Opinion

In Re: Adoption of: A.J.L.G., a Minor

Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Filed: May 25, 2018
Status: Unpublished
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 4.4%

noting that “[o]nce a child is adjudicated dependent . . . the issues of custody and continuation of foster care are determined by the child’s best interests”

How later courts described this case

noting that “[o]nce a child is adjudicated dependent . . . the issues of custody and continuation of foster care are determined by the child’s best interests”
initially filed on March 28, 2017
affirming involuntary termination of parental rights, despite existence of some bond, where placement with mother would be contrary to child’s best interests

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: A.J.L.G., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: R.L.M. :

: No. 7 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree November 30, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):

2017-0144

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.J.L.G., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: R.L.M. :

: No. 16 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Order November 30, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Juvenile Division at No(s):

CP-67-DP-0000004-2016

BEFORE: OLSON, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MAY 25, 2018

R.L.M. (“Father”) appeals from the decree and order entered November

30, 2017, granting the petitions filed by the York County Children, Youth and

Families Agency (“CYF” or the “Agency”) to involuntarily terminate his parental

rights to his minor male child, A.J.L.G. (“Child” or “minor child”) (born in

J-S24012-18

January of 2009),1 pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, and to

change Child’s permanency goal to adoption, with a concurrent goal of

placement with a legal custodian (non-relative), pursuant to the Juvenile Act,

42 Pa.C.S. § 6351. We affirm.

On August 22, 2017, the Agency filed petitions for the involuntary

termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights to Child. On August 28,

2017, the trial court appointed Attorney Kelly McNaney as Child’s legal

counsel, and re-appointed Attorney Daniel Worley as Child’s guardian ad litem.

See In re: Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172 (Pa. 2017) (initially filed on

March 28, 2017). In the same order, the trial court re-appointed Attorney

Scott Beaverson to represent Father, and re-appointed Attorney Charles

Hobbs to represent Mother.

On November 13, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on the petitions,

at which Father was present and represented by counsel, as was Mother. Both

the legal counsel and the GAL appointed for Child were also present.

The trial court set forth the factual background and procedural history

of this appeal as follows.

The entire dependency record for [Child], docketed at CP-67-DP-

004-2016, was incorporated into the hearing record. The

stipulation of counsel was filed on November 13, 2017 and was

signed by counsel for the Agency, the guardian ad litem, counsel

for Mother, counsel for Father, and counsel for [Child]. The

stipulation of counsel was incorporated into the hearing record for

the minor child, along with Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,

____________________________________________

1Child’s mother, G.L.G. (“Mother”), has not appealed the termination of her

parental rights and is not a party to these proceedings.

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and 11 for the Agency. Based upon the testimony and evidence

presented at the hearing, as well as the history of this case, the

petition to change court ordered goal and the petition for

involuntary termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights

are GRANTED as to [Child].

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The minor child was born [in January of] 2009.

2. The natural mother of the minor child is [Mother], whose

current address is [in] York, Pennsylvania[.]

3. The father of the minor child is [Father], whose current address

is [the same York, Pennsylvania residence as Mother.]

4. A Certification of Acknowledgement of Paternity for the minor

child was filed on August 29, 2017, and indicates that there is

not a claim or Acknowledgement of Paternity on file for the

minor child.

5. In an order entered by the Honorable Joseph C. Adams,

President Judge, Court of Common Pleas, dated February 14,

2017, [Father] was determined to be the biological father of

the minor child.

6. A petition for involuntary termination of parental rights and a

petition to change court ordered goal were filed on August 22,

2017 by the Agency.

7. [The family’s involvement with the Agency commenced when

a]n Application for emergency protective custody was filed by

the Agency on January 7, 2016. [The application alleged that

the Agency received a referral due to concerns about Mother’s

mental health as well as allegations of sexual abuse of Child by

Mother.]

