Young v. Dept. Rehab. & Corr.

[Cite as Young v. Dept. Rehab. & Corr., 2018-Ohio-2604.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Christopher Young, :

Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 17AP-272

(Ct. of Cl. No. 2016-0099)

v. :

(ACCELERATED CALENDAR)

The State of Ohio c/o Ohio Department :

of Rehabilitation and Correction,

:

Defendant-Appellee.

:

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on June 29, 2018

On brief: Brian K. Duncan; Nemann Law Offices, LLC, and

Adam Lee Nemann; McGeorge Legal Services, LLC, and

Anthony McGeorge, for appellant. Argued: Anthony

McGeorge.

On brief: Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Emily

Simmons Tapocsi, and Howard H. Harcha, IV, for appellee.

Argued: Howard H. Harcha, IV.

APPEAL from the Court of Claims of Ohio

BROWN, P.J.

{¶ 1} This is an appeal by plaintiff-appellant, Christopher Young, from a

judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio granting the motion for summary judgment of

defendant-appellee, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction ("ODRC"), and

denying appellant's motion for partial summary judgment.

{¶ 2} On February 9, 2016, appellant filed a complaint against ODRC, alleging he

was wrongfully confined for 661 days (from November 26, 2012 until September 17, 2014)

beyond the expiration of his lawful sentence. The complaint set forth a cause of action for

No. 17AP-272 2

false imprisonment, as well as alleged civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for

intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, malicious

prosecution, and/or abuse of process.

{¶ 3} On March 10, 2016, ODRC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack

of subject-matter jurisdiction under Civ.R. 12(B)(1), and for failure to state a claim for

relief under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). On March 23, 2016, appellant filed a memorandum contra

ODRC's motion to dismiss. On April 15, 2016, the Court of Claims filed a partial entry of

dismissal in which it dismissed appellant's civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

{¶ 4} On January 24, 2017, ODRC filed a motion for summary judgment. Also on

that date, appellant filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to his claim for false

imprisonment. Both parties subsequently filed responses to the respective summary

judgment motions.

{¶ 5} By decision filed March 22, 2017, the Court of Claims granted summary

judgment in favor of ODRC and denied appellant's motion for partial summary judgment.

The decision of the Court of Claims was journalized by judgment entry filed on that same

date.

{¶ 6} On appeal, appellant sets forth the following four assignments of error for

this court's review:

[I.] The Ohio Court of Claims erred when it found that

Appellee-Defendant's general denials to Appellant-Plaintiff's

Requests f0r Admissions were sufficient under Civ.R. 36.

[II.] The Ohio Court of Claims erred when it found that the

Affidavit of Attorney Brian K. Duncan was insufficient as the

same was permissible under the business records exception.

[III.] The Ohio Court of Claims erred when it ruled in favor of

Appellee-Defendant with respect to Appellant-Plaintiff when

it found that Appellee-Defendant was operating under a

facially valid judgment or order as the Court of Appeals had

previously determined that Appellant-Plaintiff was held past

his lawful sentence.

[IV.] The Ohio Court of Claims erred when it held that

Appellant-Plaintiff's causes of action for negligence,

intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and

No. 17AP-272 3

malicious prosecution in violation of constitutional rights

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were based upon the decisions and

result of Appellant-Plaintiff's claim for false imprisonment.

{¶ 7} In accordance with Civ.R. 56(C), "summary judgment is proper when

(1) there is no genuine issue of material fact remaining to be litigated, (2) the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can come to but

one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party." Hapgood v.

Conrad, 11th Dist. No. 2000-T-0058, 2002-Ohio-3363, ¶ 11. In considering a trial court's

ruling on summary judgment, this court reviews de novo whether there are any genuine

issues of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Id. at ¶ 13.

{¶ 8} Under the first assignment of error, appellant asserts the Court of Claims

erred in finding ODRC's responses to certain requests for admissions to be sufficient

under Civ.R. 36(A)(1). Appellant argues ODRC failed to sufficiently answer two of his

seven requests for admissions; specifically, appellant contends ODRC failed to properly

respond to requests for admissions Nos. 3 and 4 by answering those requests with a

general denial. According to appellant, ODRC's general denials were insufficient under

Civ.R. 36(A), thereby resulting in an admission.

