State of Tennessee v. Janet Michelle Stanfield, Tony Alan Winsett and Justin Bradley Stanfield

08/07/2018

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

November 8, 2017 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JANET MICHELLE STANFIELD, TONY

ALAN WINSETT and JUSTIN BRADLEY STANFIELD

Appeal by Permission from the Court of Criminal Appeals

Circuit Court for Obion County

No. CC-15-CR-84 Jeff Parham, Circuit Court Judge

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No. W2015-02503-SC-R11-CD

___________________________________

An Obion County grand jury indicted Tony Alan Winsett, Janet Michelle Stanfield, and

Justin Bradley Stanfield for multiple drug and weapons charges based on the warrantless

search of their home and the subsequent automobile stop involving defendants Winsett

and Janet Stanfield. The defendants filed motions to suppress the evidence against them

based on an allegedly improper search. Following a suppression hearing, the trial court

granted the defendants’ motions and dismissed the charges against them. The Court of

Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The State then filed an application for

permission to appeal to this Court. See Tenn. R. App. P. 11(a). We granted the State’s

application and, upon review, hold that, with respect to defendants Winsett and Janet

Stanfield, the warrantless search of the residence was constitutionally permissible based

on defendant Winsett’s status as a parolee and the doctrine of common authority.

However, we conclude that the warrantless search with respect to defendant Justin

Stanfield was constitutionally unreasonable because he retained a reasonable expectation

of privacy in his bedroom and the State failed to carry its burden of proving that

defendant Winsett exercised common authority over Justin Stanfield’s bedroom.

Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Criminal

Appeals Affirmed in Part; Reversed in Part; Remanded to the Trial Court.

ROGER A. PAGE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JEFFREY S. BIVINS, C.J.,

and CORNELIA A. CLARK and HOLLY KIRBY, JJ., joined. SHARON G. LEE, J., filed a

separate opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part in the judgment.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée Sophia Blumstein,

Solicitor General; Jeffrey D. Zentner, Assistant Attorney General; Tommy A. Thomas,

District Attorney General; and James T. Cannon, Assistant District Attorney General, for

the Appellant, State of Tennessee.

Beau E. Pemberton, Dresden, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Janet Michelle Stanfield.

Charles S. Kelly, Sr., Dyersbug, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Tony Alan Winsett.

Bruce B. Brown, Union City, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Justin Bradley Stanfield.

OPINION

This matter involves the warrantless search of a Union City residence shared by

defendant Janet Michelle Stanfield (Janet)1; her boyfriend, defendant Tony Alan Winsett

(Tony); and her adult son, defendant Justin Bradley Stanfield (Justin). Based on the

evidence seized pursuant to the search of the residence and the subsequent automobile

stop involving defendants Winsett and Janet Stanfield, an Obion County Grand Jury

indicted Tony (a parolee) and Janet (a probationer)2 for possession of 0.5 grams or more

of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony; unlawful possession

of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony involving drugs, a Class D felony;

and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§

39-17-434(a)(4); 39-17-1307(b)(1) (West 2015); 39-17-425(a). Defendant Winsett was

also indicted for attempting to elude a law enforcement officer, creating a risk of death or

injury to innocent bystanders or other third parties, a Class D felony. See id. § 39-16-

603(b)(1). Janet Stanfield was separately indicted for unlawful possession of alprazolam

with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class D felony. See id. § 39-17-417(a)(4), -(d)(1).

Janet Stanfield’s son Justin was indicted for possession of not less than one-half (1/2)

1

Because two of the defendants share the same surname, we will occasionally refer to all

parties by their first names. In doing so, we intend no disrespect.

2

Although we refer to Janet Stanfield as a “probationer,” she was actually serving a community

corrections sentence. The terms “community corrections” and “probation” are not synonymous. A

violation of either program subjects the defendant to revocation proceedings. State v. McNack, 356

S.W.3d 906, 911 (Tenn. 2011) (citation omitted). However, if a community corrections offender is

subject to revocation, he or she will receive credit for time spent in the program, see Tenn. Code Ann. §

40-36-106(e)(4), whereas a probationer will not, see id. § 40-35-310.

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ounce nor more than ten (10) pounds of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, a

Class E felony. See id. § 39-17-417(a)(4), -(g).

I. Facts and Procedural History

On April 6, 2015, defendant Janet Stanfield lived with her boyfriend, defendant

Tony Winsett, and her adult son, defendant Justin Stanfield, in a residence in Union City,

Tennessee. Janet was serving a community corrections sentence for a 2012 felony

conviction for promotion of the manufacture of methamphetamine. Defendant Winsett

was on parole for felony convictions for possession of a controlled substance with intent

to sell/deliver and promotion of the manufacture of methamphetamine. Justin was not on

any form of supervised release.

On April 6, Union City Police Officer Ben Yates, while working with the drug

task force, conducted a parole search3 at the residence of defendant Winsett. Officer

Yates contacted a parole officer to obtain a copy of defendant Winsett’s parole certificate,

but at the time of his arrival at the residence, between 1:00 and 3:00 p.m., he was

unaccompanied by a parole or probation officer and did not first obtain a search warrant.

Officer Yates was acting upon information that he received from a confidential

informant, who told Officer Yates that defendant Winsett was using methamphetamine

and “possibly injecting with needles.” The informant had previously supplied Officer

Yates with reliable and credible information that had developed a narcotics case. Officer

Yates had met defendant Winsett through his “line of work” and was aware that

defendant Winsett was a parolee and that Janet Stanfield resided with him. He had

observed Justin Stanfield’s vehicle at the residence several times, so he had reason to

believe that Justin also lived there. Officer Yates, together with Investigator David

Crocker and Agent James Hall, responded to the Winsett residence.

When they arrived at the residence, Agent Hall observed a burn pile upon which

some clear, very large, plastic vacuum-sealed bags had been discarded. The bags were

dry although it had been raining only ten to fifteen minutes earlier, which indicated to

Officer Yates that the bags had been recently placed on the pile. After further

investigation, he determined that the bags contained marijuana residue.