8. In an order for emergency protective custody dated January 7,

2016, sufficient evidence was [found] that continuation or

return of the minor child to the home of Mother was not in the

best interest of the minor child. Legal and physical custody of

the minor child was awarded to the Agency. The minor child

was to be placed in foster care.

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9. In a shelter care order dated January 19, 2016, sufficient

evidence was presented to prove that continuation or return of

the minor child to the home of Mother was not in the best

interest of the minor child. Legal and physical custody of the

minor child was awarded to the Agency. The minor child was

to remain in foster care.

10. A dependency petition was filed by the Agency on January 21,

2016

11. On March 1, 2016, the minor child was adjudicated dependent.

Legal and physical custody were awarded to the Agency. The

minor child was to remain with the emergency caregiver. The

goal initially established was return to a parent or guardian.

12. The minor child has remained dependent since March 1, 2016

and the minor child has not been returned to the care and

custody of Mother and Father since January 7, 2016.

13. Family Service Plans were prepared and dated as follows:

a. Initial Family Service Plan dated January 28, 2016.

b. Revised Family Service Plan dated July 22, 2016.

c. Revised Family Service Plan dated February 21, 2017.

d. Revised Family Service Plan dated August 1, 2017.

14. In a permanency review order[s dated August 22, 2016,

February 21, 2017, and July 25, 2017 the trial court] made

certain findings and conclusions, including, but not limited

to:

a. There had been minimal compliance with the

permanency plan by the Mother and no compliance with

the permanency plan by Father.

b. Reasonable efforts had been made by the Agency to

finalize the permanency plan.

c. Mother had made minimal progress toward alleviating

the circumstances which necessitated the original

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placement and Father had made no progress towards

alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the

original placement.

d. Legal and physical custody of the minor child were

confirmed with the Agency.

e. There continued to be a need for placement of the minor

child outside the care and custody of the Mother and

Father.

15. [F]ather participated in a Psycho Sexual Evaluation performed

by Tracy Holmes on August 17, 2017.

16. [M]other participated in a Parenting Capacity Assessment

prepared by Dr. Jonathan M. Gransee dated January 12,

2017.

17. A Pressley Ridge Family Engagement Services Team opened

with the family on November 1, 2016, and closed

unsuccessfully on March 29, 2017.

18. A Catholic Charities Family Therapist opened for services with

the [] family on March 31, 2016, and closed unsuccessfully

on August 17, 2016.

19. A Catholic Charities Family Advocate began working with the

[] family on April 5, 2016, and closed unsuccessfully on

September 8, 2016.

20. In an Outpatient Psychiatric Treatment Plan dated December

21, 2016, prepared by Dr. Valentine Krecko and Lisa

MacKillop, the minor child was diagnosed with unspecified

adjustment disorder, unspecified communication disorder,

and child neglect, confirmed, initial encounter. []

21. The minor child attends school in a life skills classroom

through the Dallastown Area School District.

22. The minor child currently participates in speech therapy both

in and out of the school environment.

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25. The minor child is limited in his ability to meet his basic needs

as well as his ability to effectively interact with other adults

and minor children.

26. There had been no drug and alcohol issues raised as it relates

to either Mother or Father.

27. Neither Mother nor Father are [sic] currently on probation or

parole.

28. Both Mother and Father currently receive disability.

29. A pre-adoptive resource has been identified for the minor

child.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/30/17, at 1-7 (emphasis in original).

On November 30, 2017, the trial court entered the decree granting the

petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights to Child pursuant to

the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, and the order changing Child’s

permanency goal to adoption, with a concurrent goal of placement with a legal

custodian (non-relative), pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351.

On December 29, 2017, Father timely filed a notice of appeal, along with

a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. In his brief, Father

raises the following issues:

I. Did the trial court commit reversible error in involuntarily

terminating the parental rights of the natural father?

II. Did the trial court commit reversible error in changing the goal

of a juvenile dependency proceeding from family reunification to

adoption?

Father’s Brief at 5.

