Lane v. Dist. of Columbia

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 6, 2017 Decided April 13, 2018

No. 15-7023

BRIDZETTE LANE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE PERSONAL

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF RALPHAEL BRISCOE,

APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION AND

CHAD LEO, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METROPOLITAN POLICE

DEPARTMENT OFFICER,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:12-cv-00514)

Billy Ponds argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellant.

Carl J. Schifferle, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the

Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause

for appellees. With him on the brief were Karl A. Racine,

Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Loren L.

AliKhan, Deputy Solicitor General.

Before: SRINIVASAN and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge: Appellant Bridzette Lane

brought this action on her own behalf and as the personal

representative of the estate of her deceased son Ralphael Briscoe

for wrongful death and survivorship against the District of

Columbia and three Metropolitan Police Department officers.

Of the twenty counts alleged in the amended complaint, several

counts were voluntarily dismissed, summary judgment was

entered in favor of the defense as to some counts, and some

counts went to trial, ending in a jury verdict for the remaining

defendants, the District of Columbia and Officer Chad Leo.

Lane appeals from the judgments in favor of the District and

Officer Leo. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the

judgment of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

The events giving rise to this action occurred in April 2011,

when appellee Leo and three other officers were on patrol as

part of the Gun Recovery Unit of the Metropolitan Police

Department (“MPD”). The officers encountered Briscoe in an

apartment parking lot. When one of the officers asked Briscoe

if he was carrying a gun, Briscoe fled. Two of the officers

pursued Briscoe on foot, while Leo and another officer pursued

in a police vehicle. A portion of the chase was captured on a

Police Department video camera.

While there is some conflict in the evidence, we relate the

further events in the light most favorable to the defendant-

appellees as we must in reviewing a jury verdict. See Pitt v.

Dist. of Columbia, 491 F.3d 494, 502 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Leo

testified that he saw Briscoe’s right hand moving toward his

waistband, causing Leo to fear that he was reaching for a gun.

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Briscoe repeatedly looked over his left shoulder, toward the

pursuing officers, and turned toward the police vehicle, pointing

what appeared to Leo to be a gun. Leo fired two shots. One

struck Briscoe in the back and one in the buttocks. Briscoe was

transported to the hospital where he died as a result of the

wounds.

A police search of the scene of the shooting recovered no

actual firearm, but it did produce a broken BB gun, which

closely resembled an actual firearm, specifically a Walther PPK

pistol. No fingerprints were found on the weapon. Police

technicians swabbed the BB gun for DNA, but there is no

evidence that the swabs were ever tested.

Lane brought the present action against the District of

Columbia and MPD Officers Chad Leo, Jeremy Sharpton, and

Guillermo Rivera on behalf of herself and Briscoe’s estate.

Lane’s complaint alleged twenty counts for: violations of the

Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, including municipal

liability for the failure to train, supervise, and negligent hiring

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; assault; battery; false arrest; negligent

infliction of emotional distress; common law negligence in

hiring, training, supervision, and retention; common law

negligence; and survival and wrongful death under the D.C.

Code. The defendants moved to dismiss Lane’s amended

complaint. The district court granted in part and denied in part

the motion to dismiss, dismissing Lane’s Fourteenth

Amendment claim. Additionally, Lane agreed to dismiss her

claims against Rivera and Sharpton without prejudice.

The remaining defendants, the District and Officer Leo,

moved for summary judgment. In her response to the summary

judgment motion, Lane voluntarily dismissed nine of her claims.

The district court granted in part the District’s motion for

summary judgment and dismissed Lane’s claims against the

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District for municipal liability under § 1983, for common law

negligence in hiring, training, supervision, and retention, and for

violation of due process under the Fifth Amendment. Lane v.

Dist. of Columbia, 72 F. Supp. 3d 215, 219 (D.D.C. 2014). The

case proceeded to trial on the remaining causes of action against

Officer Leo for excessive force in violation of the Fourth

Amendment and against the District and Officer Leo for false

arrest, assault, battery, negligent infliction of emotional distress,

and common law negligence.

