Kennedy v. United States

ORlGlNAL ` FlLED

, , JUL 19 2013

In the Umted States Court of Federal Clalms U_S_ wm OF

FEDEF{AL CLAlMS

No. 18-841C

(Filed: July 19, 2018)

****$*$*$$*******$**$$$**************

EDWARD THOMAS KENNEDY,

Pro Se Plaintiff; Sua Sponte Dismissal;

Subj ect Matter Jurisdiction; RCFC

lZ(h)(B); Proper Defendant; Civil Rights

Claims; Tort Claims; Criminal Matters;

Frivolous Claims; Collateral Attack of

Prior Decisions; Equitable Relief;

28 U.S.C. § 1631; ln Forma Pauperis

Plaintiff,

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

'X‘i€-K-)f-X-%%'ii"§£'

Defendant.

$****$******$************************

Edward Thomas Kennedv, Breinigsville, PA, pro se.

Sean King, United States Department of lustice, Washington, DC, for defendant

OPINION AND ORDER

SWEENEY, Cliief Judge

In this case, plaintiff Edward Thomas Kcnnedy, proceeding pro se, appears to allege that

various federal and state actors kept him in constructive financial imprisonment after a state

judge in Texas declined to vacate a judgment against him. Mr. Kennedy Seeks $30 million in

damages from each of several individuals and entities identified in his complaint plus attorney

fees, costs, interest, and declaratory and injunctive relief. Mr. Kennedy also filed an application

to proceed in forma pauperis As explained below, the court lacks jurisdiction to consider Mr.

Kennedy’s claims. Thus, without awaiting a response from defendant, the court grants Mr.

Kennedy’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and dismisses his complaint

I. BACKGROUND

On November 10, 2003, Mr. Kennedy filed a document titled “Petition in the Nature of a

Petition to Vacate a Void Judgrnent and Collateral Attack Ol<lahoma Statute Title 12, Sections

1031, 103 8” in the Tarrant County, Texas state district court.l’2 See generally Pet., Blumberg v.

1 The court derives the facts in this section nom the allegations set forth in plaintiffs

complaint and facts of Which the court may take judicial notice pursuant to Rule 201 of the

Federal Rules of Evidence.

2 Ol<lahoma state trial courts “have power to vacate or modify [their] own judgments or

orders,” on the basis of fraud or otherwise, within specified time limits. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12,

?Dl? ll'-l.'§l] |]|J|J[I 13le 1453`7

Kennedy, No. 352-190712-01 (Dist. Ct. 'l`arr. Cty. Tex. Nov, 10, 2003). The gravamen of Mr.

Kennedy’s allegations in that petition appears to be that Daniel Blumberg, a Texas attorney,

allegedly committed felony fraud in connection With a prior federal court proceeding in the

United States District Court for the Westem District of Oklahoma (“Western District of

Ol<lahoma”) (the nature and results of which are not provided) in an effort to deprive Mr.

Kennedy of “money, property, and rights” in contravention of section 453 of title 21 of the

Oklahoma Statutes.3 id_. 1[114-5.

Although not entirely clear, Mr. Blumberg apparently had obtained a Tarrant County

judgment (for an unspecified amount) against Mr. Kennedy following proceedings in the

Westem District of Ol<lahoma. Li In his November 10, 2003 petition, Mr. Kennedy alleged that

Mr. Blurnberg Was guilty of fraud because he “knew that the sum of demanded of [Mr. Kennedy]

was different from and greater than a sum [Mr. Kennedy] could owe under any lawful theory.”

lc_l_. 11 4. According to Mr. Kennedy, the purported fraud meant that the Tarrant County judgment

was void and “insufficient on its face,” and therefore the Tarrant County court lacked jurisdiction

to enter a judgment against him. I_cL 1[11 4-7. In light of this allegation, Mr. Kennedy asked the

Tarrant County court to vacate its earlier judgment and award him $25,000 as the “standard

damages for fraud” plus costs. Li 11 7. Mr. Kennedy served his petition on Mr. Blumberg as

well as Kurt Elieson and Peter Bagley, both of whom were attorneys working at Mr. Blurnberg’s

firm at the time. I_d_. Certificate of Service. Mr. Kennedy avers, in his complaint before this

court, that the presiding judicial officer, Judge Bonnie Sudderth, “ignored” his request Compl.