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Initially, we discuss the sufficiency of the evidence to support the goal

change, as the trial court initially discussed the goal change issue in its

opinion. Our standard of review in a dependency case follows:

“The standard of review in dependency cases requires an appellate

court to accept findings of fact and credibility determinations of

the trial court if they are supported by the record, but does not

require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s inferences

or conclusions of law.” In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa.

2010). We review for abuse of discretion[.]

In Interest of: L.Z., A Minor Child, 111 A.3d 1164, 1174 (Pa. 2015).

Regarding the disposition of a dependent child, section 6351(e), (f),

(f.1), and (g) of the Juvenile Act provide the trial court with the criteria for its

permanency plan. Pursuant to those subsections of the Juvenile Act, the trial

court is to determine the disposition that is best suited to the safety,

protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.

When considering a petition for goal change for a dependent child, the

trial court considers:

the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the

placement; the extent of compliance with the service plan

developed for the child; the extent of progress made towards

alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original

placement; the appropriateness and feasibility of the current

placement goal for the child; and, a likely date by which the goal

for the child might be achieved.

In re A.K., 936 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2007), citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f).

Additionally, section 6351(f.1) requires the trial court to make a

determination regarding the child’s placement goal:

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(f.1) Additional determination.—Based upon the

determinations made under subsection (f) and all relevant

evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall determine one

of the following:

***

(2) If and when the child will be placed for adoption, and

the county agency will file for termination of parental rights

in cases where return to the child’s parent, guardian or

custodian is not best suited to the safety, protection and

physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.

42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f.1).

On the issue of a placement goal change, this Court has stated:

When a child is adjudicated dependent, the child’s proper

placement turns on what is in the child’s best interest, not on what

the parent wants or which goals the parent has achieved. See In

re Sweeney, 574 A.2d 690, 691 (Pa. Super. 1990) (noting that

“[o]nce a child is adjudicated dependent . . . the issues of custody

and continuation of foster care are determined by the child’s best

interests”). Moreover, although preserving the unity of the family

is a purpose of [the Juvenile Act], another purpose is to “provide

for the care, protection, safety, and wholesome mental and

physical development of children coming within the provisions of

this chapter.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(1.1). Indeed, “[t]he

relationship of parent and child is a status and not a property right,

and one in which the state has an interest to protect the best

interest of the child.” In re E.F.V., 461 A.2d 1263, 1267 (Pa.

Super. 1983) (citation omitted).

In re K.C., 903 A.2d 12, 14-15 (Pa. Super. 2006).

The trial court stated the following with regard to goal change:

I. Petition for Change of Goal

Before the Court can change the goal for a child in a juvenile

dependency action, the Agency must prove by clear and

convincing evidence that the change of goal would be in the child’s

best interest. In re Interest of M.B., 674 A.2d 702 (Pa. Super.

1996). In making a disposition, the [trial court] should consider

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what is best suited to the protection and physical, mental, and

moral welfare of the child. 42 Pa.C.S.A §6351; In re Davis, 465

A.2d 614, 619 (Pa. 1983). In rendering a disposition “best suited

to the protection and physical, mental, and moral welfare of the

child,” the hearing court must take into account “any and all

factors which bear upon the child’s welfare and which can aid the

court’s necessarily imprecise prediction about that child’s future

well-being.” In re Davis, 465 A.2d 614, 620 (Pa. 1983).

The purpose of the Juvenile Act is to preserve family unity and to

provide for the care, protection, safety and wholesome mental and

physical development of the child. 42 Pa.C.S.A. 6301(a)(1)-(1.1).

The Juvenile Act was not intended to place children in a more

perfect home; instead, the Act gives a court the authority to

“intervene to ensure that parents meet certain legislatively

determined irreducible minimum standards in executing their

parental rights.” In re J.W., 578 A.2d 952, 958 (Pa. Super.

1990).

