stating that, as with statutes, we interpret court orders based on their plain language
How later courts described this case
- stating that, as with statutes, we interpret court orders based on their plain language
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2018 ME 88
Docket: Pen-17-170
Argued: October 11, 2017
Decided: July 3, 2018
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
Dissent: JABAR, J.
SHELLY R. HIGGINS
v.
TODD A. WOOD
SAUFLEY, C.J.
[¶1] In this appeal, and a separate opinion issued today, see Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs. v. Fagone, 2018 ME 89, --- A.3d ---, we clarify the
circumstances in which a court order that anticipates a change in child support
upon the occurrence of future events will be self-effectuating. In the matter
before us, we conclude that the court’s order requiring Todd A. Wood to pay a
specific amount of child support to Shelly R. Higgins did not contain a
self-effectuating provision that immediately reduced Wood’s child support
payments upon his oldest child reaching age eighteen. We also conclude that
neither administrative collateral estoppel nor administrative equitable
estoppel was properly raised and therefore those doctrines cannot provide a
2
remedy to Wood. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment on Wood’s post-divorce
motions in which the District Court (Bangor, Lucy, J.) ordered changes in
Wood’s child support effective only after Wood’s service of the post-divorce
motion to modify.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The following facts are drawn from the procedural record and from
the family law magistrate’s (Chandler, M.) findings of fact, reached upon a
stipulated documentary record and adopted by the District Court (Lucy, J.). See
Dunwoody v. Dunwoody, 2017 ME 21, ¶ 7, 155 A.3d 422. Higgins and Wood
were married in May 1997 and have three children who were born in 1991,
1998, and 2001.
[¶3] Higgins filed a complaint for divorce on March 20, 2007, and a family
law magistrate (Langner, M.) entered a divorce judgment on June 14, 2007, that
provided for Higgins to have primary residence and required Wood to pay child
support of $297.15 per week for the three children, who were then ages fifteen,
nine, and five. The child support worksheet attached to the judgment provided
as follows with respect to the overall weekly support obligation of the parents:
Basic weekly support for all children up to 18 years (or up to 19
years if still in high school) . . . .
a Total number of children 3
3
b Number of children ages 0-11 2 multiplied by amount from
table 102 X 2 = 204
c Number of children ages 12-17 1 multiplied by amount from
table 126
The court added in the $35 cost of health insurance for the three children
without apportioning it per child. The order made Wood responsible for
ninety-one percent of the weekly support and credited him for paying the cost
of health insurance, resulting in the $297 weekly support amount that was
required by the judgment for support of the three children. The child support
order stated:
The child support obligation shall continue for each child until that
child reaches the age of 18; provided, however, that if the child has
not graduated, withdrawn, or been expelled from secondary school
as defined in Title 20-A, the child support shall continue until the
child graduates or reaches the age of 19, whichever occurs first[.]
[¶4] In addition, the order stated, “Any party to this action may ask the
court to review the amount of child support and if appropriate, to modify it in
accordance with the state’s child support guidelines. To start this process, a
party must file with the court a Motion to Modify.”
[¶5] To assure that Wood met his child support obligations, Higgins
pursued support enforcement through the Department of Health and Human
Services Division of Support Enforcement and Recovery, which withheld
4
Wood’s wages to provide Higgins with the ordered child support beginning in
the middle of 2008. In 2009, the oldest child turned eighteen, having already
graduated from high school. At about that time, Wood asked the Department
to reduce his payments, though he did not move to modify the judgment in the
District Court.1 The Department made no adjustment at that time.
[¶6] Wood continued to pay child support in the amount ordered and
took no further action until February 2015 when his telephone calls to the
Department prompted the Regional Manager of the Department’s Division of
Support Enforcement and Recovery to send him a notice that the Department
was adjusting the child support obligation down to $182 per week. The $182
amount was apparently intended to reflect a flat reduction of the basic weekly
support by the $126 amount originally allocated to the oldest child in the 2007
child support worksheet, with the health insurance provisions remaining the
same despite the termination of support for one child, and the support amounts
for the other two children remaining unchanged despite the increases that
should have occurred when each of the younger children reached age twelve.
1 The Department’s case notes indicate that Wood first telephoned the Department about his
oldest child reaching age eighteen in 2009, and Wood was then informed that the “blanket order”
that was in place did not authorize a change in the amount of child support. Wood called about the
issue again in February 2015.
5
At the time of the February 2015 letter, the two younger children were ages
seventeen and thirteen.
[¶7] Several months later, in July 2015, the Director of the Division
informed Wood that the February decision was in error and that Wood needed
to file, in court, a motion to modify the child support order to seek any reduction
in the ordered support.
[¶8] On July 24, 2015, Wood filed two motions in the District Court—a
motion to modify and a motion for determination of overpayment. He argued
that he had overpaid by more than $35,000 over the course of six years because,
after the oldest child turned eighteen, his child support obligation should have
been reduced by $114 per week. Although the use of the summary judgment
process in family law matters is not authorized, see M.R. Civ. P. 56(a),2 Wood
also moved for summary judgment on his post-judgment motions, submitting a
statement of material facts and supporting evidence. In the motion for
summary judgment, he raised issues of administrative collateral estoppel and
2
The Maine Rules of Civil Procedure do not allow for motions for summary judgment on
post-judgment motions in family matters. See M.R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party seeking to recover upon a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or any part thereof.”
(emphasis added)). It was through such an impermissible motion that Wood raised administrative
collateral estoppel and equitable estoppel issues.
6
equitable estoppel. The parties filed opposing and reply memoranda and
statements of material facts.