{¶ 9} In support of his motion for partial summary judgment, appellant attached

as an exhibit a copy of ODRC's responses to his requests for admissions. Appellant's

requests for admissions Nos. 3 and 4, as well as the corresponding responses, state as

follows:

3. Admit that Defendant, via its agents, representatives,

and/or otherwise, wrongfully confined Plaintiff intentionally

without lawful privilege and against his consent within a

limited area in prison from November 26, 2012, through

September 17, 2014.

RESPONSE: Denied.

4. Admit that Defendant ODRC sua sponte ordered Plaintiff

Christopher Young to serve an additional two (2) year

sentence without the legal authority to do so.

RESPONSE: Denied.

No. 17AP-272 4

{¶ 10} In its summary judgment decision, the Court of Claims addressed

appellant's contention that ODRC failed to comply with Civ.R. 36, holding in part:

Here, plaintiff is seeking an admission of liability from

defendant—an issue of law to be determined at trial—and

relying on the assumption that defendant's general denial

would be deemed admissions by this court as a matter of law

to support his partial summary judgment. Furthermore, the

requests for admission that plaintiff seeks does not include

such statements of fact as to require a qualification of

defendant's denial. Plaintiff also had the opportunity to move

for an order with regard to the admissions pursuant to Civ.R.

36(A)(3), but did not. Accordingly, the court finds defendant's

general denials sufficient.

(Decision at 7.)

{¶ 11} Civ.R. 36(A)(2) states in part:

If objection is made, the reasons therefor shall be stated. The

answer shall specifically deny the matter or set forth in detail

the reasons why the answering party cannot truthfully admit

or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the substance of

the requested admission, and when good faith requires that a

party qualify his or her answer, or deny only a part of the

matter of which an admission is requested, the party shall

specify so much of it as is true and qualify or deny the

remainder. * * * A party who considers that a matter of which

an admission has been requested presents a genuine issue for

trial may not, on that ground alone, object to the request; the

party may, subject to the provisions of Civ.R. 37(C), deny the

matter or set forth reasons why the party cannot admit or

deny it.

{¶ 12} In asserting that ODRC's general denials resulted in an admission, appellant

relies on St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Battle, 44 Ohio App.2d 261, 269 (8th

Dist.1975), in which the Eighth District Court of Appeals held that if an answer to a

request for admission "is in the form of a denial, it shall be specific and meet the

substance of the requested admission," and that "[a] general denial is not sufficient and

results in an admission." We note, however, another appellate court has cautioned the

statement in St. Paul Fire "that '[a] general denial is not sufficient and results in an

admission,' must not be construed to mean that no general denial is ever sufficient.

Taken in its proper context, it merely means that a general denial is insufficient '* * *

No. 17AP-272 5

when good faith requires that a party qualify his answer, or deny only a part of the

matter.' " K. Ronald Bailey & Assoc. Co., L.P.A. v. Matesick, 6th Dist. No. E-92-40

(June 11, 1993), fn. 1, quoting St. Paul Fire at 269.

{¶ 13} In general, the purpose of Civ.R. 36(A) "is to facilitate early resolution of

potentially disputed issues, thereby expediting the trial." Albrecht, Inc. v. Hambones

Corp., 9th Dist. No. 20993, 2002-Ohio-5939, ¶ 12.

{¶ 14} In the present case, we agree with the observation of the Court of Claims

that the requests for admissions essentially sought "an admission of liability from

[ODRC]—an issue of law to be determined at trial—and relying on the assumption that

[ODRC's] general denial would be deemed admissions * * * as a matter of law." (Decision

at 7.) We construe the Court of Claim's statement as in keeping with the principle that

disputes should, in general, "be resolved on their merits, not through * * *

gamesmanship." In re Estate of Leichman, 12th Dist. No. CA2015-07-060, 2016-Ohio-

4592, ¶ 26. Or, as alternatively stated by one of the authorities cited in Leichman, the

purpose of requests for admissions is to "expedite trials and to eliminate the need for

proof when matters are not legitimately contested," as opposed to use as "a 'gotcha'

device." St. Mary v. Superior Court, 223 Cal.App. 4th 762, 783 (2014).