1111 7-8.

That same month, Mr. Kennedy filed a Civil Rights Act claim in the Um`ted States

District Court for the Eastern District of California against Mr. Blumberg, Mr. Bagley, Mr.

Elieson, and Robert Kennard.4 Kennedy v. Kennard, No. 2103-cv-2392 (E.D. Cal. filed Nov. 17,

2003). Mr. Kennedy voluntarily dismissed the case on March 10, 2004. LJ. As of October

2017, he intended to begin law school in Fall 2018 and expressed a desire to become an attorney

Compl. il 9, Kennedv v. United States, No. 5:17-cv-04579 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 20§7). Mr.

Kennedy acknowledged that filing lawsuits was a way to “test [his] skills as a litigator.” L;L. 11 li.

§ 1031 (West 1999). “Proceedings to vacate or modify a judgment, decree or order” on the basis

of fraud must generally be commenced “within two (2) years after the filing of the judgment,

decree or order,” although a ruling that is “void . . . may be vacated at any time, on motion of a

party, or any person affected thereby.” I_d. § 1038.

3 “Any person guilty of falsely preparing any bool<, paper, record, instrument in writing,

or other matter or thing, with intent to produce it, or allow it to be produced as genuine upon any

trial, proceeding or inquiry whatever, authorized by law, shall be guilty of a felony.” Okla. Stat.

Ann. tit. 21, §453.

4 Mr. Kennard is a California attorney specializing in third-party debt collection

Attorney Search, State Bar of Cal., http://rnernbers.calbar.ca.gov/falfl\/[ember/Detail/l17017 (last

visited July 18, 2018); Nelson & Kennard: Attornevs at Law, http://nelson-kennard.com/ (last

visited July 18, 2018).

Mr. Kennedy has filed, since October 2017 alone, at least twenty-one federal lawsuits in

Pennsylvania, New York, and elsewhere, four of which he has voluntarily dismissed

On June l2, 2018, Mr. Kennedy filed the instant suit, which shares similarities with the

cases discussed above.5 See generally Compl. He names several defendants in his complaint:

Mr. Blurnberg, Blurnberg & Associates (l\/lr. Blumberg’s former law firm), Mr. Bagley,

Blumberg & Bagley LLP (Mr. Blumberg’s and Mr. Bagley’s current law firm), Judge Sudderth,

the State Bar of Texas, the State of Texas, Mr. Kennard, Nelson & Kennard (Mr. Kennard’s law

firm), the State Bar of California, Patelco Credit Union (a Northern California-based credit union

chartered under California law), Steven Terner Mnuchin (Secretary of the Treasury), the United

States Department of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Thomas Marshall

(General Counsel and Executive Vice President of the United States Postal Service), l\/legan

Brennan (United States Postmaster General and Chief Executive Officer of the United States

Postal Service), the United States Postal Service, and the United States federal government §

He contends that “[e] ach defendant is an agent of the other, and each has his place in the chain”

of responsibility and thus ali defendants are “vicariously liable for each instance of injury.” ld_.

11 23.

At bottom, Mr. Kennedy alleges that the identified defendants_“directly, through an

agent, or in concert With one another”-have kept him in “constructive financial imprisonment.”

i;d. 111[ 2-3. Mr. Kennedy refers to the identified defendants as “[k]idnappers” and “[b]andits,”

apparently in connection with his description of financial imprisonment as a loss of liberty and

his allegations that the identified defendants have refused to return stolen property. idl 1111 1-3.

Mr. Kennedy vaguely alludes to “personal property” and “trade secrets,” § 1131, but does not

otherwise identify the property or trade secrets he alleges to have been stolen beyond stating

generally that money is owed to him.

In his complaint, Mr. Kennedy alleges:

¢ After Mr. Bluml)erg “lied under oath in documents and

records” provided to him in connection with the Tarrant

County case in 2003, ludge Sudderth “ignored [his] petition to

5 The day prior, Mr. Kennedy filed two other, unrelated actions in this court, neither of

which is assigned to the undersigned; both cases were dismissed on June 29, 2018, for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction Kennedy v. United States, No. 18-830€, 2018 WL 3214049 (Fed.