When a child is placed in foster care, the parents have an

affirmative duty to make the changes in their lives that would

allow them to become appropriate parents. In re Diaz, 669 A.2d

372, 377 (Pa. Super. 1995). A family service plan is created to

help give the parents some guidelines as to the various areas that

need to be improved. In the Interest of M.B., 565 A.2d 804,

806 (Pa. Super. 1989), [appeal denied], 589 A.2d 692 (Pa. 1990).

By assessing the parents’ compliance and success with this family

service plan, the [c]ourt can determine if the parents have fulfilled

their affirmative duty. In re J.S.W., 651 A.2d 167, 170 (Pa.

Super. 1994).

Under [s]ection 6351 of the Adoption Act, the Agency has the

burden to show a goal change would serve the child’s best

interests and the “safety, permanency, and well-being of the child

must take precedence over all other considerations.” In re D.P.,

972 A.2d 1221, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2009), [appeal denied], 973

A.2d 1007 (Pa. 2009). Thus, even where the parent makes

earnest efforts, the “court cannot and will not subordinate

indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a

parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.” In re

Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006).

In the present matter, the Agency has proven by clear and

convincing evidence that it is in the minor child’s best interest to

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change the goal to placement for adoption. The minor child has

been in placement for approximately [22] months and adjudicated

dependent for approximately [20] months. The minor child needs

a permanent, safe and stable environment.

Since the adjudication of dependency, Mother has made minimal

progress towards alleviating the circumstances which necessitated

the minor child’s placement. Mother made no progress related to

her parenting skills with the Catholic Charities team and the team

closed out unsuccessfully. Mother has made attempts for

visitation with the minor child since the adjudication of

dependency; however, Mother has never progressed to

unsupervised visits with the minor child due to her mental health

issues.

Mother received a Parenting Capacity Assessment by Dr. Jonathan

Gransee on January 12, 2017 to assess her mental health and to

determine her capacity to parent the minor child. Mother was

given IQ testing and was determined to have learning issues. Her

IQ score of 58 qualifies her for a diagnosis of Intellectual

Disability, Mild. The psychologist was informed by Mother’s

caseworker that Mother does not have any interactions with the

minor child during their visits; rather, Mother and the minor child

do not talk and Mother “just kinda stares off.” Dr. Gransee stated

in the Parenting Capacity Assessment that, “. . . at this point, it

appears she [Mother] does not possess sufficient capacity to

parent her child.”

Additionally, Mother’s Pressley Ridge in-home family therapist

testified that she has concerns related to Mother’s mental health

issues. She testified that safety issues could arise if Mother and

minor child were left alone unsupervised. The family therapist did

testify that the bond between Mother and minor child appears

strong and that termination would negatively impact the minor

child similar to how termination of any extended family member

would negatively impact a child. The issue remains that the minor

child has been adjudicated dependent for approximately [20]

months and Mother has yet to progress to unsupervised visits.

Since the adjudication of dependency, Father has made minimal

progress towards alleviating the circumstances which necessitated

the minor child’s placement. Pressley Ridge opened services with

Father on March 29, 2017 and remained open until November 13,

2017. Despite receiving services for approximately seven []

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months, Father was never able to progress to unsupervised visits

with the minor child. Father had requested to increase supervised

visits with the minor child from one to two times a week; however,

Pressley Ridge remained concerned about Father’s ability to

provide a safe environment for the minor child. The Pressley

Ridge in-home family therapist testified that, although all of

Father’s actions and boundaries with the minor child have been

appropriate during their visits, she never felt comfortable leaving

the minor child alone with Father.