Ten days before the start of the trial, Lane learned that a

fingerprint report from the BB gun was not turned over during

discovery. The district court permitted Lane to depose David

Murray, an officer knowledgeable about the results of the search

and the report. During the deposition, Lane learned that DNA

swabs were taken from the BB gun, which also had not been

disclosed during discovery. Following this revelation, Lane

filed a motion for sanctions based on these late disclosures

seeking a default judgment or a five-day continuance, leave to

amend the witness list to include Officer Murray, time to allow

additional depositions on fingerprinting and biological testing,

permission to name experts on this subject, a bar on the

defendants eliciting testimony from Officer Murray or other

witnesses about this subject matter, an instruction to the jury on

the substantial delay caused, and attorney’s fees. The district

court verbally admonished the defendants, but did not grant

Lane’s motion for sanctions.

Before trial, the defendants moved in limine to exclude

some items of evidence that the plaintiff anticipated offering,

two of which are relevant for this appeal. First, they moved to

exclude Briscoe’s cell phone bill covering the time of the

shooting incident. Second, they sought to exclude Lane’s

anticipated testimony that Briscoe suffered from ADHD and

bipolar disorder. As to the phone bill, the court granted the

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motion but accepted a stipulation from the defendants that

Briscoe was on the phone when the officers encountered him.

As to the evidence concerning Briscoe’s alleged mental

conditions, the court excluded the evidence except insofar as it

might be relevant to Briscoe’s earning capacity should the jury

reach the issue of damages.

The case proceeded to trial. During the trial, Lane

voluntarily dismissed her claim for negligent infliction of

emotional distress. Following the six-day trial and two days of

deliberations, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the

defendants on the remaining counts. In answer to a special

interrogatory, the jury found that Briscoe “had an object in his

hand that reasonably looked like a real gun to Defendant Leo at

the time” of the shooting. Following trial, Lane moved for a

new trial, arguing that the jury’s verdict was against the weight

of the evidence. The district court denied Lane’s motion. Lane

v. D.C., 104 F. Supp. 3d 7-8 (D.D.C. 2015). Lane timely filed

this appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

Lane contends on appeal that the district court erred in

excluding the cell phone bill and the testimony regarding

Briscoe’s alleged mental condition; denying Lane’s motion for

sanctions; and denying Lane’s motion for a new trial. She

further contends that the court erred in the grant of summary

judgment in favor of the District on her failure-to-train and

negligent training claims. For the reasons set forth below, we

reject each of her contentions.

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A. Trial Proceedings

1. Exclusion of Evidence

We review the district court’s grant of the motion in limine

excluding the phone bill and the mental condition evidence for

abuse of discretion. Huthnance v. Dist. of Columbia, 722 F.3d

371, 377 (D.C. Cir. 2013). We will reverse an erroneous

evidentiary ruling only if it affects a party’s substantial rights.

Id. Neither of the exclusions in this case is reversible error.

a. Cell Phone Bill

The cell phone bill shows the phone in use between 2:22 pm

and 2:25 pm at the time of the shooting, which other evidence

established at 2:24:24 pm. Because the defense stipulated that

Briscoe was on the phone when they encountered him, and there

was no apparent relevance to the question of whether Briscoe

affirmatively terminated his phone call within the next three

minutes, we cannot say that the district court abused its

discretion by excluding the cell phone bill as cumulative. Even

if a call remained connected at the time Briscoe was shot, that

evidence would have minimal relevance and its exclusion thus

would not affect Briscoe’s substantial rights, see Muldrow ex

rel. Estate of Muldrow v. Re-Direct, Inc., 493 F.3d 160, 168

(D.C. Cir. 2007), given that Briscoe may very well have put his

phone away without hanging up when he began running.

Lane argues that the cell phone evidence became probative

because two of the police witnesses, including appellee Leo,

testified that they did not recall Briscoe talking on the phone.

