“[W]e conclude that there was probable cause to initiate those criminal proceedings and that Zimmerman can therefore not establish a prima facie case of malicious prosecution.”
How later courts described this case
- “[W]e conclude that there was probable cause to initiate those criminal proceedings and that Zimmerman can therefore not establish a prima facie case of malicious prosecution.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 17-3803
__________
JOHN R. ZIMMERMAN,
Appellant
v.
THOMAS W. CORBETT; LINDA L. KELLY;
FRANK G. FINA; K. KENNETH BROWN, II;
MICHAEL A. SPROW; ANTHONY J. FIORE;
GARY E. SPEAKS
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(District Court Civil No. 1-13-cv-02788)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 12, 2018
BEFORE: JORDAN, VANASKIE, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Filed: September 27, 2018)
__________
OPINION *
__________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Appellant John R. Zimmerman, a former staff person for the Pennsylvania House
of Representative’s Republican Caucus, was implicated in what was then dubbed the
“Computergate/Boxgate” scandal. Charges against Zimmerman were ultimately
dismissed and he sued the Appellees in the District Court alleging malicious prosecution.
The District Court denied the Appellees’ motions to dismiss and denied, in part, their
motion for a judgment on the pleadings. Because the motions to dismiss invoked
qualified immunity, we had jurisdiction to entertain an immediate appeal from the
Appellees. Zimmerman v. Corbett et al., 873 F.3d 414, 416 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2017). The
Appellees appealed. We reversed the District Court’s rulings and remanded with
instructions that it enter judgment in favor of the Appellees. See id. at 616. The District
Court did so and now Zimmerman appeals. We will affirm. 1
Zimmerman raises three issues on appeal. First, he claims that he stated a
valid claim for malicious prosecution. But we have already determined that he did not.
Zimmerman, 873 F.3d at 416 (“[W]e conclude that there was probable cause to initiate
those criminal proceedings and that Zimmerman can therefore not establish a prima facie
case of malicious prosecution.”). Under the law of the case doctrine, “that decision
should continue to govern” unless there are “extraordinary circumstances such as where
the initial decision was ‘clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.’”
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816-17 (1988) (quoting
Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 n.8). There are no extraordinary circumstances
1
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Our jurisdiction is based on
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a denial of a motion for judgment on the pleadings de
novo. Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2000).
2
present here. As we explained before, ample information existed from which the
Appellees could have formed probable cause to arrest Zimmerman. Thus, he cannot state
a claim for malicious prosecution which requires, among other things, the initiation of
criminal proceedings without probable cause. Zimmerman, 873 F.3d at 418-19;
McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447, 461 (3d Cir. 2009). We therefore reject
Zimmerman’s argument as having already been decided.
Zimmerman’s two remaining issues challenge any immunity given to Appellees
for the malicious prosecution. Since Zimmerman cannot state a claim for that intentional
tort, we need not address his remaining arguments.
3