State of Tennessee v. Michael Demond Starks

03/05/2018

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs November 28, 2017

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. MICHAEL DEMOND STARKS

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Wilson County

No. 2013-CR-72, 2013-CR-73, 2016-CR-37 John D. Wootten, Jr., Judge

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No. M2016-01827-CCA-R3-CD

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After a jury trial, the defendant, Michael Demond Starks, was convicted of one count of

second-degree murder, one count of attempted first-degree murder, four counts of

attempted second-degree murder, and two counts of aggravated assault. On appeal, the

defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because he was

suffering from severe mental delusions. Additionally, the defendant argues the jury was

improperly instructed on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter and that

the trial court improperly excluded hearsay statements from a defense witness.

Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS T. WOODALL, P.J.,

and ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., joined.

Tillman W Payne, III, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Michael Demond Starks.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Leslie E. Price, Assistant Attorney

General; Tom P Thompson, Jr., District Attorney General; and Matthew Todd Ridley,

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTS

This case arises from a shooting that took place on December 20, 2012. The

defendant shot the victim, Desmine Rashad Watts, after he arrived at the defendant’s

apartment. The defendant then fled the scene in his vehicle and fired additional shots into

another vehicle while on the interstate. On March 12, 2013, the defendant was indicted

in Wilson County with one count of first-degree premeditated murder for the killing of

the victim. The defendant was later indicted with five counts of attempted first-degree

murder, five related charges for attempted second-degree murder, and two additional

counts of aggravated assault.

On December 20, 2012, the victim, Terrinessha Crowell, and Lela Crowell were

out “finish[ing] Christmas shopping.”1 The victim was driving with Terrinessha riding in

the front passenger seat and Lela Crowell riding in the back seat. While out, the victim

wanted to visit the defendant because the defendant’s mother passed away a few days

earlier. Terrinessha testified that the defendant was often known by the nickname

“Buddy.” Terrinessha watched the victim from the passenger seat of the vehicle as he

walked to the defendant’s apartment and knocked on the door. After the defendant

opened the front door, Terrinessha heard gunshots. She turned and saw the defendant

firing a weapon at the victim. Terrinessha observed the victim run away, holding his

face.

As the defendant approached the vehicle, Terrinessha quickly moved into the

driver’s seat and backed out of the driveway. Lela confirmed Terrinessha’s account,

stating that after the victim fled, the defendant approached the vehicle brandishing a

weapon. After fleeing the scene, Terrinessha found the victim across the street from the

defendant’s apartment, lying in the entrance to an auto shop.

Douglas Hodge was working at the auto shop when he witnessed an African-

American man matching the defendant’s description shooting at the victim. Mr. Hodge

then saw the defendant flee the scene in a red vehicle.

Officer Robert Bates of the Lebanon Police Department responded to a shooting

call near the defendant’s apartment complex. When he arrived at the auto shop, Officer

Bates found the victim had suffered “a gunshot wound to the face” and “complaining of

not being able to breathe.” Officer Bates also observed other gunshot wounds to the

victim’s torso. The victim identified his shooter to Officer Bates as “Buddy.” The victim

died shortly after being transported from the scene in an ambulance.

Detective David Willmore photographed the scene including the shell casings and

blood spots found at the scene. He also photographed additional shell casings found

inside the defendant’s red vehicle.

After fleeing the scene, the defendant drove along Interstate 40. While driving on

the interstate, the defendant encountered a vehicle driven by Jamie Faye Luge Cartmell.

1

Because the witnesses share the same last name, we will refer to each witness by her

first name. No disrespect is intended.

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In the vehicle with Ms. Cartmell was Nickola Dowell, who was seated in the passenger

seat, and three minor children, who were seated in the rear seats. Ms. Cartmell noticed a

red vehicle behind her that was aggressively sounding its horn. When Ms. Cartmell

changed lanes to allow the vehicle to pass, she saw the defendant was driving. Ms.

Cartmell was able to identify the defendant because she knew him as a “friend of the

family.” The defendant brandished a weapon, aimed, and fired into Ms. Cartmell’s

vehicle, shattering the glass, forcing her to pull over. Ms. Cartmell contacted the police

and waited for them to arrive. Ms. Dowell confirmed Ms. Cartmell’s account, also

identifying the defendant as the shooter. Both women testified they were shocked by the

defendant’s actions. Detective Chad Swallows documented the damage to Ms.

Cartmell’s vehicle and interviewed the passengers.