Cl. June 29, 2018); Kennedy v. United States. No. 18-826C, 2018 WL 3214115 (Fed. Cl. June

29, 2018). Also on June ll, 2018, Mr. Kennedy filed an action in the United States Tax Court.

Kennedy v. Comm’r, No. 011586-18 (T.C. filed June 11, 2018). Since filing the instant

complaint, Mr. Kennedy has filed Six additional actions in this court, one of which is assigned to

the undersigned Kennedy v. United States, No. 18-1030C (Fed. Cl. filed luly 11, 2018);

Kennedy v. United States, No. 18-1029C (Fed. Cl. filed July 11, 2018); Kennedy v. United

States, No. 18-1028C (Fed. Cl. filed July ll, 2018); Kennedy v. United States, No. 18-1027C

(Fed. Cl. filed July 11, 2018); Kennedy v. United States, No. 18-1006€ (Fed. Cl. filed July li,

2018); Kennedy v. United States, No. 18-942C (Fed. Cl. filed June 28, 2018).

_3_

vacate a void judgment.” I_d. 1111 7-8. By doing so, Mr.

Blumberg and Judge Sudderth “proceeded under color of law

and stole funds from [l\/Ir. Kennedy]” by denying him funds

that he asserts were rightfully his, resulting in a “loss of

[fmancial] liberty.” I_d. 1111 9-10. Since, according to Mr.

Kennedy, the Tarrant County court lacked jurisdiction to enter

a void judgment Mr. Blumberg and Judge Sudderth breached

their duty “to prove jurisdiction When objection to jurisdiction

is asserted.” Li 1111 11-12.

0 The identified defendants breached their duty to allow Mr.

Kennedy to “proceed without injury, secure in his capacities,”

and to “eXercise his right to liberty.” I;d. 1111 16-18.

0 The identified defendants, particularly those who are attorneys,

have “breach[ed] their oaths of offices.” I_d. 11 26. Further,

“[tjhe business model of Defendants is based on a foundation

of deceptions, lies[,] and fi'aud.” I_d. 11 28.

» Mr. Blumberg, Mr. Bagley, Mr. Kennard, and Patelco Credit

Union “stole[ Mr. Kennedy’s] personal property and trade

secrets.” Ld. 11 31.

¢ Mr. Kennedy “has the right to demand and redeem lawful

money” from Patelco Credit Union and the Federal Reserve

Bank of New York, and only recently became aware that he

could do so. Ld. 1111 32-33 (relying on 12 U.S.C. § 411). Thus,

Patelco Credit Union has been c‘unlawfully using the interest”

on Mr. Kennedy’s money since 1985, when he deposited his

first paycheck LE. 1111 33-34.

Mr. Kennedy demands, from each identified defendant, (1) the greater of “$ l ,000 for

each day of unlawful behaviors” or $5 million for “general damages,” ii 11 43, and (2) the

greater of “$5,000 for each failure to act” or $25 million for “damages for the injurycaused by

defendant[s]’ absence of required actions,” § 11 44. He also demands the return of the “value of

all bonds created in these matters in this case,” hi”d_. 11 51, pemianent injunctions enjoining the

identified defendants “from interfering in any way with [his] lawful rights” and ordering the

identified defendants to “provide him With a lawful governmen ” and “honor their fiduciary duty

to [him],” ida 1111 48-49, and declaratory judgments that “defendants have acted contrary to

constitutional right, power, or privilege” and “in excess of statutory jurisdiction [and] authority

and short of statutory right,” § 1111 46-47.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Pro Se Plaintif`f`s

Pro se pleadings are “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers” and are “to be liberally construed.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per

curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the “leniency afforded to a pro se litigant

with respect to mere formalities does not relieve the burden to meet jurisdictional requirements.”

Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 249, 253 (2007); accord Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d

795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The fact that [the plaintiff] acted pro se in the drafting of his

complaint may explain its ambiguities, but it does not excuse its failures, if such there be.”). ln

other words, a pro se plaintiff is not excused from his burden of proving, by a preponderance of

evidence, that the court possesses jurisdiction §p§ McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp..

