent
posted to petitioners' accounts the amounts that Mrs. Callaway
remitted to respondent on December 23, 1991.2
On July 6, 1995, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims dismissed
the partnership level action pursuant to section 6226(h) based
upon a stipulation for dismissal in which the partnership
conceded the adjustments set forth in the FPAA's.
2
Respondent entered these assessments in an effort to
protect against the expiration of the period of limitations in
the event that Mrs. Callaway's request for prompt assessment
filed on behalf of the decedent's estate was deemed valid.
- 5 -
On July 16, 1996 (presumably after abating the above-
described assessments entered in August and September 1993),
respondent entered identical assessments against petitioners
reflecting computational adjustments to account for the
disallowance of decedent's distributive share of Mountain View's
partnership items for the taxable years 1986, 1987, and 1988.
On August 5, 1996, respondent issued notices of deficiency
to petitioners determining various additions to tax, including
delinquent filing of returns, negligence, and valuation
overstatements for the taxable years 1986, 1987, and 1988. The
additions to tax are based upon adjustments to petitioners' tax
liability arising from the disallowance of decedent's
distributive share of Mountain View partnership items.
Petitioners invoked the Court's jurisdiction by filing a timely
petition for redetermination.
After filing their petition, petitioners filed a motion to
restrain collection asserting that respondent had failed to
timely assess and was improperly attempting to collect the
underlying tax deficiencies attributable to the disallowance of
decedent's distributive share of Mountain View's partnership
items. Respondent filed an objection to petitioners' motion to
restrain collection asserting that the Court lacks jurisdiction
to restrain respondent's collection efforts under the
circumstances presented. In further response, however,
- 6 -
respondent conceded that all assessments entered against
decedent's estate were improper on the ground that Mrs.
Callaway's request for prompt assessment filed on behalf of
decedent's estate on December 23, 1991, was valid, thereby
resulting in the immediate conversion of decedent's Mountain View
partnership items to nonpartnership items under section
6231(c)(2) and section 301.6231(c)-8T, Temporary Proced. & Admin.
Regs., 52 Fed. Reg. 6794 (Mar. 5, 1987).3 In contrast,
respondent maintained that the July 1996 assessments entered
against Mrs. Callaway were proper on the ground that,
notwithstanding the conversion of decedent's partnership items to
nonpartnership items, Mrs. Callaway continued to be treated as a
Mountain View partner pursuant to section 301.6231(a)(2)-1T(a),
Temporary Proced. & Admin. Regs., 52 Fed. Reg. 6790 (Mar. 5,
1987).
Following a hearing on the matter, we denied petitioners'
motion to restrain collection on the ground that the Court's
jurisdiction in this case is limited to a redetermination of the
additions to tax determined in the notices of deficiency for
affected items at issue, and, therefore, the Court lacks the
3
As a result of respondent's concession respecting the
validity of the request for prompt assessment filed on behalf of
decedent's estate, respondent further concedes that respondent
was obliged to issue a notice of deficiency to decedent's estate
for (or assess) any deficiencies attributable to decedent's
distributive share of Mountain View's partnership items for 1986,
1987, and 1988 by June 23, 1992. See secs. 6501(d), 6229(f).
- 7 -
authority under section 6213(a) to restrain the assessment or
collection of the underlying deficiencies. See Powell v.
Commissioner, 96 T.C. 707 (1991).
Petitioners subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment
asserting that the notices of deficiency for affected items were
issued beyond the period of limitations. Specifically, relying
on respondent's concession that decedent's partnership items
converted to nonpartnership items on December 23, 1991,
petitioners maintain that Mrs. Callaway's partnership items
likewise converted to nonpartnership items at the same time on
the ground that she is treated as a Mountain View partner only
due to her election to file joint returns with decedent for the
years in issue.
Following a preliminary review of petitioners' motion, and
considering respondent's concessions, the Court issued an order
in which the Court sua sponte raised issues respecting the
validity of the notices of deficiency for affected items and the
Court's jurisdiction in this case. As directed by the Court, the
parties subsequently filed status reports, and respondent filed a
response in opposition to petitioners' motion.
