The opinion
Opinion issued October 23, 2018
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-18-00167-CV
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WAYNE N. MYERS, Appellant
V.
PENNYMAC CORPORATION, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Civil Ct at Law No. 2
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1093378
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this forcible-detainer action, appellant, Wayne N. Myers, contends that the
trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to award possession of the disputed real
property to appellee, PennyMac Corporation, a company that purchased the property
at a foreclosure sale. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On October 22, 2004, Myers, along with Patricia N. Myers, executed a deed
of trust, in which they voluntarily granted a lien against their property. The deed of
trust provided:
If the Property is sold pursuant to this Section 22, [Myers] or any person
holding possession of the Property through [Myers] shall immediately
surrender possession of the Property to the purchaser at that sale. If
possession is not surrendered, [Myers] or such person shall be a tenant
at sufferance and may be removed by writ of possession or other court
proceeding.
On January 3, 2017, the deed of trust was foreclosed, and the property was
sold to PennyMac. A substitute trustee’s deed of trust was executed on February 6,
2017, conveying all right, title, and interest in the property to PennyMac.
On January 10, 2017, PennyMac demanded, pursuant to the terms of the deed
of trust, that Myers surrender and vacate the property. When Myers failed to do so,
PennyMac, on March 6, 2017, filed its original petition for forcible detainer in the
justice court, and the justice court subsequently entered a judgment for possession
of the property in favor of PennyMac.
Myers appealed to the county court at law. PennyMac filed a motion for
summary judgment, contending that it was entitled to a judgment of possession,
which the county court at law granted.
This appeal followed.
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JURISDICTION
Myers’s argues in his first issue that “[e]ven when jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties exists, a final order may nevertheless be susceptible of
collateral attack when the court has exceeded its jurisdiction in rendering it.” Myers
seems to contend that the trial court’s judgment of possession was made without
subject-matter jurisdiction because the foreclosure giving rise to it was erroneous.
A. Standard of Review and Relevant Law
Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law,
which we review de novo. Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468,
476 (Tex. 2012); Trimble v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 516 S.W.3d 24, 28 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (“If the trial court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, the appellate court can make no order other than reversing the judgment
of the court below and dismissing the cause.”).
A forcible detainer action is designed to be a speedy, simple, and inexpensive
means to determine the right to immediate possession of real property where there
is no claim of unlawful entry. See Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of San Antonio, 198
S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006). The only issue to be adjudicated is the right to actual
possession. TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e). To prevail in a forcible detainer action when
the property was purchased at a foreclosure sale, the plaintiff must prove that: (1)
the substitute trustee conveyed the property by deed to the plaintiff after the
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foreclosure sale; (2) a landlord-tenant relationship existed and the occupants became
tenants at sufferance; (3) the plaintiff gave proper notice to the occupants that it
required them to vacate the premises; and (4) the occupants refused to vacate the
premises. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 24.002, .005 (West 2014 & Supp. 2017);
Murphy v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 199 S.W.3d 441, 446–47 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied); see Iqbal v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. 03-
15-00667-CV, 2017 WL 2856737, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin June 29, 2017, pet.
denied) (mem. op.).
Thus, forcible detainer actions cannot resolve any questions of title beyond
the immediate right to possession. Trimble, 516 S.W.3d at 28 (citing Black v. Wash.
Mut. Bank, 318 S.W.3d 414, 417 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. dism’d
w.o.j.)). The existence of a title dispute does not deprive a justice court of jurisdiction
over the forcible detainer action; “it is only deprived of jurisdiction if the right to
immediate possession necessarily requires the resolution of a title dispute.” Id.
(quoting Black, 318 S.W.3d at 417). Because a forcible detainer action’s purpose is
not to establish title, a plaintiff bringing a forcible detainer action is not required to
prove title but is only required to show sufficient evidence of ownership to
demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession. Id. at 29. When there is a
landlord-tenant relationship between the purchaser at foreclosure and the current
possessor of the property, such a relationship “provides a basis for the trial court to
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determine the right to immediate possession, even if the possessor questions the
validity of a foreclosure sale and the quality of the buyer’s title.” Id. (quoting Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ezell, 410 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.)
).
B. Analysis
We interpret the constitutional challenges raised in Myers’s sole issue on
appeal as a challenge to the trial court’s jurisdiction to address the issue raised in this
appeal, i.e., PennyMac’s right to possession of the property.
The only issue to be adjudicated in a forcible detainer action is the right to
actual possession, and Myers presented no evidence that the right to immediate
possession necessarily requires the resolution of a title dispute in this case. See TEX.
R. CIV. P. 510.3(e); Trimble, 516 S.W.3d at 28. Furthermore, PennyMac was not
required to prove title; rather, it was only required to show sufficient evidence of
ownership to demonstrate its superior right to immediate possession. See Trimble,
516 S.W.3d at 29. As long as PennyMac provided evidence of the existence of a
landlord-tenant relationship between itself, as the purchaser at foreclosure, and the
Myers, the current possessors of the property, such a relationship “provides a basis
for the trial court to determine the right to immediate possession, even if the
possessor questions the validity of a foreclosure sale and the quality of the buyer’s
title.” See id.; Ezell, 410 S.W.3d at 921.
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“A provision in [a] borrower’s mortgage creating a landlord-tenant
relationship after a foreclosure sale satisfies” the requirement that a landlord-tenant
relationship existed, and the occupants became tenants at sufferance. Trimble, 516
S.W.3d at 29 (citing Ezell, 410 S.W.3d at 922, and Black, 318 S.W.3d at 418).
PennyMac introduced as evidence a copy of Myers’s deed of trust that he executed
on October 22, 2004. The deed of trust stated, in relevant part,
If the Property is sold pursuant to this Section 22, [Myers] or any person
holding possession of the Property through [Myers] shall immediately
surrender possession of the Property to the purchaser at that sale. If
possession is not surrendered, [Myers] or such person shall be a tenant
at sufferance and may be removed by writ of possession or other court
proceeding.
PennyMac further provided a substitute trustee’s deed demonstrating that it had
purchased the property at a foreclosure sale.
These two documents, considered together, establish that, after PennyMac
purchased the property at the foreclosure sale and Myers did not surrender
possession, Myers became a tenant at sufferance of PennyMac. This uncontroverted
evidence was sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a landlord-tenant
relationship between PennyMac and Myers, and that relationship provided the basis
for the trial court to determine the right to immediate possession of the property,
even if Myers were to challenge the validity of the foreclosure sale and the quality
of PennyMac’s title. See id.; Ezell, 410 S.W.3d at 921. Thus, the trial court had
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subject-matter jurisdiction over PennyMac’s forcible-detainer action. See Trimble,
516 S.W.3d at 28.
We overrule Myers’s sole issue on appeal.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Sherry Radack
Chief Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Brown and Caughey.
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