Charles M. Martin v. Department of Corrections

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions

Decision: 2018 ME 103

Docket: Kno-17-51

Argued: March 6, 2018

Decided: July 24, 2018

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

CHARLES M. MARTIN

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

JABAR, J.

[¶1] This case calls for us to consider whether in Maine, pursuant to the

“prisoner mailbox rule,” a pro se prisoner’s civil petition for review of a

decision by the Department of Corrections should be deemed “filed” on the

date it is delivered to prison officials to be forwarded to the clerk of court

rather than the date it is received by the clerk of court. We conclude that in

circumstances where, as here, (1) a prisoner is forced to rely on the

Department of Corrections to ensure that his Rule 80C petition—challenging

the Department’s administrative action against him—is filed; (2) that prisoner

places the petition into the “control” of the Department; and (3) the

Department fails to timely deliver his petition to the clerk of court, the open

courts provision and due process clause of the Maine Constitution require that

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the prisoner mailbox rule apply and the petition be deemed timely filed.

Accordingly, we vacate the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] The following facts are undisputed. See Ewing v. Me. Dist. Court,

2009 ME 16, ¶ 3 & n.2, 964 A.2d 644. On May 16, 2016, Charles M. Martin, a

prisoner incarcerated at the Maine State Prison, signed a petition pursuant to

5 M.R.S. § 11002 (2017) for judicial review of a Department decision finding

that he had committed a disciplinary infraction. Two days later, on May 18,

2016, he submitted that petition to prison authorities for forwarding to the

Superior Court. However, the clerk of court did not receive the petition until

May 26, 2016.

[¶3] After accepting service of the petition, the State moved to dismiss

it for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See M.R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6). According to the State, because Martin’s petition did not

specify “any date related to the action being challenged,” he failed to “make

the factual allegations necessary” to show that he filed the petition within the

thirty-day period prescribed by 5 M.R.S. § 11002(3). Martin responded with a

motion to amend the petition, a supporting affidavit, and a proposed amended

petition specifying that he was notified of the Department decision on

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April 25, 2016. The Superior Court (Knox County, Stokes, J.) granted that

motion.1

[¶4] Consequently, the State filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing

that because the clerk of court received Martin’s petition on May 26, 2016—

thirty-one days after Martin was notified of the Department’s decision and

therefore one day outside the thirty-day statutory window—the Superior

Court lacked jurisdiction over the matter. See M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Martin

opposed the State’s motion to dismiss, submitting an affidavit averring that he

signed the petition on May 16, 2016, and that he gave the petition to a unit

sergeant to mail on May 18, 2016. Citing the United States Supreme Court’s

decision in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988), Martin urged the Superior

Court to apply the “prisoner mailbox rule,” whereby the court would consider

his petition filed on the date he deposited it with prison officials for

forwarding to the clerk of court, May 18, rather than when it was received by

the clerk of court, May 26.

[¶5] The court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, concluding that

the thirty-day time limit pursuant to section 11002(3) is “jurisdictional and

mandatory” and that “Maine has not yet adopted the so-called federal mailbox

1 The court did not explicitly rule on the State’s motion to dismiss. However, we infer that the

court did so by granting Martin’s motion to amend.

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rule.” Martin then filed a M.R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from judgment,

which the court denied. This appeal followed. See 5 M.R.S. § 11008(1) (2017);

M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3) (Tower 2016).2

II. DISCUSSION

[¶6] Citing Houston v. Lack, Martin argues that the court’s failure to

apply the prisoner mailbox rule violated his constitutional right to meaningful

access to the judicial process because he “had no opportunity to bypass the

prison personnel and ensure that his petition was mailed in a more reliable

fashion.” According to Martin, his “only option, beyond breaking out of jail to

hand deliver the package himself, was to give his mail to the prison

authorities, the representatives of the very agency against whom he was

seeking an appeal.” In response, the State contends that Martin was not

denied access to the courts because even accounting for the jail’s delay in

delivering his petition for review to the court, he was still provided the “ample

time” of 23 days to prepare his petition and ensure that it was timely received.

[¶7] We review de novo a court’s denial of a motion pursuant to M.R.