298 U.S. 178, 179 (1936); Banks v. United States, 741 F.3d 1268, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing

Revnolds v. Annv & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Whether the court possesses jurisdiction to decide the merits of a case is a “threshold

matter.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998). Subject matter

jurisdiction cannot be waived or forfeited because it “involves a court’s power to hear a case.”

United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002), quoted in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S.

500, 514 (2006). “Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction

is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court

is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall)

506, 514 (1868). Therefore, it is “an inflexible matter that must be considered before proceeding

to evaluate the merits of a case.” Matthews v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 274, 278 (2006); accord

K-Con Bldg. Svs., Inc. v. United States, 778 F.3d 1000, 1004-05 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Either party,

or the court sua sponte, may challenge the court’s subject matter jurisdiction at any time.

Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 506; see also Jeun v. United States1 128 Fed. Cl. 203, 209-10 (2016)

(collecting cases).

in determining whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, the court generally “must

accept as true all undisputed facts asserted in the plaintiffs complaint and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Trusted Integration. lnc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159,

1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011). However, the court has no subject matter jurisdiction over frivolous

claims. Moden v. United States, 404 F.3d 1335, 1340-41 {Fed. Cir. 2005). For example, there is

no subject matter jurisdiction over claims that are “so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by

prior decisions . . . , or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal

controversy.” I;d. at 1341 (intemal quotation marks omitted). If thc court finds that it lacks

subject matter jurisdiction over a claim, Rule 12(h)(3) of the Rules of the United States Court of

Federal Claims (“RCFC”) requires the court to dismiss that claim.

C. The Tucker Act

The ability of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“Court of Federal Claims”) to

entertain suits against the United States is limited “The United States, as sovereign, is immune

from suit save as it consents to be sued.” United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).

The waiver of immunity “may not be inferred, but must be unequivocally expressed.” United

States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472 (2003). Further, “[w]hen Waiver

legislation contains a statute of limitations, the limitations provision constitutes a condition on

the waiver of sovereign immunity.” Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands,

461U.S.273, 287 (1983).

The Tucker Act, the principal statute governing the jurisdiction of this court, waives

sovereign immunity for claims against the United States, not sounding in tort, that are founded

upon the United States Constitution, a federal statute or regulation or an express or implied

contract with the United States. 28 U.S.C. § l491(a)(l) (2012); White l\/lountain, 537 U.S. at

472. However, the Tucker Act is merely a jurisdictional statute and “does not create any

substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages.” United States v.

Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 298 (1976). Instead, the substantive right must appear in another source of

law, such as a “money-mandating constitutional provision statute or regulation that has been

violated, or an express or implied contract with the United States.” Loveladies I-Iarbor, Inc. v.

United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).

D. Statute of Limitations

Besides meeting the 'l`ucker Act requirements, any action in the Court of F ederal Claims

must be “filed within six years after such claim first accrues” to fall within the court’s

jurisdiction 28 U.S.C. § 250l. A cause of action accrues “when all the events Which fix the

government’s alleged liability have occurred grgl the plaintiff was or should have been aware of

their existence.” Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 855 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed.

Cir. 1988), quoted in San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir.

2011). The limitations period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2501 is an “absolute” limit on the ability

of the Court of Federal Claims to exercise jurisdiction and reach the merits of a claim. John R.

Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States. 552 U.S. 130, 133-35 (2008).

III. DISCUSSION

Under a liberal construction of Mr. Kennedy’s pro se complaint, he is alleging claims for

embezzlement perjury, fraud, conspiracy, harassment, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence,

violation of 12 U.S.C. § 411, and civil rights violations against various federal, state, and private

individuals and entities. Mr. Kennedy also appears to collaterally attack decisions issued by

- courts in the Western District of Oklahoma and Tarrant County, Texas. Without inquiring into

whether Mr. Kennedy’s claims are barred by claim and/or issue preclusion based on prior court

decisions, it is clear that the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over his claims.

Consequently, Mr. Kennedy’s complaint must be dismissed

A. The United States Is the 0nly Proper Defendant in the Court of Federal Claims

Although the court has liberally construed the complaint in the light most favorable to

Mr. Kennedy, the crux of the allegations contained therein are lodged against (l) attorneys (and

their law firms) and a judge involved in his prior court cases, i.e., private individuals and state

government officials, and (2) state agencies responsible for supervising attorneys and the courts,

including the state itself. Mr. Kennedy also names Patelco Credit Union, a private entity, as a

defendant However, in the Court of F ederal Claims, “the guy proper defendant . . . is the

United States, not its officers, nor any other individual.” Stephenson v. United States, 58 Fed.

Cl. 186, 190 (2003); accord RCFC 10(a). Because “the United States itself” is the only proper

defendant in the Court of F ederal Clairns, this court lacks jurisdiction “over any claims alleged

against states, localities, state and local government entities, or state and local government

officials and employees.” Anderson v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 330, 331 (20l4). Similarly,

the Court of F ederal Clairns lacks jurisdiction “over suits against private parties.” Edelmann v.

United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 376, 380 (2007). in other words, “if the relief sought [in the Court of

Federal Claimsj is against other than the United States, the suit as to them must be ignored as

beyond the jurisdiction of the court.” Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 5 84. Accordingly, to the extent

that Mr. Kennedy complains of improper conduct by parties other than the United States federal

govemment, this court lacks jurisdiction over those claims, and they must be dismissed

B. The Court of Federal Claims Lacks Jurisdiction Over Mr. Kennedy’s Civil Rights and

Tort Claims

To the extent that Mr. Kennedy asserts civil rights violations and commissions of various

torts, his claims are outside the reach of this court’s Tucker Act jurisdiction

First, the Court of Federal Claims is not a federal district court. Ledford v. United States,

297 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 137 S. Ct.

553, 563 (2017) (distinguishing between the “Court of Federal Claims” and “federal district

courts”).

Second, only federal district courts possess jurisdiction to entertain claims alleging civil

rights violations. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 104 Fed Cl. 92, 98 (2012) (explaining that

the Court of Federal Claims has no jurisdiction over claims based on, among other causes of

action, alleged “violations of . . . civil rights”); Marlin v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 475, 476

(2005) (explaining that Bivens claims and claims alleging violations cf 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983,

and 1985 must be heard in federal district courts).

Third, this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain claims sounding in tort. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1491(a); Rick’s Mushroom Serv., lnc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

Under the Federal Tort Claims Act‘, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(l), 2671-2680, jurisdiction over tort

claims against the federal government lies exclusively in federal district courts. U.S. Maring

Inc. v. United States, 722 F.3d 1360, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Claims offraud, conspiracy,

harassment, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence sound in tort. See1 e.g., Lawrence Battelle,

Inc. v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 579, 585 (2014) (fraud and negligence); Sellers v. United

_7_

States, 110 Fed. Cl. 62, 68 (2013) (negligence); Cox v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 213, 218

(2012) (harassrnent, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty); Phang v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl.

321, 325 (2009) (fraud); Gant v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 311, 316 (2004) (conspiracy, fraud,

and negligence).

in short, the court must dismiss any civil rights or tort claims asserted by Mr. Kennedy.

C. The Court of Federal Claims Lacks Jurisdiction Over Criminal Matters

Next, Mr. Kennedy alleges that criminal activity has occurred in the form of perjury and

embezzlement HoWever, it is Well established that the Court of Federal Clairns “has no

jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims Whatsoever under the federal criminal code.” Josiiua v.

United States, 17 F.3d 378, 379 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (summarily

affirming a Court of Federal Clainis dismissal order); see also Hufford v. United States, 87 Fed.

Cl. 696, 702 (2009) (collecting cases). Therefore, to the extent that Mr. Kennedy seeks redress

for criminal violations, such claims must be dismissed as beyond the jurisdiction of this court

D. The Court of Federal Claims Lacks Jurisdiction Over Mr. Kennedy’s Statutory Claim

Mr. Kennedy also asserts that he is entitled to “demand and redeem lawful money” from

Patelco Credit Union and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 411.