{¶ 15} As also recognized by the Court of Claims, the decision in St. Paul Fire

made clear that "[i]f the party who requested the admissions is not satisfied with the

answers * * * he receives, he may move for an order with respect to these answers." Id. at

270. See also Civ.R. 36(A)(3) ("The party who has requested the admissions may move for

an order with respect to the answers or objections."). Here, the Court of Claims noted

appellant had the opportunity to make such a motion but failed to do so. Under the

circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion by the Court of Claims with respect to its

ruling as to the sufficiency of ODRC's answers to the requests for admissions.

{¶ 16} Appellant's first assignment of error is not well-taken and is overruled.

{¶ 17} Under the second assignment of error, appellant asserts the Court of Claims

erred in finding the affidavit of his attorney to be improper. Appellant argues the affidavit

was permissible under Evid.R. 803(6), the business records exception to the hearsay rule.

{¶ 18} By way of background, in support of his motion for partial summary

judgment, appellant submitted the affidavit of his counsel, Brian K. Duncan, who averred

No. 17AP-272 6

it was part of his regular practice to keep a case file for each client and that he had

"personal knowledge of the facts set forth below based upon my review of the case file,

and public records." Among other averments in his affidavit, Duncan stated that

appellant was confined in prison from July 31, 2008 until September 17, 2014, and that

appellee "intentionally confined [appellant] after his lawful term of confinement expired."

{¶ 19} The Court of Claims found the affidavit of appellant's counsel was not

proper under Civ.R. 56(E), holding in part: "Although plaintiff's counsel states in his

affidavit that he has personal knowledge of his averments, it is clear that his statements

are based upon information and belief rather than personal knowledge. Nearly all of the

statements in the affidavit relay information learned through his client or refer to the

admissions discussed previously." (Decision at 8.) The Court of Claims further noted that

"by submitting his affidavit, counsel is presenting himself as a witness in this case."

(Decision at 8.)

{¶ 20} Civ.R. 56(E) states in part: "Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be

made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in

evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the

matters stated in the affidavit." Thus, "Civ.R. 56(E) requires that affidavits supporting

motions for summary judgment be made on personal knowledge." Bonacorsi v. Wheeling

& Lake Erie Ry. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 314, 2002-Ohio-2220, ¶ 26. In this respect, "personal

knowledge" has been defined as " 'knowledge gained through firsthand observation or

experience, as distinguished from a belief based on what someone else said.' " Id., quoting

Black's Law Dictionary 875 (7th Ed.Rev.1999).

{¶ 21} This court has held that "Evid.R. 56(E) must be read in conjunction with

Evid.R. 602, 'Lack of Personal Knowledge.' " Fitch v. C.B. Richard Ellis, Inc., 10th Dist.

No. 07AP-107, 2007-Ohio-4517, ¶ 4. Evid.R. 602 states in part: "A witness may not testify

to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness

has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but

need not, consist of the witness' own testimony."

{¶ 22} In the present case, the record supports the Court of Claims' observation

that most of the statements in the attorney's affidavit appear to concern information

related by appellant to his counsel, i.e., statements involving matters within the personal

No. 17AP-272 7

knowledge of appellant and made by his attorney on information and belief, rather than

on personal knowledge. The affidavit also includes averments that contain legal

conclusions, e.g., stating that ODRC "intentionally confined [appellant] after his lawful

term of confinement expired." As also noted by the Court of Claims, the affidavit presents

a potential witness advocate concern under Prof.Cond.R. 3.7 (which, in general, precludes

an attorney from both representing a party and testifying as to a contested issue). Based

on the record presented, we find no abuse of discretion by the Court of Claims in striking

the affidavit of counsel for appellant.

{¶ 23} Accordingly, the second assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 24} Under the third assignment of error, appellant contends the Court of Claims

erred in finding ODRC was operating under a facially valid judgment, and in holding that

appellant's stated term had not expired at the time he was granted his release on a writ of

habeas corpus. Appellant challenges the finding of the Court of Claims that ODRC had

the privilege to confine him until it received an entry from the Marion County Court of

Common Pleas ordering his release.