Nonetheless, in light of the defense stipulation, the evidence

remains cumulative. Furthermore, even if we credit Lane’s

argument that the bill became relevant because of the testimony

of two witnesses that they did not recall the circumstance to

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which the defense had stipulated, “when the court’s initial

[evidentiary] ruling, correct when made, is proved erroneous in

the light of subsequent evidence,” the objecting party must

renew the objection. United States v. Sheehan, 512 F.3d 621,

627 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Lewis, 433 F.2d

1146, 1152 (D.C. Cir.1970)). Because Lane did not seek to

introduce the cell phone bill or renew her objection during the

trial, we will not reverse the district court’s decision to exclude

the cell phone bill.

b. Lane’s Testimony on Briscoe’s ADHD and

Bipolar Disorder

Lane next argues that the district court erred in excluding

her testimony that Briscoe suffered from ADHD and bipolar

disorder. While this testimony would have been of questionable

relevance at best, the trial court clearly did not err in excluding

Lane’s testimony on Briscoe’s medical condition. A trial court

does not err by excluding evidence of a medical condition from

a lay witness. A lay witness may not testify based on scientific

or other specialized knowledge. Fed. R. Evid. 701(c). We do

“not disturb the ruling of a district court where . . . an

independent basis for that ruling is uncontested.” Meijer, Inc. v.

Biovail Corp., 533 F.3d 857, 863 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Even if the

evidence would have been probative, Lane cannot credibly

contend that she was qualified to testify about a medical

diagnosis. The district court did not abuse its discretion in

excluding Lane’s testimony on Briscoe’s medical condition.

2. Sanctions

Next, Lane argues that the district court erred by not

awarding sanctions against the defendants for discovery

violations. Lane argues that two discovery violations—the late

disclosures of a fingerprint report and the existence of a DNA

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swab of the BB gun—prejudiced her case, and therefore the

district court should have sanctioned the defendants. “[T]he

district court has broad discretion to impose sanctions for

discovery violations.” Bonds v. Dist. of Columbia, 93 F.3d 801,

807 (D.C. Cir. 1996). “When reviewing the district court’s

denial of sanctions, the question is not whether we would have

ordered sanctions, but instead is whether the district court

abused its discretion in declining to do so.” Giles v. Transit

Emps. Fed. Credit Union, 794 F.3d 1, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

Lane argues that the late disclosure of the fingerprint report

prejudiced her because it was too late for her to engage a

fingerprint expert. Lane contends that her expert could

testify—consistent with her theory that the BB gun was

planted—that the fingerprint testing was flawed and that if a

different testing method was used it might have picked up

fingerprints belonging to someone other than Briscoe. The

district court found that such testimony would require a “chain

of inferences” that was “too attenuated” and would confuse the

jury. Lane also argues that a fingerprint expert could testify that

if Briscoe handled the BB gun, he would have left fingerprints.

However, the defendants timely disclosed that no fingerprints

were found on the BB gun. It was only the report itself that was

disclosed late. Because Lane knew there were no fingerprints,

she had the opportunity to pursue this type of expert testimony

despite the late disclosure of the fingerprint report.

Next, Lane argues that the late disclosure of the DNA swab

prejudiced her because it was too late for her to depose other

witnesses about whether the swab was tested for DNA. The

defendants offered affidavits that the swab was never tested for

DNA and the district court concluded that Lane had “no basis”

to conclude the swab was tested. Therefore, any additional

questioning by Lane regarding whether the swab was tested was

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unlikely to lead to any probative evidence, and we cannot hold

that the district court abused its discretion in so ruling.

Further, there is no evidence or accusation that the

defendants’ discovery omissions were intentional. Given the

district court’s broad discretion regarding sanctions, Lane’s

failure to show prejudice from the discovery violations, and the

lack of intentional misconduct, we find no error in the district

court’s denial of Lane’s motion for sanctions.

3. Motion for a New Trial

Lane also appeals the district court’s denial of her motion

for a new trial, arguing that the jury verdict was against the

weight of evidence. Our review of a district court’s denial of

such a motion is extremely limited. Daskalea v. Dist. of

Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 443 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The district

court’s consideration of such a motion and our consideration of

the district court’s denial begins with the proposition that a jury

verdict stands “unless the evidence and all reasonable inferences

that can be drawn therefrom are so one-sided that reasonable

men and women could not disagree on the verdict.” Czekalski

v. LaHood, 589 F.3d 449, 456 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal

quotation marks omitted). In urging that we should nonetheless

reverse the district court’s denial of the motion, appellant relies

heavily on a single piece of evidence—the police camera video.