In its entirety, that statute (which was last amended in 193 5) provides:

Federal reserve notes, to be issued at the discretion of the Board of

Governors of the Federal Reserve System for the purpose of

making advances to Federal reserve banks through the Federal

reserve agents as hereinafter set forth and for no other puipose, are

authorized The said notes shall be obligations of the United States

and shall be receivable by all national and member banks and

Federal reserve banks and for all taxes, customs, and other public

dues. They shall be redeemed in lawful money on demand at the

Treasury Department of the United States, in the city of

Washington, District of Colunibia, or at any Federal Reserve bank.

12 U.S.C. § 411 (2012). in other Words, cash can be (1) used to pay government debts,

(2) deposited in banks, and (3) redeemed for “lawful money” at the Treasury Department or any

Federal Reserve bank.

The purpose of this statute is to “make clear that the [F ederal Reserve] notes [i.e., cash]

are authorized currency of the United States.” Provenza v. Cornptroller of Treasurv, 497 A.2d

831, 833-34 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985). To the extent that this statute imposes a duty on the

federal government, the Treasury Department and Federal Reserve banks must redeem cash for

lawhil money when cash is presented for redemption However, Mr. Kennedy asserts that he

“may demand lawful money at any time,” Compl. 1[ 36, Without presenting cash equal in value to

the amount of lawful money demanded Such an allegation is frivolous on its face. As such, the

allegation fails to invoke the jurisdiction of this court.

E. The Court of Federal Claims Lacks Jurisdictiori to Entertain Plaintiff’ s Collateral

Attaek Against the Decisions of Other Courts

ln addition to alleging claims involving civil rights, torts, criminal matters, and statutory

violations, Mr. Kennedy appears to be collaterally attacking unspecified decisions of the United

States District Court for the Westem District of Oklahoma and the Tarrant County, Texas state

district court. I-Iowever, the Tucker Act does not provide the Court of Federal Claims with

jurisdiction to entertain collateral attacks on the decisions of other courts. 28 U.S.C. § 149l(a);

see, e.g., Shi`nnecock Indian Nation v. United States, 782 F.3d l345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2015)

(“Binding precedent establishes that the Court of Federal Claims has no jurisdiction to review the

merits of a decision rendered by a federal district court.”); Vereda, Ltda. v. United States, 271

F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he Court of Federal Claims cannot entertain a taking

claim that requires the court to scrutinize the actions of another tribunal.” (internal quotation

marks omitted)). Mr. Kennedy’s recourse concerning prior adverse decisions is “the statutorily

defined appellate process,” Shinnecock indian Nation, 782 F.3d at 1353 (citing 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291), whether in state or federal court.

F. Mr. Kennedy’s Claims Are Tinie-Barred

Even if this court otherwise had jurisdiction to entertain any of Mr. Kennedy’s claims,

they are likely barred by the six-year statute of limitations generally applicable in the Court of

Federal Claims. §§e_ 28 U.S.C. § 2501. The only specific conduct to which l\/lr. Kennedy refers

in his complaint is (l) ludge Sudderth having “ignored” his November 10, 2003 petition With

respect to Mr. Blumberg’s allegedly improper acts and (2) his own failure to demand lawful

money beginning in 1985. Further, Mr. Kennedy voluntarily dismissed a subsequent lawsuit that

he filed against Mr. Blumberg on March 10, 2004. Therefore, the six-year statute of limitations

imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2501 began to run, at the latest, on March 10, 2004, and expired, at the

latest, on March 10, 2010. Because l\/lr. Kennedy did not file the instant complaint until June 12,

2018, this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain his claims

G. The Court of Federal Claims Lacks Authority to Graiit Equitable Relief

Finally, in addition to monetary relief, Mr. Kennedy seeks certain permanent injunctions

and declaratory judgments However, it is well settled that the Court of Federal Claims generally

lacks the authority to grant such equitable relief E Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, _

905 (1988) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims lacks the “general equitable powers of a

district court to grant prospective relief ’). This court is only authorized to award equitable relief

in certain specified situations §ee judy at 905 n.40; Gonzales & Gonzales Bonds & lns. Agencv.

lnc. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 490 F.3d 940, 943 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Kanemoto v. Reno, 41 F.3d

641, 644-45 (Fed. Cir. 1994). None of those circumstances applies here. § 28 U.S.C.