[¶9] On March 21, 2016, the family law magistrate (Chandler, M.) held a
hearing.3 The parties informed the magistrate that they had agreed to a series
of three child support orders to apply from the filing of Wood’s motion, in
July 2015, forward. The first of these orders imposed an obligation of $280.50
per week toward the support of the two youngest children through January
2016 when the middle child turned eighteen. The order explicitly provided that
the support would decrease to $207.56 upon the youngest child becoming the
only child for whom support was owed, and the final order required Wood to
pay $187 per week beginning in August 2016 based on the Department’s
revised child support table. See 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-15 to -23 (2016).
[¶10] The magistrate then accepted a collection of stipulated exhibits,
and the parties offered legal arguments regarding the amount of child support
owed from the oldest child’s eighteenth birthday in 2009 through the
July 31, 2015, effective date of the first agreed-upon order. Thus, the court held
3 Despite his own assertion through his motion for summary judgment that there were no genuine
issues of material fact, Wood submitted a witness list after receiving a hearing notice and objected to
proceeding with a nonevidentiary hearing. Ultimately, the magistrate accepted stipulated exhibits
and heard legal arguments, as explained further below.
7
the trial on a stipulated record, and the parties presented argument on the
applicable law. See Rose v. Parsons, 2015 ME 73, ¶ 8, 118 A.3d 220.
[¶11] The magistrate entered the modified child support orders to which
the parties had agreed. The magistrate then concluded that Wood could not
recover any overpayment for child support paid prior to his service of the
motion to modify because the parties’ 2007 judgment did not provide dollar
amounts by which the child support order would self-adjust upon each child’s
emancipation or attainment of the age of twelve. The court ordered the
Department to determine any amount of overpayment or underpayment that
may have arisen while the motion to modify was under consideration by the
court.
[¶12] The Department filed an unopposed motion to amend the findings
of fact to correct minor factual errors, which the magistrate granted. Wood
objected to the magistrate’s order on the grounds that the magistrate applied
the incorrect law and that only a judge—not a magistrate—had the authority
to rule on the motion for summary judgment. See M.R. Civ. P. 118(a).
[¶13] The court (Lucy, J.) reviewed the magistrate’s decision and entered
a judgment in which it adopted the magistrate’s order on the modification of
child support, agreed with the magistrate that the Department did not have the
8
authority to adjust the court-ordered amount of child support, and concluded
that summary judgment must be denied, in part because a party may not move
for summary judgment on a post-judgment motion in a family matter. See id.
With respect to the alleged overpayment, the court explained that, because the
divorce judgment did not include explicit prospective calculations of child
support based on the children reaching age twelve or eighteen, a motion to
modify the judgment was necessary for the court to find the proper amount of
child support to be paid.
[¶14] Wood appealed from the judgment. See 14 M.R.S. § 1901(1)
(2017); 19-A M.R.S. § 104 (2017); M.R. App. P. 2 (Tower 2016).4 The
Department filed a brief that included a “supplement” consisting of the child
support worksheet and order from Lund v. Lund, a District Court case that
resulted in an opinion from us. 2007 ME 98, 927 A.2d 1185. Wood objected
and moved to strike the supplement because it was not in the record available
to the trial court.5 We ordered that the issue would be considered along with
4 The appeal was filed before September 1, 2017; hence, the restyled Maine Rules of Appellate
Procedure do not apply. See M.R. App. P. 1 (restyled). We cite to the applicable rules throughout this
opinion, except as indicated.
5 Wood also moved to strike certain arguments made by Higgins, but we denied that part of
Wood’s motion.
9
the merits of the appeal, and we now take judicial notice of the documents
submitted by the Department and address the merits of Wood’s appeal. See
M.R. Evid. 201(b)(2), (d); cf. In re Jonas, 2017 ME 115, ¶ 38 n.10, 164 A.3d 120
(explaining that a court may take judicial notice of the action taken by a court
in a final judgment).
II. DISCUSSION
[¶15] Wood argues that the child support order included in the 2007
divorce judgment provided for a self-effectuating reduction in the amount of
child support when the parties’ oldest child turned eighteen in 2009 and that
he is therefore entitled to recoup an overpayment of child support. Here, we
use the term “self-effectuating” to describe a provision in a judgment that
explicitly articulates a change in a support obligation on an identified date or
upon the occurrence of a specific event, such that the new, explicitly identified
amount takes immediate effect and is enforceable. In other words, we have
substituted the term “self-effectuating” for the longer description used
previously for a “self-executing provision that automatically amends a court
order” upon the occurrence of a specific event or the arrival of a specific date.
Bartlett v. Anderson, 2005 ME 10, ¶ 12, 866 A.2d 829.
10
[¶16] To review whether the judgment at issue here was
self-effectuating such that Wood was entitled to reduce his payments without
further order of the court, we (A) summarize the alternative administrative and
court processes for establishing and modifying child support, (B) examine the
law governing self-effectuating adjustments in court-issued child support
orders, (C) review whether the District Court properly applied the law, and
(D) address the application of principles of collateral and equitable estoppel.
A. Methods of Establishing and Modifying Child Support Orders in Maine
[¶17] In Maine, there are different methods for parents to obtain
enforceable orders of child support. Most commonly, a parent will seek a child
support order through (1) the Department in an administrative proceeding, see
19-A M.R.S. § 2304 (2017); 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-36 to -41, ch. 8 (2016), or
(2) the District Court in an action for divorce or for the determination of
parental rights and responsibilities, see 19-A M.R.S. §§ 901, 1652,
1653(2)(D)(3), 1653(8) (2017).6 We summarize the methods for establishing
and enforcing each of these types of orders.
6 A court order of child support may be entered in other contexts, as well, and our holding today
applies equally to any court-ordered support. See, e.g., 19-A M.R.S. § 1654 (2017) (parents living
apart); 19-A M.R.S. § 4007(9) (2017) (protection from abuse); 22 M.R.S. § 4038-C(4) (2017)
(permanency guardianship).