Discussion
The notices of deficiency at issue in this case, so-called
affected items notices of deficiency, were issued to petitioners
pursuant to the unified audit and litigation procedures set forth
- 8 -
in sections 6221 through 6233. Tax Equity & Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. 97-248, sec. 402(a),
96 Stat. 648. Pursuant to the TEFRA provisions, which apply with
respect to all taxable years of a partnership beginning after
September 3, 1982, the tax treatment of any partnership item
generally is determined in a single proceeding at the partnership
level. Sparks v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1279, 1284 (1986);
Maxwell v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 783, 789 (1986).
Partnership items include each partner's proportionate share
of the partnership's aggregate items of income, gain, loss,
deduction, or credit. Sec. 6231(a)(3); sec. 301.6231(a)(3)-
1(a)(1)(i), Proced. & Admin. Regs.
Partnership items are distinguished from affected items
which are defined in section 6231(a)(5) as any item to the extent
such item is affected by a partnership item. White v.
Commissioner, 95 T.C. 209, 211 (1990). The first type of
affected item is a computational adjustment made to record the
change in a partner's tax liability resulting from the proper
treatment of partnership items. Sec. 6231(a)(6); White v.
Commissioner, supra. Once partnership level proceedings are
completed, the Commissioner is permitted to assess a
computational adjustment against a partner without issuing a
deficiency notice. Sec. 6230(a)(1); N.C.F. Energy Partners v.
- 9 -
Commissioner, 89 T.C. 741, 744 (1987); Maxwell v. Commissioner,
supra at 792 n.9.
The second type of affected item is one that is dependent
upon factual determinations to be made at the individual partner
level. N.C.F. Energy Partners v. Commissioner, supra at 744.
Section 6230(a)(2)(A)(i) provides that the normal deficiency
procedures apply to those affected items that require partner
level determinations. For instance, additions to tax for
negligence are affected items requiring factual determinations at
the individual partner level. N.C.F. Energy Partners v.
Commissioner, supra at 745.
Congress has vested the Secretary with the authority to
prescribe exceptions to the unified partnership audit and
litigation procedures. In particular, section 6231(c)(2)
provides that, where the treatment of partnership items will
interfere with the effective and efficient enforcement of the
TEFRA provisions, the Secretary may promulgate regulations
whereby such partnership items will be treated as nonpartnership
items.4 One such special enforcement area is described in
section 301.6231(c)-8T, Temporary Proced. & Admin. Regs., 52 Fed.
Reg. 6794 (Mar. 5, 1987), which provides:
4
In those instances where partnership items are treated as
nonpartnership items, adjustments to the partner's tax liability
generally are determined at the individual partner level through
the normal deficiency procedures. Sec. 6230(a)(2)(A)(ii).
- 10 -
Prompt assessment (Temporary).--The treatment of
items as partnership items with respect to a partner on
whose behalf a request for a prompt assessment of tax
under section 6501(d) is filed will interfere with the
effective and efficient enforcement of the internal
revenue laws. Accordingly, partnership items of such a
partner arising in any partnership taxable year ending
with or within any taxable year of the partner with
respect to which a request for a prompt assessment of
tax is filed shall be treated as nonpartnership items
as of the date that the request is filed.
In sum, the partnership items of a partner on whose behalf a
request for prompt assessment of income tax is filed under
section 6501(d) shall be treated as nonpartnership items as of
the date that the request for prompt assessment is filed.5
Petitioners contend that they are entitled to summary
judgment that the notices of deficiency for affected items were
issued beyond the period of limitations on the ground that both
decedent's and Mrs. Callaway's partnership items converted to
nonpartnership items upon the filing of a request for prompt
assessment on decedent's behalf on December 23, 1991. Although
5
The filing of a request for prompt assessment on behalf
of a deceased partner presents special enforcement problems with
respect to TEFRA partnership proceedings due to the abbreviated
period of limitations associated with such a request. In
particular, sec. 6501(d) establishes an exception to sec. 6501(a)
which sets forth the general rule that the amount of any income
tax shall be assessed within 3 years after a tax return is filed.
Sec. 6501(d) provides that a request for prompt assessment may be
filed with respect to any tax (except estate tax) for which a
return is required by a decedent, or by his estate during the
period of administration, or by a corporation, and that such tax
generally shall be assessed within 18 months after filing of such
request but not later than 3 years after the return was filed.
- 11 -
petitioners' "conversion" theory and period of limitations
arguments seem logical at first glance, closer scrutiny reveals
that, if petitioners' conversion theory is correct with respect
to both decedent and Mrs. Callaway, it follows that the Court
lacks jurisdiction on the ground that the notices of deficiency
for affected items are invalid.
It is well settled that allegations concerning the period of
limitations constitute an affirmative defense, not a plea to the
jurisdiction of this Court. Saso v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 730,
734-735 (1989); see Columbia Bldg., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C.
607, 611-612 (1992). Further, the Court has long held that,
where the Court's jurisdiction and the period of limitations are
both disputed issues in a case, we are obliged to resolve first
whether the Court has jurisdiction. King v. Commissioner, 88
T.C. 1042, 1050 (1987), affd. on other grounds 857 F.2d 676 (9th
Cir. 1988). A jurisdictional issue can be raised by either party
or the Court sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings. Smith
v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 10, 13-14 (1991).
As explained in greater detail below, if we agree with
petitioners' conversion theory, the notices of deficiency for
affected items are invalid thereby rendering petitioners' period
of limitations argument moot. On the other hand, if we reject
petitioners' conversion theory, the notices of deficiency for
affected items are valid, and petitioners' period of limitations
- 12 -
argument fails. For clarity, we shall analyze the validity of
the notices of deficiency separately with respect to decedent and
Mrs. Callaway.
Jurisdiction: Estate of James T. Callaway
The Court's jurisdiction is dependent upon a valid notice of
deficiency and timely filed petition for redetermination. Rule
13(a), (c); Monge v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 22, 27 (1989); Normac,
Inc. & Normac Intl. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 142, 147 (1988). In
Crowell v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 683, 691-692 (1994), the Court
held that a taxpayer may contest the validity of a notice of
deficiency for affected items on the ground that the taxpayer's
partnership items converted to nonpartnership items by virtue of
the Commissioner's alleged failure to notify properly the
taxpayer of partnership level proceedings.
Consistent with Crowell, and considering respondent's
concession that Mrs. Callaway filed a valid request for prompt
assessment on behalf of decedent's estate, the Court sua sponte
raised the issue of the validity of the notices of deficiency for
affected items insofar as the notices were issued to decedent's
estate. In particular, because decedent's Mountain View
partnership items converted to nonpartnership items for the years
at issue in this case pursuant to section 301.6231(c)-8T,
Temporary Proced. & Admin. Regs., 52 Fed. Reg. 6794 (Mar. 5,
1987), it follows that the question of decedent's tax liability
- 13 -
for such items was excepted from the unified partnership audit
and litigation procedures. See sec. 6230(a)(2)(A)(ii) (normal
deficiency procedures apply where partnership items converted to
nonpartnership items under secs. 6231(e)(1)(B)(i) and
6231(c)(2)). Under the circumstances, we hold that the notices
of deficiency for affected items are invalid insofar as they were
issued to decedent's estate. Consequently, we shall dismiss this
case for lack of jurisdiction with respect to decedent's estate
and deny petitioners' motion for summary judgment as moot insofar
as it pertains to decedent's estate.
Jurisdiction: Elizabeth N. Callaway
Petitioners maintain that, because Mrs. Callaway is treated
as a Mountain View partner solely by virtue of having filed a
joint return with decedent for the years in issue, her
partnership items converted to nonpartnership items at the same
time that decedent's partnership items were so converted. We
disagree.6
The controversy surrounding Mrs. Callaway's status as a
Mountain View partner involves the effect of section
301.6231(a)(2)-1T(a)(1), Temporary Proced. & Admin. Regs., 52
Fed. Reg. 6790 (Mar. 5, 1987), which provides in pertinent part:
Persons whose tax liability is determined
indirectly by partnership items (Temporary).--(a)
6
Again, petitioners' conversion theory raises the question
of the validity of the notices of deficiency.
- 14 -
Spouse filing joint return with individual holding
separate interest--(1) In general. [With exceptions
not applicable here] * * *, a spouse who files a joint
return with an individual holding a separate interest
in the partnership shall be treated as a partner for
purposes of subchapter C of chapter 63 of the Code.