§ l49l(a)(2) (providing the court with jurisdiction to issue, “as incident of and collateral to” an

award of money damages, “orders directing restoration to office or position, placement in

,9_

appropriate duty or retirement status, and correction of applicable records”); § (providing the

court with jurisdiction to render judgment in nonmonetary disputes arising under the Contract

Disputes Act of 1978); § § 1491(b)(2) (providing the court with jurisdiction to award

declaratory and injunctive relief in bid protests); _i_d_. § 1507 (providing the court with jurisdiction

to issue declaratory judgments under 26 U.S.C. § 7428).

H. The Court Decliiies to Transfer This Case

When the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over a claim, it is empowered to

transfer such claim to an appropriate court if doing so “is in the interest ofjustice.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1631. “Transfer is appropriate when three elements are met: (l) [t]he transferring court lacks

subject matterjurisdiction; (2) the case could have been filed in the court receiving the transfer;

and (3) the transfer is in the interests of justice.” Brown v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 546, 550

(2006). The failure of even one of these elements renders transfer improper.

Transferring Mr. Kennedy’s case to an appropriate district court will not “serve the

interests of justice.” Khalil v. United States, l33 Fed. Cl. 390, 393 (2017). ln Khalil, another

judge of this court declined to transfer the case because doing so would “serve[j no purpose”

since the plaintiffs claims had already been considered by a district court. Ld ln the instant

case, Mr. Kennedy has similarly “already availed himself of the opportunity,” imd;, to present his

claims against the federal government to a district court. ln other words, the courts that would

have jurisdiction have already considered plaintiff s claims Therefore, as in Khalil, transferring

Mr. Kennedy’s claims would be futiie. ln any event, transferring a case where the plaintiff wants

to “test his skills as a litigator” does not advance the interests of justice.

Accordingly, the court declines to transfer any part of plaintiff s case to another court.

IV. APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

To proceed with a civil action in this court, a plaintiff must either pay $400 in fees-a

3350 filing fee plus a $50 administrative fee_or request authorization to proceed without

payment of fees by submitting a signed application to proceed in forma pauperis6 §ge 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915, 1926; RCFC 77(0); see also Waltner v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 139, 141 n.2 (2010)

(concluding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(l) applies to both prisoners and nonprisoners alike).

Plaintiff`s wishing to proceed in forma pauperis must submit an affidavit that (l) lists all of their

assets, (2) declares that they are unable to pay the fees, and (3) states the nature of the action and

their belief that they are entitled to redress. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Evaluation of a plaintiffs

ability to pay is “left to the discretion of the presiding judge, based on the information submitted

by the plaintiff” Alston-Bullock v. United States, 122 Fed. Cl. 38, 45 (2015).

6 While the Court of Federal Claims is not generally considered to be a “court of the

United States” within the meaning of Title 28 of the United States Code, the court has

jurisdiction to adjudicate applications to proceed in forma pauperis §_e§ 28 U.S.C. § 2503(d)

(deeming the Court of Federal Claims to be a “court of the United States” for purposes of 28

U.S.C. § 1915).

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As noted above, l\/lr. Kennedy filed, concurrent with the complaint, an application to

proceed iii forma pauperis. Mr. Kennedy has fulfilled all three requirements, and the court is

satisfied that he is unable to pay the filing fee otherwise required by RCFC 77.1(0). Therefore,

the court grants Mr. Kennedy’s application and waives his filing fee.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over claims involving civil rights, torts, or

criminal matters; to entertain frivolous claims or collateral attacks on the decisions of other

courts; and, with exceptions not relevant here, to award equitable relief. Therefore, the court has

no jurisdiction to consider any aspect of l\/lr. Kennedy’s complaint Further, transferring Mr.

Kennedy’s case to a district court is not in the interests of justice.

Accordingly, Mr. Kennedy’s complaint is DISMISSED WITHOU'I` PREJUDICE for

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction Mr. Kennedy’s application to proceed in fomia pauperis is

GRANTED. No costs. The clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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