district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad when it afforded plaintiff one or more opportunities to amend
How later courts described this case
- district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad when it afforded plaintiff one or more opportunities to amend
- a plaintiff’s lack of Article III standing is properly attacked through a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
- a quitclaim deed transfers only the interest the grantor possesses at the time of the conveyance
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 15 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PAMELA BROWN, an individual, No. 16-55159
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
2:15-cv-04543-CAS-JEM
v.
CHRISTIANA TRUST, a division of MEMORANDUM*
Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, as
Trustee of ARLP Trust 3,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 9, 2018**
Pasadena, California
Before: CALLAHAN and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and BATAILLON,***
District Judge.
Pamela Brown appeals the district court's dismissal of her action against
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, United States District Judge for
the District of Nebraska, sitting by designation.
Christiana Trust, a division of Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB (“the
Trust”), for lack of standing. Brown challenged alleged deficiencies in
assignments of a deed of trust and the foreclosure sale of real estate, alleging she
acquired an interest in the property via a quitclaim deed executed by defaulting
borrowers after the foreclosure sale occurred. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
1. A dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law
that we review de novo. Hyatt v. Yee, 871 F.3d 1067, 1073 (9th Cir. 2017); see
Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004) (a plaintiff’s lack of
Article III standing is properly attacked through a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). We find no
error in the district court’s finding that Brown had no rights to the property and
accordingly lacked standing to challenge the foreclosure and sale. The deed itself
and documents properly judicially noticed establish that Brown acquired the
property via quitclaim deed from defaulting borrowers after the property had been
foreclosed upon and sold in a trustee’s sale. Osswald v. Anderson, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d
23, 27 (Ct. App. 1996) (a quitclaim deed transfers only the interest the grantor
possesses at the time of the conveyance).
2. A district court’s denial of a motion for leave to amend is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. Swanson v. U.S. Forest Serv., 87 F.3d 339, 343 (9th
2 16-55159
Cir. 1996). Leave to amend is appropriately denied where an amendment would be
futile. See Chodos v. West Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (district
court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad when it afforded
plaintiff one or more opportunities to amend). We find no abuse of discretion in
the district court’s denial of leave to amend the complaint.
AFFIRMED.
3 16-55159