Furthermore, Father received a Psycho-Sexual Assessment which

the [trial court] finds seriously concerning as it relates to Father’s

views of appropriate sexual conduct. When asked to rate the

statement[,] “A lot of times, sexual assaults on children are not

planned. . . they just happen,” Father said he agreed with that

statement. When asked to rate the statement “Most women are

sluts and get what they deserve. . . ,” Father said he strongly

agreed with that statement. When asked to rate the statement

“If a young child stares at my genitals it means the child likes

what she sees and is enjoying watching my genitals. . .,” Father

neither agreed nor disagreed with that statement. Father had

previously stated that Maternal Grandmother was “fine” with

Father having sex with his step-daughter, Maternal

Grandmother’s [d]aughter and mother of the minor child subject

to this matter. Father also indicated to the [Agency] Caseworker

about one [] week prior to the [h]earing on the Agency’s [p]etition

that he did not understand why it is inappropriate for him to have

had sex with his step-daughter, adult or not. Father also

acknowledged his inability to control his sexual urges as it relates

to Mother and stated that he spends a good majority of his time

at the house in his room alone to control his urges. This testimony

raises questions of appropriate sexual boundaries between

Mother, Father and Maternal Grandmother, who all live in the

same household.

The [trial court found] that Father lied about how many times he

had sexual encounters with Mother. Father originally stated he []

never had sex with Mother. After paternity was established,

Father stated he only had sex with Mother one [] time. During

Father’s Psycho-Sexual Assessment, he stated [] he had sex with

Mother four [] times. The [trial court found] that Father lacks

credibility due to his inability to tell the truth regarding his sexual

contact with Mother.

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Furthermore, Father minimized his responsibility regarding his

sexual contact with his step-daughter, Mother of the minor child.

Although it is not legally incest, Father raised step-daughter since

she was four [] years old. The [trial court voiced] concerns about

Father’s ability to safely protect the minor child given the history

Father has with his step-daughter, Mother of the minor child.

Testimony established that the minor child and Father have a bond

and the minor child enjoys being with Father; however, testimony

emphasized the fact that the minor child believes Father is his

step-grandfather and remains unaware of the fact that Father is

his biological father. The bond between minor child and Father is

not a parental bond but rather a family relative kind of bond.

Overall, Mother and Father [] made minimal progress towards

alleviating the circumstances which caused the minor child to be

placed and have not assumed any major parental duties for minor

child. The [trial court] remain[ed] extremely concerned about the

lack of appropriate boundaries between Father, Mother and

Maternal Grandmother. As such, the [trial court found] that the

minor child’s best interest demand[ed] that the goal be changed

from reunification with a parent to placement for adoption.

***

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The current placement of [Child] continues to be necessary and

appropriate. 42 Pa.C.S. §6351(f)(1).

2. Mother and Father have not been able to meet the goals set

forth in the family service plans. 42 Pa.C.S. §6351(f)(2).

3. The circumstances which necessitated [Child’s] original

placement have not been alleviated. 42 Pa.C.S. §6351(f)(3).

4. The current goal for [Child] of reunification with a parent is no

longer feasible and appropriate because Mother and Father have

failed to meet the irreducible minimum requirements necessary to

parent the child. 42 Pa.C.S. §6351(f)(4).

5. [Child’s] best interests demand that the current goal of

reunification with a parent be changed to placement for adoption.

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Trial Court Opinion, 11/30/17, at 7-13, 20-21 (emphasis in original)

Here, competent evidence in the record supports the trial court’s change

of permanency goal for Child to adoption as best suited to the safety,

protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child. See 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 6351.

Next, we review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the

termination of Father’s parental rights. In reviewing an appeal from an order

terminating parental rights, we adhere to the following standard:

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard

when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for

termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our

standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if

they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179,

1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law

or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011)

(plurality opinion)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of

discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court

might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel

Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011);

Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a

decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon

demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,

prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying an

abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We

observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not

equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold

record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the

relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other

hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190.

Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result,

as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an

appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court

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and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment;

instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual

findings are supported by the record and the court’s legal

conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of

discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066

(Pa. 1994).

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). We

have explained, “[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the

trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of

the precise facts in issue.” Id., quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251

(Pa. Super. 2003).

Although the trial court focused its discussion on section 2511(a)(1),

(2), (5), (8), and (b), we will discuss only sections 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b).