{¶ 25} By way of background, in 2008, appellant entered guilty pleas in three

separate cases in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. Specifically, in Cuyahoga

C.P. No. CR-07-498250-A ("case No. CR-07-498250"), appellant entered a guilty plea to

one count of aggravated robbery, with two firearm specifications. On July 17, 2008, the

trial court filed an entry of conviction and sentence in that case, stating in part: "The court

imposes a prison sentence * * * of 4 year(s). 1 year as to firearm specification to run prior

to and consecutive to 3 years on base charge of Count 1 for a total of 4 years. Sentence to

run concurrent with Case CR 507594 and CR 510974." (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. Jgmt., Ex.

B.)

{¶ 26} In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-08-507594-A ("case No. CR-08-507594"),

appellant entered a guilty plea to one count of receiving stolen property. The trial court

imposed a sentence of 18 months incarceration in that case, to be served "concurrent to

Cases CR 510974 and CR 498250." (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. Jgmt., Ex. C.)

{¶ 27} In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-08-510974-A ("case No. CR-08-510974"),

appellant entered a guilty plea to one count of robbery, with accompanying one-year and

three-year firearm specifications, as well as a forfeiture specification. The trial court in

No. 17AP-272 8

that case filed an entry imposing "a prison sentence * * * of 5 year(s). 3 years as to firearm

specification to be served prior to and consecutive to 2 years on base charge of count 1 for

a total of 5 years. Sentence to run concurrent to Cases CR 498250 and CR 507594."

(Def.'s Mot. for Summ. Jgmt., Ex. D.)

{¶ 28} On March 27, 2013, appellant filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas

corpus in the Marion County Court of Common Pleas, seeking discharge from his

incarceration in the Marion County Correctional Institution. In the petition, appellant

alleged in part that "all (3) three of the cases were to be served concurrently with each

other," and that he was being held beyond his release date, having been "incarcerated for

(5) five years on these cases."

{¶ 29} On July 23, 2013, respondent, the warden of the Marion County

Correctional Institution, filed a motion for summary judgment. See Young v. Bunting, 3d

Dist. No. 9-13-46, 2014-Ohio-3671, ¶ 9. In the summary judgment motion, respondent

relied on the calculation by the Ohio Bureau of Sentence Computation, "which 'explains

that his actual sentence is 7 years because he had to serve a 3 year sentence for the firearm

specification in Case No. CR 08 510974 plus a 1 year sentence for the firearm specification

in Case No. CR 07 498250, then 2 years, plus 3 years, plus 18 months on the base charges

in the three cases for a total of 7 years." Id. Thus, the bureau of sentence computation

"calculated the sentences so that the prison terms for specifications from two separate

cases were consecutive rather than concurrent to each other." Id.

{¶ 30} The trial court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment and

denied petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that "even though the

sentencing court did not expressly state so, the three base sentences were concurrent but

the two specifications were consecutive to the base sentences and consecutive to each

other." Id. at ¶ 10. The trial court therefore concluded that "the Petitioner's total sentence

is seven years (3-year base sentence plus 1-year firearm specification plus 3-year firearm

specification)." Id.

{¶ 31} Petitioner filed an appeal from the decision of the Marion County Court of

Common Pleas, arguing that "since the sentencing court's judgment entries impose upon

him a total prison term of five years, a contrary interpretation of the sentence by the

Bureau of Sentence Computation and by the habeas court was unlawful." Id. at ¶ 11.

No. 17AP-272 9

{¶ 32} In Young, the Third District Court of Appeals determined that an ambiguity

was presented "by this situation as to whether the sentencing court acted contrary to

statute and imposed a total aggregate sentence term of five years." Id. at ¶ 19. More

specifically, the court in Young held in part:

We recognize that the sentencing court imposed a sentence

for each of the cases separately. The problem occurs because

the sentencing court then ordered that the three total

sentences, which included the firearm specifications, were to

be served concurrently. Had the sentencing court imposed

the three separate sentences without stating that they are to

run concurrently to each other, R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a) would

operate to require [appellant] to serve the two firearm

specifications consecutively and we would affirm the habeas

court's holding that "the sentences for the firearm

specifications are served consecutively by operation of law

without the necessity of the Court making such an order."

Nevertheless, we disagree with the habeas court's statement

that there is "no question of fact in this case." * * * We cannot

completely disregard the sentencing court's statements in its

sentencing entries that seem to contradict the statute. The

sentencing court's statements that "total of 5 years" sentence

in case CR-08-510974, which included firearm specifications,

was to run concurrently to the "total of 4 years" sentence in

case CR-07-498250, which included another firearm

specification, suggest a possibility that the sentencing court

imposed those specifications concurrently, contrary to the

statutory requirement.

(Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 13-14.

{¶ 33} Thus, while recognizing that "R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a) requires [appellant] to

serve the two firearm specifications consecutively to each other, for a total aggregate term

of seven years," the court in Young was "unable to completely disregard the [trial] court's

statements in its sentencing entries that seem to impose an order contradicting the

statute." Id. at ¶ 17. Noting that "[a] sentencing court speaks only through its journal

entries," the court found it could not "rely on the notes provided by the Bureau of

Sentence Computation, referring to a conversation with the sentencing court's bailiff in

resolving the ambiguity," and that "the record does not reflect any journal entries

modifying the sentences." Id. The reviewing court determined that "this matter must be

No. 17AP-272 10

remanded to the habeas court to resolve the ambiguity present," and "[i]f the habeas court

finds that the sentence imposed on [appellant] was a total aggregate term of five years in

prison, in contradiction to the statute, and the term has expired, the habeas petition must

be granted." Id. at ¶ 19.

{¶ 34} Following remand, the Marion County Court of Common Pleas issued a

judgment on September 17, 2014, granting appellant's request for a writ of habeas corpus

and ordering his immediate release. In its decision, the trial court, in reviewing the three

sentencing entries issued by the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, held in part:

The entries contain language that the sentences in each case

are concurrent. However, R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a) requires that

the firearm specification sentences be served consecutively to

each other and consecutively to the underlying sentence. If

the firearm specifications are served consecutively, as

required by law, the total sentence would be seven years in

prison. However, if all three sentences are to be served

concurrently with each other, including the firearm

specifications, then the total sentence would be five years in

prison, which would be the sentence from Case No. 08-

510974-A.

Previously, this Court ruled that the sentences imposed

pursuant to the firearm specifications are to be served

consecutively as a matter of law and, thus, the total sentence is

seven years. However, on August 25, 2014, the Third District

Court of Appeals reversed this Court's earlier decision and

remanded the case for further proceedings. The Third District

Court of Appeals held that there was an ambiguity in the

sentence and that this Court should resolve the ambiguity by

allowing a review of the complete docket of the Cuyahoga

County Court of Common Pleas and the sentencing transcript.

By agreement of the parties, the Petitioner's Exhibit 1 and

Respondent's Exhibits 1-17 were introduced into evidence and

made a part of the record. * * * Neither party requested to

present any additional evidence.

This Court is required to follow the decision issued by the

Third District Court of Appeals. Therefore, since there are no

further sentencing entries, the Petitioner's total sentence is

five years in prison, as all three sentences must be served

concurrently with each other in accordance with the language

of the sentencing entries, in spite of the requirements of R.C.

2929.14(C)(1)(a).

No. 17AP-272 11

{¶ 35} Appellant subsequently filed the instant action in the Court of Claims,

seeking damages for false imprisonment. In its motion for summary judgment, ODRC

argued appellant was legally confined pursuant to facially valid sentencing orders despite

the fact those sentencing orders were ambiguous. In its decision granting summary

judgment in favor of ODRC and denying appellant's motion for partial summary

judgment, the Court of Claims noted appellant "does not contend that the sentencing

entries are invalid" but, rather, that ODRC "erred to properly calculate the expiration date

of his sentence and sua sponte extended his sentence beyond the language of the

sentencing entries." The Court of Claims, after considering the statutory provisions of

R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a) pertaining to the imposition of consecutive sentences, held in part:

This statute requires that firearm specifications must be

served consecutively and prior to any prison term for the

underlying felony. As analyzed by the Marion Court of

Common Pleas, [appellant] was required to serve four years

for his firearm specifications prior to his three-year base

charge sentence in case number 07-498250-A pursuant to

R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a). Therefore, the court finds that [ODRC]

did not err when it calculated [appellant's] sentence release

date to be November 22, 2014, inclusive of earned jail-time

credit of 234 days. Even though [appellant's] writ was

eventually granted in contravention of the statute, at the time

of [appellant's] release, his stated term had not yet expired.

Accordingly, [ODRC] still had privilege to confine [appellant]

until it received the entry granting the writ and ordering his

release.

(Decision at 9-10.)

