Isaiah Higgs v. State of Tennessee

04/30/2018

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

February 6, 2018 Session

ISAIAH HIGGS v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 96-04184 Glenn I. Wright, Judge

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No. W2017-00708-CCA-R3-ECN

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The Petitioner, Isaiah Higgs, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s

order denying his petition for writ of error coram nobis. We affirm the coram nobis

court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

Pursuant to Rule 20

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT

WILLIAMS and J. ROSS DYER, JJ., joined.

Seth M. Segraves and Michael R. Working, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant,

Isaiah Higgs.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Zachary T. Hinkle, Assistant

Attorney General; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Muriel Malone,

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On April 18, 1996, the Shelby County Grand Jury indicted the Petitioner and his

co-defendants, Darell Moy, Bob Partee, and Darron Johnson, for one count of felony

murder during the attempt to perpetrate a robbery and one count of first degree

premeditated murder. In addition, the Petitioner was separately indicted for attempted

especially aggravated robbery and four counts of attempted first degree murder. Isaiah

Higgs v. State, No. 02C01-9801-CR-00021, 1998 WL 910189, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App,

at Jackson, Dec. 31, 1998).

On May 1, 1996, after the State presented testimony from eight of its witnesses at

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trial, the Petitioner and the State negotiated a plea agreement, whereby the Petitioner

agreed to enter guilty pleas to first degree premeditated murder, attempted especially

aggravated robbery, and two counts of attempted first degree murder, and the State

recommended concurrent sentences of life imprisonment, eight years, and fifteen years,

respectively. Id. Pursuant to this plea agreement, the State withdrew its demand for the

death penalty. Id. The Petitioner entered an Alford2 plea to these charges, and the trial

court imposed the agreed-upon sentences. The court entered the judgments of conviction

on May 1, 1996.

On April 9, 1997, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging

that trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty pleas were not knowing and

voluntary. Id. He specifically claimed that he was forced to enter his guilty pleas

because two of his co-defendants made threats against him and his family. Id. The post-

conviction court denied relief, and this court affirmed. Id. at *1-2.

More than eighteen years after his judgments of conviction became final, the

Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis. In this petition and his

amended petition filed with the assistance of counsel, the Petitioner claimed that he was

entitled to error coram nobis relief from his guilty pleas, pursuant to State v. Wlodarz,

361 S.W.3d 490 (Tenn. 2012), based on two pieces of newly discovered evidence: (1) a

transcribed telephone conversation of eyewitness Booker Matthews, who identified

“Darrell” as the individual who fired shots from an AK-47, which the State allegedly

failed to disclose to him in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and (2)

an affidavit of co-defendant Darell Moy acknowledging that he was the individual who

fatally shot the victim and that he coerced the Petitioner into confessing to this crime.

The Petitioner sought due process tolling of the statute of limitations, asserting that he

filed his petition for writ of error coram nobis within one year of uncovering this newly

discovered evidence. See Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Tenn. 1992); Workman

v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100, 103 (Tenn. 2001).

The coram nobis court bifurcated the evidentiary hearing on the petition, hearing

evidence on May 25, 2016, and September 22, 2016. After the May 25, 2016 hearing but

prior to the September 22, 2016 hearing, the Tennessee Supreme Court decided Frazier,

495 S.W.3d at 253, wherein it overturned Wlodarz, 361 S.W.3d at 503-04, and held that

“the coram nobis statute is not available as a procedural mechanism for collaterally

attacking a guilty plea.”

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Although the trial transcript was admitted as an exhibit during the coram nobis hearing on

September 22, 2016, the trial transcript was not included in the record on appeal.

2

See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

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On March 2, 2017, the trial court entered its order denying relief, finding that the

Petitioner’s claim that his plea was coerced had been previously determined on post-

conviction and that while the transcribed telephone conversation of Booker Matthews

was exculpatory, material, and had not been provided by the State, the Petitioner was not

entitled to relief because a writ of error coram nobis is not available to defendants who

enter guilty pleas, pursuant to Frazier. The court did not rule on the statute of limitations

issue. Following entry of this order, the Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal.

On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition

for a writ of error coram nobis based on the aforementioned newly discovered evidence.

He argues that this court should create an exception to Frazier because he entered his

Alford plea, without the benefit of this evidence, after several witnesses testified at his

death penalty trial, which he claims constitutes an “adversarial proceeding” as required

by Frazier. The Petitioner also contends that an exception to Frazier should be created

because he requested exculpatory evidence “at the appropriate time,” namely a pre-trial

hearing, but was forced to go to trial without this evidence as it was withheld by the State

in violation of Brady. In addition, the Petitioner asserts that Frazier stripped the coram

nobis court of its discretion to grant relief despite the fact that the court found all the

necessary elements for a coram nobis claim. Finally, the Petitioner maintains that public

policy and due process mandate that an exception to Frazier be created in circumstances,

like his, where a defendant goes to trial without material, exculpatory evidence that is

withheld in violation of Brady and then enters an Alford plea in order to avoid the death

penalty. The State responds that because no such exceptions to Frazier exist, the

Petitioner is not entitled to relief. We are constrained to conclude that the Petitioner is

not entitled to error coram nobis relief.

In its order denying relief, the coram nobis court made the following ruling

regarding the alleged Brady violation before concluding that the Petitioner was not

entitled to relief under Frazier:

The court finds that this statement [of Booker Matthews] contained

in Exhibit 5 is exculpatory and should have been provided to the defense.

The court further finds that the statement was material and could have

affected the outcome of the decision making process. The court further

finds that the evidence suggests that it was not provided, although the

omission may not have been intentional. The court also finds that the

author of this missing statement was listed as a witness on the indictment.

Neither side presented proof as to whether that witness was available for

the trial or testified. Further, if he testified, no proof was presented as to his

testimony.

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Also, there was evidence that the Petitioner had confessed to the

crime on several occasions. Of course, he now contends these confessions

were a product of coercion as mentioned earlier.

After careful consideration and in light of the Supreme Court of

Tennessee’s decision in Frazier v. State, 495 S.W.3d 246 (Tenn. 2016), a

guilty plea cannot be considered a trial for the purpose of a writ of error

coram nobis, this court finds that the Petitioner has no basis for relief under

a Writ of Error Coram Nobis.

Here, the Petitioner entered a “best interest” or Alford plea. In a footnote, the

Frazier court addressed the circumstances in which defendants enter an Alford plea:

Although uncommon, criminal defendants also may plead guilty while

maintaining that they did not commit the crime charged. Such pleas are

often referred to as “Alford pleas” based on the United States Supreme

Court case, North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed.

2d 162 (1970). In Alford, our nation’s high court held that a defendant who

professed his innocence could nonetheless enter a constitutionally valid

guilty plea when the defendant “intelligently concludes that his interests

require entry of a guilty plea.” Id. at 37, 91 S. Ct. 160. Our Rules of

Criminal Procedure refer to such pleas as “nolo contendere” pleas. Tenn.

R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2); see also State v. Crowe, 168 S.W.3d 731, 743 (Tenn.

2005). While we recognize that a criminal defendant who enters an Alford

plea may have a stronger public policy argument than other criminal

defendants for the right to seek error coram nobis relief, the issue remains

one of a policy judgment which is within the province of the legislature, not

this court.

Frazier, 495 S.W.3d at 250, n.1. Although Frazier did not involve an Alford plea, we

believe, given the language in the last sentence of this Frazier footnote, that the

Tennessee Supreme Court would apply the same reasoning it used in Frazier to conclude

that a writ of error coram nobis is unavailable to a petitioner who enters an Alford plea.

See Ronald Christopher Hayes v. State, No. M2016-01094-CCA-R3-ECN, 2017 WL

4315375, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 27, 2017).

As an intermediate appellate court, we are bound by the decisions of the

Tennessee Supreme Court. See Barger v. Brock, 535 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tenn. 1976);

State v. Brown, 373 S.W.3d 565, 574 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011). Because we are obliged

to follow the holding in Frazier, which precludes a Petitioner from collaterally attacking

his guilty plea through a writ of error coram nobis, we affirm the denial of relief.

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When an opinion would have no precedential value, this Court may affirm by

memorandum opinion the judgment or action of the trial court when the judgment was

rendered or the action was taken in a proceeding without a jury and such judgment or

action was not a determination of guilt, and the evidence does not preponderate against

the finding of the trial judge. See Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 20. We conclude that this

case satisfies the criteria of Rule 20. Accordingly, the judgment of the coram nobis court

is affirmed in accordance with Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

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CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, JUDGE

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