This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the termination of

parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 2511(a). See In

re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Section

2511(a)(1) and (2) provide, in relevant part, as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following

grounds:

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(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or

failed to perform parental duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary

for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot

or will not be remedied by the parent.

***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.

With respect to subsection 2511(a)(1), our Supreme Court has held as

follows.

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental duties

or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the court

must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation

for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between

parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of termination

of parental rights on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).

In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 708 A.2d 88, 92 (Pa. 1988). Further,

this Court has stated:

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the trial court must consider the whole history of a given case and

not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision. The

court must examine the individual circumstances of each case and

consider all explanations offered by the parent facing termination

of his or her parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in light

of the totality of the circumstances, clearly warrants the

involuntary termination.

In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 854-855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).

Our Supreme Court described the requisite inquiry under section

2511(a)(2) as follows.

As stated above, § 2511(a)(2) provides statutory grounds for

termination of parental rights where it is demonstrated by clear

and convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated and continued

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the

child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions

and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or

will not be remedied by the parent.” . . .

This Court has addressed incapacity sufficient for termination

under § 2511(a)(2):

A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be made

lightly or without a sense of compassion for the parent, can

seldom be more difficult than when termination is based upon

parental incapacity. The legislature, however, in enacting the

1970 Adoption Act, concluded that a parent who is incapable

of performing parental duties is just as parentally unfit as one

who refuses to perform the duties.

In re Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d 883, 891 (Pa. 1986), quoting

In re: William L., 383 A.2d 1228, 1239 (Pa. 1978).

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 827.

This Court has long recognized that a parent is required to make diligent

efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental

responsibilities. In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). A

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parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding

the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely

or disingenuous. Id. at 340.

This Court has stated that the focus in terminating parental rights under

section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant to section

2511(b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super.

2008) (en banc). In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under

section 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as follows.

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.

§ 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have

been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love,

comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791

(Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)],

[our Supreme] Court held that the determination of the child’s

“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds

between the parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be

paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing

the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.

In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as

well. Additionally, section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding

evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal

citations omitted). Although it is often wise to have a bonding evaluation and

make it part of the certified record, “[t]here are some instances . . . where

direct observation of the interaction between the parent and the child is not

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necessary and may even be detrimental to the child.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d

753, 762 (Pa. Super. 2008).

A parent’s abuse and neglect are likewise a relevant part of this

analysis:

concluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent simply

because the child harbors affection for the parent is not only

dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s feelings were the

dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, the analysis would be

reduced to an exercise in semantics as it is the rare child who,

after being subject to neglect and abuse, is able to sift through

the emotional wreckage and completely disavow a parent . . . Nor

are we of the opinion that the biological connection between [the

parent] and the children is sufficient in and of itself, or when

considered in connection with a child’s feeling toward a parent, to

establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The psychological

aspect of parenthood is more important in terms of the

development of the child and [his or her] mental and emotional

health than the coincidence of biological or natural parenthood.

In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court may emphasize the safety needs

of the child. See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 763 (affirming involuntary

termination of parental rights, despite existence of some bond, where

placement with mother would be contrary to child’s best interests). “[A]

parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of . . . her child

is converted, upon the failure to fulfill . . . her parental duties, to the child’s

right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a

permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856

(Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations omitted).

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The trial court explained its decision to terminate parental rights as

follows:

II. Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights

The Agency argues that Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to

the minor child should be terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.

§ 2511(a)(1) [and (2)] of the Adoption Act. The Agency has the

burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that

statutory grounds exist to justify the involuntary termination of

parental rights. In re Child M., 681 A.2d 793, 797 (Pa. Super.

1996). The clear and convincing standard means that the

evidence presented by the Agency is so “clear, direct, weighty,

and convincing” that one can “come to a clear conviction, without

hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Matter of

Sylvester, 555 A.2d 1202, 1202-1204 (Pa. 1989). The Agency

must also present evidence proving that the termination of

parental rights will serve the child’s best interests. In the Matter

of Adoption of Charles E.D.M. [ ], 708 A.2d 88, 92-93 (Pa.