{¶ 36} Pursuant to the provisions of R.C. 2743.02(A)(1), "the state may be held

liable for the false imprisonment of its prisoners." Bennett v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. &

Corr., 60 Ohio St.3d 107 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. Under Ohio law, "[f]alse

imprisonment occurs when a person confines another intentionally ' "without lawful

privilege and against his consent within a limited area for any appreciable time, however

short." ' " Id. at 109, citing Feliciano v. Kreiger, 50 Ohio St.2d 69, 71 (1977), quoting 1

Harper & James, The Law of Torts, Section 3.7 at 226 (1956). Absent "an intervening

justification, a person may be found liable for the tort of false imprisonment if he or she

No. 17AP-272 12

intentionally continues to confine another despite knowledge that the privilege initially

justifying that confinement no longer exists." Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.

{¶ 37} This court has previously noted that the elements for wrongful

imprisonment of an inmate beyond a lawful term of incarceration are: "(1) expiration of

the lawful term of confinement, (2) intentional confinement after the expiration, and

(3) knowledge that the privilege initially justifying the confinement no longer exists."

Corder v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 94 Ohio App.3d 315, 318 (10th Dist.1994).

{¶ 38} As set forth above, in finding ODRC had the privilege to confine appellant

beyond a five-year term, the Court of Claims relied in part on the analysis of the Marion

County Court of Common Pleas in the habeas corpus proceeding. Specifically, the Court

of Claims agreed with the trial court's observation that, pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a),

the sentences for the firearm specifications were required to be served consecutively to

each other and consecutively to the underling sentence, thus resulting in a seven-year

sentence. The Court of Claims reasoned that, even though appellant was eventually

granted habeas relief, his stated term had not yet expired at the time of his release.

{¶ 39} Appellant contends the Court of Claims erred in finding ODRC was

operating under a facially valid judgment in holding him past his lawful sentence.

According to appellant, the sentencing entries indicated all sentences were ordered to be

served concurrently, and that the entries imposed a total prison term of five years.

{¶ 40} In support, appellant cites to language in the Young decision, in which the

Third District Court of Appeals reviewed appellant's appeal of the trial court's decision

denying his petition for habeas corpus. As set forth above, the court in Young remanded

the matter to the trial court "to resolve the ambiguity present by this situation as to

whether the sentencing court acted contrary to statute and imposed a total aggregate

sentence term of five years." Id. at ¶ 19.

{¶ 41} In a concurring opinion in Young, Judge Rogers, while agreeing with the

majority's decision to reverse the habeas court's decision, concluded he would reverse and

order the immediate release of appellant from confinement. The concurring opinion

disagreed with the majority's view as to any ambiguity in the sentencing entries, stating in

part:

The majority asserts that the journal entries are ambiguous

and, "[b]ased on what we have before us, we are unable to

No. 17AP-272 13

resolve the ambiguity." * * * It appears that the majority

requires more in the record to prove that the court intended to

incorrectly sentence Young beyond the plain, unambiguous

language of the sentencing entries. * * * Here, the only

journalized entries on record unambiguously state that

Young's sentences were to run concurrently to one another.

There is nothing that otherwise creates ambiguity in this case.

Id. at ¶ 25.

{¶ 42} Thus, in contrast to the majority's conclusion, the concurrence determined

"there is no ambiguity in the sentences, even though they are clearly in contravention of

the law. Young's sentence expired after five years, and the State has failed to provide any

evidence that it has the authority to continue his detention." Id. at ¶ 35. Further, noting

that the sentences at issue "were not appealed by the state or modified by the trial court,"

and that "each stands as a final order of the court," the concurrence concluded that ODRC

had "no authority to modify those orders and must comply with them as written." Id. at

¶ 39.

{¶ 43} Based on this court's de novo review, we agree with the concurring opinion

in Young that no ambiguity is presented by the sentencing entries, i.e., all three

sentencing entries indicate the sentences were to run concurrently to one another.

Arguably, to the extent there is an ambiguity presented, it would be with respect to

application of the statutory language to the concurrent sentences imposed. As noted by

the concurrence in Young, however, the state did not appeal those sentences, nor were the

sentences modified by the trial court and, therefore, "each stands as a final order of the

court." Id.