11
1. Department-Issued Child Support Orders
[¶18] The Department—acting “on its own behalf or on behalf of another
state or another state’s instrumentality, an individual or governmental
applicant for services under section 2103 [support enforcement] or a person
entitled by federal law to support enforcement services as a former recipient of
public assistance”—may “establish the responsible parent’s current parental
support obligation” applying the statutory child support guidelines and the
statute governing deviation from the guidelines. 19-A M.R.S. § 2304; see
19-A M.R.S. §§ 2001-2012 (2017) (child support guidelines);7 17 C.M.R. 10 144
351-37 to -39, ch. 8, § 9.
[¶19] A party may seek administrative review of a Department decision
establishing the child support obligation within thirty days after receiving
notice of the decision. 19-A M.R.S. § 2451 (2017); 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-49,
ch. 12, § 2(B)(2)(a), (3)(i) (2017). If a party seeks to challenge the final decision
entered upon administrative review, that party may appeal to the Superior
Court for judicial review. 19-A M.R.S. § 2453 (2017); M.R. Civ. P. 80C. A party
7 Some portions of the guidelines have recently been amended, as discussed further in this opinion
below. See P.L. 2017, ch. 30 (effective Nov. 1, 2017) (to be codified at 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1653, 2001,
2006).
12
has a right of appeal to the Law Court from the Superior Court decision on the
Rule 80C appeal. See M.R. Civ. P. 80C(m).
[¶20] If there is a substantial change in circumstances after the
Department’s order becomes final, a responsible parent may seek amendment
of the order by the Department through an administrative hearing. See
19-A M.R.S. § 2304(8); 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-40, -50, ch. 8, § 15, ch. 12, § 2(C).
All rights to administrative review and appeal to the courts are again available
upon the Department’s decision. See 19-A M.R.S. §§ 2451, 2453; M.R.
Civ. P. 80C; 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-49, ch. 12, § 2(B)(2)(a), (3)(i).
[¶21] If a court enters a child support order after the Department
establishes a child support order, the court order will supersede the
Department’s administrative decision ordering the payment of child support.
See 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-40, ch. 8, §§ 14, 16.
2. Court-Issued Child Support Orders
[¶22] In a court proceeding, whether in a divorce action, in an action to
determine parental rights and responsibilities, or in any other family
proceeding, the District Court determines the amount of child support by
applying the child support guidelines and the statute governing deviation from
the guidelines. See 19-A M.R.S. §§ 901, 1652, 1653(2)(D)(3), 1653(8),
13
2001-2012. A party has the right to appeal to us from the child support ordered
in the final judgment. See 14 M.R.S. § 1901(1); 19-A M.R.S. § 104; M.R. App. P. 2;
M.R. App. P. 2A, 2B (restyled).
[¶23] After a judgment ordering the payment of child support becomes
final following an appeal or the expiration of the appeal period, a party may
seek to enforce the judgment either in court or through the Department. See
19-A M.R.S. § 2103(2) (2017); M.R. Civ. P. 120; 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-40, ch. 8,
§ 16. A judgment’s terms may be enforced by the Department if its terms are
unambiguous. See 19-A M.R.S. § 2103(2); Curtis v. Medeiros, 2016 ME 180, ¶ 8,
152 A.3d 605. If the child support obligations in the court order are ambiguous
or undefined, only the court that issued the judgment has the “inherent
authority to construe and clarify the decision.” Id.
[¶24] Upon a substantial change in circumstances, a party, including the
Department, may file a motion in the District Court seeking to modify the
amount of child support, see 19-A M.R.S. § 2009(1), and include “[a] proposed
order, incorporating the child support worksheet.” See 19-A M.R.S.
§ 2009(4-A)(E). The Department has no authority to modify the court’s
judgment. See 19-A M.R.S. § 2009.
14
[¶25] When the parties reach an agreement to modify the amount of
child support that has been established by a court order, the process is
straightforward and inexpensive. No filing fee is required if a motion seeks only
to modify child support. See Revised Court Fees Schedule and Document
Management Procedures, Me. Admin. Order JB-05-26 (as amended by
A. 12-17), § I(A)(2) (effective Jan. 1, 2018).8
[¶26] The entry of a modified order can be addressed promptly if the
motion is uncontested and the amount of child support in the proposed order
is at least as much as the amount that would be ordered through the ordinary
application of the child support guidelines. 19-A M.R.S. § 2009(5), (6). In such
circumstances, if neither party requests a hearing within thirty days after the
service of the motion, “the court may enter an order modifying support without
hearing using the proposed order.” Id.
[¶27] Only if the moving party proposes a downward deviation or one of
the parties requests a hearing on the pending motion will the parties be
required to proceed with mediation and, if necessary, a hearing. See id.
8 The fee schedule has recently been amended, effective July 1, 2018, but there is no fee for filing
a motion seeking only the modification of child support. See Revised Court Fees Schedule and
Document Management Procedures, Me. Admin. Order JB-05-26 (as amended by A. 7-18), § I(A)(2)
(effective July 1, 2018).
15
[¶28] Again, a right of appeal to us is available after the entry of a final
judgment on the motion to modify. See 14 M.R.S. § 1901; 19-A M.R.S. § 104; M.R.
App. P. 2; M.R. App. P. 2A, 2B (restyled). The final judgment, if unambiguous,
may be enforced through the court or the Department. See 19-A M.R.S.
§ 2103(2); M.R. Civ. P. 120; 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-40, ch. 8, § 16; see also Curtis,
2016 ME 180, ¶ 8, 152 A.3d 605.
[¶29] Because the original order entered in Higgins and Wood’s divorce
was issued by a court, a motion to modify was required to be filed in court to
change the amount of the child support obligation, unless the original order
unambiguously specified an enforceable adjustment. The question, therefore,
is whether the divorce judgment provided for a quantified change in the
amount of child support with sufficient specificity that it could be enforced and
effectuated through the Department without additional court involvement.