Thus, the spouse who files a joint return with a
partner will be permitted to participate in
administrative and judicial proceedings.
Respondent contends that, notwithstanding the conversion of
decedent's partnership items to nonpartnership items pursuant to
section 301.6231(c)-8T, Temporary Proced. & Admin. Regs., 52 Fed.
Reg. 6794 (Mar. 5, 1987), Mrs. Callaway was at all times treated
as a Mountain View partner who was fully entitled to participate
in partnership level proceedings pursuant to section
301.6231(a)(2)-1T, Temporary Proced. & Admin. Regs., 52 Fed. Reg.
6790 (Mar. 5, 1987). In this regard, respondent asserts that the
notices of deficiency for affected items are valid as to Mrs.
Callaway and that such notices were timely issued following the
conclusion of the partnership level proceeding in the U.S. Court
of Federal Claims.
Based upon the plain language of the provisions in question,
we agree with respondent that Mrs. Callaway's partnership items
did not convert to nonpartnership items pursuant to section
301.6231(c)-8T, Temporary Proced. & Admin. Regs., 52 Fed. Reg.
6794 (Mar. 5, 1987). We begin with section 301.6231(a)(2)-1T(a),
Temporary Proced. & Admin. Regs., 52 Fed. Reg. 6790 (Mar. 5,
1987), which plainly states that a spouse who files a joint
- 15 -
return with an individual holding a separate interest in a
partnership shall be treated as a partner for purposes of
subchapter C of chapter 63 of the Code and will be permitted to
participate in administrative and judicial proceedings. In
practical effect, section 301.6231(a)(2)-1T(a), Temporary Proced.
& Admin. Regs., 52 Fed. Reg. 6790 (Mar. 5, 1987), ensures that a
spouse, who may be jointly and severally liable under section
6013(d)(3) for any deficiency in tax arising with respect to a
joint return, will be permitted to protect his or her interests
by fully participating in any unified partnership level
administrative or judicial proceeding.7 By virtue of having
filed joint returns with decedent during the years in issue, Mrs.
Callaway clearly qualifies for treatment as a partner under this
temporary regulation.
In contrast, we find no support for petitioners' position
that Mrs. Callaway's partnership items converted to
nonpartnership items as a consequence of the request for prompt
assessment filed on decedent's behalf. Section 6501(d)
establishes a limited exception to the normal 3-year period of
7
Sec. 6013(d)(3) provides: "if a joint return is made,
the tax shall be computed on the aggregate income and the
liability with respect to the tax shall be joint and several."
One of the fundamental characteristics of joint and several
liability is that the obligee (respondent) may proceed against
the obligors (joint taxpayers) separately and may obtain a
separate judgment against each. Dolan v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.
420, 427 (1965).
- 16 -
limitations set forth in section 6501(a) by providing that the
assessment procedure may be expedited where a request for prompt
assessment is filed on behalf of a decedent, the decedent's
estate, or a corporation. Section 6501(d) does not provide
prompt assessment relief to a surviving spouse. See Garfinkel v.
Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1028, 1032-1033 (1977); Estate of Severt v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-34. Similarly, we conclude that
section 301.6231(c)-8T, Temporary Proced. & Admin. Regs., 52 Fed.
Reg. 6794 (Mar. 5, 1987), which provides that partnership items
will be treated as nonpartnership items "with respect to a
partner on whose behalf a request for a prompt assessment of tax
under section 6501(d) is filed", does not apply to the surviving
spouse of a deceased partner.
We note that in Dubin v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 325, 334
(1992), we rejected a similar argument under analogous
circumstances. In Dubin v. Commissioner, supra, the taxpayer and
her husband held a joint interest in a partnership. Because the
taxpayer's husband was named as a debtor in a bankruptcy
proceeding, his partnership items converted to nonpartnership
items pursuant to section 301.6231(c)-7T(a), Temporary Proced. &
Admin. Regs., 52 Fed. Reg. 6793 (Mar. 5, 1987). However, in a
reversal of the positions of the parties in the instant case, the
Commissioner argued in Dubin that the partnership items of the
taxpayer (wife) had converted to nonpartnership items at the time
- 17 -
that her husband filed for bankruptcy.8 Specifically, the
Commissioner argued that the taxpayer's partnership items
converted to nonpartnership items by virtue of section
6231(a)(12), which provides that a husband and wife who have a
joint interest in a partnership generally shall be treated as one
person (or partner).