{¶ 44} Further, accepting the sentencing court in Cuyahoga County erred in

ordering the sentences to be served concurrently, we conclude ODRC had no authority to

disregard facially valid entries, which all provided for concurrent sentences and which

imposed a total aggregate sentence of five years. Stated otherwise, ODRC lacks authority

to interpret or correct an unambiguous sentencing entry even if it believes the sentence is

erroneous. See State ex rel. Corder v. Wilson, 68 Ohio App.3d 567, 573-74 (10th

Dist.1991) (Adult Parole Authority could not ignore trial court's determination of jail-time

credit and substitute its own calculations). Thus, we agree with appellant's contention the

No. 17AP-272 14

Court of Claims erred in its determination that ODRC "still had privilege to confine

[appellant] until it received the entry granting the writ and ordering his release."

{¶ 45} Based on this court's de novo review, we conclude the Court of Claims erred

in granting summary judgment in favor of ODRC on appellant's claim for false

imprisonment.

{¶ 46} Therefore, we sustain the third assignment of error.

{¶ 47} Under the fourth assignment of error, appellant contends the Court of

Claims erred in holding that his causes of action for negligence, intentional and negligent

infliction of emotional distress, and malicious prosecution in violation of constitutional

rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 were based on the decisions and result of appellant's claim for

false imprisonment.

{¶ 48} In its summary judgment decision, the Court of Claims noted it had

previously dismissed appellant's constitutional claims alleging negligence, intentional and

negligent infliction of emotional distress and malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. 1983

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (by entry of partial dismissal filed on April 15,

2016). The decision further stated: "Assuming, however, that these claims remain

pending, the court finds that these claims are based upon the decisions and result of

[appellant's] claim for false imprisonment. As such, [ODRC] is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law." (Decision at 10.)

{¶ 49} At the outset, we note this court has "consistently held that the Court of

Claims does not have jurisdiction over actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983."

Jackson v. Northeast Pre-Release Ctr., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-457, 2010-Ohio-1022, ¶ 19,

citing Deavors v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 98AP-1105 (May 20, 1999);

White v. Chillicothe Corr. Inst., 10th Dist. No. 92AP-1230 (Dec. 29, 1992); and Rankin v.

Ohio Reformatory for Women, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-524, 2009-Ohio-6575, ¶ 20. Such

conclusion "is consistent with the fact that the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction

over civil actions against the state or its agencies, and that neither the state nor its

agencies is a 'person' within the meaning in Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code." Deavors.

{¶ 50} Counts 3, 4, and 5 of appellant's complaint, alleging intentional and/or

negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence and malicious prosecution, are all

styled as "violation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983." To the extent

No. 17AP-272 15

appellant alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Court of Claims properly dismissed

those counts. To the extent the summary judgment decision discusses any potentially

remaining claims as disposed of by the "result of [appellant's] claim for false

imprisonment," appellant has failed to demonstrate prejudice in light of our disposition of

the third assignment of error.

{¶ 51} Appellant's fourth assignment of error is not well-taken and is overruled.

{¶ 52} Based on the foregoing, appellant's first, second, and fourth assignments of

error are overruled, the third assignment of error is sustained, and the judgment of the

Court of Claims of Ohio is reversed, and this cause is remanded to that court for further

proceedings in accordance with law, consistent with this decision.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

KLATT, J., concurs

SADLER, J., concurs in judgment only.

SADLER, J., concurring in judgment only.

{¶ 53} I agree with the majority that ODRC has no authority to disregard facially

valid sentencing entries providing for concurrent sentences, regardless of the statutory

law to the contrary. Because the state elected not to appeal from the sentencing entries,

those sentences are final. I therefore agree with the majority that the Court of Claims

erred in its determination that ODRC had a privilege to confine appellant until it received

the entry granting the writ.

{¶ 54} In reaching its conclusion, however, the majority states at paragraph 43 that

"we agree with the concurring opinion in Young that no ambiguity is presented by the

sentencing entries." In my view, it is not necessary for this court to weigh in on the

apparent disagreement between the panel members in Young in order to reverse the

judgment of the Court of Claims in this case, particularly where the unappealed judgment

of the trial court on remand conclusively established that the sentencing entries provided

for concurrent sentences.

{¶ 55} My departure from this aspect of the majority opinion notwithstanding, I

concur with the judgment of the majority.

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