Civ. P. 60(b)(4)3 to set aside a judgment because of a constitutional violation.

See Reliable Copy Serv., Inc. v. Liberty, 2011 ME 127, ¶ 8, 32 A.3d 1041.

2 The restyled Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure do not apply because this appeal was filed

before September 1, 2017. See M.R. App. P. 1 (restyled Rules).

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A. Statutory Provisions

[¶8] The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Maine Rules of

Civil Procedure govern the commencement of an appeal from a state agency’s4

decision. See 5 M.R.S. §§ 11001-11008 (2017); M.R. Civ. P. 80C(b).

Rule 80C(b) provides, “The time within which a review of final agency action

or the failure or refusal of an agency to act may be sought shall be as provided

by 5 M.R.S.A. § 11002(3).” Section 11002(3) of the APA provides, “The

petition for review shall be filed within 30 days after receipt of notice if taken

by a party to the proceeding of which review is sought.” Although the APA

does not define the term “filed,” section 11002(1) specifies that the petition

for review must be filed “in the Superior Court.” 5 M.R.S. § 11002(1).

B. Houston v. Lack

[¶9] In Houston v. Lack, the Supreme Court articulated the unique

obstacles facing pro se prisoners in exercising their right to access the courts.

487 U.S. at 270-71. There, the Court considered whether a prisoner’s civil

appeal was timely filed where it was delivered to prison authorities three

3 Although Martin specified M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) and M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) as the grounds for the

motion, his argument—that “[i]t was a mistake to believe that I could count on the respondent[s]

. . . to take responsible and prompt action, in regards to the actual mailing of the petition for

review”—can reasonably be read as a contention that the Department violated his right of access to

the courts by failing to deliver his petition to the clerk of court in a timely manner.

4 As used here, “agency” includes the Department of Corrections. 5 M.R.S. § 8002(2) (2017).

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days before the expiration of the thirty-day filing period established by

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1),5 but was received by the clerk of

court one day after the filing period expired. Houston, 487 U.S. at 268-69. The

Court concluded that for purposes of then Rule 4(a)(1), the petitioner’s appeal

was filed at the moment it was delivered to prison authorities, and the Court’s

reasoning in so creating this prisoner mailbox rule warrants quotation at

some length—

The situation of prisoners seeking to appeal without the aid of

counsel is unique. Such prisoners cannot take the steps other

litigants can take to monitor the processing of their notices of

appeal and to ensure that the court clerk receives and stamps

their notices of appeal before the 30-day deadline. Unlike other

litigants, pro se prisoners cannot personally travel to the

courthouse to see that the notice is stamped “filed” or to establish

the date on which the court received the notice. Other litigants

may choose to entrust their appeals to the vagaries of the mail and

the clerk’s process for stamping incoming papers, but only the pro

se prisoner is forced to do so by his situation. . . . Worse, the pro

se prisoner has no choice but to entrust the forwarding of his

notice of appeal to prison authorities whom he cannot control or

supervise and who may have every incentive to delay. No matter

how far in advance the pro se prisoner delivers his notice to the

5 When the Supreme Court decided Houston v. Lack, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)

provided,

In a civil case in which an appeal is permitted by law as of right from a district court

to a court of appeals the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the

clerk of the district court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or

order appealed from . . . .

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) (1992) (amended 1993).

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prison authorities, he can never be sure that it will ultimately get

stamped “filed” on time.

Id. at 270-71.

[¶10] Because Houston v. Lack involved the interpretation of a federal

rule of procedure and did not invoke the United States Constitution, the

Supreme Court’s decision is not binding on the states. See State ex rel. Tyler v.