B. Self-Effectuating Reductions of Court-Ordered Child Support in Maine
[¶30] A child support order entered by a court remains in effect as to a
child until that child reaches age eighteen or another specified event occurs:
Termination of order. A court order requiring the payment of
child support remains in force as to each child until the order is
altered by the court or until that child:
A. Attains 18 years of age. For orders issued after
January 1, 1990, if the child attains 18 years of age while
16
attending secondary school as defined in Title 20-A,
section 1, the order remains in force until the child
graduates, withdraws or is expelled from secondary school
or attains 19 years of age, whichever occurs first;
B. Becomes married; or
C. Becomes a member of the armed services.
19-A M.R.S. § 1653(12) (2017). The statute in effect when the parties’ divorce
judgment was entered authorized, but did not require, the court to “include
automatic adjustments to the amount of money paid for the support of a child
when the child attains 12 or 18 years of age; or when the child graduates,
withdraws or is expelled from secondary school, attains 19 years of age or is
otherwise emancipated, whichever occurs first.” 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(13)
(Pamph. 2007).9
[¶31] More than two years before Higgins and Wood were divorced, we
considered whether the Department had the authority to reduce court-ordered
child support obligations upon a child reaching the age of eighteen or the
9 This portion of the statute was repealed, effective November 1, 2017, when the Legislature
“amend[ed] the laws governing child support guidelines to conform to changes made by the
Department of Health and Human Services by rule that eliminate the age categories in the child
support table.” L.D. 364, Summary (128th Legis. 2017); see P.L. 2017, ch. 30, § 1 (effective
Nov. 1, 2017) (repealing 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(13)). The Department’s revised single-tier table was
adopted with an effective date of July 29, 2016. See 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-15 to -23 (2016). We do
not opine on whether the Department acted within its rulemaking authority to eliminate the age
categories in July 2016 when the statutory guidelines still described age categories. See 19-A M.R.S.
§§ 1653(13), 2001(1), (11), 2006(1), (6), (7), (8) (2016).
17
occurrence of another triggering event. See Bartlett, 2005 ME 10, ¶¶ 12-20,
866 A.2d 829. The children in Bartlett were ages twelve, six, and one at the time
of their parents’ divorce in 1995. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. The judgment required the father
to pay $111 per week toward the support of the three children, later increased
to $200 per week upon motions to modify. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. After the parties’ oldest
child graduated from high school in June 2001 at the age of eighteen, the
Department unilaterally reduced the weekly withholding from the father’s
salary by one-third. Id. ¶ 6. The Department did not, however, unilaterally
increase the amount of support when the middle child reached age twelve in
July 2001. Id.; see generally 19-A M.R.S.A. § 2006 (1998) (providing for differing
support obligations when a child reaches the age of twelve).10 Upon the
mother’s March 2003 motion for post-judgment relief, the District Court
determined that, because the Department had no authority to reduce the
amount of child support, the father owed the full $200 per week as ordered.
Bartlett, 2005 ME 10, ¶¶ 8, 10, 866 A.2d 829.
[¶32] We affirmed the judgment, holding that, when a court has entered
an order of child support containing a termination provision that does not
10 See P.L. 2017, ch. 30 (effective Nov. 1, 2017) (to be codified at 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1653, 2001, 2006)
(eliminating age categories from the guidelines for determining child support).
18
specify the dollar amount of the adjustments, that provision is not
self-effectuating, and a motion to modify, filed by the Department or one of the
parents, is required so that a court—not the Department or a party—can
adjudicate the proper amount of child support. See id. ¶¶ 12-17 (citing
19-A M.R.S.A. § 2009 (1998)). We also held that, because child support orders
may be modified retroactively only back to the date of service of the motion to
modify on the opposing party, the court could not relieve the father of his
preexisting obligations incurred before that date. Id. ¶ 19 (citing 19-A M.R.S.A.
§ 2009(2)).
[¶33] In reaction to Bartlett, the Legislature amended the child support
statute with respect to judgments that were entered before the Bartlett
decision, requiring,
With regard to any initial or modified child support order that
affects more than one child and that was entered before
January 18, 2005, unless that order states the manner in which the
order must be modified upon the events listed in subparagraphs
(1) to (4), that the order be automatically modified pursuant to this
paragraph to address any of the following events:
(1) Any child reaches 18 years of age and has graduated from
secondary school;
(2) Any child reaches 19 years of age without having
graduated from secondary school;
(3) Any child obtains an order of emancipation; or
19
(4) Any child dies.
As of the date of an event listed in subparagraphs (1) to (4), the
total child support amount stated in the order must be decreased
by the child support amount assigned to that child in the
worksheets accompanying the child support order or as set forth
in the order.
P.L. 2005, ch. 352, § 5 (codified as subsequently amended at 19-A M.R.S.
§ 2006(8)(G) (2017)11) (emphasis added).
[¶34] The divorce judgment in the matter before us was entered in
2007—two years after our decision in Bartlett. Thus, by its plain language,
section 2006(8)(G) does not apply to the matter on appeal.12
[¶35] About one month after Higgins and Wood’s divorce judgment was
entered in 2007, we decided another matter in which a judgment’s provisions
regarding the reduction of child support were at issue. See Lund, 2007 ME 98,
927 A.2d 1185. There, the 1999 divorce judgment provided certain specific
11 The subsequent amendment to this paragraph merely altered the ending punctuation and
added the word “and” to accommodate a new paragraph H. See P.L. 2009, ch. 290, § 15 (effective
Sept. 12, 2009).