In rejecting the Commissioner's position, we noted that
section 301.6231(a)(12)-1T(a), Temporary Proced. & Admin. Regs.,
52 Fed. Reg. 6793 (Mar. 5, 1987), establishes an exception to the
general rule stated in section 6231(a)(12) by providing that
spouses holding a joint interest in a partnership are treated as
separate partners. Further, focusing on the bankruptcy rule set
forth in section 301.6231(c)-7T(a), Temporary Proced. & Admin.
Regs., 52 Fed. Reg. 6793 (Mar. 5, 1987), we concluded that the
temporary regulation "concerns itself with the treatment of items
as partnership items with respect to a partner named as a debtor
in a bankruptcy proceeding; partnership items of such a partner
are treated as nonpartnership items." Dubin v. Commissioner,
supra at 334. We concluded our analysis as follows:
8
The Commissioner's position was born of the fact that the
Commissioner had not notified the taxpayer of the partnership
level proceedings but rather issued the taxpayer a notice of
deficiency. The case was before the Court on the parties' cross-
motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Commissioner
argued that the case should be dismissed on the ground that the
petition was not timely filed, and the taxpayer moved to dismiss
on the ground that the notice of deficiency was invalid.
- 18 -
Because the focus in the bankruptcy rule is limited to
the partner's status as a debtor in bankruptcy, we are
compelled here to look only to petitioner's status,
since she is the only partner before us, and, although
she is a partner, she is not in bankruptcy.
Accordingly, we find the bankruptcy rule to be
inapplicable.
Id. Consistent with our finding that the taxpayer's partnership
items had not converted to nonpartnership items in Dubin, we held
the notice of deficiency issued to the taxpayer to be invalid.
Although the Dubin case involved the status of a taxpayer
holding a joint partnership interest with her husband, whereas
the instant case concerns the status of a taxpayer who filed a
joint return with her husband, who held a separate partnership
interest, we see no meaningful distinction between the
controlling statutory and regulatory provisions. In short, just
as the bankruptcy provision at issue in Dubin was found to extend
only to the partner/spouse in bankruptcy, the prompt assessment
provision at issue in the instant case only extends to the
deceased partner on whose behalf the request for prompt
assessment is filed.
Based upon the preceding discussion, we hold that Mrs.
Callaway's Mountain View partnership items did not convert to
nonpartnership items at the time that decedent's partnership
items converted to nonpartnership items pursuant to section
301.6231(c)-8T, Temporary Proced. & Admin. Regs., 52 Fed. Reg.
6794 (Mar. 5, 1987).
- 19 -
Petitioners further contend that Mrs. Callaway's partnership
items converted to nonpartnership items as a consequence of
respondent's failure to notify properly petitioners of the
beginning of the Mountain View administrative proceedings.
Again, we find that the controlling statutory provisions do not
provide any support for petitioners' position.
Section 6223(a) provides in pertinent part that the
Commissioner shall notify the partners of a TEFRA partnership of
(1) the beginning of an administrative proceeding at the
partnership level and (2) the final administrative adjustment
arising from such proceeding.9 Section 6223(e) provides various
remedies where the Commissioner fails to provide timely notice
under section 6223(a). Section 6223(e) provides in pertinent
part:
(e) Effect of Secretary's Failure To Provide Notice.--
(1) Application of subsection.--
(A) In general.--This subsection applies
where the Secretary has failed to mail any
notice specified in subsection (a) to a
partner entitled to such notice within the
period specified in subsection (d).
* * * * * * *
(2) Proceedings finished.--In any case to which
this subsection applies, if at the time the Secretary
mails the partner notice of the proceeding--
9
Respondent concedes that decedent is a Mountain View
"notice partner" within the meaning of secs. 6223(a) and
6231(a)(8).
- 20 -
(A) the period within which a petition
for review of a final partnership
administrative adjustment under section 6226
may be filed has expired and no such petition
has been filed, or
(B) the decision of a court in an action
begun by such a petition has become final,
the partner may elect to have such adjustment, such
decision, or a settlement agreement described in
paragraph (2) of section 6224(c) with respect to the
partnership taxable year to which the adjustment
relates apply to such partner. If the partner
does not make an election under the preceding
sentence, the partnership items of the partner for the
partnership taxable year to which the proceeding
relates shall be treated as nonpartnership items.