Dr. Adele Lewis, a medical examiner in Nashville, was present for the victim’s

autopsy, which was performed primarily by Dr. Amy Hall. The autopsy revealed the

victim died as a result of “multiple gunshot wounds.” Specifically, Dr. Lewis explained

the victim suffered one gunshot to the face and separate wounds to the chest and back.

After the shooting, the defendant arrived at the Lebanon Police Department to turn

himself in. After taking the defendant into custody, Officer Cody Bryan recovered a

nine-millimeter pistol from the defendant’s vehicle. Officer Bryan also recovered bullets

and casings from inside the defendant’s vehicle. The casings recovered during the

investigation were analyzed by Special Agent Teri Arney of the Tennessee Bureau of

Investigation. Agent Arney’s investigation indicated the defendant’s weapon, recovered

by Officer Bryan, matched the casings recovered at the scene of the murder and within

the defendant’s vehicle.

After the State rested, the defendant attempted to call his sister, Kim Bass, to

testify about conversations she had with the defendant prior to the murder. The State

objected. During a hearing outside the presence of the jury, Ms. Bass testified about

discussions she had with the defendant on December 18, 2012, two days before the

murder. During that conversation, the defendant warned Ms. Bass that people had been

following him and “that he had thought a gang had had a hit on him, and he said that they

killed our mother because they couldn’t get him.” Ms. Bass testified that the defendant’s

mother had passed away from natural causes about two weeks before the shooting.

However, Ms. Bass testified that the defendant told her he believed his mother had died

from a gunshot wound. Additionally, on the day the defendant’s mother died, Ms. Bass

explained she had to take a gun away from the defendant because he was threatening to

kill himself. Ms. Bass did not speak to the defendant the day of the shooting. The trial

court rejected the defendant’s argument that Ms. Bass’s testimony fell under the excited

utterance exception. It also rejected the contention that the defendant’s statements to Ms.

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Bass related to his “then existing mental condition.” The trial court stated in the relevant

part:

[Ms. Bass] can testify about what she observed about [the defendant],

whether or not he was upset, but his statements per se, they’re inadmissible,

and my ruling remains the same. . . . She said, people are following [the

defendant], taking pictures of him. [The defendant] may have said that, but

it doesn’t have anything to do with the then existing conduct. I think

you’re trying to boot strap that and obviously I don’t think you can do that.

I just don’t think it applies here. . . . She can testify about what she

observed about him . . . [s]he just can’t get into what he said to her.

After the determination by the trial court, the defendant chose not to call Ms. Bass to

testify.

The defendant then called Dr. Stephen Anthony Montgomery, a forensic

psychiatrist at Vanderbilt University. Dr. Montgomery testified the defendant lacked the

capacity to premeditate his crimes. Dr. Montgomery interviewed the defendant in June

of 2014 and also reviewed the defendant’s past medical records. In his adolescence, the

defendant had been diagnosed with “major depressive disorder,” and on “a couple of

occasions” required hospitalization. Dr. Montgomery testified the defendant “seemed to

be paranoid” based on the defendant’s belief that his mother had been murdered. Based

on his evaluation, Dr. Montgomery diagnosed the defendant with “major depressive

disorder,” “borderline personality disorder,” and “substance abuse disorder,” all of which

were exacerbated by the defendant’s abuse of alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine.

Dr. Montgomery testified the defendant “was acutely depressed, not only with the

grief, but was also suicidal [on the day of the shooting].” Dr. Montgomery stated the

defendant “was very impulsive,” did not have good judgment on the day of the shooting,

and was delusional. Dr. Montgomery concluded the defendant was not “able to pause

and exercise judgment and reflection before acting.” Dr. Montgomery did not believe the

defendant was “malingering,” though he added the tests on this diagnosis were

“somewhere in the indeterminate range.”

Finally, the defendant called his father, Michael Wayne Starks, Sr., to testify. Mr.

Starks was present at the defendant’s residence when the defendant shot the victim.

When the victim arrived at the house, the defendant said “there’s these bitches that killed

my mama.” After the shooting, Mr. Starks saw the defendant depart in a red vehicle.

In rebuttal, the State called Dr. Rokeya S. Farooque, an expert in the field of

forensic psychiatry. The defendant was evaluated at Dr. Farooque’s facility, Middle

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Tennessee Mental Health Institute, for a period of thirty days beginning in July 2013. In

her expert opinion, Dr. Farooque explained the defendant “was able to form the requisite

mental condition to commit first-degree murder.” In particular, Dr. Farooque’s tests

concluded the defendant was “faking really bad” and skewed the test results. Dr.