12 To the extent that the use of the date of the Bartlett decision in the statute is ambiguous,
testimony regarding the legislation indicates that the statute was designed to “eliminate the
extremely harsh retroactive application of the decision in Bartlett,” but leave “orders established or
modified after Bartlett” to be “calculated according to the holding in that case.” An Act to Improve
Child Support Services: Hearing on L.D. 1589 Before the J. Standing Comm. on Judiciary, 122d Legis. 3
(2005) (testimony of Stephen Hussey, Director of Division of Support Enforcement & Recovery, Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs. Bureau of Family Independence).
20
amounts with respect to the youngest of three children reaching the age of
twelve:
Pursuant to the guidelines currently in effect, [the father] shall pay
to [the mother] the sum of $ 175.00 per week as child support for
the minor children, in accordance with the Court guidelines. When
[the youngest child] turns age 12 on May 11, 1999, [the father]’s
child support obligation shall increase to $ 187.00 per week
pursuant to the Court guidelines.
Id. ¶ 2 (bold emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The attached child support
worksheets provided for a basic weekly support obligation of $88 per child
during the ages twelve to seventeen. Id. ¶ 2 n.1. The order also included a
provision that the obligation would continue for each child until the child
reached age eighteen after graduation, graduated at age eighteen, or reached
the age of nineteen without graduating, whichever occurred first. Id. ¶ 2.
[¶36] The original judgment in Lund did not address the increase in the
per-child amount of support provided for in the guidelines if only two children
were subject to a support order. Although the judgment did not specify the
calculations that would apply upon the termination of support for the oldest
child, we held that the judgment did allow for a self-effectuating adjustment
because it ordered changes in support by a specific amount when the youngest
child turned twelve and stated the conditions for the termination of the support
obligation for each child. Id. ¶ 21.
21
[¶37] We must acknowledge the confusion that has resulted from the
legislative language and from the Lund decision regarding self-effectuating
changes in child support orders. In Lund, we did not discuss changes in the
application of the guidelines based on the number of children subject to a child
support order, 2007 ME 98, ¶¶ 4, 22, 927 A.2d 1185, despite our statement in
Bartlett that “the payment obligation for two children is not automatically
two-thirds of the payment obligation for three children,” 2005 ME 10, ¶ 13,
866 A.2d 829.
[¶38] Thus, we now specifically hold that guideline-related adjustments
are part of the reason that a motion to modify child support is required if a
parent seeks an adjustment that is not explicitly quantified in the existing
judgment. A motion to modify is also necessary if the child support worksheet
includes health insurance costs, extraordinary medical expenses, or child care
expenses that are not apportioned on a per-child basis. See 19-A M.R.S
§ 2006(3). The new amount of such costs or expenses, and any related health
insurance adjustment, cannot be calculated without some adjudication of facts
by a court.
[¶39] Because our opinion in Lund and other changes in the law have
made it difficult for parents and the Department to determine whether a
22
particular judgment ordering child support for multiple children provides for
self-effectuating adjustments that may be immediately implemented, we
endeavor to clarify the circumstances in which prospective amendments to the
amount of child support ordered by a court are self-effectuating. We now
clarify that, for any court judgment ordering the payment of child support
entered after Bartlett, a change in child support is self-effectuating only if the
judgment includes a specific, quantifiable amount of support ordered to replace
the original obligation on a specific date or upon the occurrence of a specific
event. See Bartlett, 2005 ME 10, ¶¶ 12-17, 866 A.2d 829. If a judgment does
not provide the necessary specificity, neither a parent nor the Department can
determine the amount of support upon that change in circumstances, and a
motion to modify is required so that the court can take appropriate action. See
19-A M.R.S. § 2009.13
[¶40] Because, as we have summarized, court orders entered in different
timeframes are treated differently under the law, we provide the following
clarification.
13 Although the filing of such a motion may seem burdensome, as we indicated above, it is possible
for a judgment to be entered promptly if no hearing is requested and “the proposed modified support
obligation is equal to or greater than the obligation resulting from the application of” the applicable
support guidelines. 19-A M.R.S. § 2009(6) (2017). In such circumstances, no hearing is required, and
the parties’ modified order may be entered swiftly. See id.
23
1. For judgments containing child support orders entered before
January 18, 2005, a reduction in support may be self-effectuating when
a child reaches age eighteen after graduating from secondary school,
reaches age nineteen without having graduated from secondary school,
obtains an order of emancipation, or dies, unless the order “states the
manner in which the order must be modified upon [those identified]
events.” 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(8)(G). How that reduction is calculated will
depend on the language in the child support order.
2. For judgments entered between January 18, 2005, and the recent
elimination of the age-tiered child support table, a change in the amount
of court-ordered child support is self-effectuating only if the order
provides for specifically quantified prospective amounts owed upon
dates or specific events explicitly addressed in the order. See Bartlett,
2005 ME 10, ¶¶ 12-17, 866 A.2d 829. The actual amount of the
anticipated updated child support obligation must be stated in the order.
3. We have yet to opine on whether judgments entered after the
elimination of the age-tiered system can be self-effectuating without
specifying an adjusted dollar amount. See P.L. 2017, ch. 30 (effective
Nov. 1, 2017) (to be codified at 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1653, 2001, 2006);
17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-15 to -23. However, given that guideline
adjustments occur when the number of supported children changes, and
that other components of support, including health insurance and child
care costs, may change, an order will not be self-effectuating upon the
aging-out of the oldest child unless the new amounts are expressly stated
in that order. See 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-15 to -23.
[¶41] To assure clarity, reduce costs to the parties, and avoid
unnecessary additional process, in those cases where changes should occur
without any return to court, all who are involved—judges, magistrates, parties,
and counsel—should focus on developing orders that explicitly specify the
adjustments to be effectuated when support obligations cease for each child.
24
[¶42] The judgment at issue here falls into the second category because
it was entered after Bartlett and before the elimination of the age-tiered system.