(3) Proceedings still going on.--In any case to
which this subsection applies, if paragraph (2) does
not apply, the partner shall be a party to the
proceeding unless such partner elects--
(A) to have a settlement agreement
described in paragraph (2) of section 6224(c)
with respect to the partnership taxable year
to which the proceeding relates apply to the
partner, or
(B) to have the partnership items of the
partner for the partnership taxable year to
which the proceeding relates treated as
nonpartnership items.
As previously mentioned, respondent was unable to provide
the Court with copies of the NBAP's purportedly issued to
petitioners respecting Mountain View's 1986 and 1987 taxable
years. However, respondent did mail to decedent on February 5,
1991, a NBAP respecting Mountain View's 1988 taxable year.
Further, on October 5, 1992, respondent mailed to petitioners
- 21 -
copies of the FPAA's respecting Mountain View's taxable years
1986, 1987, and 1988.
Relying on Mrs. Callaway's December 23, 1991, letter and
respondent's failure to prove that NBAP's were mailed to
petitioners with respect to Mountain View's 1986 and 1987 taxable
years, petitioners contend that their partnership items converted
to nonpartnership items either at the time that respondent should
have mailed the NBAP's to petitioners or upon delivery of Mrs.
Callaway's December 23, 1991, letter requesting that her
partnership items be treated as nonpartnership items.
Even assuming that respondent failed to mail the NBAP's, the
record is clear that respondent mailed FPAA's to petitioners
respecting Mountain View's 1986, 1987, and 1988 taxable years on
October 5, 1992--prior to the date that a partner other than the
TMP filed a petition for readjustment of Mountain View
partnership items with the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. Under
the circumstances, Mrs. Callaway's remedy, upon receipt of the
FPAA's, was to make an election under section 6223(e)(3)(B) to
have her Mountain View partnership items treated as
nonpartnership items. Cf. Wind Energy Associates III v.
Commissioner, 94 T.C. 787, 791-792 (1990). In this regard,
section 301.6223(e)-2T(c)(2), Temporary Proced. & Admin. Regs.,
52 Fed. Reg. 6785 (Mar. 5, 1987), provides:
The election shall be made by filing a statement with
the Internal Revenue Service office mailing the notice
- 22 -
regarding the proceeding within 45 days after the date
on which that notice was mailed.
Under the circumstances, we are not persuaded that Mrs.
Callaway's earlier letter to respondent dated December 23, 1991,
wherein Mrs. Callaway requested that her partnership items be
treated as nonpartnership items, constitutes a qualifying
election within the meaning of section 6223(e)(3)(B).
Finally, we are satisfied that Mrs. Callaway's letter dated
December 23, 1991, in which Mrs. Callaway unilaterally attempted
to terminate any extension of the period of limitations
concerning the partnership for the years in issue, was
ineffective to overcome the TMP's broad grant of authority under
section 6229(b)(1)(B) to execute agreements to extend the period
of limitations. Because Mrs. Callaway does not assert that the
notices of deficiency for affected items were issued beyond 1
year from the date that the U.S. Court of Federal Claims'
decision in the partnership level proceedings became final, see
sec. 6229(d), we deem the point conceded.
In sum, we conclude that Mrs. Callaway's partnership items
did not convert to nonpartnership items, and the notices of
deficiency for affected items are valid insofar as they were
issued to Mrs. Callaway. Petitioners have failed to prove that
the period of limitations expired prior to the issuance of the
notices of deficiency for affected items to Mrs. Callaway.
- 23 -
Consequently, we shall deny petitioners' motion for summary
judgment insofar as the motion pertains to Mrs. Callaway.
To reflect the foregoing,
An order will be issued
dismissing this case for lack
of jurisdiction as to the estate
of James T. Callaway, amending
the caption of the case as
appropriate, and denying
petitioners' motion for summary
judgment as moot insofar as the
motion pertains to decedent's
estate and denying petitioner's
motion for summary judgment
insofar as the motion pertains to
Mrs. Callaway.