1998). To determine whether termination is within the best

interest of the child, the court must examine the possible effect

the termination would have on the child’s needs and general

welfare. In re Adoption of Godzak, 719 A.2d 365, 368 (Pa.

Super. 1998).

THE AGENCY HAS PROVEN BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING

EVIDENCE THAT PARENTAL RIGHTS TO THE MINOR CHILD

MUST BE TERMINATED PURSUANT TO 23 Pa.C.S.

§2511(a)(1)

To terminate parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(a)(1) of the

Adoption Act, the Agency must establish, by clear and convincing

evidence, that the parent has either demonstrated a settled

purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has failed to

perform parental duties. In the Matter of Adoption of Charles

E.D.M. [ ], 708 A.2d at 91. Once one (1) of the two (2) factors

has been proven, the Court must examine the following three []

factors: (1) parent’s explanation for the conduct; (2)

post-abandonment contact between parent and child; and (3)

effect of termination on child. Id.

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The Agency has proven by clear and convincing evidence that

Mother and Father have failed to perform any significant parental

duties for the minor child. The minor child has been dependent

for approximately [20] months. Testimony established that

Mother made no progress regarding her parenting skills during the

time minor child has been dependent and failed to successfully

complete services with Catholic Charities.

Testimony [also] established that[,] although supervised visits

between Mother and minor child occurred, there is a continuing

safety concern regarding Mother’s mental health issues and her

ability to properly parent the child. As such, the Agency testified

that the minor child does not have a parental bond with Mother

but rather an extended family member type of bond. Further,

Mother failed to progress to unsupervised visits with the minor

child since the child was taken into care in March 2016.

In the [20] months that minor child has been adjudicated

dependent, Father has never progressed to unsupervised visits.

There is a continuing concern regarding Father’s ability to

understand appropriate sexual boundaries given his history with

his stepdaughter and untruthfulness surrounding his history with

her. The Pressley Ridge in-home family therapist testified that

she never felt comfortable leaving the minor child alone with

Father and did not feel comfortable progressing to unsupervised

visits at the time of the [h]earing on the Agency’s Petition for

termination of parental rights.

Before entering foster care, the minor child showed significant

dental neglect. Mother and Father neglected taking minor child to

the appropriate dental appointments for many years and, as a

result, the minor child suffered significant pain over a two (2) year

period. Additionally, the minor child was not properly

potty-trained and could not appropriately feed himself with

utensils when he came under the care of the Agency when he was

six (6) years old. Since residing with foster parents, the minor

child has learned how to care for his hygiene independently and

has had his dental issues managed.

Academically, the minor child has shown improvement under the

foster parents’ care. The minor child receives instructional

support in a neurological support classroom within the Dallastown

Area School District. He also receives speech services both in and

out of the school. When the minor child came into the foster

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parents’ care, he displayed a [k]indergarten/beginning [f]irst

[g]rade level when he started [s]econd [g]rade. Currently under

the foster parents’ care, his instructional support educator

testified that he has shown significant improvement and now

displays a mid-[f]irst [g]rade level in reading, a [f]irst [g]rade

level in math, and a beginning [f]irst [g]rade level in writing. His

teacher testified that neither Mother nor Father were involved in

the updating of the child’s IEP in February 2017. Mother has never

attended any of minor child’s school activities and has never

contacted the school regarding the minor child’s IEP. Father, on

the prompting of the caseworker, contacted the school one [] time

[] to request information related to the minor child’s IEP plan.

Overall, the [trial court] finds that the termination of Mother’s and

Father’s parental rights will provide a benefit to the minor child in

that the child will achieve stability and permanency in a loving and

safe home. Therefore, for all the reasons stated above, the

Agency has proven by clear and convincing evidence that

termination of parental rights to the minor child is justified

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) of the Adoption Act.