For an adjustment in such a child support order to be self-effectuating, the
judgment must explicitly identify the amount of child support to be paid when
each of the youngest children has reached the age of twelve and when support
terminates as to each child. See Bartlett, 2005 ME 10, ¶¶ 12, 17, 866 A.2d 829.
Focusing specifically on the termination of child support for the oldest child,
judicial decision-making is necessary if the judgment does not specify the
amount thereafter owed for the younger children. Cf. Teele v. West-Harper,
2017 ME 196, ¶¶ 12-20, 170 A.3d 803 (holding that a parent must move to
modify a judgment to receive a credit for dependent benefits if the credit was
not ordered in the original judgment).
C. Review of the District Court’s Application of the Law
[¶43] In the parties’ 2007 divorce judgment, the court ordered Wood to
pay $297 per week for support of the three children. The judgment provided
that the child support obligation would terminate for each child upon the child
reaching age eighteen or another triggering event, but it did not state the
amount of the new support obligation upon the termination of support for each
child and did not indicate specific increases upon each younger child reaching
25
age twelve. Also, the accompanying child support worksheet did not allocate
the cost of health insurance on a per-child basis.
[¶44] Given the language of the court order in effect on the eighteenth
birthday of the oldest child, no automatic adjustment was possible. Although
the worksheet accompanying the 2007 child support order identified the basic
weekly support amount for the parties’ oldest child as $126 while Wood was
responsible for support for three children at younger ages, the order did not
specify the amount of support owed upon the termination of support for the
oldest child, an event that occurred only after one of the younger children had
reached age twelve. Absent such specificity, the court could not enforce any
amount other than that specified in the 2007 divorce judgment. The court
therefore properly limited Wood to the remedy of moving to modify the child
support order to determine how much support was owed for the two younger
children.
[¶45] Once Wood did move to modify the amount of child support, the
court, based on the parties’ agreement, ordered a very modest change in the
amount of support owed for the period beginning when the motion to modify
was served. The obligation for that period was reduced from $297 per week to
$280.50 per week. The court, again based on the parties’ agreement, also
26
entered modified child support orders providing for exact modifications on
specific future dates based on the children’s changes in age and a change in the
child support table. See 19-A M.R.S. § 2009(2); 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-15 to -23.
Because the original judgment lacked this degree of specificity, however, the
court correctly concluded that, in the absence of a motion to modify, no change
in the amount of child support took effect upon the oldest child reaching age
eighteen.
[¶46] To consider fully Wood’s argument that he has overpaid by more
than $35,000, we attempt to estimate the amount of support that would have
resulted from an application of the guidelines if Wood had filed a motion to
modify immediately when the oldest child reached age eighteen. Although
Wood contends that the 2007 child support worksheet establishes the amount
owed for each child, the amount owed per child increased pursuant to the
guidelines if there were only two children subject to a child support order, and
the amount owed for a younger child increased when the child reached age
twelve. See Child Support Guidelines and Calculation Tables (effective
Dec. 1, 2008), available at 19-A M.R.S.A. § 2011 (Pamph. 2010); see also Child
Support Guidelines and Calculation Tables (effective Feb. 8, 2014), available at
19-A M.R.S.A. § 2011 (Supp. 2015).
27
[¶47] Assuming that the cost of health insurance for two children was
identical to the cost for coverage for all three children, and assuming that each
party’s income remained the same, had Wood filed a motion immediately after
his oldest child’s eighteenth birthday, we estimate that his total child support
obligation pursuant to the guidelines in 2009 would only have been reduced by
approximately $51 per week, not the $114 per week that he asserts could be
subtracted from the original obligation. See Child Support Guidelines and
Calculation Tables (effective Dec. 1, 2008). Moreover, the child support table
was updated over time, and based on the table in effect from 2013 when the
youngest child turned twelve through 2015 when Wood moved to modify,
Wood’s obligation for the two youngest children would have exceeded the
originally ordered $297 per week in child support for the three children. See
id.; Child Support Guidelines and Calculation Tables (effective Feb. 8, 2014).
Therefore, even if Wood had filed a motion to modify immediately upon the
oldest child reaching age eighteen, it is unlikely that his child support obligation
would have been reduced over the years at issue by the substantial amount that
Wood claims.14
14 Recognizing that a retrospective calculation without the benefit of the parties’ input is an
imperfect vehicle for accuracy, we acknowledge that these numbers are estimates.
28
[¶48] Although the dissent posits that our holding produces an unfair
result, any interpretation of the law in this area will produce a result that may
seem unfair to one party or the other. Due to the divorce judgment’s language
and the identified ambiguities in our earlier case law, neither Higgins nor Wood
could be certain about the amount of support owed after the oldest child
reached age eighteen. Interpreting the judgment as we have, Wood has paid
somewhat more than he would have pursuant to the child support guidelines
then in effect. See Child Support Guidelines and Calculation Tables (effective
Feb. 8, 2014); Child Support Guidelines and Calculation Tables (effective
Dec. 1, 2008). If we were to interpret the change in support as Wood suggests,
however, Higgins—the parent providing primary residence for the children—
would have received significantly less than the amount of child support that she
was entitled to pursuant to those guidelines. See Child Support Guidelines and
Calculation Tables (effective Feb. 8, 2014); Child Support Guidelines and
Calculation Tables (effective Dec. 1, 2008). It is hoped that today’s clarification
of the law will increase certainty and predictability for families and the
Department and avoid this shifting sense of unfairness in the future.
29
D. Administrative Collateral Estoppel and Equitable Estoppel
[¶49] Wood raised issues of administrative collateral estoppel and
equitable estoppel in his motion for summary judgment, and he now argues
that the court erred in failing to grant him relief pursuant to those doctrines.