3

As discussed infra, as a condition of defendant Winsett’s parole, Winsett signed a Parole

Certificate stating, among other things, that “I will agree to a search, without a warrant, of my person,

vehicle, property, or place of residence by any Probation/Parole officer or law enforcement officer, at any

time without reasonable suspicion.”

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Officer Yates knocked on the front door. Investigator Crocker simultaneously

knocked on the back door, but no one answered at either door. There were no cars visible

in the driveway. The police continued to knock on the doors for approximately ten to

twenty minutes. While Investigator Crocker and Agent Hall continued knocking at both

entry doors, Officer Yates noted an open window on the north side of the residence and

proceeded toward it. Through the window he could hear movement inside the house,

which sounded to him “like a running noise.” Noting the presence of security cameras

around the house and the recently discarded plastic bags, Officer Yates believed someone

was present inside the residence destroying evidence.

Based upon this belief, Agent Hall used a pocket knife to gain entry through the

front door of the residence. As soon as the officers entered the residence, they detected a

“very strong odor of marijuana.” A large dog, estimated to weigh 140 pounds, was in the

living room. Officer Yates attributed the sounds he had heard to the dog. The dog had

not made any other noise, such as barking, other than the “running noise.” After

entering, officers noted three bedrooms with open doors. One of the bedrooms was used

as storage and was uninhabitable. The officers ascertained which of the other two

bedrooms belonged to whom. Officer Yates recognized defendant Winsett’s bedroom

because he observed a jacket that he had seen Winsett wearing on previous occasions. He

knew that defendants Winsett and Janet Stanfield had been in a relationship for some

time and observed articles of women’s clothing; thus, he identified that bedroom as being

jointly occupied by those two defendants. In Justin’s bedroom, officers found an

identification card from Justin’s place of employment and a piece of mail addressed to

him in a closed drawer of a nightstand.

Officer Yates searched the bedroom occupied by defendants Winsett and Janet

Stanfield. In it they seized a 9mm Smith & Wesson handgun and thirty-five rounds of

ammunition. The serial number had been scratched off the handgun. They also seized a

plastic box containing several sets of clear plastic bags, a set of digital scales, a marijuana

pipe, and a small blue flashlight. Upon discovering that the flashlight did not work,

Officer Yates unscrewed the battery compartment and found a small bag of a substance

that he recognized as methamphetamine. Investigator Crocker located a pill container

that contained methamphetamine inside the pocket of a black leather jacket. Agent Hall

found a large pickle jar in Justin’s bedroom, concealed inside a wooden television stand,

that contained approximately seven ounces of marijuana. Agent Hall also seized a Glock

22 .40 caliber handgun and fifteen rounds from that room.

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Meanwhile, Officer Yates observed a television monitor in the master bedroom

that showed live video feed from the security cameras placed around the outside of the

residence. He noted that Justin’s vehicle passed by the residence very slowly then

accelerated at a high rate of speed. Officers left the residence and conducted a traffic

stop of Justin’s car. Nothing was seized from the vehicle, and Officer Yates advised

Justin of his Miranda rights and placed him in custody. Officer Yates asked Justin if he

sold marijuana. At first he denied it but subsequently admitted that he did, in fact, sell

marijuana. Officer Yates requested consent to search Justin’s cellular telephone, which

he granted. When Justin unlocked the telephone, Officer Yates saw a message to the

effect of “Deleting All Messages.” He knew that at the initiation of the traffic stop, Justin

had deleted all of the information on his telephone. As the messages were deleting, a

new text message appeared. Justin acknowledged that it pertained to a sale of one ounce

of marijuana. Justin arranged a location to meet the buyer; an officer then transported

Justin to the jail while Officer Yates drove to the predetermined meeting place to

confront the would-be purchaser, at which time he placed the man under arrest.

During the narcotics operation involving Justin’s would-be purchaser, a vehicle

matching the description of defendant Winsett’s vehicle drove past. Officer Yates called

Agent Hall and advised him of the sighting. Agent Hall located the vehicle and began

pursuing it, but the driver of the vehicle would not stop. Officer Yates activated his

emergency equipment and went to assist Agent Hall. When Officer Yates arrived, Agent

Hall had already placed the driver, defendant Winsett, in custody, and Janet, the front seat

passenger, had been detained. Both defendants were advised of their Miranda rights, and

officers began a search of the vehicle. Agent Hall confiscated four alprazolam pills and

$238 in currency from Janet’s purse. Defendants Winsett and Janet Stanfield were

arrested based on the incriminating evidence found in the residence and from Janet’s

person during the vehicle stop.

Prior to trial, defendants filed motions to suppress the evidence obtained as a result

of the warrantless search. The trial court made the following findings of fact and

conclusions of law:

Upon entering the residence, [law enforcement officers] determined

that there were no people present. They cleared the house, was the

testimony. By that, they went room to room and verified that there was no

one present at that location. And at that point the officer also said that they

could smell the odor of marijuana, although, it wasn’t testified as to

whether that was the odor of raw marijuana or smoked marijuana. And the

testimony was that they did not have a probation officer with them. But I

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think, under the Turner case, . . . that is not fatal to this matter, that the

officers could in fact go and do the parole search.

What the Court is having trouble with here, though, is while they

were in the residence and had cleared the residence and had secured the

residence, they clearly had probable cause to get a warrant. However,

acting upon their belief that they could just unilaterally search anything

within the residence, including opening drawers, and they entered – let me

go back. That they entered this residence believing someone was

destroying evidence, which, once they secured the residence they could find

that, that wasn’t happening.

So, the Court in this case finds that, once they entered the residence

and had secured it, the Court finds that at that point they should have gotten

a warrant, that with no one present, there was no harm, there [were] no

exigent circumstances to justify the continued Fourth Amendment

intrusion, therefore, I’m going to suppress the evidence.

Accordingly, the court dismissed the indictments.

The State appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals. Addressing defendant

Winsett’s motion to suppress, the appellate court first acknowledged that “the evidence in

the burn pile, security cameras, and unidentified noises coming from inside the house

may have created exigent circumstances for officers to cause forced entry into the house”

but concluded that any exigency that prompted the forced entry no longer existed upon

the officers’ discovery of the source of the suspicious noise. State v. Stanfield, No.