THE AGENCY HAS PROVEN BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING

EVIDENCE THAT PARENTAL RIGHTS TO THE MINOR CHILD

MUST BE TERMINATED PURSUANT TO 23 Pa.C.S.

§ 2511(a)(2)[.]

The Agency has also proven by clear and convincing evidence that

the parental rights to the minor child should be terminated

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) [] of the Adoption Act. The

mandates of these sections are as follows:

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary

for his physical or mental well[-]being and the conditions

and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal

cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

The [trial court found] that the conditions which led the minor

child to placement outside the care and custody of Mother and

Father continue to exist. The minor child has been in placement

for approximately [20] months and is well-bonded to the foster

family. The minor child has a bond with Mother but it is not a

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parent-child bond; rather, the minor child sees Mother as an

extended family member. While the minor child has a bond with

Father, minor child believes Father is actually his step-grandfather

and does not look to Father as a parent nor does he address Father

as “Dad.”

The [trial court] remains concerned with Mother’s and Father’s

ability to parent and care for the minor child. Testimony

established that Mother currently does not have employment nor

does she have any previous working experience. Mother has

received disability since the time she was [18] years old due to

her mental health diagnoses. Father also receives disability and

does not work. Mother and Father currently reside in the same

house, along with Father’s wife who is also the mother of minor

child’s [m]other. The [trial court was] troubled by the

inappropriate boundaries between these three [] adults.

Overall, Mother and Father have failed to remediate the conditions

which led to the minor child’s placement and have failed to provide

parental duties on behalf of the minor child. Mother and Father

have been unable to progress to unsupervised visits with the

minor child since the adjudication of dependency approximately

[20] months ago. In consideration of this testimony, the [trial

court found] that the Agency clearly and convincingly established

that termination of parental rights is justified pursuant to [s]ection

2511(a)(2)[] of the Adoption Act.

IN CONSIDERATION OF §2511(b), TERMINATION OF

PARENTAL RIGHTS WOULD BEST SERVE THE NEEDS AND

WELFARE OF THE MINOR CHILD

Having established the statutory grounds for the involuntary

termination of the parental rights of Mother and Father, the [trial

court’s] final consideration is whether termination of parental

rights will best serve the developmental, physical and emotional

needs and welfare of the child. 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(b).

[T]he Court must carefully consider the tangible

dimension, as well as the intangible dimension - the love,

comfort, security, and closeness - entailed in a parent –

child relationship. (citations omitted). The court must

consider whether a bond exists between the child and

[parents], and whether termination would destroy an

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existing beneficial relationship. In re: B.N.M., 856 A.2d

847 (Pa. Super. 2004).

The [trial court] thoroughly evaluated the minor child’s

relationships in this matter. [It found] that the minor child has a

bond with Mother but it is not of a parent-child nature. The [trial

court further found] that the minor child has a bond with Father;

however, the minor child believes Father is his step-grandfather,

not his biological father. The [trial court found] that the minor

child has a much stronger parental bond with the foster family and

that the minor child looks to the foster parents for comfort. It is

the foster family who provides for the minor child’s daily needs

and acts as the minor child’s parental figures. Testimony

established that the minor child calls the foster parents “mom”

and “dad.” At this point, the [trial court therefore concluded] that

the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights will not

have a significantly negative impact on the minor child.

The [trial court] also finds that the bond between the minor child

and foster family is strong and healthy. Testimony established

that the child is thriving and improving both health-wise and

academically in the foster family’s care. Before entering foster

care, the minor child showed significant dental neglect. Mother

and Father neglected taking minor child to the appropriate dental

appointments for many years and, as a result, the minor child

suffered significant pain over a two[-]year period. Additionally,

the minor child was not properly potty-trained and could not

appropriately feed himself with utensils when he came under the

care of the Agency when he was six [] years old. Since residing

with foster parents, the minor child has learned how to care for

his hygiene independently and has had his dental issues managed.