[¶50] The Maine Rules of Civil Procedure do not allow for motions for
summary judgment on post-judgment motions in family matters. See M.R.
Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or
any part thereof.” (emphasis added)). Thus, these arguments were not
properly raised in the District Court, and neither the magistrate nor the District
Court could adjudicate the issues. Wood did not seek conclusions of law
concerning either of these doctrines after the court entered its judgment on the
post-divorce motions. See M.R. Civ. P. 52.
[¶51] Thus, although Wood has argued the doctrines of administrative
collateral estoppel and equitable estoppel on appeal, these arguments were
never properly presented to the trial court for consideration. We cannot, in this
procedural posture, provide any meaningful appellate review.
30
[¶52] Moreover, even if the issues had been presented properly, Wood
could not prevail. Although Wood contends that Higgins and the Department
may not relitigate the determination that the Department reached in its
February 2015 letter, administrative collateral estoppel cannot preclude a
court from ruling on a legal issue presented through a motion to modify
court-ordered child support. See Larrivee v. Timmons, 549 A.2d 744, 747-48
(Me. 1988); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 83(4)(b) (Am. Law Inst.
1982) (stating that relitigation of an issue decided in an administrative
proceeding is not precluded “if according preclusive effect to determination of
the issue would be incompatible with a legislative policy that . . . [t]he tribunal
in which the issue subsequently arises be free to make an independent
determination of the issue in question”); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.”); 19-A M.R.S. § 2009 (authorizing a
court—not the Department—to modify court-ordered child support).
[¶53] As to equitable estoppel, there is no indication in the stipulated
evidence that Wood took action to his detriment in reasonable reliance on
either Higgins or the Department, to the extent that the Department can be
31
considered Higgins’s agent. See Dunwoody, 2017 ME 21, ¶¶ 13-14,
155 A.3d 422.15
III. CONCLUSION
[¶54] Judgments in family matters should provide certainty that the
amount of court-ordered child support will remain in place unless and until that
amount is either (1) superseded by a predictable, prospectively designated
amount that is explicitly stated in the child support order itself or (2) modified
by the court upon a proper motion. We have not authorized, and do not here
authorize, self-help in changing the amount of child support. See Lund,
2007 ME 98, ¶ 21, 927 A.2d 1185; Bartlett, 2005 ME 10, ¶ 17, 866 A.2d 829.
15 On these facts, even had Wood properly presented the facts and law in support of his equitable
claim, he would not have prevailed, given the general purpose of equity to provide a remedy only
where the rigid application of the law results in an injustice. See Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v.
Pelletier, 2009 ME 11, ¶ 19, 964 A.2d 630; see generally John Norton Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity
Jurisprudence § 67, at 89 (5th ed. 1941). After Wood’s oldest child reached age eighteen, Wood
continued to pay the mother of his three children $297 per week ($15,444 per year) for six years
while she continued to provide the primary residence for their two younger children. Wood did not
move to modify the court order until 2015 despite the notice within the judgment that a change in
the judgment required the filing of such a motion. He now seeks to require Higgins to return at least
one-third of the amount that he paid—approximately $35,000—while Higgins continues to provide
the primary residence for their youngest child, who will not reach age eighteen until 2019.
In sum, the amount Wood seeks is far in excess of the reductions that the guidelines would likely
have established upon the pertinent changes in the children’s ages, he was made aware in the
judgment of the necessity to file a motion to modify if any circumstances changed, and any
overpayments went toward the support of his own children. A court would not be likely to provide
an equitable remedy in such circumstances. Cf. Pelletier, 2009 ME 11, ¶ 19, 964 A.2d 630 (“Equitable
estoppel must be evaluated with circumspection and applied judiciously in the context of child
support actions brought by the Department.”).
32
Contrary to the concerns expressed by the dissent, this clarification and
certainty of process will reduce litigation and prevent the stress and surprise
that happened here when a parent, after paying a specific amount of child
support for six years, sought to reclaim thousands of those dollars from his
children’s mother.
[¶55] When a judgment entered after January 18, 2005, does not include
an explicit amount for the future obligation, a new court order will be necessary
to establish the amount owed when circumstances change. See Bartlett,
2005 ME 10, ¶¶ 12-17, 866 A.2d 829. Neither a parent nor the Division of
Support Enforcement and Recovery may unilaterally reduce the amount of
court-ordered support owed when the judgment does not specify the amount
of the reduction. The parties, however, may quickly and inexpensively obtain
an updated order of child support when they agree upon a new amount that is
at or above the amount established by the child support guidelines. See 19-A
M.R.S. § 2009(5), (6); Revised Court Fees Schedule and Document Management
Procedures, Me. Admin. Order JB-05-26 (as amended by A. 7-18), § I(A)(2)
(effective July 1, 2018).
33
[¶56] The court did not err in concluding that Wood was not entitled to
recover a substantial portion of the child support that he paid to Higgins before
he served his motion to modify on her. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
JABAR, J., dissenting.
[¶57] I respectfully dissent because I believe that the Court ignores the
plain language of the statute and imposes additional burdens on family law
litigants that the Legislature neither intended nor anticipated.