Alexander, 555 N.E.2d 966, 967 (Ohio 1990). However, since Houston,

numerous states have addressed the issue—twenty-two states have adopted a

variation of the prisoner mailbox rule through court decision,6 and two states

have adopted the Rule through state rules of procedure.7 Although many

states, following Houston’s example, have adopted the Rule by interpreting

state statutes and/or court rules, see, e.g., Warner v. Glass, 135 S.W.3d 681,

6 These states are Alabama, Ex parte Williams, 651 So. 2d 569 (Ala. 1992); Arizona, Mayer v.

State, 908 P.2d 56 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); California, In re Jordan, 840 P.2d 983 (Cal. 1992); Florida,

Haag v. State, 591 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1992); Georgia, Massaline v. Williams, 554 S.E.2d 720 (Ga. 2001);

Hawaii, Setala v. J.C. Penney Co., 40 P.3d 886 (Haw. 2002); Idaho, Munson v. State, 917 P.2d 796

(Idaho 1996); Indiana, Dowell v. State, 922 N.E.2d 605 (Ind. 2010); Kansas, Taylor v. McKune,

962 P.2d 566 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998); Kentucky, Hallum v. Commonwealth, 347 S.W.3d 55 (Ky. 2011);

Louisiana, Tatum v. Lynn, 637 So. 2d 796 (La. Ct. App. 1994); Massachusetts, Commonwealth v.

Hartsgrove, 553 N.E.2d 1299 (Mass. 1990); Mississippi, Sykes v. State, 757 So. 2d 997 (Miss. 2000);

Nevada, Kellogg v. Journal Commc’ns, 835 P.2d 12 (Nev. 1992); Oklahoma, Woody v. State ex rel.

Dep’t of Corrs., 833 P.2d 257 (Okla. 1992); Oregon, Hickey v. Or. State Penitentiary, 874 P.2d 102

(Or. Ct. App. 1994); Pennsylvania, Smith v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 683 A.2d 278 (Pa. 1996); South

Carolina, Mose v. State, 803 S.E.2d 718 (S.C. 2017); Texas, Warner v. Glass, 135 S.W.3d 681

(Tex. 2004); Vermont, In re Bruyette, 136 A.3d 575 (Vt. 2016); Washington, State v. Hurt,

27 P.3d 1276 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001); and Wisconsin, State ex rel. Shimkus v. Sondalle,

620 N.W.2d 409 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000).

7 These states are Colorado, Colo. R. Civ. P. 5(f); and Tennessee, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 5.06.

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682 (Tex. 2004); State v. Hurt, 27 P.3d 1276, 1282 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001),

other states have adopted the Rule by tolling the applicable statutes of

limitations, see Taylor v. McKune, 962 P.2d 566, 570 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998); Mose

v. State, 803 S.E.2d 718, 721-23 (S.C. 2017); State ex rel. Shimkus v. Sondalle,

620 N.W.2d 409, 412 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000).

[¶11] The circumstances of this case, however, preclude us from

following either approach. In Houston, as here, the prisoner’s appeal was

subject to both a rule of procedure and a statute establishing the filing

deadline. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1); 28 U.S.C.S. § 2107(a) (LEXIS through

Pub. L. No. 115-196). Nevertheless, unlike this case, the statutory filing

deadline in Houston did not specify where a notice of appeal was required to

be filed. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (providing a deadline to file but not

specifying which court to file in), with 5 M.R.S. § 11002(1) (2017) (specifying

that petitions for review must be filed “in the Superior Court”). As such,

whereas the Houston Court held that the absence of such a specification

permitted its interpretation that a different meaning of the word “filed” could

apply to pro se prisoners, 487 U.S. 266 at 272, we are unable to reach the

same conclusion here due to section 11002(1)’s clear directive that filing must

occur “in the Superior Court,” see Darling’s v. Ford Motor Co., 1998 ME 232,

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¶ 5, 719 A.2d 111 (“When interpreting a statute, we seek to give effect to the

intent of the Legislature by examining the plain meaning of the statutory

language . . . .”). Accordingly, we cannot consider this case in the same manner

as did the Houston Court.

[¶12] Nor can we, as other states have done, permit Martin’s petition to

proceed by tolling the thirty-day filing deadline provided in 5 M.R.S.

§ 11002(3). Although “[s]tatutory filing deadlines are presumptively subject

to equitable tolling,” that presumption is rebutted when those deadlines

“define the court’s jurisdiction,” Neverson v. Farquharson, 366 F.3d 32, 40 (1st

Cir. 2004), and we have previously held that the time limits contained in the

APA are jurisdictional, see Brown v. State, Dep't of Manpower Affairs, 426 A.2d

880, 888 (Me. 1981) (“We now state expressly that the Act’s time limitations

are jurisdictional.”); see also Reed v. Halperin, 393 A.2d 160, 162 & n.6

(Me. 1978) (explaining that the APA does not permit judicial-enlargement of

time limitations for judicial review). As such, this appeal must be considered

on constitutional grounds.