W2015-02503-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1205952, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 31,

2017), perm. app. granted (Tenn. Jul. 19, 2017). The appellate court further stated that

“[o]nce the house was ‘cleared,’ the subsequent extensive search without the parolee’s

presence did not further any legitimate law enforcement concerns.” Id. The court

highlighted the State’s failure to address reasonable suspicion for the search or the

reliability of the confidential information. Id. at *5.

With regard to Janet’s motion, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that with

regard to a search of a probationer’s residence, a warrantless search is permissible if

reasonable suspicion for the search exists. Id. at *6 (citations omitted). The intermediate

appellate court concluded that the police officers lacked reasonable suspicion as to Janet

because they were unaware of her status as a probationer and lacked any evidence of her

engaging in criminal activity. Id. at *6-7. The court concluded that “the subsequent

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traffic stop and search of Janet’s person was too attenuated from the search of the house”

and that the evidence seized in the stop was properly suppressed. Id. at *7.

Finally, as to Justin’s motion, the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the State’s

“common authority” argument and opined that because the State failed to establish that

either of the other occupants had common authority over Justin’s bedroom, despite the

fact that the door was open, the evidence against Justin was properly suppressed. Id.

We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal in this case to

consider, inter alia, the expectations of privacy enjoyed by an individual granted

supervised release from incarceration (“a parolee,” i.e. Tony Winsett); an individual

granted alternative sentencing (“a probationer,” i.e. Janet Stanfield); and a private citizen

residing with both a parolee and a probationer (i.e. Justin Stanfield). Necessary to our

discussion is an analysis of how one’s expectation of privacy is impacted when he or she

either cohabitates with (in the same bedroom) or resides in the same dwelling with a

person or persons who enjoy a lesser expectation of privacy due to legal status.

II. Standard of Review

On appeal from a ruling on a motion to suppress, we will uphold the trial court’s

findings of fact unless the evidence preponderates against those findings. State v.

Hawkins, 519 S.W.3d 1, 32 (Tenn. 2017) (citing State v. Bell, 429 S.W.3d 524, 528

(Tenn. 2014)); State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, 556 (Tenn. 2013); State v. Turner, 297

S.W.3d 155, 160 (Tenn. 2009); State v. Day, 263 S.W.3d 891, 900 (Tenn. 2008); State v.

Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). “‘Questions of credibility of the witnesses, the

weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters

entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact.’” Hawkins, 519 S.W.3d at 32 (quoting

Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23). The party prevailing in the trial court on a motion to suppress

“‘is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at the suppression

hearing as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that

evidence.’” Turner, 297 S.W.3d at 160 (quoting Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23). We review

the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo with no presumption of

correctness. Hawkins, 519 S.W.3d at 32-33 (citing State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 81

(Tenn. 2001)); Turner, 297 S.W.3d at 160 (citations omitted).

III. Analysis

A. The Fourth Amendment

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The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that “‘[t]he

right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but

upon probable cause . . . .’” State v. Christensen, 517 S.W.3d 60, 68 (Tenn. 2017)

(quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV); State v. McCormick, 494 S.W.3d 673, 678 (Tenn.

2016). Determining whether a particular search is “unreasonable” and therefore a

violation of the rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment “‘depends upon all of the

circumstances surrounding the search . . . and the nature of the search . . . itself.’”

Turner, 297 S.W.3d at 160 (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S.

531, 537 (1985)). “‘The purpose of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and

seizures under the Fourth Amendment is to “safeguard the privacy and security of

individuals against arbitrary invasions [by] government[al] officials.”’” Christensen, 517

S.W.3d at 68 (quoting State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997) (quoting

Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)); see also State v. Talley, 307 S.W.3d

723, 729 (Tenn. 2010); State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Tenn. 1998).

Similarly, article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution provides that “‘the

people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from

unreasonable searches and seizures.’” Christensen, 517 S.W.3d at 68 (quoting Tenn.

Const. art. I, § 7). The search and seizure provisions of the federal and state constitutions

are “‘identical in intent and purpose.’” Id. (quoting Sneed v. State, 221 Tenn. 6, 423

S.W.2d 857, 860 (1968)). Under both constitutional guarantees, reasonableness is “the

ultimate touchstone.” Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006);

McCormick, 494 S.W.3d at 679. A search is presumptively reasonable when conducted

on the basis of probable cause and with a warrant. See McCormick, 494 S.W.3d at 678-

79. Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable, even if the police

possess probable cause for the search. Id. However, there are circumstances where the

reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 requires neither

probable cause nor a warrant. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846 (2006);

Turner, 297 S.W.3d at 157. The search of a parolee—a person who has been convicted

of a criminal offense and is serving a sentence involving release into the community—is

one such circumstance. Turner, 297 S.W.3d at 157.

B. Warrantless Search of Tony Winsett’s Residence (Parolee)

In the matter before us, both the State and defendant Winsett rely on this Court’s

opinion in State v. Turner, 297 S.W.3d 155 (Tenn. 2009). In Turner, this Court

considered, as a matter of first impression, the application of Samson v. California to

Tennessee’s jurisprudence regarding searches and seizures and held that “parolees who

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are subject to a warrantless search condition may be searched without reasonable or

individualized suspicion.” Turner, 297 S.W.3d at 157. Therefore, we begin our analysis

with Turner’s synopsis of the Samson opinion.

In Samson, a California law provided “that every prisoner eligible for release on

state parole ‘shall agree in writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or

other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant and

with or without cause.’” Samson, 547 U.S. at 846 (citation omitted). Relying on this

statutory authorization, a police officer who encountered Samson on the street conducted

a warrantless and suspicionless search of his person “based solely on [Samson’s] status as

a parolee.” Id. at 846-47. The officer found “a cigarette box in [Samson’s] left breast

pocket. Inside the box he found a plastic baggie containing methamphetamine.” Id. at

847. The officer seized the methamphetamine, and Samson was charged with possession.

Id. The trial court denied his motion to suppress, finding that the search was reasonable,

authorized by California law, and not “arbitrary or capricious.” Id. A jury convicted

Samson, and he received a seven-year sentence. Id. The California Court of Appeals

affirmed the trial court’s denial of Samson’s motion to suppress, ruling that suspicionless

searches of parolees are constitutionally reasonable so long as such searches are not

“arbitrary, capricious or harassing.” Id. The United States Supreme Court affirmed. Id.

In doing so, the United States Supreme Court considered “the totality of the

circumstances.” Id. at 848 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court explained that

this determination requires a balancing, “on the one hand, the degree to which [a search]

intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed

for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). As for the degree of intrusion on the privacy of the Samson, a parolee, the

Court explained that “parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers,

because parole is more akin to imprisonment[;] . . . [t]he essence of parole is release from

prison, before the completion of sentence, on the condition that the prisoner abide by

certain rules during the balance of the sentence.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 850 (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). As a result, the Court explained, “parolees . . .

have severely diminished expectations of privacy by virtue of their status alone.” Id. at

852.

Second, the Supreme Court found it “salient” that the California law requiring

parolees to submit to warrantless, suspicionless searches by a parole officer or other

peace officer “at any time,” was “clearly expressed” to Samson. Id. (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). The Supreme Court pointed out that Samson “signed an

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order submitting to the condition and thus was unambiguously aware of it.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme Court balanced the diminished expectation of privacy a parolee has

with the State’s “‘overwhelming interest’” in supervising parolees, “‘[who] are more

likely to commit future criminal offenses,’” and the State’s interests in reducing

recidivism and in promoting reintegration and positive citizenship. Id. at 853 (quoting

Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 524 U.S. 357, 365 (2014)). The Supreme Court concluded

that the State’s substantial interests in supervising parolees “warrant privacy intrusions

that would not otherwise be tolerated under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. Accordingly,

the Supreme Court upheld the warrantless, suspicionless search of Samson based on his

parolee status alone. Id. at 857.

In Turner, this Court adopted the rationale and holding of Samson, stating:

The [United States] Supreme Court has recognized that a criminal

conviction subjects the offender to “a continuum of possible punishments

ranging from solitary confinement in a maximum-security facility to a few

hours of mandatory community service.” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S.

868, 874, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). An offender’s place on

this continuum alters what is “reasonable” for purposes of the Fourth

Amendment. For instance, incarcerated felons have no legitimate

expectation of privacy in their prison cells. . . .

....

On the continuum of possible punishments and reductions in

freedoms, parolees occupy a place between incarcerated prisoners and

probationers. Tennessee’s statutory scheme defines parole as “the release

of a [previously incarcerated] prisoner to the community . . . prior to the

expiration of the prisoner’s term subject to conditions . . . .” Tenn. Code

Ann. § 40-28-102(5). “Release on parole is a privilege and not a right . . .

.” Id. § 40-35-503(b) (2006); see also id. § 40-28-117(a) (2006). Under

Tennessee’s statutory scheme, persons released outside of prison walls on

parole remain in the legal custody of the warden (or relevant penal

supervisor) and are subject to all of the provisions upon which their parole

is conditioned. Id. § 40-28-117(a); Doyle v. Hampton, 207 Tenn. 399, 340

S.W.2d 891, 893 (1960). Parolees remain under the confinement of their

sentences while on parole. Doyle, 340 S.W.2d at 893.

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Turner, 297 S.W.3d at 161-63 (alterations in original). The Turner Court described

Samson as “a narrow exception to the usual rule: an exception which is hardly misguided

given the minimal privacy interests retained by parolees and the government’s

‘overwhelming interest’ in ensuring that a parolee complies with the conditions of her

parole.” Id. at 164.

As such, this Court in Turner expressly held that under both federal and Tennessee

state constitutional protections,

[a] parole condition requiring that the parolee submit to warrantless

searches is reasonable in light of the parolee’s significantly diminished

privacy interests; the goals sought to be attained by early release; and

society’s legitimate interest in protecting itself against recidivism. We

therefore adopt the reasoning of Samson and hold that the Tennessee

Constitution permits a parolee to be searched without any reasonable or

individualized suspicion where the parolee has agreed to warrantless

searches by law enforcement officers.

Id. at 166 (footnote omitted).

By contrast, this Court held, the State’s interests were substantial. Turner, 297

S.W.3d at 163 (quoting Samson, 547 U.S. at 853). The Court noted that

“[the] State has an ‘overwhelming interest’ in supervising parolees because

‘parolees . . . are more likely to commit future criminal offenses.’

Similarly, this Court has repeatedly acknowledged that a State’s interests in

reducing recidivism and thereby promoting reintegration and positive

citizenship among probationers and parolees warrant privacy intrusions that

would not otherwise be tolerated under the Fourth Amendment.”

Id. (quoting Samson, 547 U.S. at 853).

Applying Turner to the matter at hand, the search of defendant Winsett’s residence

was constitutionally reasonable, even though officers neither had a search warrant nor

sought to obtain a warrant prior to searching defendant Winsett’s residence, based upon

Winsett’s status as a parolee. Just as in Samson and Turner, as a condition of defendant

Winsett’s parole, Winsett signed a Parole Certificate stating, among other things that “I

will agree to a search, without a warrant, of my person, vehicle, property, or place of

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residence by any Probation/Parole officer or law enforcement officer, at any time without

reasonable suspicion.” His signature on the document clearly illustrates that defendant

Winsett was “unambiguously” aware of the search condition contained in his parole

agreement, and the officer conducting the search was aware of his status as a parolee.

See Samson, 547 U.S. at 850. Thus, the search of defendant Winsett’s residence was

constitutionally reasonable based on his status as a parolee alone.

The Court of Criminal Appeals erred in concluding that once the officers entered

the residence and determined that the source of the suspicious noise was due not to

nefarious conduct but to a rambunctious canine, the exigency no longer existed, and the

officers should have halted. Stanfield, 2017 WL 1205952, at *6. This analysis ignores

the salient circumstance that this defendant enjoyed a lessened expectation of privacy due

to his parolee status. Moreover, the intermediate court’s conclusion ignores the holdings

of Turner and Samson, both of which authorized the warrantless search based upon

Winsett’s parolee status alone.4

We hasten to emphasize, however, that neither Samson nor Turner afford law

enforcement unfettered and unreviewable discretion. As this Court emphasized in

Turner, a warrantless and suspicionless search of a parolee could be deemed

unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional under circumstances indicating that the

search was conducted for reasons other than valid law enforcement concerns, for

instance, “a pattern of repetitive searches while the parolee is at work or asleep,”

“[s]earches intended to cause the parolee some harm,” or a “search conducted out of

personal animosity.” Turner, 297 S.W.3d at 167. “A suspicionless search of a parolee

would also be constitutionally suspect if the law enforcement officer conducted it without

knowing that the person searched was a parolee subject to warrantless and suspicionless

searches.” Id. at 166-67. This Court recognized that “there may be other situations

where a warrantless, suspicionless search of a parolee is unreasonable.” Id. at 167.

Accordingly, as a procedural safeguard, this Court held that “the totality of the

circumstances surrounding a warrantless, suspicionless search of a parolee must be

examined to determine whether the search is constitutionally unreasonable.” Id. We

noted, however, that “[a] suspicionless search of a parolee subject to a warrantless search

4

For this same reason, the intermediate appellate court erred by criticizing the State for failing to

address reasonable suspicion in its brief. Because Turner and Samson authorized a warrantless,

suspicionless search of defendant Winsett’s residence based on his status alone, the State had no

obligation to brief the question of reasonable suspicion. Stanfield, 2017 WL 1205952, at *5.

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condition, and which is conducted out of valid law enforcement concerns, is not

unreasonable.” Id.

Pursuant to Turner, we must now engage in a review of the totality of the

circumstances, “of which [the] [d]efendant’s status as a parolee and [his] agreement to

the warrantless search condition are salient circumstances, and determine whether the

search of [the] [d]efendant’s residence was reasonable.” Id. at 168 (footnote omitted).

Here, the record lacks evidence establishing that the search was constitutionally

unreasonable. Officer Yates was aware of Winsett’s parole status and was conducting a

search based upon what he deemed to be credible information5 to determine whether

Winsett was engaging in drug activity—a valid law enforcement concern.6 The officers

arrived at the home in the middle of the afternoon, not during the night. The police had

been to the residence twice before and had not entered when no one answered their

knock. On the day in question, the police knocked for ten to twenty minutes and entered

only after hearing suspicious noises from inside the dwelling that could have been

attributable to destruction of evidence. Even then, they entered the residence in a manner

that minimized property damage. There is no evidence in the record that suggests that

Officer Yates was acting in an arbitrary manner. The record is devoid of any proof that

Officer Yates sought to cause Winsett any harm, that Officer Yates acted out of personal

animosity, or that the search was one of a pattern of repetitive searches while Winsett was

at work or asleep.7

5

In conducting its totality of the circumstances analysis, the Court of Criminal Appeals

concluded that the search was unreasonable because Officer Yates based his search in part on an

unidentified informant whose reliability and basis of knowledge had not been established and because the

“exigent circumstances” the officers believed to exist based on the noises they heard while outside of the

house were subsequently extinguished. Stanfield, 2017 WL 1205952, at *6. In light of Turner, the Court

of Criminal Appeals erred in concluding that these factors were determinative.

6

In its Rule 11 application, the State asks this Court to address the parameters of what would

constitute a “legitimate law enforcement concern” under Turner. Resolution of this case does not require

us to set forth an over-arching definition of that term. Suffice it to say that because this case clearly

involves detection and prosecution of drug-related offenses, officers were acting pursuant to a legitimate

law enforcement concern.

7

In this case, defendant Winsett was not home at the time of the search, a fact upon which the

trial court seemingly relied. Our research has yielded no authority for the proposition that a search of a

parolee’s residence is per se unreasonable if the parolee is not present at the time. To the contrary, at

least one federal circuit court has concluded that a parole search conducted outside the presence of the

parolee was, indeed, not unreasonable. See, e.g., United States v. Cantley, 130 F.3d 1371, 1376 (10th Cir.

1997) (rejecting parolee’s argument that parole officer’s search of his residence became unreasonable

once the parole officer determined that the parolee was not at home). In its brief, the State emphasizes

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Accordingly, considering the totality of the circumstances, the search of defendant

Winsett’s bedroom was clearly permissible. Based upon the Turner and Samson

decisions, we conclude that because Officer Yates knew about defendant Winsett’s parole

status and because Winsett was aware that he was subject to warrantless and

suspicionless searches at any time as a condition of his parole, officers did not err in

searching certain areas of defendant Winsett’s residence. Absent any evidence

whatsoever that the search in question was unreasonable in a constitutional sense and

keeping in mind the State’s significant interests in combating recidivism and thwarting

illegal drug activity by parolees, we hold that evidence seized during the warrantless

search of defendant Winsett’s residence was admissible against him and that the trial

court erred in suppressing the evidence against defendant Winsett. We reverse the trial

court’s decision granting defendant Winsett’s motion to suppress and the Court of

Criminal Appeals’ opinion affirming the same.

C. Warrantless Search of Janet Stanfield’s Possessions in Shared Bedroom

(Probationer)

We next address the trial court’s decision to grant defendant Janet Stanfield’s

motion to suppress. As stated supra, defendants Winsett and Janet Stanfield shared a

bedroom within the residence; as such, their legal statuses intertwine. Therefore, it is

necessary to consider whether the doctrine of common authority applies to the search of

belongings that were found within the bedroom but that clearly belonged to Janet.

In State v. Bartram, 925 S.W.2d 227 (Tenn. 1996), this Court recognized the

United States Supreme Court’s decision regarding common authority as set forth in

United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974), stating, “[T]he consent of one who

possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, non-

consenting person with whom that authority is shared.” Bartram, 925 S.W.2d 230-231

(citing Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171).

The [United States Supreme C]ourt defined common authority as the

“mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or

control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of

the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and

that it is not seeking to establish a rule that would permit law enforcement to enter parolee residences in

the absence of exigent circumstances, such as those present in this case. Thus, we confine our analysis to

the facts of this case.

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that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit

the common area to be searched.”

Id. at 231 (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, n.7).8 Following the Matlock decision,

Tennessee applied the common authority test in a case involving spousal consent. State

v. Pritchett, 621 S.W.2d 127, 134 (Tenn. 1981). “In Pritchett, this Court stated, ‘[A] wife

can consent to the search of her home, and if objects are found [that] would incriminate

her husband, such objects are admissible in evidence.’” Bartram, 925 S.W.2d at 231

(quoting Pritchett, 621 S.W.2d at 134); see also Talley, 307 S.W.3d at 734) (holding that

a live-in girlfriend can consent to search based on the doctrine of common authority).

Many jurisdictions acknowledge that if a parolee is sharing a residence with

someone else, a parole search may nonetheless extend to all parts of the premises to

which the parolee has common authority:

A warrantless search of a parolee may result in an invasion of privacy, at

least to some extent, for those living with the parolee. If the Fourth

Amendment rights of nonparolees living with parolees were not reduced, a

parolee could avoid all warrantless parole searches by living with a

nonparolee and asserting the nonparolee’s constitutional rights, and thus

emasculate one significant feature of the parole system.

5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment §

10.10(d), at 556-57 n.138 (5th ed. 2012)

(citing State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Utah 1987) (abrogated on other grounds)

and (citing United States v. Cantley, 130 F.3d 1371, 1376 (10th Cir. 1997) (concluding

that parole search was lawful as to parolee’s wife because officers only searched common

areas and the one bedroom that was identified as belonging to Cantley)); see United

States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting co-defendant’s argument

that officers exceeded scope of warrantless search of probationer’s residence when they

searched a safe that was under the apparent joint control of probationer and co-

8

Later, the United States Supreme Court limited Matlock by holding that “if a potential

defendant with self-interest in objecting is in fact at the door and objects, the co-tenant’s permission does

not suffice for a reasonable search, whereas the potential objector, nearby but not invited to take part in

the threshold colloquy, loses out.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121 (2006). Here, neither

defendant Winsett nor Janet Stanfield was present, so we need not consider how, if at all, Georgia v.

Randolph applies to parole searches.

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defendant). “Persons who live with [parolees] cannot reasonably expect privacy in areas

of a residence that they share with [parolees].”9 People v. Pleasant, 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 796,

798 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). As such, “a warrantless search, justified by a [parole] search

condition, may extend to common areas, shared by [nonparolees], over which the

[parolee] has ‘common authority.’” People v. Smith, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 694, 697 (Cal. Ct.

App. 2002) (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171); see also State v. Yule, 905 So.2d 251,

264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (A nonparolee’s “diminished expectation of privacy

extends to those portions of the shared residence over which the [parolee] and

[nonparolee] have joint dominion.”).

Tennessee has not yet considered the doctrine of common authority as it relates to

parole searches. 10 However, adoption of the doctrine in this context seems to be a logical

extension thereof. Applying the doctrine of common authority to parole searches also

furthers important policy considerations. The State has an “overwhelming interest” in

supervising parolees and “reducing recidivism.” Turner, 297 S.W.3d at 163 (quoting

Samson, 547 U.S. at 853). The privacy intrusion upon an individual sharing a bedroom

(i.e., an area with common authority) with a parolee is not so invasive that it would not be

tolerated under the Fourth Amendment. See id.; see also State v. Bursch, 905 N.W.2d

884, 890 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (“Non-probationers who choose to live with probationers

‘assume the risk that they too will have diminished Fourth Amendment rights in areas

shared with the probationer.’ˮ) (quoting State v. Adams, 788 N.W.2d 619, 623 (N.D.

2010)); State v. West, 517 N.W.2d 482, 491-92 (Wis. 1994). Therefore, we expressly

adopt the doctrine of common authority as it applies to parole searches of areas of a

residence over which a parolee has common authority.

Nevertheless, the government bears the burden of proving the common authority

doctrine applies. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990); West, 517 N.W.2d at

491. The State has satisfied its burden in this case. It is without question that Tony

Winsett and Janet Stanfield shared a bedroom in the residence.11 Thus, by virtue of the

9

As we explained supra, parole and probation fall along different points on the continuum of

possible punishments. However, both statuses involve supervised release into the community as opposed

to incarceration. While these terms are not interchangeable, for the purpose of our analysis, we find

reference to cases involving probation instructive on this issue.

10

While some case law suggests that parole searches are akin to consent searches, other

jurisdictions disagree on whether a parole search is, indeed, a consent search because of the involuntary

and mandatory nature of the search. Our decision does not require consideration of that precise issue.

11

As part of the rules of community corrections, Janet signed a form requiring that she comply

with law enforcement requests to conduct a search of her person and all areas of her residence “to control

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doctrine of common authority, law enforcement officers did not err in searching and

seizing all items of contraband found in the shared bedroom. The trial court, therefore,

erred in suppressing the evidence against Janet Stanfield.

To that end, having found that the search of the residence was constitutionally

reasonable as to Janet Stanfield, her argument that evidence seized from her person

during the ensuing stop of defendant Winsett’s automobile should also be suppressed as

fruit of the poisonous tree is without merit as well. We reverse the trial court’s granting

of defendant Janet Stanfield’s motion to suppress and the Court of Criminal Appeals’

decision affirming the same.

D. Warrantless Search of Justin Stanfield’s Room

(Private Citizen)

More problematic, however, was the warrantless search of Justin Stanfield’s room

and the resulting seizure of marijuana. The extent of the privacy interest of an individual

who is unencumbered by a conditional release status but who resides with an individual

subject to such restrictions is a matter of first impression in Tennessee. The State urges

us to apply the common authority doctrine and uphold the officers’ search of Justin

Stanfield’s bedroom.

As suggested by the record, the searches of the bedrooms occurred simultaneously

but only after the officers determined ownership of each bedroom. Officer Hall, who did

not testify at the suppression hearing,12 continued to perform a thorough search of Justin

Stanfield’s room even after establishing to whom it belonged. He seized a pickle jar

containing marijuana from a closed wooden television stand in Justin’s bedroom. The

State relies on Justin’s open bedroom door and the lack of evidence that he intended to

restrict access to the room, such as a lock on the door or testimony that he regularly kept

the door closed.

contraband or locate missing or stolen property.” Given our conclusion that the search of the bedroom

was constitutionally reasonable based on the common authority doctrine, we need not and do not

determine whether the conditions of community corrections to which Janet Stanfield agreed also would

have supported a suspicionless, warrantless search of her residence.

12

We must note that due to the particular facts of this case, it would have been beneficial for the

trial court and the appellate courts if Officer Hall had testified at the suppression hearing to clarify some

of the intricacies of the search.

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Assuming the search was valid as to defendant Winsett, as we have so held, the

question becomes whether Justin’s bedroom fell within the purview of the parole search.

See, e.g., 67A C.J.S. Pardon & Parole § 70 (2018) (noting that “a parole search may

extend to all parts of the premises to which the parolee has common authority even over

the objections of a non[-] parolee living on those premises”). There is no evidence

indicating whether Justin did or did not manifest an expectation of exclusivity, but the

State argues that the open door refutes the notion of exclusivity.13

As stated supra, “The ‘rights assured by the Fourth Amendment are personal

rights.’” Talley, 307 S.W.3d at 729 (quoting Simmons, 390 U.S. at 389). Accordingly,

we focus on the extent of Justin Stanfield’s constitutional rights. See id. (citing Rakas,

439 U.S. at 139). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to Justin as the

prevailing party at the hearing on the motion to suppress, together with all reasonable and

legitimate inferences therefrom. Turner, 297 S.W.3d at 160. In addition, “evidence

obtained as a result of a warrantless search or seizure ‘is subject to suppression unless the

State demonstrates that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the

narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.’” Talley, 307 S.W.3d at 729-30

(quoting Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 629). The State, of course, “bears the burden of proof

when a search or seizure is conducted without a warrant.” State v. Berrios, 235 S.W.3d

99, 105 (Tenn. 2007) (citing Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 629).

As noted above, the government also bears the burden of proving the common

authority doctrine applies. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181. As the Tenth Circuit Court of

Appeals has explained, proof of common authority requires “persuasive evidence of both

shared use and joint access or control.” United States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 864

(10th Cir. 1992). The State cannot meet its burden

if agents, faced with an ambiguous situation, nevertheless proceed without

making further inquiry. If the agents do not learn enough, if the

circumstances make it unclear whether the property about to be searched is

subject to “mutual use” by the [parolee] . . . , “then warrantless entry is

unlawful without further inquiry.”

13

We also note the dearth of evidence of whether any of Winsett’s or Janet Stanfield’s

possessions were found in Justin’s room. Had any of their possessions been found in Justin’s room, this

would have supported the application of the doctrine of common authority as to the search of Justin’s

room.

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Id. (quoting United States v. Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D. C. Cir. 1991) (quoting

Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188-89)). The State has not satisfied its burden in this case.

Justin Stanfield, the twenty-one-year-old son of Janet Stanfield, maintained a

separate bedroom in the residence he shared with the co-defendants. Officer Yates

testified that the door was open. Although common sense would dictate that Justin was

aware that his mother was on probation and that defendant Winsett was on parole, the

State presented no evidence that Justin was aware of the search conditions of their release

from confinement or that those conditions could possibly implicate his own constitutional

protections. “[W]idely shared social expectations” would not support defendant

Winsett’s or Janet Stanfield’s rummaging through cabinets or drawers in Justin’s

bedroom. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006). Moreover, although Justin is

the son of defendant Janet Stanfield, this is not a “family” situation; Justin was not a child

who resided with his mother and father or mother and step-father. Rather, the living

arrangement is more closely akin to three adult roommates sharing a residence. In such

arrangements, roommates typically do not have authority to rummage through the

personal belongings of another roommate.

We also emphasize that Officer Yates had observed Justin’s vehicle at the

residence on several occasions and testified that he had reason to believe that Justin lived

there. Ergo, Officer Yates knew that one of the three bedrooms was occupied by

defendants Winsett and Janet Stanfield and another one was occupied by Justin Stanfield.

The presence of women’s clothing in the shared bedroom immediately resolved the

question of who inhabited each bedroom. However, upon observing that a third bedroom

was uninhabitable due to clutter, officers did not search inside that bedroom; it stands to

reason that the third bedroom would have been an excellent place to hide illegal

substances or objects and could have been the source of the odor of marijuana. Rather,

the officers chose to search the bedroom of Justin Stanfield. These two facts seem

irreconcilable from a Fourth Amendment perspective.

While other jurisdictions accept that persons who are not subject to conditional

release status and choose to reside with parolees or probationers assume the risk that they

too will have diminished constitutional rights in areas that are shared by all residents,

State v. Adams, 788 N.W.2d 619, 623 (N.D. 2010), it does not follow that a co-occupant

has no privacy expectation in his own bedroom and furniture simply because a parolee is

“physically capable” of reaching said areas, Milton v. State, 879 P.2d 1031, 1036 (Alaska

Ct. App. 1994); see also Bursch, 905 N.W.2d at 891 (holding that those who live with a

parolee have normal expectations of privacy in areas under their exclusive control “so

long as there is no basis for [law enforcement] to reasonably believe the [parolee] has

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authority over those areas” (quoting People v. Robles, 3 P.3d 311, 317 (Cal. 2000)).

These cases held that “[l]aw enforcement may not search areas that are under the non-

[parolee’s] exclusive control, like the non-[parolee’s] bedroom, just because they live

with a parolee.” Bursch 905 N.W.2d at 892; see also Robles, 3 P.3d at 317 (“That

persons under the same roof may legitimately harbor differing expectations of privacy is

consistent with the principle that one’s ability to claim the protection of the Fourth

Amendment depends upon the reasonableness of his or her individual expectations.”).

The risk to non[-parolees’] Fourth Amendment rights demands that, when

officers conduct a [parole] search where a [parolee] lives with a non[-

parolee], the facts available to the officers must support a reasonable belief

that the probationer has at least common authority over the area searched.

State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 533 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); see also People v. Burgener, 714

P.2d 1251, 1269 (Cal. 1986) (“Inasmuch as authority to search the residence of a parolee

[or probationer] extends to areas which are jointly controlled with other occupants of the

residence, the authority to search these premises necessarily portends a massive intrusion

on the privacy interests of third persons solely because they reside with a parolee [or

probationer].” (citation omitted)).

While the warrantless entry into the shared residence did not violate Justin’s

Fourth Amendment rights, he is not completely divested of his constitutional rights

simply by residing with a parolee. Even when faced with objections by non-parolees,

officers may still enter a residence in this situation but may only search the areas that are

under the control of the parolee, such as the parolee’s bedroom or other areas over which

the parolee shares common control or authority. Law enforcement officers may not

search areas that are under the non-parolee’s exclusive control, such as the non-parolee’s

bedroom, simply because the non-parolee resides with someone on conditional release

status.

To give clear guidance to law enforcement officers, we emphasize that law

enforcement is only permitted to conduct a search of a certain area of a parolee’s

residence if “the facts available to the officers . . . support a reasonable belief that the

[parolee] has at least common authority over the area searched.” Davis, 965 P.2d at 533.

By so holding, this Court is balancing the State’s interests in enforcing the terms of

parole by not allowing parolees to create a “loophole” by residing with a non-parolee

while simultaneously respecting the Fourth Amendment rights of an unencumbered

citizen by not allowing law enforcement officers unfettered access to all areas inside the

parolee’s residence.

- 20 -

In expressly adopting the doctrine of common authority as applied to parole

searches, we also adopt the limitations thereof. Under these circumstances and the

unique facts presented by this case, we conclude that rather than permitting the search of

Justin’s bedroom, as asserted by the State, the doctrine of common authority applies to

limit law enforcement’s search of an area held exclusively by an individual with no

conditional release status. To hold otherwise would be to grant law enforcement carte

blanche to conduct full searches of any residence in which a parolee is living, regardless

of the person who is actual target of the search, thus obviating the warrant requirement in

such situations. Absent a showing that it was reasonable for law enforcement officers to

believe that defendant Winsett had shared authority of Justin’s bedroom, Justin held a full

expectation of privacy in his bedroom that was not diminished by the conditional release

status of his co-residents. There is no evidence in the record to indicate that law

enforcement reasonably believed that defendant Winsett exerted any authority over

Justin’s bedroom; as such, Officer Yates and Agent Hall were not allowed to search his

bedroom merely because they were conducting a parole search of the residence.

Because the parole search of the residence was proper, it was therefore permissible

for officers to enter Justin’s bedroom to clear it for officer safety. Upon detecting the

odor of marijuana in the residence, officers had probable cause to obtain a warrant to

search further, but they did not. At this point, Justin’s privacy interests were paramount

to the promotion of governmental interests. See Turner, 297 S.W.3d at 160 (stating that

“the permissibility of a particular practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the

individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate

governmental interests”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

These limitations also further the State’s interests from a policy perspective. In

addition to combating recidivism among parolees, the State also has an interest in

promoting a parolee’s or probationer’s reintegration into society. Turner, 297 S.W.3d at

163 (quoting Samson, 547 U.S. at 853). It would be counterintuitive to effectively strip

all constitutional rights from an individual who has no restraint on his legal status by

virtue of his sharing a residence with a parolee. Should circumstances exist that call into

question the legality of a non-parolee’s actions, such as the odor of marijuana in this case,

officers should follow the appropriate channels and obtain a search warrant for the

exclusive bedroom of the third party. See State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1260 n.3

(Utah 1983) (“Caution would certainly suggest that a warrant be obtained if the rights of

non-parolees might be affected [by a parole search].”).

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Having cleared the residence, there was no longer an exigency as it related to

Justin Stanfield’s bedroom. The parole search was valid as it pertained to the common

areas of the residence and defendants Winsett/Stanfield’s bedroom, but it did not extend

to Justin Stanfield’s private quarters. When the officers entered and walked toward the

bedrooms, it was immediately apparent that one bedroom was uninhabitable, one

bedroom contained both men’s and women’s clothing, and the remaining bedroom, by

process of elimination, belonged to Justin. A search of Justin’s bedroom was not

necessary to determine ownership, yet officers opened a nightstand drawer and located

Justin’s identification. Armed with this additional knowledge, Agent Hall nonetheless

continued to perform a thorough search of Justin’s bedroom, opening cabinets and

drawers. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, we conclude

that the State has failed to carry its burden of proving that a thorough search of Justin’s

room was permissible under these circumstances.

CONCLUSION

We hold that because of the sweeping parole conditions to which defendant

Winsett was subject and of which defendant Winsett and Officer Yates were aware, the

parole search of portions of defendant Winsett’s residence was constitutionally

permissible. We further hold that considering the totality of the circumstances presented

by this case, defendant Winsett’s absence during the search did not rise to the level of

rendering the search constitutionally unreasonable. Because defendants Winsett and

Janet Stanfield shared a bedroom, the search of her personal belongings located within

that bedroom was proper pursuant to the doctrine of common authority and

notwithstanding any conditions of her probation. The resulting stop and search of the

vehicle in which defendants Winsett and Janet Stanfield were traveling was not so

attenuated as to necessitate suppression of the evidence seized therein. All evidence

against these two defendants is admissible, and the trial court erred in suppressing the

same.

Despite having a reduced expectation of privacy in the common areas shared by

defendants Winsett and Janet Stanfield, defendant Justin Stanfield enjoyed a reasonable

expectation of privacy within his private bedroom, and absent a warrant or other

exception to the warrant requirement, the search of his bedroom was improper, and all

evidence against him was properly suppressed.

Therefore, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision to the extent that it

affirmed the granting of defendants Winsett’s and Janet Stanfield’s motions to suppress,

- 22 -

and we affirm the opinion as to the court’s upholding Justin’s motion to suppress. We

remand this cause to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Costs of this appeal are taxed to the State.

_______________________________

ROGER A. PAGE, JUSTICE

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