A. Plain Meaning of the Statute and the Court Order
[¶58] When we are required to interpret text—in legislation and in
contracts—we are first and foremost guided by the principle that the plain
language of the statute or document controls our analysis. See Griffin v. Griffin,
2014 ME 70, ¶ 18, 92 A.3d 1144; Daniel G. Lilley Law Office, P.A. v. Flynn,
2015 ME 134, ¶ 17, 129 A.3d 936. We are similarly guided by this concept when
tasked with interpreting court orders. See Burnell v. Burnell, 2012 ME 24, ¶ 15,
40 A.3d 390. Led by this bedrock tenet, the analysis in this case must begin with
34
an examination of the plain language of 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(12)(A) (2017),
which states,
12. Termination of order. A court order requiring the payment
of child support remains in force as to each child until the order is
altered by the court or until that child:
A. Attains 18 years of age. . . .
[¶59] As written, the language of section 1653(12)(A) is simple, logical,
and clear. Keeping in mind that roughly seventy-five percent of the litigants in
family court navigate the system without an attorney, 2014 Me. Laws 1654
(State of the Judiciary address of Chief Justice Leigh I. Saufley to 2d Reg. Sess. of
126th Legis.), the language in section 1653(12)(A) clearly states that when a
child turns eighteen, the order, as to that child, is no longer in force. Despite
this clarity and simplicity, the Court now engrafts two new requirements upon
section 1653(12)(A): (1) a self-effectuation concept that is not present in the
plain language of the statute, and (2) an affirmative duty upon litigants to
initiate litigation that the statute neither anticipates nor requires. Court’s
Opinion ¶¶ 1, 15, 54-55.
[¶60] After today’s Opinion, if an obligor has more than one child, that
obligor can no longer look to the plain language of section 1653(12)(A) in order
to know what happens when one of their children turns eighteen. Section
35
1653(12)(A) is no longer sufficient on its own. The Court uses the new term,
“self-effectuating,” which does not appear in case law, in statute, or in the court
order at issue in this case. Court’s Opinion ¶¶ 1, 15. In Bartlett v. Anderson, the
Court used the term “undifferentiated” to refer to the child support order,
which did not provide a different amount when one child, but not the others,
had reached the age of eighteen. 2005 ME 10, ¶ 13, 866 A.2d 829. In other
words, undifferentiated orders do not distinguish between the amount owed
for each child, but, rather, contain only one figure to represent the amount
owed for all children. The Bartlett Court said that “section 1653(12) specifies
no formula or method to adjust payment obligations when one child, among
several covered by a single, undifferentiated child support payment obligation,
reaches age eighteen.” Id. (emphasis added).
[¶61] Here, the Court’s use of the term “self-effectuating” effectively
amends section 1653(12)(A) to include a provision that the Legislature did not
provide for in the statute. However, contrary to the Court’s conclusion, an order
can differentiate the amount owed for each child without creating a formula for
calculating the remaining support owed for the children still under age
eighteen. By interposing the concept of a “self-effectuating” order, the Court
today takes the “undifferentiated” language from Bartlett one step further.
36
Ultimately, the Court should not amend the statute to include a provision that
it acknowledges the Legislature did not contemplate in the statute.
[¶62] The Legislature did not qualify the straightforward plain language
of the statute by adding that, if there are other children, then the order remains
in effect beyond the oldest child’s eighteenth birthday, until such time that the
court makes adjustments to the order. Despite the absence of this or similar
language in the statute, the Court today amends the plain language of section
1653(12)(A) to include this new requirement. Court’s Opinion ¶ 40. Such a
statutory amendment should be left to the Legislature.
[¶63] Turning to this case, the child support order, which mirrors the
statute, is clear: “The child support obligation shall continue for each child until
that child reaches the age of 18 . . . .” The child support worksheet, which is
incorporated into the child support order, distinguishes between the amount
owed for the oldest child and the amount owed for the younger children. Based
on the worksheet, it is a simple task to determine how much child support is
attributed to the eighteen-year-old. The language in the order is clear and
unambiguous and should therefore be given its full weight and effect. The
overall child support obligation should have been reduced by the amount
37
specified in the child support worksheet attributed to the oldest child when that
child turned eighteen.
B. Reliance on Bartlett
[¶64] As the Court acknowledges, subsequent to Bartlett, the Legislature
passed legislation to circumvent the harshness of the holding in that case.
Court’s Opinion ¶ 33; P.L. 2005, ch. 352, § 5 (codified as subsequently amended
at 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(8)(G) (2017)).16 Because of this legislative action, any
reliance on Bartlett is misplaced.
[¶65] The new legislation placed the burden on the courts, not the
obligor, and put the obligee, in this case, the State, on notice of the need for an
order that makes an automatic adjustment when there are children who have
not yet attained the age of eighteen. See 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(8)(G). When the
court fails to include such a “self-effectuating” provision in an order, and the
obligee fails to secure such an order, then the plain meaning of the order and
the statute should prevail: the obligor’s obligation for a child ends when the
child reaches age eighteen.
16 As the Court intimates, the subsequent amendment has no relevance here. Court’s Opinion
¶ 33 n.11.
38
[¶66] Furthermore, Bartlett did not turn on the need for a
“self-effectuating” order; rather, it turned on the distinction between
differentiated and undifferentiated orders. See Bartlett, 2005 ME 10, ¶ 17,
866 A.2d 829. The Bartlett Court concluded that the order was
undifferentiated. See id. However, based on the incorporated child support
worksheet in Bartlett, it is arguable that the order there, like the order here,
was differentiated because the worksheet delineated the different amounts
owed for the children based upon their ages. The Bartlett opinion does not
demonstrate whether that issue—differentiated versus undifferentiated—was
fully litigated on appeal.
C. Conclusion
[¶67] With its opinion today, the Court is not only legislating new
requirements for litigants involved in family matters, it is increasing the volume
of litigation and making the process exceedingly more complicated for the
many self-represented litigants in family court. Given the plain language of
both section 1653(12)(A) and the order in this case, when the child attained the
age of eighteen, the child support obligation for that child should have
terminated without the need for the obligor to return to court.
39
Ezra A. R. Willey, Esq. (orally), Willey Law Offices, Bangor, for appellant Todd
A. Wood
Wayne Doane, Esq., Exeter, for appellee Shelly R. Higgins
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, Thomas A. Knowlton, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally),
and Debby Willis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for
appellee Department of Health and Human Services
Bangor District Court docket number FM-2015-459
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY