elements of First Amendment retaliation claim in the prison context
How later courts described this case
- elements of First Amendment retaliation claim in the prison context
- prisoner must be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense during disciplinary proceedings, unless limited exceptions apply
- prisoner 2 18-35417 has a protected liberty interest in avoiding detention in a “supermax” facility, where such placement disqualified the prisoner from parole consideration, duration of the assignment was indefinite, and almost all human contact was limited
- prison policy that impinges on 3 18-35417 prisoner’s constitutional rights must be reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 18 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KEITH A. BROWN, No. 18-35417
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:17-cv-00160-BLW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
KEITH YORDY, Warden; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
B. Lynn Winmill, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 12, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, HAWKINS, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Idaho state prisoner Keith A. Brown appeals pro se from the district court’s
judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various constitutional
claims arising out of his disciplinary proceedings and sanctions. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v.
Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
The district court properly dismissed Brown’s due process claims that were
premised on his allegations that internal policies were not followed during his
disciplinary proceedings and that his thirty-day confinement in disciplinary
segregation violated a protected liberty interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472, 483-85 (1995) (a constitutionally protected liberty interest arises only when a
restraint imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life”); Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1419-20
(9th Cir. 1994) (allegations that prison regulations were not followed during
disciplinary proceedings, without more, does not violate the Due Process Clause).
However, Brown further alleged that he was unable to present evidence during his
disciplinary proceedings, and that because of the disciplinary charges, he was
transferred to the Idaho State Maximum Security Institution, denied parole, and
excluded from “almost all human contact.” Liberally construed, these allegations
“are sufficient to warrant ordering [defendants] to file an answer.” Wilhelm, 680
F.3d at 1116; see also Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223-225 (2005) (prisoner
2 18-35417
has a protected liberty interest in avoiding detention in a “supermax” facility,
where such placement disqualified the prisoner from parole consideration, duration
of the assignment was indefinite, and almost all human contact was limited); Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566-69 (1974) (prisoner must be allowed to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense during disciplinary
proceedings, unless limited exceptions apply). We therefore reverse the judgment
as to these claims and remand for further proceedings.
The district court dismissed Brown’s equal protection and retaliation claims
on the basis that the prison had a legitimate penological reason for enhancing
Brown’s disciplinary charge. However, Brown alleged that disciplinary charge
number 166443 was enhanced in retaliation for his involvement in a class action
lawsuit, and that prison authorities thereby treated him differently than other
similarly situated inmates. Liberally construed, these allegations “are sufficient to
warrant ordering [defendants] to file an answer.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1116; see
also Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487 n.11 (Equal Protection Clause protects prisoners from
arbitrary state action); Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005)
(elements of First Amendment retaliation claim in the prison context); McElyea v.
Babbit, 833 F.2d 196, 197-98 (9th Cir. 1987) (prison policy that impinges on
3 18-35417
prisoner’s constitutional rights must be reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest). We therefore reverse the judgment as to these claims and
remand for further proceedings.
We reject as without merit Brown’s contentions that the district court
improperly dismissed his claims against the Idaho Board of Corrections and the
Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole. See S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. City of Los
Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 508 (9th Cir. 1990) (Eleventh Amendment immunity bars
claims against states and their agencies).
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
4 18-35417