Farooque concluded, based on the tests, the defendant suffered from depression and a

mood disorder. She concluded, however, these illnesses did not prevent the defendant

from forming the requisite mental state. Due to the defendant’s erratic behavior, Dr.

Farooque prescribed an anti-psychotic medication to manage the defendant’s behavior

while he was in jail.

At the conclusion of the testimony, the defendant made an oral request for a

special instruction on voluntary manslaughter. The defendant requested the following

language be added: “The statute requires ‘adequate’ provocation there is no requirement

that there is ‘rational’ provocation.” The trial court denied the request stating:

I read your case and I’m sticking with the standard charge. Let me tell you

why. I read your case. Number 1, it is an unreported case. Number 2 . . . I

view . . . as dictum . . . that change [of] phraseology or that addition to the

charge. And so, with all due respect, I am going to deny that modification

on that charge.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted the defendant of the lesser-

included offense of second-degree murder for the killing of the victim. For the attempt

charges, the defendant was convicted of one count of attempted first-degree murder of

Ms. Cartmell and four counts of attempted second-degree murder of Ms. Logue and her

four minor children. The defendant was convicted as charged on the two counts of

aggravated assault. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the

defendant to serve thirty-two years on the second-degree murder conviction, thirty-two

years for the attempted first-degree murder conviction, sixteen years each on the four

attempted second-degree murder convictions, and eight years each on the two aggravated

assault convictions. The trial court ordered the second-degree murder conviction to run

consecutively to the attempted first-degree murder conviction. The remaining

convictions were ordered to run concurrently, for an effective sentence of sixty-four

years.

ANALYSIS

On appeal the defendant raises three issues for consideration. First, he argues the

evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding of attempted premeditated first-

degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, and second-degree murder. Second, the

jury did not receive a proper instruction on the elements of the lesser-included offenses of

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voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter. And third, the trial court

improperly ruled Ms. Bass’s testimony as inadmissible hearsay. The State argues there

was sufficient evidence, the jury was properly instructed, and the hearsay was correctly

excluded. Upon our thorough review of the record, we agree with the State.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the relevant question of the

reviewing court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see also

Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e) (“Findings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or

jury shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support the findings by the trier of

fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 190-92

(Tenn. 1992); State v. Anderson, 835 S.W.2d 600, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). All

questions involving the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given the

evidence, and all factual issues are resolved by the trier of fact. See State v. Pappas, 754

S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by

the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all

conflicts in favor of the theory of the State.” State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn.

1973). Our Supreme Court has stated the rationale for this rule:

This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge and the

jury see the witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe their

demeanor on the stand. Thus the trial judge and jury are the primary

instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and credibility to be

given to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alone is there human

atmosphere and the totality of the evidence cannot be reproduced with a

written record in this Court.

Bolin v. State, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. 1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 370 S.W.2d

523 (Tenn. 1963)). “A jury conviction removes the presumption of innocence with

which a defendant is initially cloaked and replaces it with one of guilt, so that on appeal a

convicted defendant has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient.”

State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).

A. Second-Degree Murder

In the instant case, the jury convicted the defendant of second-degree murder.

“Second-degree murder is . . . [a] knowing killing of another.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-

210 (2014). “A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of the person’s conduct

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when the person is aware that the conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.”

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-302(b). “To establish that a defendant committed a second-

degree murder, the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the

defendant killed the victim, and (2) the defendant committed the killing with a ‘knowing’

state of mind.” State v. Parker, 350 S.W.3d 883, 904 (Tenn. 2011).

The evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the State, showed the

defendant shot the victim several times after he greeted the victim at his door. Witnesses

testified they saw the victim run away from the door, holding his face after having been

shot. While the victim was waiting for the ambulance to arrive, he identified his shooter

as “Buddy,” a known nickname for the defendant. The jury heard testimony that the

casings recovered from the crime scene matched the weapon owned by the defendant.

The medical examiner testified the victim’s cause of death was the result of multiple

gunshot wounds to the face, back, and chest. Based on the foregoing and when viewed in

a light most favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient for a jury to conclude

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly shot and killed the victim. As

such, the defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

B. Attempted First-Degree Murder and Attempted Second-Degree Murder

Additionally, the jury convicted the defendant of attempted first-degree,

premeditated murder of Ms. Cartmell, and four counts of attempted second-degree

murder of the other four occupants of Ms. Cartmell’s vehicle. “A person commits

criminal attempt who, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the

offense . . . [a]cts with intent to complete a course of action or cause a result that would

constitute the offense, under the circumstances surrounding the conduct as the person

believes them to be, and the conduct constitutes a substantial step toward the commission

of the offense.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-101(a)(3). First-degree murder is “a

premeditated and intentional killing of another.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1). In

this context, premeditation is “an act done after the exercise of reflection and judgment.”