C. Constitutional Considerations

[¶13] Particularly relevant here, of the twenty-four states that have

adopted the Rule, two states—Florida and Oklahoma—have done so on

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constitutional grounds, holding that failure to adopt the Rule would violate

the principles of fundamental fairness contained in their respective

constitutions. See Haag v. State, 591 So. 2d 614, 616-17 (Fla. 1992); Woody v.

State ex rel. Dep’t of Corrs., 833 P.2d 257, 259-60 (Okla. 1992). Indeed, relying

on Houston, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Woody concluded that

pursuant to the provision of its state constitution analogous to our own open

courts provision, “the courts must be open to all on the same terms without

prejudice. The framers of the Constitution intended that all individuals

without partiality could pursue an effective remedy designed to protect their

basic and fundamental rights. . . . The constitutional guarantee of access to the

courts is not an empty formality.” 833 P.2d at 260.

[¶14] The same reasoning applies with equal force in this case, and we

therefore conclude that the Supreme Court’s rationale in Houston rings of the

fundamental fairness required by both the open courts provision and due

process clause of the Maine Constitution. See Me. Const. art. I, §§ 6-A, 19.

[¶15] The open courts provision states that “[e]very person, for an

injury inflicted . . . shall have remedy by due course of law; and right and

justice shall be administered freely and without sale, completely and without

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denial, promptly and without delay.” Me. Const. art. I, § 19.8 Pursuant to this

provision, courts are required to “be accessible to all persons alike without

discrimination . . . for every wrong recognized by law as remediable in a

court.” Me. Med. Ctr. v. Cote, 577 A.2d 1173, 1176 (Me. 1990). Although the

Legislature “may erect reasonable procedural requirements for exercising the

right to an adjudication,” Irish v. Gimbel, 1997 ME 50, ¶ 16, 691 A.2d 664, such

requirements may not “absolutely deprive [a citizen] of his remedy under

color of regulating it,” Sampson v. Sampson, 63 Me. 328, 333 (1874). Thus,

“[w]e do not construe section 19 as prohibiting reasonable limits on the time

within which a claimant must seek redress in the courts. . . . The only issue of

constitutional significance is whether such time limits are so unreasonable as

to deny meaningful access to the judicial process.” Cote, 577 A.2d at 1176

(emphasis added).

[¶16] Likewise, the due process clauses of the Maine and United States

Constitutions also establish a right to meaningful access to the judicial

8 This “sweeping guarantee” is derived from Part I, Article XI, of the Massachusetts Constitution

of 1780, and “[i]ts roots are in Magna Carta, chapter 29, as interpreted by the great

seventeenth-century jurist Lord Coke.” Marshall Tinkle, The Maine State Constitution 58

(2d ed. 2013) (citing Cary L. Fleisher, Comment, Article 1, Section 19 of the Maine Constitution: The

Forgotten Mandate, 21 Me. L. Rev. 83, 84-85 (1969)). The Magna Carta provides, in pertinent part,

“We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right,” which Lord

Coke interpreted to mean that “every subject of this realm, for injury done to him . . . may take his

remedy by the course of the law, and have justice, and right for the injury done to him, freely

without sale, fully without any deniall, and speedily without delay,” 1 E. Coke, The Second Part of the

Institutes of the Laws of England 45, 55 (1797).

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process. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Me. Const. art. 1, § 6-A; see Johnson v.

Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 498 & n.24 (1969). The Maine Constitution’s concept of

due process is identical to that contained in the United States Constitution,

Penobscot Area Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Brewer, 434 A.2d 14, 24 n.9

(Me. 1981), and as the Supreme Court has held, “absent a countervailing state

interest of overriding significance,” a generally valid statute or rule “may be

held constitutionally invalid as applied when it operates to deprive an

individual of a protected right,” Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377, 379

(1971).

[¶17] As applied to Martin, the filing requirements contained in 5 M.R.S.