Lane argues that the video evidence clearly shows that

Briscoe was not carrying a gun. Therefore, Lane reasons, a jury

verdict resting on the conclusion that Officer Leo reasonably

believed that he saw a gun was against the weight of the

evidence. Lane supports her contention by arguing that Officer

Leo reviewed the video frame-by-frame during trial and testified

that he did not see anything in Briscoe’s hands. Further, Lane

argues that no evidence was presented at trial that Lane was

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carrying or possessed a BB gun except for Officer Sheehan’s

testimony that Briscoe said “it wasn’t even real” after he was

shot. Advancing her theory that the BB gun was planted, Lane

argues that Officers Katz, Leo, Torres, and Sheehan impeached

themselves by saying no items were moved or touched at the

crime scene.

In denying the motion for a new trial, the court noted the

following additional evidence was presented to the jury: Officers

Leo and Torres testified that they saw Briscoe holding a gun, the

BB gun recovered from the scene, and the video. The jury was

shown the video and was able to make their own determination

regarding the credibility of the officers’ testimony and whether

Briscoe appeared to have in his hand a cell phone, a shadow, or

a gun. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Lane’s motion for a new trial and we affirm.

B. Summary Judgment

Finally, Lane appeals the district court’s partial grant of

summary judgment and the dismissal of her failure-to-train and

negligent training claims against the District. Summary

judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates

that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). In determining whether a genuine issue of material

fact exists, the court must view all facts, and draw all reasonable

inferences, in the light most favorable to the party opposing the

motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S.

574, 587 (1986). We review de novo the district court’s grant

of summary judgment. Ark Initiative v. Tidwell, 749 F.3d 1071,

1074 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when the

municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.

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City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989); see also

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658

(1978). Policy omissions, including failure to train, which rise

to the level of deliberate indifference, establish a cause of action.

Daskalea, 227 F.3d at 441. There is deliberate indifference

when the need for training reaches a level of moral certainty and

the constitutional consequences become obvious. Id. at 441-42.

In addition to a failure-to-train cause of action under

Monell, Lane also brought a common law claim for negligent

training. Liability for common law negligent training is

derivative of the employer’s tort liability. “In a negligence case,

the plaintiff has the burden of establishing ‘the applicable

standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the

defendant, and a causal relationship between the deviation and

the plaintiff’s injury.’” Young v. Dist. of Columbia, 752 A.2d

138, 145 (D.C. 2000) (quoting Dist. of Columbia v. Hampton,

666 A.2d 30, 35 (D.C. 1995)).

Lane offered evidence that there is a national standard of

care in training Gun Recovery Unit (“GRU”) officers and that

the MPD deviated from this standard of care by not providing

the GRU officers specialty training in identifying firearms. If

the GRU officers had specialty training, Lane argues, they

would not have misidentified Briscoe’s cell phone as a gun.

However, any error that Lane argues may have been

committed by the district court is harmless because the jury

verdict vitiates both the failure-to-train and negligent training

claims. Under a Monell failure-to-train theory, Lane must prove

“a direct causal link” between the failure to train and a

constitutional violation. Harris, 489 U.S. at 385. The initial

inquiry is whether there was a “predicate constitutional

violation.” Baker v. Dist. of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306

(D.C. Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court has reasoned, in the

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context of civil rights claims against a municipality, if “[an

officer] inflicted no constitutional injury . . . , it is inconceivable

that [the city] could be liable.” City of Los Angeles v. Heller,

475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986). In this case, the jury found that Lane

did not show that Officer Leo caused any constitutional injury

to Briscoe. Without a predicate constitutional violation, Lane

cannot sustain a failure to train cause of action.

This also means that Lane’s negligent training claim fails.

Liability for negligent training requires the plaintiff to show a

relationship between a deviation in the standard of care and an

injury. Young, 752 A.2d at 145. Because the jury found no

underlying common law tort, Lane cannot take the next step

required to show a relationship between any deviation from the

standard of care and the injury.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we deny Lane’s appeal and

affirm the district court’s judgment.