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(d). Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-202(d)

further states:

“Premeditation” means that the intent to kill must have been formed prior

to the act itself. It is not necessary that the purpose to kill preexist in the

mind of the accused for any definite period of time. The mental state of the

accused at the time the accused allegedly decided to kill must be carefully

considered in order to determine whether the accused was sufficiently free

from excitement and passion as to be capable of premeditation.

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Id. “The element of premeditation is a question for the jury which may be established by

proof of the circumstances surrounding the killing.” State v. Young, 196 S.W.3d 85, 108

(Tenn. 2006) (citing State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 660 (Tenn. 1997)). The Tennessee

Supreme Court has identified certain factors which tend to support a finding of

premeditation, including: “the use of a deadly weapon upon an unarmed victim; the

particular cruelty of the killing; declarations by the defendant of an intent to kill;

evidence of procurement of a weapon; preparations before the killing for concealment of

the crime[;] and[,] calmness immediately after the killing.” Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 660

(citing State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 541-42 (Tenn. 1992); State v. West, 844 S.W.2d

144, 148 (Tenn. 1992)). Bland does not include an exhaustive list of factors for

consideration when finding premeditation. State v. Adams, 405 S.W.3d 641, 663 (Tenn.

2013). A conclusion the killing was premeditated may also be supported by the nature of

the killing or evidence establishing a motive. Id. Likewise, lack of provocation by the

victim, failure to render aid, and destruction or secretion of evidence may also support an

inference of premeditation. State v. Larkin, 443 S.W.3d 751, 815-16 (Tenn. Crim. App.

2013) (internal citations omitted). Finally, the firing of multiple shots can allow a jury to

infer premeditation. State v. Halake, 102 S.W.3d 661, 669 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001)

(“Additionally, in the instant case the victim was shot multiple times, which although not

indicative of premeditation when considered by itself, can be considered as evidence of

premeditation in addition to other proof of premeditation.”)

The jury heard proof that after the defendant shot the victim he fled the scene in a

red vehicle. During his flight from the scene of the first shooting, the defendant chased

down Ms. Cartmell’s vehicle on Interstate 40, aimed into her vehicle, and fired his

weapon into her vehicle. Furthermore, a search of the defendant’s vehicle produced a

weapon that matched shell casings found at the scene. There were additional shell

casings within the vehicle indicating the defendant discharged the weapon while driving.

Ms. Cartmell and the passengers inside her car were all unarmed and even indicated at

trial they did not view the defendant as a threat until he began shooting. Additionally, the

jury heard testimony from Dr. Farooque indicating the defendant was capable of forming

the requisite mental state and premeditating his actions. While the defendant presented

contrary testimony from Dr. Montgomery, the jury determines the credibility of witnesses

and the weight afforded to the evidence, and this Court does not reweigh the evidence or

substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact. Accordingly, this Court

presumes that any conflicts in Dr. Farooque’s and Dr. Montgomery’s testimonies were

resolved by the jury in reaching its verdict. See Campbell, 245 S.W.3d at 335; State v.

Adams, 45 S.W.3d 46, 55 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). Based on the fact the defendant fired

at unarmed victims and Dr. Farooque’s opinion that the defendant was capable of

premeditating his actions and was deceptive in his interview, the evidence was sufficient

to support the jury’s verdict of attempted first-degree murder. Furthermore, this same

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evidence also supports a jury’s verdict of an attempted “knowing” killing. See Tenn.

Code Ann. § 39-13-210(a)(1). The defendant is, therefore, not entitled to relief.

II. Jury Instructions

A defendant has a right to a correct and complete jury charge. State v. Garrison,

40 S.W.3d 426, 432 (Tenn. 2000). This right is constitutional in nature. State v. Phipps,

883 S.W.2d 138, 142 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). The trial court must present the

propositions of law governing the case plainly to the jury, in such a manner as to enable

them to comprehend the principles involved. State v. Williamson, 919 S.W.2d 69, 80

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). “Nothing short of this will ‘satisfy the demands of justice’ or

the defendant’s right to a jury trial.” Id. (quoting Crawford v. State, 44 Tenn. 190, 195

(1867)).