§ 11002(1), (3) and M.R. Civ. P. 80C(b)—which do not prohibit prison officials

from determining when, or if, they forwarded his petition to the clerk of

court—are so unreasonable that they effectively deprived him of his right to

“meaningful access to the judicial process.” Cote, 577 A.2d at 1176; see Boddie,

401 U.S. at 379. Martin necessarily lost control over his petition on May 18,

2016, the moment it was delivered to prison authorities, and no matter how

far in advance he delivered the petition, he could never be certain that the

court clerk would receive it by May 25, 2016. Thus, he was denied the

opportunity to contest his disciplinary matter when the petition was received

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by the clerk of court on May 26, 2016, one day outside of the statutory

window and eight days after he gave it to the prison.

[¶18] “[I]n the absence of a sufficient countervailing justification for the

State’s action,” Boddie, 401 U.S. at 380-81, such ephemeral access to the court

cannot be properly characterized as “meaningful” and therefore does not

comport with the open courts provision and due process clause of the Maine

constitution. See Me. Const. art. I, §§ 6-A, 19. However, this is not to say that

the filing requirements pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 11002 and Rule 80C(b) will

always deprive a pro se prisoner of his or her right to meaningful access to the

judicial process. Because it is incumbent upon a pro se prisoner to recognize

that, unlike represented prisoners or nonincarcerated persons, he or she has

no choice but to mail his or her petition, it is not unconstitutionally

unreasonable to require that the petition be delivered to prison authorities at

least three days prior to the thirty-day filing deadline. See M.R. Civ. P. 6(c)

(recognizing that a period of three days is generally sufficient to allow for the

mailing of legal documents).

[¶19] Accordingly, a pro se prisoner’s constitutional rights are only

violated where—as in this case—he or she completes the prison’s procedures

for depositing the petition with the prison for mailing at least three days

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before the last day on which the petition may be timely filed, and the petition

does not reach the clerk of court until after that deadline has passed. Put

simply, the filing deadline created by 5 M.R.S. § 11002(3) and Rule 80C(b) has

effectively deprived Martin “of his remedy [against the Department] under

color of regulating it.” Sampson, 63 Me. at 333. This is especially so here,

given that the Department—as the party against whom Martin had attempted

to file his petition—was also the institution he was forced to rely upon to

ensure that his petition was timely filed. See Bennett v. Davis, 90 Me. 102, 107,

37 A. 864 (1897) (holding a filing statute unconstitutional where it “might put

the citizen at the mercy of his adversary . . . a result abhorrent to the very

nature of constitutional government”); see also Warner, 135 S.W.3d at 685

(recognizing “the unique problem that arises when one party is forced to rely

on his opposing party to ensure pleadings are timely filed” (quotation marks

omitted)).

[¶20] Accordingly, the State’s argument on appeal—that Martin’s

constitutional rights were not violated because he received the “ample time”

of twenty-three days to petition the court—misapprehends the constitutional

interest at stake, as such a standard would nonetheless result in Martin losing

all control over his petition upon delivery to prison authorities and would

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permit the Department to delay his petition for an indeterminate period in

order to ensure his inability to pursue a claim against it. Moreover, although

the State identifies our previous opinions in cases such as Giberson v. Quinn,

445 A.2d 1007, 1008-09 (Me. 1982), for the proposition that the open courts

provision does not prohibit a reasonable time limit for filing a judicial action,

those cases and the rationale underlying them are inapposite to the situation

at hand. Unlike Martin, the plaintiff in Giberson was not impermissibly forced

to rely on his opposing party to ensure that his pleadings were timely filed.

See generally id.

[¶21] For the foregoing reasons, we adopt the prisoner mailbox rule for

any unrepresented prisoner whose Rule 80C petition, having been delivered

to the Department of Corrections at least three days before the last day on

which the petition may be timely filed, arrives at the clerk of court after that

deadline has expired.

The entry is:

Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior

Court for reinstatement of the 80C petition.

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E. James Burke, Esq., and Alec Youngblood, Stud. Atty. (orally), Cumberland

Legal Aid Clinic, Portland, for appellant Charles M. Martin

Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and James E. Fortin, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally),

Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine

Knox County Superior Court docket number AP-2016-21

FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY