Opinion

People v. Brown

  • 2018 NY Slip Op 3863
Court
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
Filed
May 30, 2018
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 4.4%

The opinion

People v Brown ( 2018 NY Slip Op 03863 )

People v Brown

2018 NY Slip Op 03863

Decided on May 30, 2018

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on May 30, 2018

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P.

RUTH C. BALKIN

JEFFREY A. COHEN

COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ.

2014-05834

[*1]People of State of New York, respondent,

v

Gary Brown, appellant.

Seymour W. James, Jr., New York, NY (Nancy E. Little of counsel; Emma Shreefter on the brief), for appellant.

Michael E. McMahon, District Attorney, Staten Island, NY (Morrie I. Kleinbart and Anne Grady of counsel), for respondent.

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Leonard P. Rienzi, J.), dated May 23, 2014, which, after a hearing, designated him a level three sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

In this proceeding pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act ( see Correction Law art 6-C; hereinafter SORA), the Supreme Court did not err in denying the defendant's request for a downward departure from his presumptive risk level designation. A defendant seeking a downward departure from the presumptive risk level has the initial burden of "(1) identifying, as a matter of law, an appropriate mitigating factor, namely, a factor which tends to establish a lower likelihood of reoffense or danger to the community and is of a kind, or to a degree, that is otherwise not adequately taken into account by the [SORA] Guidelines; and (2) establishing the facts in support of its existence by a preponderance of the evidence" ( People v Wyatt , 89 AD3d 112, 128 ; see People v Gillotti , 23 NY3d 841, 861 ; see also Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 4 [2006] [hereinafter Guidelines]).

Here, the defendant failed to sustain his burden of proof in support of his request for a downward departure. The mitigating circumstances identified by the defendant either were adequately taken into account by the Guidelines, or were not proven by a preponderance of the evidence ( see People v Velasquez , 145 AD3d 924, 924-925 ; People v Game , 131 AD3d 460, 461 ; People v Shelton , 126 AD3d 959, 960 ; People v Coleman , 122 AD3d 599, 599-600 ). The defendant's contention that the use of the risk assessment instrument prepared by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders violated his right to due process is without merit ( see People v Warren , 152 AD3d 551 ; People v Ferrer , 69 AD3d 513, 514 ).

Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination to deny the defendant's request for a downward departure from his presumptive risk level designation and designate him a level three sex offender.

MASTRO, J.P., BALKIN, COHEN and DUFFY, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Aprilanne Agostino

Clerk of the Court

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.