Under the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, a party requesting special jury

instructions “may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on the law as set

forth in the requests.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 30(a). “A trial court will not be placed in error

where a requested instruction is not in writing.” State v. Timothy M. Hodge, No. M2001-

03168-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1732357, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, July 26,

2002) (citing State v. Mackey, 638 S.W.2d 830, 836 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982)). Because

Rule 30 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure “envisions that such requests be

made in writing,” oral requests for instructions are not sufficient for an appellate court to

find that the trial court’s instructions were improper. Mackey, 638 S.W.2d at 836.

In the defendant’s case, the jury instructions were not requested in writing as

required by Rule 30(a) and Mackey. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 30(a); Mackey, 638 S.W.2d at

836. Thus, on appeal, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying the

defendant’s proposed jury instructions. While the trial court does note that it “read your

case,” there is no written request included in the record before this Court. It is the

defendant’s duty to prepare a fair, accurate, and complete record on appeal to enable

meaningful appellate review. See Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b). Regardless, the defendant is

not entitled to relief on the basis of this issue. Defendants have a “constitutional right to

a correct and complete charge of the law.” State v. Teel, 793 S.W.2d 236, 249 (Tenn.

1990). Accordingly, trial courts have the duty to give “a complete charge of the law

applicable to the facts of the case.” State v. Davenport, 973 S.W.2d 283, 287 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 1998) (citing State v. Harbison, 704 S.W.2d 314, 319 (Tenn. 1986)). A trial

court’s denial of a request for special jury instructions is error only when the trial court’s

charge does not fully and fairly state the applicable law. State v. Cozart, 54 S.W.3d 242,

245 (Tenn. 2001). The record here reveals that the trial court correctly and completely

instructed the jury on the law as it applied to the facts in the case, which included issuing

the pattern jury instruction on actual and constructive possession. As such, we conclude

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that the trial court committed no error in its refusal to give the defendant’s requested

special instructions.

Even if the defendant had made his request for a special instruction in writing and

it was included in the record on appeal, any error on the part of the trial court in denying

the defendant’s request was harmless. Harmless error is an error which does not

“affirmatively appear to have affected the result of the trial on the merits.” Tenn. R.

Crim. P. 52(a). The defendant wished for the jury to consider his irrational delusion that

the victim had killed his mother as sufficient provocation to warrant a finding of

voluntary manslaughter. However, the jury found the defendant guilty of second-degree

murder, attempted first-degree murder, and attempted second-degree murder, in addition

to the other charges. Because the jury convicted the defendant of offenses greater than

voluntary manslaughter, any error regarding the manslaughter instruction is harmless

because the jury did not consider that charge. See State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 108

(Tenn. 1998); State v. Boyd, 797 S.W.2d 589, 593 (Tenn. 1990) (Any possible error in

failing to instruct voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, when second-degree murder

was charged and the defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder, was

“completely harmless.”). The defendant, therefore, is not entitled to relief.

III. Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence

The defendant asserts he was prejudiced by the trial court’s ruling concerning Ms.

Bass’s hearsay statements. Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant

while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter

asserted.” Tenn. R. Evid. 801(c). Hearsay is generally not admissible. Tenn. R. Evid.

802. A trial court’s findings of fact or credibility determinations underlying a decision to

admit or exclude hearsay are binding on an appellate court unless the evidence

preponderates against them. Kendrick v. State, 454 S.W.3d 450, 479 (Tenn. 2015). The

appellate court reviews de novo the determination of whether the statement is hearsay or

whether it is subject to an exception to the rule against hearsay. Id. We review for abuse

of discretion the determination to exclude otherwise admissible hearsay based on

relevance or on a balancing of probative value and prejudice under Tennessee Rule of

Evidence 403. Id.

In the instant case, the trial court excluded specific statements as hearsay but

permitted Ms. Bass to testify as to her observations of the defendant. In response, the

defendant made a tactical decision to not call Ms. Bass as a witness. Regardless of the

defendant’s decision not to call Ms. Bass to testify regarding the matters the trial court

found admissible, any error on the part of the trial court in excluding other portions of the

testimony was harmless. The defendant was able to offer extensive expert testimony

from Dr. Montgomery as to the defendant’s delusions and mental state. Additionally, the

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defendant presented testimony from his father about delusional statements he made

immediately prior to the shooting. Because the defendant was able to offer additional

testimony and evidence that illuminated the defendant’s mental state on the day of the

shooting, we find no prejudice in the exclusion of Ms. Bass’s hearsay testimony. Cf.

State v. McLeod, 937 S.W.2d 867, 873 (Tenn. 1996) (noting the weight of other admitted

evidence made any error in determining the admissibility of specific hearsay harmless).

The defendant, therefore, is not entitled to relief.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we affirm the judgments of the

trial court.

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J. ROSS DYER, JUDGE

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