Quinton Bonner v. State of Tennessee

09/20/2018

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs August 7, 2018

QUINTON BONNER v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 13-02771 James Lammey, Judge

No. W2017-00925-CCA-R3-PC

In 2014, the Petitioner, Quinton Bonner, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, and the

trial court imposed a sentence of ten years. The Petitioner then sought to withdraw his

guilty plea on the basis that it was not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that his trial

counsel ineffectively advised him concerning his plea. The trial court denied his motion,

and this court affirmed its judgment. State v. Bonner, No. W2015-00812-CCA-R3-CD,

2016 WL 1403308, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, April 7, 2016) no perm. app.

filed. In 2016, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his

guilty plea was entered involuntarily and that he had received the ineffective assistance of

counsel. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed his petition on the grounds that

the claims had been previously determined. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the

trial court erred when it summarily dismissed his petition. After review, we affirm the

post-conviction court’s judgment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JAMES

CURWOOD WITT, JR. and ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JJ., joined.

Quinton Bonner, Only, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Jonathan H. Wardle, Assistant

Attorney General; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Ryan E. Thompson,

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts and Background

A. Guilty Plea

This case originates from the Petitioner’s being charged with two counts of

aggravated assault, one count of false imprisonment, and one count of domestic assault

resulting from an incident with his wife inside their home. The Petitioner initially elected

to proceed to trial, but he decided to plead guilty before the case was charged to the jury.

The Petitioner entered an “open” plea to aggravated assault, meaning that the trial court

would determine his sentence, and the State dismissed the remaining three charges.

Bonner, 2016 WL 1403308, at 4.

This court summarized the events that transpired after the entry of the Petitioner’s

guilty plea:

After the trial and the guilty plea hearing but prior to sentencing, [the

Petitioner] filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In the motion, [the

Petitioner] claimed that “due to the death of his father” the week prior to

trial, he “suffered from emotional trauma to the degree that he could not

properly participate in his defense nor could he make a sound or rational

decision about whether or not to enter a plea of guilty.” [The Petitioner]

claimed that it would be a manifest injustice to deny the motion.

Months before sentencing, the trial court held a hearing on the

motion to withdraw the guilty plea. At the hearing, Officer Robert

Halliburton testified that he responded to the call at the residence, observed

the bruising on the victim, tagged a knife into evidence, and called his

supervisor. After his supervisor arrived and assessed the scene and spoke

with witnesses, Officer Halliburton was advised to arrest [the Petitioner] for

aggravated assault.

[The Petitioner] also testified at the hearing. He claimed that he

never told his attorney that he was guilty and that during the trial, his

attorney informed him after the State’s closing argument that his best

option was to “cop a plea.” [The Petitioner] maintained that he did not

want to plead guilty. [The Petitioner] recalled that his father passed away

right before trial so he just “gave up.” [The Petitioner] insisted that

“immediately after” the guilty plea he wrote his attorney a letter in which

he expressed his displeasure for counsel’s representation.

....

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[The Petitioner] admitted that this was not his “first rodeo” because

he had entered guilty pleas in the past but that he did not understand what

was going on the day that he pled guilty.

The trial court questioned [the Petitioner] with regard to the guilty

plea hearing. [The Petitioner] admitted that the trial court informed him on

the range of punishment and the difference in going to trial versus pleading

guilty. [The Petitioner] still claimed that he did not understand and that he

relied on his trial counsel to “guide [him], to show [him] where [he] should

go and what [he] should do. . . .”

Trial counsel was allowed to testify based on [the Petitioner’s]

allegations. Trial counsel indicated that he met with [the Petitioner] several

times in preparation for trial and talked about different ways to approach

the defense. Trial counsel recalled that [the Petitioner] had concerns about

some inconsistencies in some of the police reports. Trial counsel did not

bring up any issue with regard to the knife or inconsistencies in the police

reports at trial because the knife had been tagged into evidence by the State

and the reports contained some things that were “injurious to [the

Petitioner].”

Trial counsel recalled [the Petitioner’s] wanting to plead guilty at the

conclusion of the trial. Trial counsel explained to [the Petitioner] that this

would be an “open” plea with no agreement with regard to sentence. He

told [the Petitioner] that it was not a “great idea” but that it was ultimately

[the Petitioner’s] decision. Trial counsel felt that [the Petitioner]

understood what was going on at the guilty plea. In fact, trial counsel

stated that he “tried to be very thorough” with [the Petitioner] because [the

Petitioner] had “written the Board of Professional Responsibility, at least

twice, maybe three times.” Trial counsel “made sure that [the Petitioner]

understood the [State’s] [three-year] offer that he was rejecting.” Trial

counsel informed the trial court that he “practically got into a fist fight

[with the Petitioner] when he turned down that three year offer.” Trial

counsel was “surprised” when [the Petitioner] did not take the offer and

even continued to ask the State for that offer when the trial began. Trial

counsel denied that [the Petitioner] told him “immediately” after the plea

that he wanted to withdraw the plea.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court recounted the

proceedings and commented:

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[A]t no time did I ever feel that [the Petitioner] did not

understand what he was doing. At no time did I ever feel that

he was confused, or that he was not understanding what we

were going through.

The trial court noted that [the Petitioner] was “very familiar with the

system” because of his “five, six, or seven prior felony convictions” and

prior guilty pleas. The trial court was satisfied that [the Petitioner] received

“competent representation” and that the guilty plea was entered “freely and

voluntarily.” The trial court denied the motion to withdraw and stated:

I don’t find that there is any fair and just reason to set

this aside. To me, I find that [the Petitioner] knew what he

was doing and made a valid choice, whether it’s the right

choice or the wrong choice, I don’t know, but there’s no basis

for me granting that and I think to set this aside was nothing

more than [the Petitioner’s] argument that this is not what he

wanted to do and that he was coerced into this and enticed

into this and led into this by [trial counsel]. I don’t find that

there’s any basis for that statement, whatsoever.

The trial court also entered a written order denying the motion. In

the written order the trial court commented that Defendant had “the burden

of showing a manifest injustice would occur if the [the Petitioner] was not

allowed to withdraw the plea.”

[The Petitioner] sought an interlocutory appeal in this Court. He

later filed a motion to withdraw the appeal, and his appeal was dismissed

by this Court. See State v. Quinton Bonner, No. W2015-00277-CCA-R9-

CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2015) (order).

Bonner, 2016 WL 1403308, at *2-4. The trial court held a sentencing hearing and

sentenced the Petitioner as a Range III, persistent offender to ten years for the aggravated

assault conviction. Id. at *4. The Petitioner appealed the trial court’s denial of his

motion to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that the trial court applied the incorrect

standard to his motion and failed to consider relevant factors to its determination. On

appeal, this court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the motion, concluding that,

although the trial court had applied an improper standard in its written order, the error

was harmless. Id. at *5. The trial court further concluded that the Petitioner had not

established a fair and just reason for the withdrawal of his guilty plea. Id. at *6.

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B. Post-Conviction

The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, pro se, in which he

alleged that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because he had

received the ineffective assistance of counsel. He also requested that counsel be

appointed to his case. The State filed a response alleging that the Petitioner’s claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel had been previously determined by the trial court in the

motion to withdraw the guilty plea hearing. The post-conviction court issued an order

stating that

the allegations, as laid out, were previously determined during an

evidentiary hearing . . . on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.

In the court’s order denying the [P]etitioner’s motion to withdraw

[the] guilty plea, the [c]ourt found after a full evidentiary hearing that

“having heard all of the proof and having observed the representation that

the [P]etitioner] received during the course of the trial the Court found that

the [P]etitioner had received the effective assistance of counsel.

The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the Petitioner’s petition. It is from

this judgment that the Petitioner now appeals.

II. Analysis

On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it

summarily dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief. He contends that his claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel was not previously determined “because he was not

accorded an opportunity for full and fair litigation.” The State responds that the

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was previously determined because he

raised the claim at his motion to withdraw the guilty plea hearing and received a full and

fair hearing on the claim. We agree with the State.

In order to obtain post-conviction relief, a petitioner must show that his or her

conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgment of a constitutional

right. T.C.A. §40-30-103 (2014). The petitioner bears the burden of proving factual

allegations in the petition for post-conviction relief by clear and convincing evidence.

T.C.A. § 40-30-110(f) (2014). The post-conviction court’s findings of fact are conclusive

on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against it. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450,

456-57 (Tenn. 2001). A post-conviction court’s conclusions of law are subject to a

purely de novo review by this court, with no presumption of correctness. Id. at 457.

“Where a petition conclusively shows that the petitioner is entitled to no relief, it is

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properly dismissed without the appointment of counsel and without an evidentiary

hearing.” Givens v. State, 702 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985).

Issues that have been “previously determined” may not be re-litigated in a post-

conviction procedure. See T.C.A. § 40-30-106(f). A ground for relief has been

previously determined when “a court of competent jurisdiction has ruled on the merits

after a full and fair hearing.” See T.C.A. § 40-30-106(h). “A full and fair hearing has

occurred where the petitioner is afforded the opportunity to call witnesses and otherwise

present evidence, regardless of whether the petitioner actually introduced any evidence.”

Id.; see Miller v. State, 54 S.W.3d 743, 747-48 (Tenn. 2001) (holding that the issue raised

and resolved in the petitioner’s direct appeal “cannot be revisited in this post-conviction

proceeding.”).

Upon our review of the transcript of the hearing on the Petitioner’s motion to

withdraw his guilty plea, we conclude that the Petitioner’s claim that he received the

ineffective assistance of counsel has been previously determined and that he received a

full and fair hearing. The Petitioner was represented by counsel (hereinafter “motion

counsel”) at the hearing on the motion. The Petitioner’s trial counsel testified at the

hearing, as did the Petitioner and the officer who investigated the crime scene and made

the arrest. The trial court reviewed with the Petitioner that which had transpired at the

guilty plea hearing and whether the Petitioner had a full understanding of entering a plea.

Trial counsel was subject to direct and cross-examination, as well as questions from the

trial court, about the Petitioner’s decision to plead guilty and what occurred leading up to

his decision to plead guilty. Motion counsel argued that the Petitioner’s and trial

counsel’s antagonistic relationship prevented the Petitioner from receiving competent

counsel. Motion counsel presented all of the facts surrounding the entry of his plea and

the timeline surrounding his motion to withdraw it. On this basis we conclude that the

Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has been previously determined.

As such, his petition conclusively demonstrated that he was not entitled to relief, and the

post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition summarily.

III. Conclusion

After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude the

post-conviction court properly summarily dismissed the Petitioner’s petition for post-

conviction relief. In accordance with the foregoing reasoning and authorities, we affirm

the judgment of the post-conviction court.

________________________________

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE

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